Boosting the ICBM force; Nuclear rank matters; Japan abandons pacifism; ACC prepares for the future

GOING TO NUCLEAR REHAB

The Air Force is about to invest a lot more money and attention in its nuclear forces to fix cultural and organizational problems that seem to have defied correction in recent years, service Secretary Deborah Lee James said in June.

Speaking with defense reporters in Washington, D.C., James said she pulled \$50 million from other Air Force accounts in Fiscal 2014 to shore up the nuclear mission area in the wake of a cheating scandal that highlighted new morale and discipline problems. The amount, she said, was all Air Force Global Strike Command believed it could usefully spend this year. She plans to infuse another \$350 mil-

lion above and beyond previously budgeted amounts into the nuclear mission over the next five years.

"I am certain that additional resources are probably still in order" beyond that, James asserted.

The nuclear mission area has been plagued with morale and discipline problems for a while. In 2008, the previous Chief of Staff, Gen. Norton A. Schwartz, and previous Secretary, Michael B. Donley, were brought in with a charter to revitalize the nuclear enterprise. James said the mission's decline "is not something that happened in the last year or two or even 10. It's probably been happening gradually over the last 25 years. So I hesitate to say that there are [any] quick fixes out there."

James laid out a series of initiatives she thinks will raise morale among the nuclear forces, by making them feel more appreciated and that they're fulfilling a critical function, with their work reasonably evaluated, and their service valued in tangible ways.

For starters, James said the mission area will be largely excused from personnel cuts previously

planned for the nuclear area and will in fact see a boost of 1,100 people. These will be principally field positions, in what she called "eight critical nuclear specialties," now "undermanned." This situation has hurt morale and effectiveness because others have had to work harder to make up for the missing people, she said.

The existing "zero defect" mentality revealed by the cheating scandal "wasn't a healthy environment" and "we've redone the testing environment" so small errors on tests will not doom a nuclear professional, James asserted.

New directives have been issued to the field designed to push decision-making authority to lower levels, James reported.

"Memos don't shift culture," she acknowledged. "Leadership and time eventually shifts culture, but this is a start."

Observing that "rank matters in the military," James said she plans to propose elevating the commander of AFGSC—now a three-star job—to four-star level, to put the commander on an even footing with other major command chiefs. Similarly, a two-star general, who supervises nuclear matters on the Air Staff, would be elevated to three stars to give the mission the necessary organizational clout.

Starting with Fiscal 2015, "we're going to introduce some new incentives for the [nuclear] force." New missileers will receive an accession bonus, ROTC scholarships will be provided for those seeking to enter the field, and "we're going to be providing field incentive pay for people who deploy out to the missile fields for X number of days, and so forth." There will be "a variety of financial incentives to kick it up a notch for this force."

James said she's done extensive "focus groups" and interviews with rank-and-file nuclear professionals, and for most, "it was probably not their first, second, or third choice" of a career field. "They were assigned according to the needs



James is paying attention to the nuclear force. A lot of attention.

of the service" and usually didn't volunteer, she said. While she doesn't think the incentives will change the mindset "by themselves," she said, "it's one element of a holistic picture." Also, putting money toward modernizing the weapons themselves and nuclear facilities will make clear to the airmen in the career field how valued the mission itself is and they can feel "like [they're] making an important contribution."

She will also lobby Pentagon leaders to understand that this "is a national mission, ... not just for the Air Force," to see if "we [can] get some additional assistance for some additional needs."

"We're not done yet," James acknowledged. There could "well be more [steps] to come. ... We didn't get here overnight and we're not going to fix it overnight."

(For more on the nuclear mission, see "Global Strike Evolution," in this issue.)

JAPAN'S NEW CO-SECURITY SPHERE

Japanese combat forces may now deploy and fight abroad, after Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in July announced a change

to the country's constitutional Article 9 that in 1947 renounced Japan's right to wage war. The change, made by the Japanese Cabinet, circumventing a formal process, was met with praise from the US, hostility from China, wariness from South Korea, and disapproval from many Japanese citizens, who protested the move in the streets of Tokyo. The announcement is considered Japan's most significant military policy change in 60 years.

Japan's Self-Defense Forces are among the largest and best-equipped in Asia, but they've been chiefly confined to the region immediately surrounding Japan and have limited offensive capabilities. Article 9 has been interpreted to exclude Japan from possessing aircraft carriers, bombers, nuclear weapons, or intercontinental ballistic missiles. Military deployments have been few: In 2004, Japan sent a noncombat civil reconstruction team to Iraq, and it raised a huge domestic furor.

The policy change eases Japan's ability to join in "collective defense" with other countries. If, for example, US ships near Japan came under attack, Japan can now respond with force. Prior to the change, Japan could only rescue the survivors of such an attack. The move also eases Japanese participation in United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations.

The change enumerates several conditions where force may be used. In the case of a country Japan has "close ties" with, the JSDF may employ the minimum force necessary to help protect that country if Japan itself is under threat, if there is clear danger that people's lives and liberties are at stake, and if there is no "appropriate" alternative.

Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel issued a statement welcoming the move, saying it will allow Japan's Self-Defense Forces "to engage in a wider range of operations and make the US-Japan alliance even more effective." He called the change "an important step for Japan as it seeks to make a greater contribution to regional and global peace and security." He also said it would make it easier "to modernize our alliance through the revision of our bilateral guidelines for defense cooperation."

Abe called the move a natural extension of Japan's ability to defend itself, given the changing nature of alliance defense. He specifically ruled out, however, the idea of Japan using force "to defend foreign forces."

In a news conference after the decision to modify Article 9 was accepted, Abe said there's "no change in the general principle that we cannot send troops overseas."

China reacted to the announcement with hostility. The Japanese government has fabricated a threat from China "to promote its domestic political agenda," said China's Foreign Ministry spokesman at a press conference in Beijing. "We demand that Japan respect the reasonable security concerns of its Asian neighbors," he said.

The South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs said it will monitor the situation to ensure that Japan pursues "collective defense" in a transparent manner respectful of Korean sovereignty. Various party leaders in South Korea's national assembly expressed shock and anger at the Article 9 change, complaining that Japan has still not adequately apologized for privations and atrocities inflicted on Korea during World War II.

Making the change without going through a formal, national process sparked large demonstrations in Tokyo, numbering thousands of people. One man set himself on fire in protest.

Although technically in force now, the change to Article 9 must be approved by the Diet.

VIRTUALLY SUPERIOR

The really innovative techniques and tactics that will give the Air Force its edge in future conflicts will be developed and trained with in the simulator—not in live flying, according to Air Combat Command's latest strategic plan.

The change was revealed in "Securing the High Ground 2014," released by ACC Commander Gen. Gilmary Michael Hostage III in June. The document lays out ACC's response to changing world conditions—particularly the financial crunch, which is restraining training and modernization, and the proliferation of advanced air combat technologies worldwide

The strategic plan warns that as potential adversaries become more sophisticated in their airpower capabilities, "it is increasingly difficult to provide realistic adversaries and environments for live training." Moreover, it's getting tougher "to hide our countertactics from our adversaries" in live-fly exercises. Consequently, ACC proposes to "flip the realistic training paradigm."

Live, "hands-on training" in actual aircraft will provide foundational "blocking and tackling" skills, according to ACC, but "the virtual and constructive environment will become the primary method for advanced training in all aircraft, not just our fifth generation assets," such as the F-22 and F-35.

At issue is not just what potential enemies might see with satellites or learn from foreign participants in US air exercises, however. "ACC cannot afford to waste valuable resources and must focus on new, efficient ways of doing business," according to the document. Hostage has suggested in recent years that simulator time may have to eclipse live flying to keep crews sharp.

The ACC plan stacks its priorities as follows: emphasizing new systems over fixing up old ones; preventing "hollow force" lapses in readiness; accepting "short-term risk for long-term capability"; and a "whole, integrated approach" in which all programs compete for funding within their portfolios, "including special access," or deeply classified, projects.

ACC "has had to cut viable programs" to recapitalize some critical waning capabilities," which were not named. "When necessary, we will continue to sacrifice capacity for the capabilities we need to win in the highly contested environment." ACC still thinks it will have to "selectively refurbish elements" of its legacy force, though it "has found it difficult to fund fourth generation fighter" upgrades. The capacity offered by these aircraft remains important, though, and "further in the future, we may need to reorient missions to extend the lifespan and capacity of the reserve component."

When forced to choose, however, ACC will opt for newer systems rather than stretching the utility of old ones, even if it means some "capacity risk."

"The alternative is arriving in the middle of the next decade with a now 45-year-old fighter and bomber fleet that is neither tactically relevant nor capable of providing sufficient global power and an industrial base that has withered away."

One of ACC's core functions, air superiority, faces many "challenges," according to the strategic plan.

Rapidly evolving threats and "lack of procurement funding for our most critical air-to-air weapons have degraded" air superiority kill chains. The development of tougher and denser air defenses are "outpacing our ability to recapitalize and refurbish air superiority assets." The answer is to upgrade fourth gen fighters where possible, but "keep fifth generation assets fully capable in the face of an evolving threat."

The Air Force is pursuing a \$7 billion program to upgrade its 185 F-22s and recently signed a \$10 billion contract to keep the B-2 bomber up to snuff while the service pursues its new Long-Range Strike Bomber, which ACC's roadmap says will be available "in the midterm."

Also, the document said, "We must continue to focus on a mix of preferred weapons which, when fully integrated with these delivery platforms, offer a superior level of survivability and standoff range required to mitigate risk, irrespective of the scenario."