

TRANSCRIPT

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General Herbert J. “Hawk” Carlisle Commander, Pacific Air Forces

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DWG: Our guest this morning is General Herbert J. Carlisle, known by almost everybody as Hawk. Sir, thank you once again. The General is the Commander of Pacific Air Forces out of Hickam Air Force Base in Hawaii. We appreciate you coming in and making time for us on your busy schedule.

Let me begin with a combination of your regional priorities and the realities of Washington here.

You recently laid out a set of new strategic priorities for Pacific Air Forces, and to paraphrase them, one of them was to increase the engagement with partner nations in the region, increase combat capability, and —

General Carlisle: Warfighting integration.

DWG: Warfighting integration, yes.

The first one in particular seems like it would be especially vulnerable to the budget turmoil that you’re experiencing right now. You can’t travel, you can’t exercise. So what effect is this having?

General Carlisle: You’re right. Expand engagement is one of our tenets, prime tenets of our strategy. The sequestration’s having an impact. We had to cancel a Red Flag, actually, which was horrendous. The Indian Air Force was going to bring their SU-30s

out to participate, and in fact their Air Chief put a lot of effort to get that through the system in India and approved and I had to call them and tell them we canceled it. So it has a profound impact.

Having said that, there is, when we talk about engagement it's everything from senior leader engagement — myself, the Vice, the other Numbered Air Forces — to subject matter experts where we'll send small teams that help in C-130 maintenance, space discussions. So we cover the spectrum. Mobile training teams, we'll invite them to our exercises, we'll invite them for conferences. The Pacific Air Power Symposium that we have in the fall. So there are a lot of different facets to it.

Your bottom line question of how do you do it in sequestration is beg, borrow and steal, to some extent. You find ways to piggyback stuff. We're doing much better with respect to the joint discussion in PACOM, with all the components. If one of the other components is having an engagement we can tag along or vice versa, they can tag along with us so we'll try to go as a joint team. So a lot of interaction between the four component commanders to try to make sure we can meet that engagement. Because everyone's trying to engage. And ultimately, our belief is that if we're not there, some other nation probably will be and we may or may not like that. So it's really important for us to be present. Again, anything from air shows — [AV-1], Aero India — to engagement, to full-scale high end exercises.

We have coming up in August, we were able to salvage kind of a Red Flag Alaska and it's an international one. In fact one of the great things about it is the Japanese and the Koreans are both participating together. They'll fly together up on the range in Alaska. So there are some things you can do to continue to work it, but it is a challenge. At the end of the day when we're not flying, when we're standing down airplanes, it's tough to fund an engagement.

DWG: As you plan for next year, is it your assumption that it will be a continuation of what you're experiencing right now? Or do you think you can build it back up?

General Carlisle: It depends on what Congress does. If you look at all the authorizations right now, none of them meet the sequester law, BCA, so the question is, are we going to — We've been told to kind of prepare for the worst. The good news is we can — the problem with this year that gave us such problems was the fact that we were 60 percent, 50 percent through the year. Everybody saying sequester wouldn't happen. So the only place to go is O&M. If we have a deliberate approach to it, we can find other money potentially. We can try to reprogram early and take lower priorities and put it against higher priority programs. And the Pacific is the priority and engagement is part of that priority, so I think we'll be able to save money for that, at least in some [part].

DWG: Thank you. Last week you had a meeting with the Indian Air Force to [inaudible]. Can you give us some details about what the meeting was, the issues you discussed, and the state of relations with the Air Force to [inaudible]? Where do you see the relationship moving forward from here?

General Carlisle: The relationship's great with the Indian Air Force. I think Air Chief Marshal Brown and I are good friends. We've known each other for a while.

We talked about a variety of things. One of them was, again, an apology on our part for canceling Red Flag. We did make a commitment to have Red Flag next year about this time and they are going to participate, so that was a positive in that respect.

We talked about other engagement opportunities. Their C-17 — He was here picking up a C-17 out of Long Beach, their second one. He actually flew the C-17 back here to Washington, D.C. through Colorado. So we talked about the C-17. One of the discussions was doing some exchanges with their C-17 folks and ours.

The other things that he talked about were the Indian Air Force, the Indian military is trying to develop a Space Command on the military side. Right now almost everything that's done in India in space is done on the civilian commercial side. So they're trying to develop an Indian military space capability as well as a cyber capability.

He was in Colorado Springs, got to meet with Air Force Space Command, so we talked about our potential to show them how we do it, some of the education that's available, some of the organizational things, some of the things we learned as we stood up Space Command a long time ago. So we'll have subject matter expert exchanges on that, so we're going to try to do those in the fairly near future.

Then the cyber realm was another one. That's probably a little bit farther down the road.

Other than that, we talked about the security and stability of South Asia and what we can do as partners to continue to work in that part of the world and towards security issues. It's everything from, on the West side, piracy going into the Maldives; to the East side of what's happening in the South China Sea and with the Straits of Malacca and how we can continue to maintain security and stability there. So a very good discussion.

DWG: On the Eastern side, the security thing, was Afghanistan, was China also discussed?

General Carlisle: China was very much discussed. We talked about it quite a bit. I think writ large every nation in the Asia Pacific region has a relationship with the PRC, us included. We have to be cognizant of that. And as we talked about their issues and commonality with the PRC, they have border issues, as you well know, but they also have trade, and we talked about the fact that the U.S.-China relationship is so important to the entire region. I heard that in Singapore when I was there; I heard it from the Indian Air Chief; you hear it everywhere you go, that how the United States and the PRC manage and build their relationship is critical to the entire region. He reiterated that. Again, I think the fact that every nation has a complex and in many times challenging relationship in some ways, positive in other ways, it's important that we as the United

States are very cognizant of those challenges that those nations face in dealing with the PRC. It was a very good discussion.

We didn't talk as much about Afghanistan. We talked about it a little bit. He's concerned. I think many nations there are concerned with what it looks like post-2015. And of course the proximity and border gives him concern with the potential for terrorism and other things. He did spend time in Colorado talking to General Jacoby, the Commander of NORAD/NORTHCOM about security and land defense, and some of that was in relation to the potential if things went back in Afghanistan. Hopefully they won't, but if things turn bad in Afghanistan.

DWG: Sir, you work with the Japanese every day, and them scrambling their jets apparently from [inaudible] base as the Chinese demonstrate their interest in the region. As an operator, as somebody who saw our intelligence plane go down a few years ago, are you increasingly concerned that the Chinese are behaving in a fashion that may lead to a major accident, or is everybody playing pretty well on the playground?

General Carlisle: I'd say yes to both. I think that right now the professionalism of the air forces out there, as the naval forces as well because there's a lot going on on the high seas as you well know, everywhere from Northeast Asia and Japan down to South Asia and Southeast Asia, the Second Thomas Shoal and Scarborough Reef. There is good professionalism on the part of all the militaries. There was a move on the PRC's part to kind of consolidate their maritime law enforcement agencies which I think gives them better control and better understanding of what's going on.

But on the same hand, I am concerned. I think any time tensions rise, and I think if you look at what's happening with the PRC and increasingly in some cases aggressive approach to territorial discussions from again, Senkakus to Second Thomas Shoal to Spratlys to the Nine Dash Line in the South China Sea, all those are challenges. That they're being fairly aggressive is, I think runs itself the risk of creating the potential for miscalculation.

One of the problems, one of the things about the maritime law enforcement that is kind of encouraging, was before the Chinese had about five or six different agencies that were doing maritime law enforcement.

That leads to kind of a bifurcation and the right hand and left hand maybe not talking to each other. So the fact that they consolidated those I think is a positive sign in that they're making sure they have command and control and they know what's going on at the leadership levels within the PRC.

But I will tell you, I think if there's a potential for things to go wrong in the Asia Pacific region, territorial disputes, resource constraints and things like the Senkakus, the Spratlys, the Paracels, those are all ripe for challenge. And that's something we think about every day, from Admiral Locklear to every one of the components of what we can do to stabilize those situations.

DWG: Given that, with sequestration have you been able to scramble a patrol at will as you need, or can you give us some examples of what you have to stand down to —

General Carlisle: We have not stood down any of our air defense. So that is, we have scrambled against every airplane that we needed to scramble against. It was a challenge on occasion. There were some Russian bombers flying around the Alaskan ADIZ and actually penetrated the Alaskan ADIZ. We scrambled F-22s to intercept them. AWACS as well, and tankers. But every time you do that, you have to get it from somewhere, so something else is going to suffer.

AWACS and tankers are ones that clearly they're highly in demand. If you use those to scramble in response to a potential ADIZ penetration, then you run the risk of, you take that from somewhere else.

But the priority of air defense means that we'll always find a way to do the air defense piece. We will never not scramble. We'll find a way to make that happen.

DWG: When was that Russian —

General Carlisle: That was probably a month ago. Three weeks, a month.

The Russians are fairly, as most folks know, they do a lot of long range bomber. It's called LRA, Long Range Aviation. They practice it. They demonstrate it. When they're in international airspace we monitor it. If they're going to penetrate in ADIZ then we try to scramble and make sure we do a visual identification. Then we monitor them. So that's fairly common with respect to — and they're doing it more so recently. I think they're demonstrating their long range aviation more in the recent past than they have.

They just had a gigantic exercise in the Far East Military District in Russia, tankers and AWACS and bombers spread through Ukrainka and Anadir and Tiksi and all that in the Eastern District. They're demonstrating their capability.

DWG: A clarification of [inaudible]. The Red Flag with India that was canceled, was that going to be at Nellis or at Eielson?

General Carlisle: That was Nellis.

DWG: Were you able to do any [Flags] this year?

General Carlisle: We have. We did some pre-sequestration. We had one that was going to occur, the one that the Indians were going to participate was in the spring, and that one actually more in the summer. That was the one that had to be canceled. The ones in Alaska, we have down-scoped. We had to cancel one and we have down-scoped the one that we're participating in in August but were able to allot some of our units from the Western Pacific are not going to be able to participate, but we're able to have

units in Alaska as well as some foreign air forces participate. So we're able to do a bit of a scaled down version in Alaska in August. So we have had to cancel some.

DWG: Nellis didn't have any this year?

General Carlisle: They did earlier, but they haven't, this summer they haven't had any. Once we went into sequestration in April, from that point on we have canceled — I'm trying to think if there was one in the spring after sequestration. I don't think there was. I think the last one ended in the middle of April, and then we haven't had one since.

DWG: Also I'd just ask about — I know we can talk about F-35 at Eielson. Do you have some thoughts on that? Talk about where that is right now?

General Carlisle: Sure. We're in the process now of doing the strategic basing to determine where the F-35 — The Secretary of the Air Force has said the first overseas F-35s will, and that is the 2nd Ops Squadron, is going to be in the Pacific, which is what I think is the right decision as you might imagine. I think it points to the rebalance to the Pacific.

We are in the process of determining what base that would go to. Obviously we have nine bases, U.S. bases in the Pacific. Some of them are suitable, some of them aren't. We'll down-select to probably four sometime this fall. Then we'll, sometime probably after the turn of the year we'll pick the preferred plan and then a reasonable alternative.

Eielson fares very well, mostly because of the training space, the range. JPARC is an outstanding range. The infrastructure is already there and available, so the MilCon to build is lower. And it's part of the Pacific in that it can get to Northeast Asia rapidly and it also has the ability, obviously, to travel in the rest of the Asia Pacific area.

The challenge obviously with Alaska is location. For some places, for the Koreans and the Japanese it's very easy to get there and participate and for us to go the other direction. South and West is a little bit more of a challenge. Then of course the winters.

But I think, my belief is, I haven't seen the final tally, but I think Eielson will come out as one of the three or four alternatives and I think it will do very well in the decision. I think there's a lot to putting them, the potential to put them in Alaska, but the decision hasn't been made.

DWG: What are some of the other [inaudible]?

General Carlisle: Realistically, it's pretty limited. If you look at all nine bases in the Pacific, we're not going to put them in Hawaii. We have F-22s there. We won't put them in Elmendorf because we have two squadrons of F-22s there. Andersen is really not optimum. There's not a lot of airspace and there's a lot of other PSP and the Marines are going in there. So that kind of leaves, and we won't put them in Yokota because

that's where the C-130s are. That really leaves four bases — Misawa, Kadena, Osan and Kunsan. I think Kadena doesn't have air-to-ground range space, and Misawa doesn't have air-to-ground range space. It's a little bit limited in Korea. One of the reasons Eielson looks good is those other four have limitations in range and on peninsula in the case of the Korean Peninsula.

Reasonably, we haven't made the decision, we haven't down-selected, but I would say that Eielson, Misawa, Kadena, and maybe Osan would be the four. That would be my guess. Then we would down-select from those four to a preferred alternative.

DWG: Secretary Hagel has said several times that the Strategic Review [inaudible]. What's the status of that? And how confident are you that [you remain a priority]?

General Carlisle: I don't doubt the priority. I think that this administration certainly within the Department of Defense, the need to maintain a focus on the Asia Pacific region and the belief that the future of the United States is tied to the future of the Asia Pacific — stability, security of the Asia Pacific region. So I don't think there will be a lack of a belief that the focus needs to stay on the Asia Pacific. The ability to execute that, given the budget challenges and what happens with sequestration, I think that's a huge challenge.

At the end of the day there's a question of capability and capacity. I think capability wise the United States continues with demonstrating we're the greatest military in the world. But capacity to do Asia Pacific as well as other parts of the world under sequestration or Budget Control Act, is a challenge. And determining what Congress does — the key in the Department of Defense today is whatever the budget ends up is to maintain readiness — whatever force we have has to be ready. We can't have a force that's large and maintain a large force, then not have the money to maintain the readiness of it.

So if we have to shrink in numbers — ships, brigades, airplanes — then our capacity to operate in as many different environments and in different places at one time is a challenge.

I believe that the focus will stay on the Asia Pacific, again, because of the importance to the future of this country.

DWG: Do you think it's inevitable, though, that the focus will have to be scaled back?

General Carlisle: I don't think it's inevitable, I really don't. I guess maybe I'm a bit more positive in that I think we have got to figure out a way to do things smarter and obviously the economic challenges that face this country, our economy's a key element of national power and we've got to get that right, so there are things we have to do and fix, and the Department of Defense is part of that.

But having said that, we also can do it smartly and there are ways that we can continue to maintain that focus and still do it hopefully under a reasonably economic approach.

And part of that is, going to the earlier question of Adam, is expand engagement. As we, our friends and partners and allies within the area continue to get better, then there's a capability to do — you gain capacity with integration with foreign militaries as well as capability of foreign militaries. So as the Koreans and the Australians and the Japanese and the Indians get better and we build those relationships, then that builds capacity as well.

We've got a lot of work to do. It's not going to be easy, but I'm not pessimistic.

DWG: You mentioned the C-17 [exchange] earlier. That might not happen, or did you just start discussing that?

General Carlisle: It's not a definite. They have one and they just picked up their second one. They were going to buy ten initially. They're doing some pretty neat things. Alan Partridge, my friend here, is a C-17 Weapons School instructor and he was talking about, Chief Marshal Brown was talking about landing C-17s and delivering cargo at 11,000 to 13,000 foot runways. That's pretty harrowing in a large cargo airplane, so there's some opportunity for us to learn from each other as we do things like that.

But I think it's certainly got a great potential for the future and it's things that we'll continue to expand on. So it's not a definite.

DWG: Can you flesh out a little bit, just broadly, the Air Force's part on the Asia rebalance? The Navy talks about having 60 percent of its vessels there over the next five, to 2018. How is this plan for the Air Force in terms of the F-22, the B-2, B-2 rotations, Global Hawk —

General Carlisle: Right.

DWG: And F-15Es, [inaudible].

General Carlisle: We're not going to build any more bases in the Pacific. The term you'll hear that we use often is places, not bases. It's building that relationship. Then, I was going to say I'm pretty sure I'm the oldest person here, so back in the late great days of the Cold War that most folks here were not around for, we had a thing called Checkered Flag. We rotated almost every CONUS unit to Europe for the big Fulda Gap war, right? Everybody got familiar. And every 18 months or two years, every unit would go and work out of a collateral operating base in Europe.

The Air Force is turning to that in the Pacific. The Theater Security Plan, the PSP. Right now we have 12 F-22s in Kadena and 24 F-16s on the Korean Peninsula, additionally, on top of what was there before. So as I envision it, as I talk about expanded engagement, is a lot of our rebalance is a rotational presence through the Pacific. And obviously we'll maintain our capability in Northeast Asia. In a lot of ways we'll increasingly move south and west with the rotational presence. Darwin, Tindal, [Pilbara], Changi East in Singapore, CARAT in Thailand, Trivandrum in India. So the engagement throughout

and rotation in other parts of the Asia Pacific Region. That's one thing is the rotational presence, and that's a big part of it.

The most capable platforms will be rotated into the Pacific. Today half the F-22s in the United States Air Force are in the Pacific. We have three squadrons, two in Alaska and one in Hawaii. The only E-3s outside of continental United States permanently stationed, U.S., are in Alaska and Japan. KC-135s, F-35s. The first F-35s are going to be there. The Global Hawks at Andersen. The best capability will go to the Pacific as it's developed and brought on line.

DWG: Is there any plan to keep permanently based several B-2s at Andersen, or just rotate them?

General Carlisle: We have a permanent bomber presence at Andersen and it rotates between B-2s and B-52s. We'll continue to do that. We probably will not permanently base them there. In a way we have, because we permanently rotate them through there, but we won't stand up a permanent squadron there.

We're looking at potentially bringing out some folks instead of sending them TDY all the time, to actually PCS them into Andersen. That's one thought that we're looking at. It saves money and it also gives folks a little bit more of an opportunity to spend more than two or three or six months, and spend a couple of years there.

DWG: [Inaudible]. Is there any ConOps being developed for C-17s or C-5 transport, LCS, [inaudible] modules [inaudible] the Pacific to help the Navy's concept of swapping these things out in [inaudible] they can. It seems they would need an Air Force component to get the stuff out there.

General Carlisle: There is. There is clearly, that's part of it. And our C-17s, again, C-17s stationed at both Alaska and Hawaii give us great flexibility in the Asia Pacific and that's part of it. That is part of the discussion. I love my Navy brethren, they have great capability. But when you talk about speed, range and flexibility, the speed of the Air Force, we go in hours but it takes them days. So our ability to respond with those moves throughout the Asia Pacific is very valuable to the Navy and we have looked at how we're going to do that. And again, going into Singapore, for example, for the USS Freedom that's there now. Our ability to land at [Pilbara], Changi East and unload and reload right away with [assembling] LCSes in the — that's one of our ConOps.

DWG: One follow-up question, then another. On your engagement, have you seen more interest in our partners out there to have U.S. engagement since the Chinese have gotten more and more aggressive? Obviously the Japanese have been much more active with us, particularly on the Navy side. Do you think the Chinese blustering may be counter-productive? They've been trying to push us out, and they're actually pulling us in?

General Carlisle: I think that's definitely the case. We saw it with President Aquino in the Philippines recently, talked about the increased U.S. presence with the military rotationally, not permanently. So I do think that some of their fairly assertive, aggressive behavior has in fact brought partners, our friends and allies, into relying on us to be there and be present.

But I would caution a little bit because again, those are — they're very complex relationships and Australia, for example, Australia is a great friend of ours. We operate with them, we train with them military to military. It's a great relationship. Having said that, their greatest trading partner is the PRC. So those are things that have to be kept in consideration when you talk about that.

So yeah, I think they have in some ways brought us out there, but even then, even when their fairly aggressive behavior, I think they want the United States there to continue to provide alternatives that may not be taken. In other words, they may want the U.S. there just so they can look to alternatives and not necessarily go to the PRC, but then still go to the PRC but have us there.

It's a complex discussion. I do think that certainly recently it has caused friends and partners to rely on us more.

Having said that also, though, there are other complex relationships. Right now the relationship between Japan and Korea is not as good as it should be. If you look at what the PRC's doing in relation to that, and continuing to try to drive wedges between alliances, again, it's a complex, challenging environment that you have to consider. Every action has unintended consequences and second and third order effects. I think the PRC is learning that rapidly as they saw with the Senkakus and Second Thomas Shoal and Scarborough Reef.

DWG: There's a lot of talk on the AirSea Battle concept. Two places where that is talked about, your area against China, and then the Persian Gulf against Iran. What are you doing? Are there exercises, planning? Are you working with the Navy any differently than you have been in the past?

General Carlisle: It's kind of the heart of — one of my tenets for strategy is improved warfighter integration. That is what AirSea Battle is all about. It is cross-domain coordination; it's cross-domain capabilities. It's the ability to do it in a denied and contested environment. So we do, we train from Valiant Shield to Northern Edge, which unfortunately had to be canceled because of sequestration, which is one of our great high end exercises up in Alaska.

So we have been doing increased discussion on that. There's Title 10 wargames that both the Navy and the Air Force do; Global 13 and Unified Engagement. We've turned those into a combined Navy/Marine/Air Force exercise where we're going to kind of flesh out some concepts for AirSea Battle, some ConOps for using those. So very much in the exercise realm, as the — Previously some of the challenges with exercising and

training was between the Air Force rotations through the Middle East and the Navy, lack of carrier presence in some cases in the Pacific due to the Middle East. The opportunities were limited. Those opportunities are coming back and we are continuing to work through the concepts and actual practical applicability. So the AirSea Battle has got some great thought behind it. It's done some great work in looking at kill chains and how to do cross-domain ops. But now we've got to bring it into the Air Force and the Fleet and the Marines and the Army and actually exercise it and start working it.

It covers everything. It covers training, it covers, most people think of it, it's about buying things and it's some of that, but that's only part of it. It's doctrine. It's organizations. It's training. It's exercising. And we've got to get it out to the field to get to all the rest of those things and practice it.

DWG: General, I wanted to ask you about satellite communications. There's been some talk at DOD about how to increase satellite communication capacity for [inaudible]. And [inaudible] if you see that as an immediate problem, long term problem, and are there opportunities maybe to share costs with allies so the U.S. is more [inaudible]?

General Carlisle: Yeah, I think yes and yes. We've already demonstrated with WGS and with the Australians, so we already are to some extent with that partner. But satellite communications clearly is something we're thinking about. We use a lot of commercial com right now. Then there's some U.S. military com, and then there's some U.S. military protected communications.

What we're looking at for the future is the ability to build a communications backbone that uses kind of an area layered network that you have space capability and you have some aerial capability as well.

For example in Afghanistan we use a thing called BACN which is a Battlefield Air Communications Node. But basically it allows Army on the ground to speak from one end to the next of Afghanistan that they couldn't do before because they have an airborne node to aid that communication. So they don't necessarily have to go up to a satellite and back down, they can go through an airborne node.

So when we think about, especially in the Pacific because of its size, and our ability to do beyond line of sight communications, if there is a satellite component, an airborne backbone component, and there's a resiliency and kind of a network, both network and com, that can continue to operate even in a denied environment.

The other part of it, I think that's critical is we know that com is vulnerable to cyber attacks, to certainly satellite attacks if it came to that, as well as other forms. So our ability to operate in those environments will, what we call a thin blue line of communications. We're not going to get everything we want, but if we have a little bit of com what's the most important piece of information we need to pass. So we're looking at all of that as part of the com architecture. Does that make sense?

DWG: Is there a possibility that allies would want to invest in the high end satellites? Satellites maybe where [inaudible]? Is that an option?

General Carlisle: We can talk to Willy Shelton and Bob Kehler about that a little bit more. We do talk to them about joint programs and again, there are some that have occurred. But there's so much on — It kind of depends on what kind of — If you're talking — There's so much commercial com and there are so many multinational corporations that do the commercial com, I think when you start talking about protected com, AEHF type of protection, then it becomes a different discussion. And to be honest, I know we certainly with the UK and Australia there are some of those discussions going on. Other partners and allies I don't know what level we're at in those discussions.

There is another effort in trying to look at small sats, and some of the ability to get those rapidly, fairly low weight, fairly rapidly into some kind of ability to fill in gaps if you lose it and things like that. So that's one of the things we're talking about. And that's something I would venture to say we would look at with potential partners and friends and allies.

DWG: I have a couple of follow-up questions, but one to the broader theme. On the follow-up on the F-35, and also on Global Hawk. Some of these weapon systems. To what extent do you think that foreign arms sales have become an increasingly important part of your strategy given the constrained resources, given the challenges, given the dimensions on the range, particularly in the region?

Then to quickly follow up on the question about the satellites. You mentioned cyber [inaudible]. Has your thinking changed after — there's been a shift since last fall, I think it was October, where [inaudible] that really shifted people's way of thinking about that. Would you say there's a discernible move, kind of toward — has this been a more layered approach? Is it a significant shifting of resources as well?

General Carlisle: Your first question, I think you're spot on with respect to allies and partners, and our arms sales to trusted friends and partners and allies. As I mentioned earlier, the capacity to do what we need to do and have an interoperable system with our partners, F-35 in Japan in Australia and Singapore, that will pay tremendous dividends. We notice it today with F-16s, F-15s, and the interoperability there. Global Hawks, there are a couple of nations, Japan and I think Korea has given some thought to it. So definitely, I believe that that's part of the engagement, that's part of building those relationships with our partners so that we build capacity through initial support. And if you think about it today, the only defense budgets in the world that are climbing are in Asia. Japan's higher than it was before. Korea's is going up. So I definitely think that's part of it. That's one of the reasons that one of the main tenets of our strategy is to expand that engagement and interoperability and integration with not only our sister services but our friends and partners' militaries. So interoperable with the Koreans and Japanese and Indians and Australians is —

DWG: Can I ask a follow-up on that question? Specifically, to that end, do you have a strong feeling about Korea's fighter competition which has been — [Laughter]. Then you also mentioned Singapore. We reported and heard that they are, they're part of the F-35 program already, but that there was some movement to kind of complete an inertial sale. Can you give us an update on —

General Carlisle: I talked to their CDF [Chief of Defense Force], Chee Meng. I was just in Singapore. Singapore's decided to buy the B model, the VSTOL variant to begin with. But I don't know where they're at in putting it into their budget. I know that's a decision that's been made and that's why they're part of the program, but I don't know where they're at in putting that in the budget.

Korea is, the fact of the matter is all the competitors came in and didn't meet the target that the Korean government was looking for. All of them were over, of all the different nations. So Korea had to make a decision of either finding a way to pay a higher amount or lowering the number of airplanes they were going to buy to get within their target that was given to them. That decision hasn't been made. As a matter of fact, the weekend I get back, the Korean Air Chief's going to be in Hawaii and I'm hosting him, so we'll probably have more on this discussion.

But I think they have not decided between lowering the numbers, finding more money, or slipping it to the right. I think that slipping the idea to the right is problematic because they see they have a gap and I think they want to fill the gap for some aging airplanes. And if they ended up slipping the program, they would probably have to, ultimately it would cost them more because they'd have to take money and put some back into the current fleet so it would delay retirement of some of their older airplanes.

DWG: I think they decided something about August as —

General Carlisle: I wouldn't hold my breath. I think they're struggling a little bit with making that decision. I'll give you a better update here in about a week, but I think they will.

On the other question on com. I think ultimately for the last 13 years we've operated with impunity, and I think the shift is, we had al-Udeid, the CAOC in al-Udeid controlled the entire air war in Iraq and Afghanistan. Unencumbered. We practiced continuity of operations plans. So we did — but ultimately, as I've said in the past, anything more than about eight feet off the ground we owned in Iraq and Afghanistan. We did. We could operate with impunity.

The potential in other environments to have that kind of sanctuary is non-existent. So the shift in the thinking has been two-fold. One is we've got to figure out how to make that com layer and an aerial layered network, some of it an aerial backbone of BACN concept. Have we prioritized satellite communications? So if we go down to a thin blue line of communications, how do we prioritize and make sure that we're passing the right

information at the right time and not superfluous information or less important information. Then how do we work in degraded ops when we can't talk?

So my AOC in Hickam, theoretically, was running a kind of air campaign anywhere in the Asia Pacific region. So if I can't, if my AOC in Hawaii can't talk to somebody, what do we do? So we're working those with some playbook approaches from [graceful] degradation. Some AETFs, Air Expeditionary Task Force, at a subordinate level that have mission type command and they understand what the game plan is and when they lose communications or they lose the ability to communicate. They can operate autonomously for a period of time until we get some level of communication back.

So we're working all those things as part of the look to the future, knowing that again, going all the way back to 1991, adversaries know how well we do when we have that kind of communications and that kind of control. So any potential adversary, wherever they're at, is going to try to deny us that.

The PRC term is JARC, Joint Anti-Air Raid Campaign. They want to stop our ability to do air, so they have a campaign that's designed called the Joint Anti-Air Raid Campaign.

DWG: And a joint [inaudible] space.

General Carlisle: True, which includes anti-space. So there's a belief that we have got to continue to look and figure out how to work that communications and networking in a degraded operations in a denied environment.

DWG: General, I'll just ask an F-35 question. Simple, but big picture.

The services announced the IOC dates not long ago and I wanted to see your thoughts as sort of the front line operator, what are your thoughts on the possibility of going to war with F-35A and 2016 Block 2B?

General Carlisle: I'd take it to war in a heartbeat. It's a great airplane. It doesn't have all the capabilities, but it would work in conjunction with 4th generation, modernized 4th generation aircraft, and it would be an exponential increase in capability.

DWG: Would it serve as the lead fighter in an F-22, F-35 scenario? Or as the sort of support to the F-22?

General Carlisle: It would kind of depend on what the scenario was. It depends on what you're doing. If you're trying to gain and maintain air superiority then, then F-22 would be the lead. If you're trying to potentially take out a target on the ground, potentially the F-35 would be. But even the 2B capabilities are pretty impressive.

DWG: Any concern about not waiting until the 3F, more refined capability?

General Carlisle: No. I think — you mean to declare IOC?

DWG: Yes.

General Carlisle: No. I think the fear is that if we don't delay — if we declare IOC before 3F, then the potential as budgets get tighter and things get tighter, then we maybe lose the ability to get to 3F. So it's a little bit of paranoia which doesn't mean they're not after you.

The real driver in delaying IOC was to make sure we get to that capability. But I think there's a commitment to get there anyway. I think 2B is a great airplane. I think 3F is going to be a fantastic airplane. And I think we'll continue to work, once we get IOC in 2B then we'll work to that 3F. I'm confident that we'll get there. Again, I'm a glass is half full kind of guy.

I wanted to ask you, covering Capitol Hill there's been this huge fight over military sexual assault. Hildebrand is certainly building a lot of consensus around her bill. But Levin has been a very strong opponent of that piece of legislation and removing these complaints from the chain of command. I was wondering what your thoughts on this would be.

General Carlisle: Let me start by saying that sexual assault in our military is abhorrent, it's unconscionable, and it's something that is a problem that we have got to fix. It is a cancer inside of our military that will destroy us if we don't figure it out, and we have got to fix it. It is something that our moral obligation is to take care of the sons and daughters of this nation that serve in the military and if we're not doing that for every one of them, then we're making a mistake and we've got to fix that.

I think the answer, in my opinion, is, and I have this discussion with my folks all the time, it's an uncomfortable conversation because when you stand in front of a group of Airmen, 90 percent of them or some great majority of them, it would never even cross their mind to attack another Airman. But you've got to find that minority that's doing it and the answer is the majority. Those 90 percent have got to watch each other's back, take care of the young men and women out there and be cognizant of what's going on around them. It's something we've got to fix and it is a problem that we have to get after.

With respect to the language in what's talked about, the idea, the change to one of the articles of the UCMJ that removed the ability of the commander to overturn, I think that was the right move. I don't think we needed it. The appellate system is in place so we didn't need the ability, I don't think a commander needs the ability to overturn a conviction given the appellate review and everything that's, or an acquittal or whatever. I think that part was probably the right move and I think all the Chiefs of Staff, the CJCS, all agreed with that.

The idea of taking sexual assault out of the chain of command I don't agree with, because there's a vested interest in the chain of command fixing things. And if you have

an impartial person from outside, I don't know if they're going to — I don't see them being better at fixing the problem. If you believe that 90 percent of the folks are trying to do the right thing and will do everything in their power to prevent it, so the chain of command wants to fix the problem. They have to for the good health and well-being of their force. So I just disagree with the idea of taking it out of the chain of command.

I think if you go to the organizations like RAIN and SWAN and all those organizations and how we're approaching it, I think we're taking advice from just about everybody that is knowledgeable on it, trying to figure out how to approach it and fix it. But I just think that the chain of command is the one that has the vested interest to fix the problem.

DWG: I wanted to follow up on the India Space Command inquiry. In the short term what are some of the most important capabilities you're trying to help them develop and what are some of the long term priorities that you guys are working on?

General Carlisle: With respect to our Space Command or —

DWG: India's.

General Carlisle: I think the Indian part of it is, and what Air Chief Marshal Brown told me, and again, I'm not an expert in Indian space, but there's not really a military component like there is in the United States. So there is space capabilities, but it's in the civilian/commercial side. What Air Chief Marshal Brown is trying to do is create a military space program so that he can, it's become an increasingly contested, congested and competitive environment that he has, as a military, he has the ability to affect what happens in space. So it's really trying to establish what it looks like, how they set up the command. Capabilities wise, it's exactly what you would expect. It exists, I think, to some extent, within the civilian side of the Indian government and that is you have to have position, navigation and timing, TNT. You have to have the weather capability. There's reconnaissance capability. And com capability. Those are the ones that jump to mind.

Again, I'm not an expert within the civilian space enterprise within India, so I can't really talk about where they're at or where they're going. It's really with respect to Air Chief Marshal Brown. It's helping him set up the type of organization to incorporate it into the military mindset.

DWG: The Air Force [inaudible] decision to have Ospreys in the [theater]?

General Carlisle: There are CV-22s that are going to go to the Special Operations Command in the Pacific. There have been some discussions on where they're going to go. We have not finalized that decision. Kadena was one of the ones because that's where some of the C-130s are that they would replace, and some of the helicopters. Yokota is also a discussion that is ongoing as well as some other bases in the Pacific. The final decision has not been made yet, but it's fairly — we're still working through it and

we have to work with the government of Japan for the final decision as we move forward. But we've talked about it.

DWG: Do you have a sense of [inaudible]?

General Carlisle: I think the final decision will happen probably by the first of the year.

DWG: Is it tied at all to the Marines?

General Carlisle: No, it's really separate from the Marines. It's Air Force Special Operations Command and SOCPAC, Special Operations Command Pacific, and it's working with the Japanese government, to be honest. You know there are some issues with Kadena and Okinawa, and there's a recent election that occurred, Abe and his approach to things, and what happens as we work through the government of Japan of what's the smartest way to do that. We need to get, we firmly believe and we plan on having CV-22s in the Pacific.

DWG: About Australia. [Inaudible]. I was wondering what your conversation was with Australian [inaudible], possible growth for the Air Force in that area.

General Carlisle: Definitely. The term is force posture initiatives that was agreed to. The Marines were the beginning part of that, up at Darwin, bringing in initially platoons and they're growing to company size. We're doing Talisman Saber right now, it's actually just ending, I think, which is a big exercise with the Australians in Australia. There's Marine presence, there's Sailors. Vice Admiral Swift is aboard the Blue Ridge off the coast, and we're running it out of the AOC, the air part of it out of the AOC in Hawaii.

But from the Air Force perspective, the potential to go into Darwin and Tindal were the two most common places. Tindal is probably where we'll potentially start rotating folks through. It is going to be fighters, tankers, at some point in the future maybe bombers. We've talked about that. On a rotational basis.

But it goes back to that idea of rotational presence, moving it south and west. The plan would be to rotate fighter and tanker capability initially and then potentially long term rotate bomber capability through probably Tindal. We may start at Darwin just because of the ramp capability and then move to Tindal later on, but that's what we're looking at and that's moving forward very well.

DWG: What are some of the units that might be the first ones to be part of that rotational force?

General Carlisle: It would be anything from CONUS-based folks to Misawa F-16s of Kadena F-15s. We have landed a bomber out of Andersen that was on a bomber presence. We've landed it down at Darwin and turned around and took it off again. So

we've demonstrated it. We've brought tankers down there. And we do bring fighters down fairly often into Tindal and Darwin to exercise with the Australians.

DWG: Is there a time line for that to ramp up?

General Carlisle: Part of it's putting some money into the infrastructure for ramp space. We have put some equipment down there. I think over the next year you'll see it's kind of on a gradual climb I think over the next year, you'll see it climb a little bit. And then it will start to, again based on budgets, it will start to increase in probably 2015.

DWG: Just to follow up on the CV-22 deployment question. Regardless of where you decide to base them, do you have any time line for that deployment, when you plan on putting those CV-22s out there?

General Carlisle: They're moving into Mildenhall in '14. I think the first ones are supposed to be in the Pacific sometime in '15 is the plan. I'll ask tomorrow, but I'm pretty sure it's '15.

DWG: We are at exactly 9:00 o'clock. That was masterful.

General Carlisle: I really appreciate all your time today. Thank you very much. I enjoyed talking to you. It's a fascinating discussion.

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