Defense Reforms

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions? If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

No, I do not see any need to modify the Goldwater-Nichols Act. If confirmed, I will continue to be alert to the need for any modifications.

Duties

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command?

The Commander, U.S. Pacific Command is responsible for deterring attacks against the United States and its territories, possessions, and bases, to protect Americans and American interests and, in the event that deterrence fails, to win its Nation’s wars. The Commander is also responsible for expanding security cooperation with our allies, partners and friends across the Asia-Pacific region.

What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

I believe my thirty-five years of military experience, culminating in command of U.S. Naval Forces Europe, U.S. Naval Forces Africa and NATO Joint Force Command Naples, Italy have prepared me for assuming command of U.S. Pacific Command.

Operationally, I have gained valuable experience and insights planning and leading extensive joint and coalition operations at both the tactical and operational levels. In my current position, I commanded both the U.S. and NATO-led Libya operations, ODYSSEY DAWN and UNIFIED PROTECTOR. As Commander, U.S. THIRD Fleet in San Diego, California, I was responsible for the training and certification of all Pacific rotational Naval forces, for the planning and execution of the bi-annual Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) multinational exercise,
and served as the alternate Joint Maritime Component Commander for key Pacific Operational Plans. As the Commander of the NIMITZ Carrier Strike Group, also in San Diego, California, I operated throughout the USPACOM and USCENTCOM AORs and commanded Naval forces in the planning and execution of the initial combat phase of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Additionally, I was privileged to command the destroyer, USS LEFTWICH (DD984), homeported in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

Ashore, as a member the Joint Staff J5 Plans and Policy Directorate, and three times as a flag officer assigned to the Navy staff, including serving as the Director of the Navy Staff, I gained valuable insights into the resourcing and administrative processes that underpin an effective Department of Defense, including a deep appreciation for the interagency and the importance of the whole of government approach.

Finally, Pam, my wife of 33 years, embodies today's military spouse and family, and is a superb representative of our U.S. Armed Forces. We are a great team and she adds significantly to my qualifications.

Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command?

If confirmed, I intend to take every opportunity to enhance my knowledge of and relationships with our allies and partners across the Pacific. I look forward to engaging with senior leaders within the Department of Defense, the Department of State, regional security experts, leading think tanks and universities, and military and civilian leaders throughout the Asia-Pacific in order to improve my understanding of U.S. interests in the region.

Relationships

If confirmed, what will be your relationship with:

The Secretary of Defense

The Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, performs his duties under the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense. He is directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the ability of the Command to carry out its missions.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense performs duties as directed by the Secretary and performs the duties of the Secretary in his absence. The Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, ensures the Deputy has the information necessary to perform these duties and coordinates with him on major issues.
The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Under Secretaries are key advocates for combatant commands’ requirements. The Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, coordinates and exchanges information with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on strategic and regional security issues involving the Asia-Pacific theater.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

The Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, coordinates and exchanges information with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence as needed to set and meet the Command’s intelligence requirements.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Chairman functions under the authority, direction and control of the National Command Authority. The Chairman transmits communications between the National Command Authority and the U.S. Pacific Command Commander and oversees the activities of the U.S. Pacific Command Commander as directed by the Secretary of Defense. As the principal military advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman is a key conduit between the Combatant Commander, Interagency, and Service Chiefs.

The U.S. Pacific Command Commander keeps the Chairman informed on significant issues regarding the U.S. Pacific Command Area of Responsibility. The Commander communicates directly with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a regular basis.

Commander, U.S. Central Command

The U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Central Command share a border between their respective Areas of Responsibility (AOR). The Commander U.S. Pacific Command maintains a close relationship and communicates directly with the Commander, U.S. Central Command on issues of mutual interest that affect both of their AORs so that respective strategies, policies and operations are coordinated and mutually supportive. India-Pakistan issues have heightened the importance of close cross-COCOM coordination.

Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command

As a subordinate unified command of U.S. Pacific Command, Special Operations Command Pacific and its component units deploy throughout the Pacific, supporting Commander, U.S. Pacific Command’s Theater Security Cooperation Program, deliberate plans, and real world contingencies. The Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, maintains a close relationship and communicates directly with the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command on issues of mutual interest. U.S. Pacific Command coordinates requirements and operations of Special Operations Forces within the U.S. Pacific Command Area of Responsibility through Commander, Special Operations Command, Pacific.
The other combatant commanders

Commander, U.S. Pacific Command shares borders with and maintains close relationships with the other combatant commanders. These relationships are critical to the execution of our National Military Strategy and are characterized by mutual support, frequent contact, and productive exchanges of information on key issues.

The Service Secretaries

The Service Secretaries are responsible for the administration and support of forces assigned to combatant commands. The Commander, U.S. Pacific Command coordinates with the Secretaries to ensure that requirements to organize, train, and equip Pacific Command forces are met.

The Service Chiefs

The Commander, U.S. Pacific Command communicates and exchanges information with the Service Chiefs to support their responsibility for organizing, training, and equipping forces. Successful execution of U.S. Pacific Command’s mission responsibilities requires coordination with the Service Chiefs. Like the Chairman, the service chiefs are valuable sources of judgment and advice for the combatant commanders.

Commander United Nations/Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces Korea

As a subordinate unified commander, the Commander, U.S. Forces Korea receives missions and functions from Commander, U.S. Pacific Command. I recognize his role as Commander, Combined Forces Command and will fully support his actions in that sensitive and demanding role.

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel

The Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, coordinates and exchanges information with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/Missing Personnel Affairs on strategic policy issues involving the POW/MIA accounting mission worldwide and Personnel Recovery requirements in the Asia-Pacific Region.

The Chief of Naval Research

The Office of Naval Research is a valuable source for technologies that help the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command counter developing threats in the Asia-Pacific region. If confirmed, I will maintain a close relationship with the Chief of Naval Research as well as the other service research organizations and national laboratories to ensure the requirements for developing technologies for U.S. Pacific Command are understood.
Challenges and Priorities

In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next Commander of U.S. Pacific Command?

As our nation globally rebalances toward the Asia-Pacific region, I will focus on three main challenges in the USPACOM Area of Responsibility. First, North Korea’s conventional military, weapons of mass destruction and proliferation activities coupled with the ongoing Kim regime transition create threats to regional security and stability. Second, the stability, security and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific will depend on strong relationships with our Asia-Pacific treaty allies and partners to ensure that we are able to maintain regional access to and use of the global commons. Finally, China’s rise as a regional and global power, including its substantial military modernization and buildup, is a source of strategic uncertainty and potential friction. The China/U.S. relationship has been an area of in-depth study and analysis by the current Commander and Staff of USPACOM. I look forward to closely reading and broadening my understanding of this very dynamic relationship that cuts across all facets of our government.

Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

USPACOM will support the Administration’s whole-of-government approaches to achieve a peaceful, secure and prosperous future security environment on the Korean Peninsula. Our forward military presence reassures our treaty allies and deters aggression by North Korea. While the ongoing leadership transition creates a period of uncertainty, it may also present opportunities for the Peninsula to advance to a greater level of stability and security.

We will continue our commitments to modernizing and strengthening our treaty alliances and partnerships in the region. These critical relationships will be enhanced by maintaining interoperable military capabilities that deter regional aggression and build partner security capacity.

We will remain steadfast in our efforts to mature the military-to-military relationship with China. Both China and the U.S. have a strong stake in the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. Building a cooperative bilateral relationship will reduce the likelihood of a miscalculation, increase the clarity of Chinese strategic intentions and encourage mutual engagement in areas of common concern.

If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of issues which must be addressed?

My first priority will be to continue to maintain a credible deterrent posture and reassuring military presence in the Asia-Pacific.

Next, we must both deter North Korean aggression and counter their proliferation activities. To do so we will work through DoD to collaborate with other elements of U.S. government and
our allies to maintain peace on the Peninsula and dissuade North Korea from actively pursuing a nuclear weapons program. With regard to China, actively pursuing steady and measured military-to-military engagement will be one of my top priorities.

Lastly, while supporting our nation’s strategic focus on the Asia-Pacific and sustaining the realignment and transformation processes already underway, we must also carefully shepherd and repeatedly assess progress toward desired force posture, ensuring we remain cognizant of evolving budgetary realities. These efforts will receive my prioritized attention as we work to build on and strengthen bilateral relationships with our regional allies and partners.

Defense Strategic Guidance and USPACOM Force Posture

The Defense Strategic Guidance, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century Defense”, announced by President Obama on January 5, 2012, includes, among other things, the intention of the Administration and the Pentagon to “rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region.” In his associated remarks, Secretary Panetta explained that the “U.S. military will increase its institutional weight and focus on enhanced presence, power projection, and deterrence in Asia-Pacific.” Significant changes to the U.S. force posture in the region are already planned over the next several years, including movement of Marines from Okinawa to Guam and the relocation of U.S. forces within South Korea. There are also discussions about increasing presence in southern parts of the Asia-Pacific, including countries like Australia and Singapore, and developing more comprehensive engagement strategies with a number of other countries in the region. These initiatives will likely compete with other global commitments for increasingly constrained funding.

What is your understanding of the plan for the Asia-Pacific region as contemplated in the January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance?

My understanding is that we will emphasize our existing alliances, which provide a vital foundation for Asia-Pacific security. We will also expand our networks of cooperation with emerging partners throughout the Asia-Pacific to ensure collective capability and capacity for securing common interests. Additionally, we look to invest in a long-term strategic partnership with India to support its ability to serve as a regional economic anchor and provider of security in the broader Indian Ocean region. Furthermore, we will maintain peace on the Korean Peninsula by effectively working with allies and other regional states to deter and defend against provocation from North Korea, which is actively pursuing a nuclear weapons program.

The maintenance of peace, stability, the free flow of commerce, and of U.S. influence in this dynamic region will depend in part on an underlying balance of military capability and presence. Over the long term, China’s emergence as a regional power will have the potential to affect U.S. economic and security interests in a variety of ways. Our two countries have a strong stake in peace and stability in East Asia and an interest in building a cooperative bilateral relationship. However, the growth of China’s military power must be accompanied by greater clarity of its strategic intentions in order to reduce the prospects for regional
instability. The United States will continue to make the necessary investments to ensure that we maintain regional access and the ability to operate freely in keeping with our treaty obligations and with international law. Working closely with our network of allies and partners, we will continue to promote a rules-based international order that ensures underlying stability and encourages the peaceful rise of new powers, economic dynamism, and constructive defense cooperation.

In your view, what should the United States do to “increase its institutional weight and focus” in the Asia-Pacific?

In keeping with our national-level strategic guidance, I believe it is essential that the United States maintain an enduring military presence that reassures countries in the region that the United States is committed to Asia-Pacific security, economic development, and rules and norms necessary to the region’s success. My understanding is that the strategic guidance seeks to maintain a robust force presence in Northeast Asia and to distribute U.S. forces geographically better throughout the region to address the significant security challenges we face across the entirety of the region. This affords the United States the capability to strengthen regional security and better perform the types of missions our forces are likely to face in the future such as combating terrorism, responding to natural disasters, and counter proliferation.

As you understand it, what does this strategy guidance mean in terms of changes to the numbers and types of operational units assigned within the USPACOM AOR?

If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary and his staff and my counterparts across the Department to assess the potential global tradeoffs, risks, and budgetary implications associated with any changes in U.S. forward presence in the Asia-Pacific. Consulting closely with our allies and partners, and tailoring defense posture appropriately will allow the United States to respond more effectively to the wide range of challenges confronting the Asia-Pacific region.

What are your views on the current number and types of ships forward-stationed in the Asia-Pacific region? Are they sufficient to support the January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, as you understand it, or would you foresee the need to increase or change that naval force structure in the AOR?

The January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance places an emphasis on the importance of the Asia-Pacific. If confirmed, I will review levels of assigned forces in the Asia-Pacific region and if there are shortfalls, I will advocate for additional resources required to support the President’s and Secretary’s priorities.

What do you believe should be the United States’ force posture priorities in the Asia-Pacific and what strategic criteria, if any, should guide the posture of U.S. forces in the region to best support those priorities at acceptable risk levels?
I believe the United States should prioritize an enduring military presence in the Asia-Pacific region that demonstrates our commitment to Asia’s security and the protection of American interests.

I agree with the assessment that U.S. force posture in the region must be geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable.

How important is a forward-basing strategy to the ability of USPACOM to execute its day-to-day mission? Its operational contingency plans?

I believe the United States’ forward-based forces are our most visible sign of our commitment to regional peace and stability. Forward based forces are not only the first responders in any contingency, they also serve to assure allies and partners and deter potential adversaries and are vital for day-to-day engagement where we train and exercise together to enhance capabilities and capacities across the region.

Based on the above thoughts and because of the wide expanse of the theater, I believe forward-based forces are critical to USPACOM’s day-to-day operations as well as operational contingency plans.

How, if at all, do the methods of forward-basing, rotational forces, and agreements with allies for training and logistics activities throughout the region contribute to forward presence?

DoD views posture as a combination of three elements: forces, footprint, and agreements. “Forces” are U.S. military capabilities, equipment, and commands, assigned or deployed. “Footprint” describes our infrastructure, facilities, land, and prepositioned equipment. “Agreements” are treaties, as well as access, transit, support, and status of forces (SOFA) agreements with allies and partners.

Together, these enable the United States to maintain a forward presence to achieve our national security objectives and demonstrate our commitment to the region.

What do you see as the implications, if any, of the planned force posture changes in Korea, Japan, and Guam for the U.S. commitment to the Asia-Pacific region in general?

As the President has made very clear, we are steadfast in our commitment to the defense of Japan and the Republic of Korea. I understand that as the Department considers posture changes in the Asia-Pacific region, the goal is to fulfill our treaty obligations in Northeast Asia, while enhancing our presence in Southeast Asia, and ensuring our posture is geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable.
How does the planned relocation of U.S. forces from Okinawa to Guam improve U.S. security in the region?

Our commitment to the security of Japan is unshakeable. I understand the planned changes in the Asia-Pacific region will result in force posture that is geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. Guam’s strategic location supports our ability to operate forces from a forward location.

Planned posture shifts result in greater geographic distribution of our forces in the region, enhancing our ability to respond to contingencies and meet treaty obligations in Asia. It demonstrates our commitment to allies and to fulfilling our agreements with allies and partners.

How does the planned relocation of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula improve security?

Our commitment to the security of the Republic of Korea is unshakeable. I understand that as with planning for Japan, Guam, and Australia, the planned posture changes in Korea will result in force posture that is geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. The changes appear to address host nation concerns and simultaneously improve our mutual defense infrastructure. I support the posture changes on the Peninsula consistent with the joint vision for the alliance laid out by our Presidents and further developed by the Secretary of Defense and his ROK counterpart.

What is your understanding of the plans for rotational deployments of U.S. Marines to Australia and how, in your view, will such a presence advance U.S. security interests?

In November 2010, the Department established a Force Posture Working Group with our ally, Australia to develop options to align our countries’ force postures in complementary ways to benefit the national security of both nations. During the September 2011 Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN), Secretaries Clinton and Panetta discussed with their counterparts several of the Working Group’s recommendations. And when the President visited Australia this past November, he and Australian Prime Minister Gillard announced two new force posture initiatives – one to phase in a rotational deployment of up to 2500 Marines near Darwin, and another to expand U.S. access to Northern Australian airfields.

As I understand it, the initiatives will enhance our engagement with Australia and with regional partners. They will also enable the military forces of both our nations to better – and possibly cooperatively – respond to contingencies, including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

These initiatives – developed in cooperation with a key ally – demonstrate the strength of the U.S.-Australia Alliance and its ability to enhance regional stability and security. If confirmed, I will continue the close defense cooperation with Australia.
In your view, are the levels of funding, manning and military-to-military engagement in the Asia-Pacific region appropriate to the management of current and future risk to U.S. strategic interests in the region?

The January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance places an emphasis on the importance of the Asia-Pacific. If confirmed, I will review levels of funding, manning, and military-to-military engagement in the Asia-Pacific region and – if there are shortfalls in existing resources – I will advocate for additional resources required to support the President’s priorities.

Engagement Policy

One of the central pillars of our national security strategy has been military engagement as a means of building relationships around the world. Military-to-military contacts, joint combined exchange training exercises, combatant commander exercises, humanitarian assistance operations, and similar activities are used to achieve this goal.

If confirmed, would you support continued engagement activities of the U.S. military? If yes, would you advocate for expanding U.S. military-to-military engagement? If not, why not?

A regular program of military engagement is essential to sustaining existing relationships and nurturing emerging ones. I would support a sustainable pace of operations that whenever possible includes innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve national security objectives. Military-to-military contacts at both senior and junior levels, bilateral and multilateral exercises, humanitarian assistance operations and similar activities are important elements of this engagement. With the current budget environment, careful choices will need to be made that focus resources where they provide the most value and return. Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve Pacific theater security objectives.

In your opinion, how do these activities contribute to U.S. national security?

Military engagement activities strengthen the network of alliances and partnerships in the Asia-Pacific reinforcing deterrence, helping to build the capacity and competence of U.S., allied, and partner forces which in turn advances common interests, addresses shared threats, and facilitates freedom of movement and access to the region. Military engagement builds partnership capacity which remains important for sharing the costs and responsibilities of global leadership and postures the U.S. as the security partner of choice.

Building Partner Capacity

In the past few years, Congress has provided the Department of Defense a number of temporary authorities to provide security assistance to partner nations, including the global train and equip authority (“Section 1206”) and Global Contingency Security Fund.
What is your understanding of the purpose of the Section 1206 global train and equip authority and Global Contingency Security Fund?

Section 1206
Congress approved Section 1206 global train and equip authority in 2006 in part to give the State Department and DoD a more flexible capacity building authority to address urgent and emergent threats before the threats destabilize theater partners or threaten the Homeland. Later in 2009, the scope expanded to assist coalition partners as they prepare for deployment. I understand this rapid funding tool currently is USPACOM's most agile mechanism to address counter terrorism capability gaps in partner nations.

Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF)
The GSCF is a new initiative to pool the resources of State and DoD, as well as the expertise of other departments, to provide security sector assistance for emergent challenges and opportunities.

The GSCF has no appropriated funding, rather State and DoD can transfer funds from other FY 2012 appropriations into the GSCF. DoD can transfer up to $200M from defense-wide Operations & Maintenance and State can transfer up to a combined $50M from Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE), and the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF). Once transferred, funds remain available until September 20, 2015.

The GSCF can provide assistance (1) to national military and security forces, as well as the government agencies responsible for overseeing these forces; and (2) for the justice sector when civilian agencies are challenged (including law enforcement and prisons), rule of law programs, and stabilization efforts in a country.

As I understand it, the GSCF will be run by a small staff composed of both State and DoD employees, as well as employees from other departments and agencies in some cases. Exact reporting structures and procedures for implementation are being developed to address the specifics of the legislation granted by Congress.

In your view, what are our strategic objectives in building the capacities of partner nations in the Asia and Pacific region?

The United States' primary objective in building the capacity of foreign partners should continue to be to help them develop effective and legitimate security institutions that can provide for their countries' internal security, and contribute to regional and multilateral responses to shared threats and instability. Maintaining and strengthening our alliances and partnerships are critical to the stability in the region. Capacity building provides opportunities to build defense relationships and promotes both interoperability between our forces and access to the region during peacetime and contingency operations. Lastly, building this capacity in our allies and partners lessens the burden on U.S. forces responding to security threats outside the United States.
China

China’s defense spending has had double-digit increases annually for about the past 20 years. While a certain amount of military expansion is to be expected for a country experiencing the kind of economic growth that China has over about that same period, the types of platforms and capabilities China is developing have been interpreted by some as designed to project power, limit freedom of movement by potential adversaries, and conduct military operations at increasing distances. Such developments, coupled with strident rhetoric and a lack of transparency, stoke growing concerns about China’s intentions in the region. The Defense Strategic Guidance, announced on January 5th, refers to China as one of the countries that “will continue to pursue asymmetric means to counter our power projection capabilities.”

How would you characterize the current U.S. relationship with China?

In January 2010, President Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao affirmed the need for a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive U.S.-China relationship. I would describe the relationship as simultaneously possessing elements of cooperation and competition. The United States, including the Department of Defense, continues to pursue opportunities to cooperate where there is a mutual benefit, while having frank discussions of areas where we may have differences.

What do you believe are the objectives of China’s steady increase in defense spending and its overall military modernization program?

China appears to be building the capability to fight and win short duration, high-intensity conflicts along its periphery. Its near-term focus appears to be on preparing for potential contingencies involving Taiwan, and to deter or deny effective intervention in a cross-strait conflict. Its modernization efforts emphasize anti-access and area denial capabilities. China is also devoting increasing attention and resources to conducting operations beyond Taiwan and China’s immediate periphery. Beijing’s growing focus on military missions other than war includes humanitarian assistance, non-combat evacuation operations, and counter-piracy support. Lastly, China is strengthening its nuclear deterrent and enhancing its strategic strike capabilities through the modernization of its nuclear forces, and is improving other strategic capabilities, such as in space, counter-space, and computer network operations.

How should the United States respond to this Chinese military growth and modernization?

I believe the United States should continue to monitor developments in China’s military concepts and capabilities while encouraging Beijing to be more transparent about its military and security affairs. The United States has been and should remain the pivotal military power in the Asia-Pacific region in order to preserve the conditions that have fostered peace and prosperity. The United States’ response to China’s military modernization should be flexible and supported by the continued transformation of our force posture in the Asia-Pacific region, the maintenance of our global presence and access, the modernization of our own capabilities
in such areas as countering anti-access and area denial, and the strengthening of our alliances and partnerships.

What do you believe are the Chinese political-military goals in the Asia-Pacific region? Globally?

The overriding objectives of China’s leaders appear to be to ensure the continued rule of the Chinese Communist Party, continue China’s economic development, maintain the country’s domestic political stability, defend China’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and secure China’s influence and status. Within this context, preventing any moves by Taipei toward de jure independence is a key part of Beijing’s strategy. Within each dimension there lies a mix of important challenges and opportunities for the United States that will continue to deserve priority attention.

What effect is China’s military growth having on other countries in the region?

In terms of regional security, China’s economic growth has increased China’s international profile and influence, and has enabled China’s leaders to embark upon and sustain a comprehensive transformation of its military forces. The pace and scale of China’s military modernization, coupled with the lack of transparency, raise many questions, both within the United States and in the region as a whole, about China’s future.

Other countries in the region are closely watching the growth of China’s military, and how its military acts. China’s military is working through the Association of South Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defense Ministers Plus structure to enhance regional cooperation on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. At the same time, there have been worrisome incidents in disputed waters in China’s neighboring seas that have caused concern in nations such as the Philippines and Vietnam. Security concerns regarding Chinese military intentions have contributed to a greater focus on regional forums, such as ASEAN, where issues may be addressed multilaterally; such security concerns have also led to stronger and more welcoming relations with the United States as a security partner of choice.

How do you assess the current cross-strait relationship between China and Taiwan, and how can we help prevent miscalculation on either side?

Both China and Taiwan have made significant strides to reduce tensions in the Taiwan Strait. These initiatives should be encouraged and we welcome progress made by both sides. I believe the United States can help contribute to cross-strait stability by continuing to abide by our longstanding policies, based on the one-China policy, three joint U.S.-China Communiqués, and the Taiwan Relations Act, including making available to Taiwan “defense articles and services in such quantities as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” We are committed to our one-China policy and would oppose unilateral changes, by either side, to the status quo.
How do China’s efforts to establish a strategic presence in the Indian Ocean by securing and maintaining access to seaports in various South and Southeast Asian countries affect its political-military posture and influence in the region?

China looks to South and Southeast Asia as an area of strategic importance, which includes political objectives, access to resources, trade, and investment. With regard to South and Southeast Asian sea-ports, the important question is how China intends to use its presence. As China increases deployments to the region, including ongoing participation in counter-piracy activities in the Gulf of Aden, China will require greater forward logistical capabilities to sustain operations in that region. Yet in order to establish access to various seaports, China will encounter the same political issues the U.S. faces in maintaining our overseas access. This will require improving ties with states along the Indian Ocean littoral, closer cooperation with other regional navies, and will expose them to more non-traditional security challenges such as terrorism and piracy. The United States retains strong relationships in South and Southeast Asia and should continue to monitor China’s growing presence in the region.

What is the role of DOD in helping to ensure that China’s nuclear power industry does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region?

The Obama Administration has reiterated that preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems, along with related technologies and materials, is a key goal for the United States. I believe that DoD should work in the interagency process to ensure that any proliferation concerns relating to China are expressed to the Chinese Government in appropriate forums.

Our military-to-military relations with the Chinese military have been modest, at best, and can be accurately described as “on again, off again.” One thing that has hobbled U.S.-China military relations in recent years has been China’s propensity for canceling or postponing military-to-military engagements in response to U.S. arm sales to Taiwan.

What is your assessment of the current state of U.S.-China military-to-military relations?

As President Obama stated in January 2011, the United States seeks a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relationship with China. We continue to pursue opportunities to cooperate where there is mutual benefit while discussing areas where we may have differences in a frank and candid manner. Such dialogue can be especially important during periods of friction and turbulence.

I believe we should continue to use military engagement with China as one of several means to demonstrate U.S. commitment to the security of the Asia-Pacific region, to encourage China to play a constructive role in the region, and to press China to partner with the United States and our Asian allies and partners in addressing common security challenges.
Do you believe that the United States should make any changes in the quality or quantity of our military relations with China? If so, what changes and why?

I believe that military exchanges with China can be valuable, but can only truly work if China is equally committed to open and regular exchanges. If confirmed, I would look for ways to deepen and enhance our military-to-military relationship with China, and to encourage China to act responsibly both regionally and globally.

What is your view regarding the longstanding U.S. policy of selling defense articles and services to Taiwan despite objections and criticism from China?

U.S. policy on arms sales to Taiwan is based on the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which provides that the United States will make available to Taiwan defense articles and services in such quantities as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. The Act also states that the President and the Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan. That policy has contributed to peace and stability in the region for more than 30 years and is consistent with the longstanding U.S. calls for peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue in a manner acceptable to the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

In your view, to what extent, if at all, should China’s possible reaction to such sales be considered by the United States when making decisions about the provision of defense articles and services to Taiwan?

Our decisions about arms sales to Taiwan are based solely on our assessment of Taiwan’s defense needs. The Taiwan Relations Act states the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.

By most accounts, China has become more assertive in its claims of sovereignty in various domains, including maritime, air and space. There are numerous examples of this assertiveness, but one in particular is China’s increased aggressiveness in asserting its excessive maritime claims in the South China Sea. In one such incident, Chinese-flagged ships harassed the USNS IMPECCABLE, a U.S. military ship conducting ocean surveillance in the international waters of the South China Sea. That incident underscored the nature of Chinese maritime claims and the Chinese sensitivity associated with U.S. Navy operations in these areas.

What role should the United States play in the ongoing maritime disputes in the South China Sea?

As the President stated clearly during his trip to Asia last November and as Secretary Panetta affirmed when he met with representatives from the ASEAN Defense Ministers meeting in October of last year, the United States is a Pacific nation with a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime domain, the maintenance of peace and stability, free and open commerce, and respect for international law, including in the South China Sea.
The United States does not take a position on the competing territorial claims over land features in the South China Sea, and I believe all parties should resolve their disputes through peaceful means and in accordance with customary international law, without resorting to the threat or use of force.

At the same time, the United States should continue to call upon all parties to clarify their claims in the South China Sea in terms consistent with international law. Consistent with international law, claims to maritime space in the South China Sea should be derived solely from legitimate claims to land features.

How does the presence of the U.S. Navy in the South China Sea influence this maritime dispute and, in your view, would an increase in U.S. activity in that region serve to stabilize or destabilize the situation?

The U.S. Navy is a key provider of the military presence that underlies peace and stability across the globe, including in the South China Sea. I believe it is essential for the U.S. Navy to maintain its presence and assert its freedom of navigation and over flight rights in the South China Sea in accordance with customary international law.

Preservation of the rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea depend largely upon their continual exercise. Around the world, U.S. military forces conduct operations to prevent excessive maritime claims asserted by coastal states from limiting our national interest in freedom of navigation. In the South China Sea, we have expressed our freedom of navigation interest for many decades, through diplomatic protests and operational assertions against excessive maritime claims asserted by several nations. Of note, we challenge excessive maritime claims asserted by any nation, including claims by allies and partners. Our military presence in the South China Sea includes Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOps), Sensitive Reconnaissance Operations (SRO), Special Mission Ship (SMS) operations, and other routine military transits, operations, and exercises. The United States should sustain our military presence in international waters and uphold its commitments to its allies and partners in order to maintain peace and stability in the region.

What should the United States do to help prevent dangerous encounters in the South China Sea?

To reduce the risk of conflict in the South China Sea, I believe the United States should continue to support initiatives and confidence building measures that will help claimant States reach agreement on a binding Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. Additionally, the United States should continue serving as a positive example of a nation that adheres to the international norms of safe conduct, through policy implementation, effective training, and proper accountability. The United States also continues to robustly exercise the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) with China as a positive bilateral mechanism to address operational safety issues in the maritime domain.

These include the international “rules of the road,” such as the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs) and other established international safety and
communication procedures, such as the Code for Unalerted Encounters at Sea (CUES). The United States should also encourage all South China Sea claimants to abide by these norms of safe conduct to ensure greater operational safety and reduce the risk of dangerous incidents at sea.

Cyber space has become a critical realm for civilian and military applications and also represents a potentially substantial vulnerability. There are reports that China is aggressively pursuing cyber warfare capabilities, and would likely seek to take advantage of U.S. dependence on cyber space in the event of a potential conflict situation.

What is your understanding of China’s efforts to develop and deploy cyber warfare capabilities?

As with the United States and many other countries around the world, China fully understands the critical importance of cyber as an element of modern warfare. Chinese military writing clearly shows that China views itself at a disadvantage in any potential conflict with a modern high-tech military, such as that of the United States. To overcome this disadvantage, China is developing organizations and capabilities that are designed to reduce the perceived technological gap. This is done by increasing China's own military technological capability, and by building capability to target U.S. military space-based assets and computer networks using network and electronic warfare. The development of these wartime capabilities are the motivation for China's efforts at peacetime penetration of U.S. government and industry computer systems. The theft of U.S. information and intellectual property is attractive as a low-cost research and development tool for China's defense industry, and provides insight into potential U.S. vulnerabilities. Overall, China's development in the cyber realm, combined with its other anti-access/area denial capabilities, imposes significant potential risk on U.S. military activities.

If confirmed, what would you do to help ensure our military is protected in cyber space and prepared to defend against a cyber attack?

If confirmed, I would be sure to work with other parts of DoD and interagency partners to include State, Homeland Security, and Commerce, to facilitate a coordinated approach to cyber threats, not only from China, but from any potential adversary. While an increased cyber defensive posture is important, it is not enough for us to build thicker walls and continue to absorb daily cyber attacks. Defense in itself will not deter our nation's adversaries. We must work together as a government to not only defend, but also to impose costs on our adversaries to deter future exploitation and attack. These costs we impose cannot simply be symmetrical cyber activities; a cyber versus cyber fight is not sustainable in the long-term. As the President stated in his International Strategy for Cyberspace, we reserve the right to use all necessary means – diplomatic, informational, military, and economic – as appropriate and consistent with applicable international law, in order to defend our Nation, our allies, our partners, and our interests against hostile acts on cyberspace. In so doing, we will exhaust all options before military force whenever we can.
In January 2007, China used a ground-based missile to hit and destroy one of its weather satellites in an anti-satellite test creating considerable space debris and raising serious concerns in the international community. Since then, China has continued its active pursuit of missile and satellite technology.

What is your view of China’s purposes for its pursuit of these capabilities?

In my view, this test was just one element of China’s military modernization effort to develop and field disruptive military technologies, including those for anti-access/area-denial, as well as for nuclear, space, and cyber warfare. The United States’ goal is to promote the responsible use of space.

What do you see as the long term implications of such developments for the U.S. military, for U.S. national security, and for U.S. interests in space?

Space systems are vital to our national security and our economy. In this regard, the United States should seek ways to protect our interests in space. U.S. space policies and programs should be informed by China's space and counter space capabilities, which have contributed to today's challenging space environment. I believe we need to enhance our deterrence and ability to operate in a degraded environment. At the same time, the United States should seek to engage China, a major space-faring nation, to promote the responsible use of space. However, our concern should not be focused on only one country, but on the range of actors that add to the increasingly congested, contested, and competitive environment in space.

What are your views regarding the potential weaponization of space and the international agreements to prevent space weaponization?

I support the principles outlined in the 2010 National Space Policy, including that all nations have a right to explore and use space for peaceful purposes, and that all nations should act responsibly in space to help prevent mishaps, misperceptions, and mistrust.

Space is vital to U.S. national security and that of our allies and partners. I support our longstanding national policies of affirming the right of all nations to use outer space for peaceful purposes, the right of free passage through space, and the right to protect our forces and our nation from those that would use space for hostile purposes.

Taiwan

Much of the recent discourse regarding Taiwan has involved the readiness and capacity of Taiwan’s defensive military capabilities and the U.S. commitment to do what is “necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability” as required by the Taiwan Relations Act. In particular, much of the debate about how best to enhance Taiwan’s current defensive capabilities has revolved around fighter aircraft and what air defense capabilities are most prudent and appropriate under the circumstances.
What is your view of U.S.-Taiwan security relations?

*Our relations are guided by the Taiwan Relations Act stipulation that we will make available to Taiwan defensive articles and services as necessary for Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. To that end we maintain military-to-military engagement with Taiwan.*

What do you believe should be the priorities for U.S. military assistance to Taiwan?

*We closely monitor the shifting balance in the Taiwan Strait and Taiwan’s defense needs. Given the rapid pace of PRC military modernization, I believe our priorities should include assisting Taiwan with its joint operations capabilities and training, streamlining and integrating its existing defense programs to be more effective, and seeking innovative solutions to complement its traditional military capabilities.*

What is your opinion of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA)? Enacted 33 years ago this year, do you see any need to modify the TRA to reflect the current state of affairs in the region? If so, how?

*The Taiwan Relations Act, which guides our unofficial relations with Taiwan, has been in force now for over thirty years and plays a valuable and important role in our approach to the Asia-Pacific region. As called for in the TRA, our long-standing policy to assist Taiwan with maintaining a sufficient self-defense capability helps ensure security and stability in the region. I would not recommend any changes to the law.*

Given the increasing military imbalance across the Taiwan Strait, do you think Taiwan is making appropriate investments in its defensive capabilities? If not, what is the best way to encourage Taiwan to invest more in its military?

*Taiwan must ensure that it adequately resources its defense programs and defense transformation, to include looking at increasing its defense budget. I believe the best way to encourage Taiwan to invest more in its military is to send strong and consistent messages from the U.S. Government to Taiwan.*

What military capabilities do you believe would be most effective in improving Taiwan’s self-defense capability over the next 5 to 10 years?

*Capabilities that deter the PRC or increase the Taiwan military’s survivability are critical. No less important, non-materiel solutions such as improved jointness, training, integration and innovative solutions will improve Taiwan’s defense capability. Finally, one of the most cost effective solutions Taiwan can adapt from the U.S. military is to continue developing their NCOs and Junior Officers – an invaluable element of our past and future success.*

Do you think the United States should sell new F-16 C/D aircraft to Taiwan?

*The recently announced F-16 A/B upgrades are similar in capability to new F-16 C/Ds and are an important and much needed contribution to the capabilities of Taiwan’s Air Force. As*
Taiwan recapitalizes its air force, it must ensure its future air force is made more effective by being integrated into a joint construct, by ensuring that its air defense capability is survivable, and by seeking other innovative solutions to complement its traditional military capability.

If confirmed, this is an issue I will continue to evaluate in coordination with the rest of DoD.

North Korea

Despite the death of long-time leader Kim Jong-il, North Korea remains one of the greatest near term challenges to security and stability in Asia and deterring conflict on the Korean Peninsula remains a top priority. In fact, with the uncertainties associated with the ongoing leadership transition, upcoming challenges on the Peninsula may be even greater.

With the unexpected change in leadership in North Korea, what is your assessment of the current security situation on the Korean peninsula?

Following the death of Kim Jong Il, North Korea so far appears to be managing the leadership transition from father to son. On the surface, North Korea appears stable, and Kim Jong Un and his leadership is primarily focused on domestic matters. However, enduring U.S. and allied concerns – North Korea’s past provocative behavior, large conventional military, proliferation activities, and pursuit of asymmetric advantages through its ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs (including uranium enrichment) – present a serious threat to the United States, our allies and partners in the region, and the international community. The change in leadership in North Korea adds to our concerns as new variables have been added to North Korea’s decision-making process.

What is your understanding of the threats posed to the United States and our allies by North Korea’s ballistic missile and WMD capabilities?

North Korea's potential use of WMD presents a serious threat. We must ensure our forces are prepared to respond and that North Korea is deterred from using WMD. North Korea has an ambitious ballistic missile program that poses a significant threat to the Pacific region. As witnessed in 2006 and 2009, North Korea continues to flight-test theater ballistic missiles – demonstrating the capability to target South Korea and Japan. North Korea also continues to develop the Taepo Dong-2 (TD-2), which Pyongyang claims to have tested in a space launch configuration but could also reach the United States if developed as an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Furthermore, North Korea continues to develop newer systems – including a solid propellant short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) and intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM).

What is your estimate of North Korea’s threat of nuclear proliferation?

North Korea's continued proliferation efforts pose a significant threat to the Pacific region and beyond. It is a proven proliferator of ballistic missiles and associated technologies to countries like Iran – creating a serious and growing capability to target U.S. forces and our
allies in the Middle East and assisted Syria in building a covert reactor in the early 2000s, which would have been capable of producing plutonium for nuclear weapons. As such, we continue to work with our allies and partners to build a regional capability to combat weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

What concerns you most about North Korea and, if confirmed, what would you do to address those concerns?

North Korea maintains a large, offensively postured conventional military, continues to develop long-range ballistic missiles, seeks to develop nuclear weapons, and engages in the proliferation of ballistic missiles against international norms and law. North Korea has also conducted provocative attacks against the Republic of Korea. Most concerning about this range of threats is that they come from a single state standing on the outside of the international community. If confirmed as Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, I will drive intelligence to refine forecasts and warnings, sustain and advance our military readiness and coordination with allies and partners, and whether in lead or support, will both seek and welcome opportunities to apply all means of national power to affect North Korean behavior.

The February 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report established a policy and program priority for defending against near-term regional ballistic missile threats, and elaborated on the Phased Adaptive Approach to regional missile defense, including to defend against North Korean ballistic missile threats.

Do you support the missile defense policies and priorities established in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, including the Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense in the Asia-Pacific region to defend against North Korean regional ballistic missile threats?

Yes, the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review provides the USPACOM region with an integrated effort to strengthen regional deterrence architectures against North Korea. It aligns our defensive strategy, policies and capabilities to the strategic environment. The implementation of a Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) will strengthen defenses against North Korean missile threats to U.S. forces, while protecting allies and partners. PAA will enable regional allies to do more to defend themselves against a growing North Korean ballistic missile threat. It must be built on the foundation of strong cooperative relationships with allies and appropriate burden sharing. Finally, it reinforces the defense of the Homeland.

Republic of Korea

What is your understanding of the current status of the U. S.-South Korean security relationship?

In my view, the U.S.-ROK Alliance remains one of the cornerstones of U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific region and is as strong and viable today as it has ever been. This was most recently reaffirmed by the Secretary during participation in the Security Consultative Meeting in Seoul on October 28, 2011. Our security relationship is based on mutual commitment to
common interests, shared values, continuous dialogue, and combined planning, ensuring a comprehensive strategic alliance.

If confirmed, what measures, if any, would you take to improve this security relationship?

As I understand it, DoD and the ROK continue to work closely to realign U.S. forces on the Peninsula and to prepare for the transition of wartime operational control to the ROK by December 2015. If confirmed, I would support this continued realignment and the return of facilities that our forces no longer require. The U.S. is also working toward developing new command and control relationships with Korea, which will ensure that contingency plans remain appropriate to changing circumstances. Additionally, I believe it is important to ensure the U.S. and Korean publics continue to understand the enduring mutual benefits derived from this alliance, and that the U.S. effectively works with the ROK as it plays an increasing role in regional and global security issues commensurate with the ROK's economic status and influence. If confirmed, I would work hard to maintain close contact with ROK military leadership and to build upon the solid foundation developed to date to improve and transform this important security relationship.

What is your view regarding the timing of the transfer of wartime operational control from the United States to South Korea, now planned for December 2015, and what will you do to ensure this transition takes place as planned?

I understand that the United States and the ROK have a comprehensive way forward to transition wartime operational control by December 2015. If confirmed, I will work with ROK military leadership to complete this process under the Strategic Alliance 2015 framework, ensuring the transition is implemented methodically that the combined defense posture remains strong and seamless.

Do you support increasing the tour lengths of U.S. personnel assigned to the Republic of Korea to two- or three-year tours of duty and increasing the number of military and civilian personnel authorized to be accompanied by their dependents for these longer assignments? If so, how would you purport to implement such an increase in accompanied tours?

I understand tour normalization in Korea was designed to further our commitment to support our forward-stationed forces and family members. It was to be implemented on an "as affordable" basis and not according to any specific timeline. However, as Secretary Panetta has said, DoD is closely evaluating all spending. If confirmed, I will continue to thoroughly assess the cost of implementation and our proposed force posture to determine the best way forward.

Are the costs associated with this policy change affordable in the current fiscal environment?
In the January 2012 Priorities for 21st Century Defense, the President announced a necessary rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region. He also emphasized the importance of our existing alliances as providing a vital foundation for Asia-Pacific security. If confirmed, I will continue to assess the costs associated with this policy change and how they fit into our current fiscal environment.

Do you believe that the security relationship with South Korea should remain focused on defense of the Korean Peninsula, or should U.S. forces stationed in Korea be available for regional or global deployments?

In accordance with the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the ROK, U.S. presence on the Korean Peninsula serves to deter potential aggressors from taking hostile actions that would threaten the peace and security of the Republic of Korea. In my view, this presence has both deterred further war on the Korean Peninsula and contributed to the stability of the Northeast Asia region. The U.S.-ROK Alliance is transforming to ensure a capable and relevant forward presence for the future security environment. For U.S. forces in Korea, it is my understanding that the Strategic Alliance 2015 annex on Force Management agreed at the 42nd Security Consultative Meeting in 2010 provides us flexibility for regional and global deployments, while assuring we will continue to meet our commitments to the safety and security of Korea. As ROK military forces have served and will continue to serve with the U.S. military in places off the Peninsula (e.g., Iraq, Afghanistan, and in the Gulf of Aden), I believe the U.S.-ROK Alliance will continue to serve an important role regionally and globally.

What is your assessment of the security benefits of the force repositioning agreed to under the Land Partnership Plan and the Yongsan Relocation Plan and how does repositioning U.S. forces change the way they will operate on the Korean Peninsula?

The two plans work to consolidate and relocate U.S. forces from north of Seoul and from the Seoul Metropolitan area to locations south of Seoul, primarily U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys and Daegu. The movement of units and facilities to areas south of the Han River improves force protection and survivability, placing the majority of personnel and equipment outside of the tactical effective range of North Korean artillery. In addition, the move to a central location outside of Seoul provides efficiencies, reduces costs, contributes to the political sustainability of our forward presence, and improves military readiness on the Korean Peninsula.

Is the relocation plan affordable?

The majority of costs associated with the Yongsan Relocation Plan will be paid by the ROK. Costs associated with the Land Partnership Plan will be shared between the ROK and U.S. and is affordable.

Since the North Korean attacks last year – the sinking of the South Korea Navy ship CHEONAN and the artillery attack on the South Korean island – South Korea has been adamant that it will responded “firmly” to the next such provocation. A main topic during
recent U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meetings was reportedly the Joint Operational Plan for responding to future North Korean provocations.

What is your understanding of the U.S. obligations in the event of an attack on South Korea by North Korea, and under what circumstances do you believe the U.S. armed forces should be committed to engage North Korean forces in response to an attack on South Korea?

My understanding is that, under the Mutual Defense Treaty, when the political independence or security of South Korea or the United States are threatened by external armed attack, the United States and South Korea will consult together and develop appropriate means to deter the attack. Given the pattern and future likelihood of North Korean provocations, the two sides should continue to consult closely so that responses are effective.

Japan

How would you characterize the current U.S.-Japan security relationship?

The U.S.-Japan relationship is the cornerstone of security in East Asia. Japan is a valued ally and anchor of democracy and prosperity in the region. Our alliance has held fast through the turbulence of the post-Cold War, political turnover in Japan, and at times contentious trade disputes, and now stands poised as a truly global alliance. The United States and Japan are in the middle of a complicated realignment process that is part of a larger Alliance Transformation agenda that also includes a review of roles, missions, and capabilities to strengthen and ensure the relevance, capability, and cohesiveness of the alliance for the next several decades. In terms of our military-to-military relationship, the shared experience of U.S. and Japanese forces, working shoulder-to-shoulder in response to the earthquake, tsunami and nuclear crisis of last spring validated our continuing close cooperation and mutual respect.

How does Japan’s relationship with its regional neighbors, mainly China, North Korea and South Korea influence the U.S.-Japan relationship?

I believe it is important for Japan to continue to maintain and further develop constructive relations with all of its neighbors. Japan and other East Asian nations can and should increase their security cooperation. Working with other U.S. allies and partners in the region, Japan can increase its contribution to peace, security, and prosperity throughout Asia and globally. Japan is a valued and essential partner in the Six-Party Talks process and in other important regional security architectures. Progress made to bolster trilateral security dialogues in Northeast Asia effectively links Japan, U.S. and South Korean approaches.

What steps, if any, do you believe Japan ought to take to become a more active partner in security activities with the United States and in the international security arena?
Japan is already a strong security partner with the United States, and is increasingly contributing to international security activities; however, the changing security environment in Asia will present new challenges. The U.S. needs to continue to work with Japan to deal with these challenges, including greater interoperability between our armed forces at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. If confirmed, I would encourage Japan’s development of joint doctrine and organizations that will enhance Japan’s ability to undertake complex missions to build security in East Asia. I would also encourage trilateral security cooperation with the Republic of Korea and with Australia, as these kinds of activities effectively strengthen the functional capacity of the emerging regional security architecture. Regarding international security activity, Japan has actively participated in combined counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, is participating in the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, and has been a significant donor to ongoing Afghanistan reconstruction. I believe participation in such international security operations are very positive developments, and would encourage future Japanese participation in such missions.

What is your view of the United States-Japanese joint development of the Standard Missile-3, Block IIA missile defense interceptor, and of the overall program of cooperation between the United States and Japan on ballistic missile defense?

Ballistic missile defense cooperation with Japan is a success story for the alliance and has resulted in Japan’s fielding of both sea and land-based missile defense systems. Japan is one of our most important ballistic missile defense partners and U.S.-Japan bilateral cooperation on ballistic missile defense plays an important role in supporting our common strategic objectives on defense. The SM3 Block IIA is an important cooperative program that will result in a significant increase in ballistic missile defense capability.

Currently, the 2006 Roadmap Agreement between the United States and Japan links the closure of the Futenma Marine Corps Air Station on Okinawa and the movement of U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam to the plan to build a Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at Camp Schwab on Okinawa. The plan to build the FRF has run into difficulties and, as a result, the closure of Futenma and the movement of Marines remain uncertain.

What is your opinion of the prospects for the successful construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at Camp Schwab on Okinawa?

I believe that the Government of Japan (GOJ), like the U.S. Government, remains committed to the principles of the 2006 Realignment Roadmap, and although both governments have acknowledged that the Futenma Replacement Facility will not be constructed by 2014, as originally planned, there appears to be incremental but positive movement towards the construction of a replacement facility at Camp Schwab. The GOJ submission of the environmental impact statement to the prefectural government of Okinawa in December 2011 was a necessary and politically significant step forward. The U.S. Government is committed to working with the GOJ in taking the next step prior to the start of construction, securing the Governor’s approval for the landfill permit.
Is the cost-sharing arrangement between the United States and Japan to pay for the relocation of U.S. forces from Okinawa to Guam and to cover the costs associated with the continued presence of U.S. forces in Japan equitable and appropriate? Why or why not?

I believe the cost-sharing arrangements with the Government of Japan (GOJ) to be among the best we have. Under the terms of the 2006 Realignment Roadmap and the 2009 Guam International Agreement, Japan committed to providing up to $6.09B (in FY08 dollars) for the relocation of Marines to Guam. For the GOJ this was an unprecedented step, funding the construction of facilities for the use of U.S. forces on U.S. sovereign territory. To date, the GOJ has provided $834M towards fulfillment of that commitment. For relocations within Japan, the GOJ is paying the lion’s share of the costs to develop new facilities. In April 2011, we entered into a new, five-year host nation support agreement with Japan that maintained the overall level of support we receive from Japan for labor and utilities, while for the first time putting a floor on the amount the GOJ provides for facilities construction.

How, in your view, does building a new airfield on Okinawa, one that is opposed by a large segment of the population on Okinawa and could take 7 to 10 years to finish at a cost of at least $3.6 billion, serve to improve the U.S.-Japan relations in general and the U.S. military-Okinawa relations in particular?

The Government of Japan and the United States agreed to construct a Futenma Replacement Facility at Camp Schwab, in conjunction with reducing the number of U.S. forces on Okinawa and consolidating U.S. basing on the island. Futenma Replacement Facility will enable the closing of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma (MCAS Futenma), which is located in a very densely populated portion of Okinawa. At the same time, the plan preserves U.S. forces’ ability to meet our security commitments to Japan, in accordance with the Mutual Security Treaty. Thus, when fully executed, this new force posture will improve U.S.-Japan relations in general and the U.S. military-Okinawa relations in particular.

India

What is your view of the current state of the U.S.-India security relations?

A close, continuing, and expanding security relationship with India will be important for security and stability in Asia and for effectively managing Indian Ocean security in the twenty-first century. The United States and India have a range of common security interests that include maritime security, counter-terrorism, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Over the past decade, there has been a rapid transformation in the U.S.-India defense relationship. What was once a nascent relationship between unfamiliar nations has evolved into a strategic partnership between two of the preeminent security powers in Asia. Today, U.S.-India defense ties are strong and growing, including a robust slate of dialogues, military exercises, defense trade, personnel exchanges, and armaments cooperation. Efforts over the past ten years have focused on relationship-building and establishing the foundation for a long-term partnership. The strong ties between our two militaries reflect this. The U.S. remains committed to a broad defense trade relationship that enables transfers of some of our
most advanced technologies to assist India’s military with its modernization efforts. Having said this, India has a long history of non-alignment and is firmly committed to its policy of strategic autonomy. The continued growth of our partnership should be focused on working closely on common interests in a true partnership, rather than attempting to build a U.S.-India bilateral alliance in the traditional sense.

If confirmed, what specific priorities would you establish for this relationship?

*India is essential to achieving long-term U.S. goals for regional economic development, security and stability, and wide-ranging cooperation to counter extremism and radicalization.* If confirmed, I believe our priorities for this relationship should focus on increasing maritime security cooperation, expanding the military-to-military relationship, and deepening cooperation on defense trade and production. I believe there is potential for cooperating on counter-proliferation, collaborating on humanitarian assistance and disaster response, countering piracy, cooperating on counter-terrorism, greater intelligence sharing on common threats, and working towards stability in Afghanistan and the broader Indian Ocean region.

What, in your view, is the effect on DOD interests, if any, of the civil nuclear cooperation agreement with India?

The civil-nuclear cooperation agreement was a landmark agreement that significantly transformed the U.S.-India bilateral relationship. The agreement deepened the level of trust between the United States and India and will have positive effects on DoD interests leading to greater military-to-military cooperation and increased defense trade. Successful implementation of this agreement will serve to deepen U.S.-India ties.

What is your assessment of the relationship between India and China and how does that relationship impact the security and stability of the region?

The current relationship between the region’s two fastest growing powers, India and China, is complicated by a trust deficit stemming from China’s longstanding relationship with Pakistan, India’s defeat in the 1962 Sino-Indian war, and increasing competition for resources. The ongoing border dispute, trade imbalances and competition for influence across South and Southeast Asia complicate efforts to reduce the mistrust. Regional states exploit the competitive Sino-Indian relationship, seeking favorable aid packages from New Delhi and Beijing to enable their own development. New Delhi and Beijing do find common ground and cooperate in international forums such as BRICS, the G20, and in Climate Change Conferences where both countries leverage their convergent interests to shape international trade rules to ensure their continued domestic development and economic growth.

What do you believe the United States should do to assist the Indian government in the prevention of and response to terrorist events in India?

*As the world’s largest democracy, I believe India is a critical strategic partner of the United States. Both India and the United States share a strong interest in preventing terrorism.* The United States can continue to work with the Government of Pakistan to take effective action
against groups based in Pakistan that advocate and actively participate in attacks against India. As to capacity building, counterterrorism efforts in India are primarily a Ministry of Home Affairs responsibility that employs domestic intelligence assets in conjunction with police and paramilitary forces. Therefore, counterterrorism cooperation with India is through a whole-of-government approach led by the Departments of State (via the Counterterrorism Cooperation Initiative) and Homeland Security (via the Homeland Security Dialogue), with support from the Department of Justice and DoD. If confirmed, I will work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense in support of this whole-of-government approach to address counterterrorism efforts with India in the areas they request support or seek to expand the relationship.

What is your assessment of the current relationship between India and Pakistan?

India and Pakistan have a long and complex history characterized by animosity, mistrust, and conflict. Support by elements of Pakistan’s military and intelligence services for violent extremist organizations (VEOs) targeting India strains the relationship; this support has the potential to result in military confrontation which could rapidly escalate to a nuclear exchange. Current efforts at dialogue have yielded few concrete results on the core security issues, especially regarding the resolution of territorial disputes; however, the efforts have provided each side greater insight into the other’s positions. While progress is slow, the trajectory is positive and offers the promise of increased confidence-building measures.

In your view, what impact has the ongoing tension between Pakistan and India had on the stability of Central and South Asia generally, and on the prospects for lasting security in Afghanistan?

India’s actions in South and Central Asia generally align with U.S. goals – increasing economic growth and political stability through strengthened democratic institutions, and developmental assistance to help prevent radicalization. Regional stability depends on cooperation among India, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Transparency in the India-Afghanistan and Pakistan-Afghanistan bilateral relationships is critical to reduce misunderstanding and mistrust between India and Pakistan. The ongoing transition of lead responsibility for security in Afghanistan to Afghan forces and the strategic partnerships Afghanistan has been negotiating with the United States and other international partners are important steps toward demonstrating long-term commitment of the international community, addressing conditions that create uncertainty, and stabilizing the region.

Republic of the Philippines

What is your view of the current state of U.S.-Philippine military relations?

The Philippines is one of the United States’ five treaty allies in the Pacific and remains a committed security partner facing regional challenges characteristic of current geo-strategic realities. Our alliance is strong and is the foundation of our security partnership. The U.S. military-to-military engagement with the Philippines is mature and focused, allowing the
Philippines security forces (military, coast guard and police) to better address security needs as evident by enhanced counter-terrorism performance, expanded maritime security activities, increased multilateral engagement, and effective participation in UN Peacekeeping operations.

What do you believe the U. S. goals should be in the Republic of the Philippines and how best can we achieve those goals?

The primary goal of the United States should be to strengthen the alliance with the Philippines and assist them in building and maintaining the capabilities of their security forces. Our alliances in the Pacific, such as what we have with the Philippines, are the bedrock of U.S. security strategy within the region as we face common threats. A Philippines that is capable of mitigating terrorist threats, providing a secure maritime environment that ensures freedom of navigation within its sub-region, and leading multilateral approaches towards regional peace and stability will enable it to fulfill its treaty obligations to the United States, directly benefit U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region, and contribute to regional security and stability.

What is your assessment of U. S. military efforts in the Philippines and the effectiveness of the U. S. assistance being provided to the Philippine military in its fight against insurgent groups?

U.S. military efforts and assistance in the Philippines are in support of the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty to which both sides are committed. The U.S., however, does not assist the Philippines in its fight against insurgent groups, e.g. the New People’s Army and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. The Philippines was the first country in Asia to support the U.S. after 9-11 in fighting terrorism. In this regard, U.S. military assistance is focused on helping the Philippines fight terrorism by assisting with the development of skill sets that are no different than those needed to adequately help and protect its civilian populations. It is the Philippine government’s prerogative to assert its capabilities and resources where needed in conducting its internal security operations.

Do you anticipate a reduced U. S. military footprint or change in mission for U. S. military forces in the Philippines in the near to mid-term?

The U.S. and the Philippines are discussing arrangements that will allow greater flexibility for U.S. and Philippine security forces to train and work together. This may, on a rotational basis, increase U.S. military engagement with the Philippines in the near to mid-term.

What policy guidelines, if any, would you establish, if confirmed, to ensure that U. S. personnel do not become involved in combat or law enforcement in the Republic of the Philippines?

Current U.S. guidelines in place for the conduct of U.S. forces in the Philippines adequately address the roles and responsibilities of our military forces. All U.S. military personnel are in the Philippines under the Philippines-U.S. Visiting Forces Agreement and operate under the auspices of the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Board and Security Engagement Board.
Their activities, which will always be in consultation with, and agreement by, the Philippine government, are limited to conducting Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response; assisting Philippine security forces improve their capacity and capability including training and upgrading equipment; and supporting Philippine counter-terrorism operations through activities such as intelligence fusion, and sustainment support. Additionally, U.S. forces are prohibited from engaging in combat without prejudice to their right of self defense.

Indonesia

Indonesia is a key Asian power and is the largest Muslim country in the world. Consequently, it is important to build on opportunities to improve and expand U.S. relations with Indonesia where possible. In July 2010, Secretary Gates announced that DOD intended to resume working with elements of the Indonesian Special Forces, known as Kopassus. DOD engagement with Kopassus had been suspended for more than a decade because of past human rights violations by some of its members.

What is your view of the current state of military-to-military relations with Indonesia and, specifically, Kopassus?

In 2010, Presidents Obama and Yudhoyono inaugurated the U.S.-Indonesian Comprehensive Partnership. A key element of this broad partnership is the security component. Our defense relationship with Indonesia – a pivotal country to U.S. national interests – is managed through the Defense Framework Arrangement and facilitated through several forums and mechanisms. Our military-to-military relations with Indonesia are robust and continue to progress and mature, with over 140 theater security cooperation activities scheduled for this fiscal year. These security cooperation engagements include a wide range of activities focused on four main areas of emphasis: Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief, Peace Keeping Operations, Maritime Security and continued Professionalization / Reform of the Indonesian Defense Forces (TNI). Beginning with the normalization of military-to-military relationship in 2005, engagements have increased in number and evolved from initial small-scale bilateral exchanges into more complex bilateral and multilateral activities.

In addressing the current state of military-to-military relations with the Indonesian Army Special Forces (known as Kopassus), it is worth noting that this unit has undergone a near-complete transformation over the past decade and is at the forefront of TNI professionalization and adherence to human rights standards. Following a 12-year hiatus in bilateral activities, at the direction of then Secretary Gates, USPACOM established a measured and gradual program of security cooperation activities with Kopassus. These security cooperation activities have consisted of key leader engagements and small-scale subject matter expert exchanges in areas such as military decision making, medical planning, law of war, and safeguarding human rights. I expect future activities of this type to continue and gradually expand at a pace commensurate with the demonstrated progress in TNI transparency and reform efforts. Chief among these reform efforts are the fulfillment of commitments made by Indonesian leaders to then Secretary Gates in 2010 to continue to safeguard human rights and accountability throughout the Indonesian military through the
unequivocal investigation and prosecution of those military personnel accused of human rights abuses and, if convicted, their removal from military service.

What is your understanding of the extent to which the Indonesian government is cooperating with the United States in the war on terrorism?

Based on my current understanding, the Government of Indonesia has cooperated closely and effectively with the U.S. and our partners in combating global terrorist networks in the region. The Government of Indonesia has shown tremendous success in arresting and convicting terrorists. Additionally, Indonesia has leveraged its leadership role within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) by electing to co-chair the Executive Working Group on Counter-Terrorism with the U.S. in the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus forum. This initiative seeks to encourage greater regional counter-terrorism cooperation, reinforce military support to civil authorities, build capacity and collectively address regional security issues in an open consultative forum.

Do you favor increased U.S.-Indonesian military-to-military contacts? If so, under what conditions? Why?

If confirmed, I would support increased military-to-military contact within the context of the Comprehensive Partnership, guided by close consultation with the Departments of State and Defense, and within the boundaries of existing legal mechanisms. I believe close military-to-military relations with Indonesia are integral to achieving numerous stated U.S. national interests in the region. I also believe that one of the most effective methods for encouraging reform is through interaction between Indonesian and U.S. service members. Regardless of their mission, any interactions with U.S. service members reinforce professional military practices, to include respect for human rights and the rule of law. Increased interactions facilitate greater understanding and reinforce professional values.

What is your understanding of the factors that informed the decision to re-engage with Kopassus members?

It is my understanding that the decision to begin a measured and gradual re-engagement with Kopassus within the limits of U.S. law was intended to acknowledge the significant progress made by the TNI over the past decade and encourage continued reform within the TNI. Essential to this decision to move ahead with Kopassus were the commitments made by the Government of Indonesia to protect human rights and advance TNI accountability.

What is your view of the commitment of the Indonesian military leadership to professionalization of its armed forces, adhering to human rights standards, improving military justice, and cooperating with law enforcement efforts to investigate and prosecute those military personnel accused of human rights abuses?

Indonesian defense reform progressed at a rapid pace after the resignation of President Suharto in 1998, with the separation of the police from the military, the elimination of formal political roles for the TNI, increased accountability, and the establishment of widespread
human rights training initiatives. While reform efforts appear to have slowed, they have notably not reversed. According to several public opinion polls, the TNI enjoys the respect of the majority of the Indonesian populace. In fact, TNI often is the most respected of government institutions. This is a concrete indicator of progress. Continued reforms that the U.S. should continue to encourage include accountability for past human rights abuses, strengthening civilian control and oversight of the military, and continued professionalism of the TNI officer corps.

If confirmed, what would you do to encourage respect for human rights and accountability in the Indonesian military?

If confirmed, I would support TNI’s continued progress by encouraging senior Indonesian leaders to fulfill their stated commitments with particular emphasis on accountability, transparency and respect for human rights. We can accomplish this through bilateral security discussions, joint training, military assistance, including military training programs. I view U.S. interaction with TNI counterparts as an effective, indeed essential, method to encourage professionalism and continued reform within the Indonesian military.

Burma

Recent developments in Burma suggest that the government may be willing to take steps toward meaningful reform.

What is your understanding of the current security situation in Burma and, if confirmed, what would be your approach toward Burma?

While there have been very encouraging signs of reform and positive government intentions, Burma still faces many challenges in its road to reform, and there are still many obstacles in the U.S.-Burma relationship that must be overcome. The Department of State remains the lead agency in all U.S. engagement with Burma.

Operational Access and Freedom of Action

Much has been made in recent years of the development of anti-access/area denial capabilities of certain countries, and the impact such capabilities might have on the United States’ freedom of action and ability to project power.

What is your understanding of the emerging challenges associated with anti-access and area denial strategies in the Asia-Pacific?

As discussed in the Defense Strategic Guidance released in January, “China will continue to pursue asymmetric means to counter our power projection capabilities.” This would include PRC pursuit of anti-access/area denial strategies. The United States maintains robust regional and global power projection capabilities that provide a full range of options to
succeed in defense of national interests and of our allies. To this end, if confirmed, I will work closely with OSD and the Services in support of policy and programmatic inputs based on assessed operational risk, to ensure we have the ability to project power throughout the theater and preserve the capabilities necessary to maneuver within it.

The Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) released on January 17 this year broadly describes the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s intent for how joint forces will respond to the operational challenges associated with potential adversaries’ anti-access and area denial capabilities.

What, in your view, is the JOAC’s contribution to better understanding and dealing with the challenges of military operations in the USPACOM AOR?

The JOAC’s primary contributions are illuminating the variety of challenges for which U.S. forces must be prepared across an increasingly diverse and rapidly evolving set of domains – air, sea, land, space, and cyber – and identifying Cross-Domain Synergy as the central tenet for addressing these challenges in order to assure operational access.

The JOAC identifies 33 capabilities required for its implementation, but this list of capabilities is not exhaustive nor is it prioritized.

In view of the USPACOM mission, how would you prioritize the required capabilities listed in the JOAC and what capabilities, if any, would you add?

Because achieving unity of effort at all echelons within the U.S. armed forces is central to Cross-Domain Synergy, I would prioritize capabilities required for situational awareness and command and control, especially across domains. I would add the capability to develop, exercise, and validate potential lines of operation across the Government as a whole during pre-, post- and ongoing hostility phases in a manner that complements military activities.

What new technologies would you suggest DOD pursue in order to develop or improve these capabilities?

In general, I would suggest pursuit of technologies that improve situational awareness, command and control, and interagency coordination.

With respect to air, sea and land capabilities, some proponents of the “air-sea battle” concept appear to de-emphasize ground combat forces.

This concept looks at ways to improve our inter-service coordination and ability to counter developing challenges but it does not discount the contribution of ground forces.

There are numerous potential operations in the PACOM AOR that could require ground forces. Decisiveness in an operation or campaign still requires the credible threat of land combat forces that can physically threaten an adversary, seize and/or hold ground.
What are your views on the requirement for land forces before, during, and after operations to gain and maintain assured access?

Land forces are necessary for all phases of an operation, including peacetime, steady-state. Most notably, in Phase 0 Shaping, land forces are critical to tangibly demonstrating U.S. commitment to allies and partners as well as resolve to potential adversaries. Land forces, as an integrated part of the joint force, engage with allies and partners in the region to influence, train with, and improve the capabilities and integration of those capabilities enabling allies and partners to better defend themselves against aggression. Ground forces allow rapid and effective response, not only to conflict, but also to natural disasters and humanitarian crises. A recurring theme in U.S. military engagement is that, while our peer competitors may provide money in an attempt to buy influence, most militaries identify with and attempt to emulate the U.S. in doctrine, professionalism, and values. This is principally due to the one-on-one contact and influence that our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen have with their counterparts of all ranks in exercises and training events throughout the year.

During conflict, we must be able to credibly project ground forces in a maritime environment consisting of numerous of islands, archipelagoes, and littoral population centers. Expeditionary land forces provide indispensable capabilities which complement our navy and air forces in the region. Land force headquarters and staffs also provide a Joint Task Force (JTF) command and control capability that is necessary to pursue multiple operations simultaneously, a necessity for a region that spans fifty one percent of the globe. If conflict arises, these same ground forces would be called on to not only make gains but consolidate those gains in the aftermath.

What, in your view, are the required size and capabilities for ground combat forces in the Pacific region, and what capabilities, if any, may be needed to improve their effectiveness?

The President’s new Strategic Guidelines now clearly establish the Asia-Pacific as the strategic focus. As we assess our increased commitment to the region, the Department will more precisely determine the required size and capabilities necessary for ground combat, and other forces.

Broadly speaking, however, we can categorize potential needed improvements in basing, mobility, and technologies.

- Traditionally, basing focused on threats in Northeast Asia. Adequate basing throughout Asia is necessary to address the whole of the region.

- The vastness of the Asia-Pacific means that forces throughout the region must have adequate mobility in the form of sealift and air transportation to allow them to engage, train, and respond to disasters in Phase 0, as well as to fight during contingencies.

- Given the vastness of the region, deployment of technologies in the form of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets that allow timely and continuous situational awareness are required. This enables the rapid and focused application of limited resources to the point of necessity. Movement of men, weapons,
and equipment is measured in days and weeks in the Pacific theater. Area denial systems and tactics make that even more difficult without the technologies to observe and accurately assess the actions of potential adversaries.

High Altitude Transition Plan

The Department of Defense, under the High Altitude Transition (HAT) Plan, intends to retire the U-2 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) fleet in the middle of this decade and replace these aircraft with the Global Hawk RQ-4. Under the HAT Plan, the RQ-4s will apparently be a USPACOM-wide asset, flying missions throughout the region, whereas the U-2s have been dedicated to supporting U.S. and Korean forces on the Korean peninsula. The United States and Republic of Korea (ROK) have been considering a ROK purchase of the Global Hawk aircraft through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process. If this FMS case were to proceed, much but not all of the impact of U-2 retirement would be mitigated, but either way the level of airborne ISR available on a day-to-day basis in Korea may well be diminished.

In your assessment, is the possibility that the level of airborne ISR available on a day-to-day basis will be diminished a concern, or are there other means to compensate for the retirement of the U-2?

The possibility of diminished ISR capacity in USPACOM is a concern. As the Defense Strategic Guidance shifts focus toward the Asia-Pacific region, I expect that USPACOM ISR requirements will grow. While we depend on our allies and partners to contribute to our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in the region, the U-2 is a unique platform with capabilities that cannot currently be duplicated by other collection platforms.

If the sale does not go through, how would you propose that the United States sustain required levels of airborne ISR support on the Korean peninsula?

If the FMS process were curtailed, if confirmed, I would closely consider recommendations keeping the U-2 on the Korean peninsula until a similar capability is fully operational. The U-2 provides USFK a deep look multi-intelligence collection capability that supports both U.S. and ROK daily intelligence requirements. However, without FMS to the ROK, USPACOM’s strategic flexibility to respond to requirements outside the Korean peninsula may be limited.

What will happen if Global Hawk is cancelled or curtailed as part of the budget process?

If Global Hawk is divested, I am concerned about how the impact of losing these platforms translates into an overall reduction of available ISR world-wide. The removal of these assets would likely result in a rebalancing of global assets that could translate into a decrease of ISR capacity in the Pacific Theater. Furthermore, the second order effect from such a decision has the potential to impact critical strategic relationships with our allies and partners. Given
the Defense Strategic Guidance’s increased focus toward the Asia-Pacific, any potential reduction of ISR capacity warrants detailed assessment.

### United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

A number of the nations in the USPACOM area of responsibility contribute large numbers of police and troops to multilateral peacekeeping operations.

What role, if any, do you believe USPACOM should play with regard to engaging the troops from Asia-Pacific nations which contribute to peacekeeping missions?

If confirmed, I will continue engagement with Asia-Pacific nations in regards to peacekeeping contributions. This is another venue for military-to-military cooperation that allows us to increase partner capacity in military capability, professionalism, and increased awareness of human rights issues such as the protection of civilians in a UN mission area. It is in our best interest that countries contributing peacekeepers provide quality troops that are capable, respected, and have the requisite tactical and technical ability, and will enforce the UN mandate of that particular mission.

### Counter-Piracy Operations

Since January 2009, the U.S. Navy has been patrolling the waters of the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia as part of the international coalition engaged in counter-piracy operations. Even before our engagement off the coast of Somalia, DOD worked with our Asian partners to address piracy in Southeast Asia, including the Strait of Malacca.

What is your understanding of the current threat of piracy in the Asia-Pacific region?

Piracy in the USPACOM AOR exists in the Strait of Malacca and South China Sea. Somali-based piracy also migrates eastward to the USPACOM AOR across the Indian Ocean to the vicinity of India and the Maldives.

What role, if any, should USPACOM play in countering piracy in the Asia-Pacific?

Continued USPACOM focus on enabling Asian partners to be successful in counter-piracy efforts through education, training, and exercises is vitally important. Current efforts are focused on employing resources via partner nation engagement to increase the effectiveness of ally and partner nation forces as well as continuing development of information sharing to locate, isolate, and defeat piracy as it surfaces within the AOR. This process of developing the capabilities of our Asian partners proved very effective in reversing the piracy threat within the Strait of Malacca.
Combating Terrorism

Last year, the Administration released its National Strategy for Counterterrorism. This strategy highlights the need to maintain pressure on al Qaeda’s core while building the capacity of partners to confront mutual threats. The strategy also underscores the need to augment efforts to counter threats from al Qaeda-linked groups “that continue to emerge from beyond its core safe haven in South Asia.”

If confirmed, what would be your role within DOD with respect to counterterrorism?

If confirmed, USPACOM will continue highly successful “by, with, and through” approaches to counter-terrorism that have produced measurable success in the Asia/Pacific region. These efforts rely on a capacity, capability, and network building approach that emphasizes working together with regional host nation partners, other U.S. government agencies, and key allies, such as the Australians, to deny al Qaeda, adherents, affiliates and associated forces the ability to operate in the region.

What do you believe is the terrorism threat from al Qaeda and affiliated groups in the Asia-Pacific region?

The threat of attack by al Qaeda, its affiliates, and like-minded groups and individuals against U.S. and partner nation interests in the USPACOM AOR is still a serious concern. The possible re-emergence of other terrorist organizations, like Jamaah Islamia and the Abu Sayaaf Group, that have been weakened but not defeated by the counter-terror efforts of our allies and partners could quickly affect the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. Other decentralized groups and individuals ideologically linked to al Qaeda, as well as organizations based primarily outside the USPACOM AOR like Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, desire to support their agendas by conducting destabilizing attacks inside the region. Additionally, al Qaeda affiliated groups operate in the USPACOM AOR using facilitation networks that support threats to U.S. interests throughout the world.

Is there a nexus between terrorist groups and criminal networks in the Asia-Pacific?

Yes, there is a nexus and it is a serious impediment to regional stability. Transnational crime and terrorism thrive on common enablers such as illicit transportation networks, weapons trafficking, corruption, trafficking in persons, counterfeiting, and movement of money to support nefarious activities. These threats impact political, social, and economic systems by eroding the rule of law and undermining the legitimacy of governments and institutions.

In Southeast Asia, most notably in the Philippines and Indonesia, U.S. engagement with partner nations has helped combat violent extremist ideology and activities. The integration of operations by host nation security forces with U.S. capacity building, development, and information support operations has dramatically reduced the ability of violent extremist organizations to operate.
What more can the United States do in Southeast Asia to help combat the threat of terrorism perpetrated by violent extremists?

The U.S. should sustain current engagements with individual nations in the region and continually look for opportunities to assist with ally and partner efforts. Additionally, we should foster multilateral efforts, specifically through organizations like the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN), to build regional networks that deny transnational violent extremist and global terrorist facilitation networks the ability to operate within or through Southeast Asia.

Which Southeast Asian countries are most important in the fight against terrorism in that region and what should the United States do to enhance relations with those countries?

Even though Indonesia and the Republic of the Philippines have seen tremendous counter-terrorism successes, they remain vulnerable to violent extremism through radicalization and recruitment and are potential terrorist safe havens. Additionally, Malaysia and Thailand have been used as facilitation hubs by violent extremist organizations that operate across the region. On behalf of the U.S. effort, USPACOM should maintain its robust presence and continue its “by, with, and through” engagement strategy in Southeast Asia.

Section 1208 Operations

Section 1208 of the Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375), as amended by subsequent legislation, authorizes the provision of support (including training, funding, and equipment) to regular forces, irregular forces, and individuals supporting or facilitating military operations by U.S. Special Operations Forces to combat terrorism.

What is your assessment of the overall effectiveness of this authority?

It is my understanding that Section 1208 funding is most effective in the U.S. Central Command AOR, and currently limited in its application in USPACOM. I understand it is an extremely effective authority and if confirmed, I will work with DoD to identify any potential requirements appropriate for using 1208 authority.

Department of Defense Counternarcotics Activities

On an annual basis, DOD’s counternarcotics (CN) program expends approximately $1.5 billion to support CN operations, build the capacity of certain foreign governments in Asia and around the globe, and analyze intelligence on CN-related matters.
What is your understanding and assessment of the DOD CN program?

DoD Counternarcotics and Global Threats program is a capabilities-based, mission-focused, fully integrated effort that provides a comprehensive structure to support U.S. government agencies principally responsible for securing the health and safety of U.S. citizens. These agencies strive to effectively disrupt and degrade national security threats posed by drug trafficking, transnational organized crime, threat finance networks, piracy, and any potential nexus among these activities.

Drug trafficking and associated organized crime are multidimensional threats. In addition to the impact on our nation’s public health and economy, drug trafficking and other forms of transnational organized crime provide a funding source for terrorists and insurgents, undermine legitimate government institutions, and contribute to international instability.

JIATF West executes USPACOM’s Counternarcotics (CN) program. Funded with approximately $30.4 million out of the CN budget, JIATF West focuses their efforts on Asian, Iranian, Eurasian and other transnational criminal organizations that operate within the USPACOM AOR while also conducting detection and monitoring of illicitly trafficked Asian-sourced precursor chemicals used for the production of methamphetamine, particularly precursor chemical shipments to the Western Hemisphere.

What is your understanding of the illegal narcotics industry in Asia?

Methamphetamine produced using diverted precursor chemicals, heroin transshipment through Asia, poppy cultivation, and potential narco-terrorist funding remain the principle drug threats to the U.S. from the Asia-Pacific region.

Methamphetamine precursors produced in Asia are the primary source of required chemicals used to produce methamphetamine trafficked to the U.S. Southwest Border violence is fueled by the Mexican Cartel’s battle to control this market.

South and Southeast Asia have become increasingly attractive as bases for drug trafficking organizations’ production and smuggling operations. Several Asian and Pacific nations have experienced an increase in the production, transshipment, trafficking, and consumption of narcotics in recent years.

JIATF West’s detection and monitoring efforts support U.S. and partner nations’ law enforcement agencies in combating this threat. In FY11, their interagency collaborative efforts resulted in the seizure of over 1000 metric tons of meth precursor chemicals bound for the Western Hemisphere and were critical in interrupting distribution to U.S. markets while contributing to the disruption of Asian and Mexican drug trafficking organizations. Conservatively, 1000 metric tons of precursors equate to approximately 220 metric tons of methamphetamine with a street value of $23.2 billion.
What role, if any, should DOD play in countering – either directly or and with our Asian partners – the illegal narcotics industry in Asia?

I believe the current DoD role is appropriate. The Department serves as the single lead agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime trafficking of illicit drugs flowing toward the U.S. In addition, DoD plays a critical role in supporting U.S. and foreign law enforcement agencies responsible for counterdrug and drug-related activities, primarily through information sharing and building partner nation security capacity. In cooperation with the U.S. interagency and foreign partners, DoD conducts activities to detect, disrupt, and dismantle drug-related transnational threats in Asia and the Pacific.

Law of the Sea


I support U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention. It is in the enduring interests of the United States to be at the forefront of promoting the rule of law, including in the world’s oceans. U.S. accession to the Convention would send an additional, clear signal to the world that we remain committed to advancing the rule of law at sea. Additionally, under the Convention, the United States would have the firmest possible legal foundation for the rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea needed to project power, reassure allies and partners, deter adversaries, respond to crises, sustain deployed combat forces, and secure sea and air lines of communication that underpin international trade and our own economic prosperity.


U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention would benefit the U.S. military’s mission in the Asia-Pacific region by enabling the United States to reinforce and assert the Convention's rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea, including the right of innocent passage of U.S. warships through the territorial seas of other nations, the right of transit passage of U.S. warships and aircraft in strategic straits, and the freedom of U.S. forces to conduct a wide range of military activities beyond the territorial seas of any coastal state. In addition, becoming a Party to the Convention would support combined operations with regional partners and demonstrate our commitment to conduct Proliferation Security Initiative activities consistent with international law; establish undisputed title to our extended continental shelf areas; strengthen our position in bilateral discussions with the People’s Republic of China; and bolster our leadership in future developments in the law of the sea. Accession would also improve the United States’ position and add to our credibility in a large number of Asia-focused multilateral venues where Law of the Sea matters are discussed.

It is important to note that the United States was one of the leaders of the Conventions’ negotiations and our national interests – as both a coastal nation and maritime nation – are
reflected in its provisions. Consequently, accession by the United States would send a powerful and affirmative message to the international community that the U.S. believes the legal regime reflected in the Convention is worth supporting and upholding against any nation that might seek to manipulate the ordinary and intended meaning of certain provisions in its self-interest. In short, ratification would enhance stability for international maritime rules and the freedom of access for U.S. forces in the USPACOM AOR to execute assigned missions.

POW/MIA Accounting Efforts

The Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command is critical to the recovery and identification of remains of missing military members. Recovery of remains of U.S. service members from World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War continues to be a high priority. Section 541 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 requires that the Secretary of Defense ensure that sufficient resources, personnel, and funded are provided to attain at least 200 identifications per year by fiscal year 2015.

What is your view of the Department’s and the POW/MIA community’s ability to achieve this goal?

While Department leaders have made a significant increase in resources available to meet the requirement, the goal of reaching 200 identifications a year remains a challenge. JPAC has been funded to hire an additional 253 personnel (civilians and military). I understand the JPAC Commander and his team are working to increase efficiencies and find new scientific ways of making identifications. DoD, in its review of its budget requirements for Fiscal Years 2012-2016, fully resourced JPAC’s requirements in its efforts to reach 200 identifications by 2015. However, real world events and current budget deliberations could alter actual funding received affect attainment of JPAC’s mandated goal.

On October 20, 2011, the Department of Defense announced an agreement with North Korea that will allow U.S. personnel to return to North Korea to resume recovery of remains of U.S. service members missing from the Korean War. Recovery operations in North Korea were suspended in 2005.

What is your understanding of this recent agreement to resume recovery operations in North Korea?

During the 1st Quarter, Fiscal Year 2012, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense for Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office negotiated an arrangement with North Korea to conduct joint operations in 2012 to recover the remains of American personnel. JPAC had previously conducted operations in North Korea; however operations were suspended in 2005 due to rising tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

JPAC has committed to conduct its mission in North Korea and is currently preparing to conduct four Joint Field Activities in the DPRK during this calendar year.
How might the resumption of recovery efforts in North Korea impact the future of the Six Party talks or the stability on the Korean Peninsula?

The resumption of recovery operations in North Korea is not linked to the future of the Six Party talks or to stability on the Korean Peninsula.

If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to enhance POW/MIA recovery efforts in the PACOM area of responsibility?

If confirmed, the JPAC Commander and his team will have my full support. The noble mission of JPAC and the U.S. government’s commitment to accounting for missing service members from past conflicts are a powerful signal to our nation’s military and their families that we believe strongly in the return of our fallen heroes. Proper resourcing for JPAC missions and force protection for personnel participating in recovery efforts will be a personal priority.

In the context of maintaining and improving USPACOM’s engagement strategy, and fully recognizing the POW/MIA effort as humanitarian, I will establish an environment to encourage full cooperation in host nations where we conduct POW/MIA activities and continue to reinforce U.S. government priorities as I meet and talk with national leaders. Because JPAC’s mission is worldwide, I will work to ensure JPAC’s resources and accounting efforts are available and focused not only in USPACOM’s AOR but as globally as appropriate.

Foreign Language Policy

In 2005, the Department of Defense approved the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap to improve the Department’s foreign language capability and regional area expertise. Since then, the Department has been working toward implementing that roadmap.

Does USPACOM have access to enough foreign language experts to ensure good intelligence assessments?

While there are shortages in some languages, overall there are sufficient linguists for non-crisis intelligence assessments. During a significant crisis, existing foreign language resources will be hard pressed to maintain the current level of quality intelligence collection and assessments.

In your view, how should the United States expand the foreign language skills of civilian and military personnel in order to improve the quality of intelligence input to, and policy output by, the Office of Asian and Pacific Security Affairs?

Greater emphasis and incentives should be placed on recruiting both civilian and military personnel with existing language capability and regional expertise. Improvements to machine
translation tools should be resourced so that they can be used routinely to provide first draft translations/interpretations to increase productivity of the linguist workforce.

Counter Threat Finance

A number of officials in DOD and the intelligence community (IC) have called for investing significantly more resources in identifying and tracking the flow of money associated with terrorist networks and illicit trafficking.

What are your views on the role of DOD in counter-threat finance activities?

DoD has tremendous intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets that are invaluable in identifying and defining threat finance networks and characterizing those networks critical vulnerabilities. This information can then support and enable our interagency partners’ counter-threat finance actions, be shared with partner nations to allow them to defeat threat finance activities within their own borders, and help drive bilateral and multi-lateral engagement strategies. We have unique access and placement through our military-to-military engagements that allow us to work closely in collaboration with the interagency to provide training and advice to partner nations on counter-threat finance and to bolster their capabilities. These and other DoD capabilities will ensure, in close coordination with other U.S. Government departments and agencies, that threat finance networks do not threaten our national security.

In your view, should DOD seek to expand its support to other U.S. Government departments and agencies conducting counter threat finance activities?

With the understanding that an enemy’s financial capability is the linchpin to their operational capability, I believe we should expand our support to other U.S. Government departments and agencies. As we continue to further detect and define the various and numerous threat finance networks that support adversaries around the globe, a whole-of-government approach is the only way to contain and defeat these threats to national security. Different U.S. government departments and agencies each have authorities to attack these networks from different directions. DoD, can be a major enabler and supporter of these agencies in the execution of their authorities.

Transnational criminal organizations are having a debilitating impact on the ability of our foreign partners to govern their nations and provide opportunities for their people.

Do you think expanding counter threat finance activities in the Asia-Pacific region would be beneficial? If so, what role – if any – should DOD play in those activities?

Within the Asia-Pacific region, the threat finance environment is extremely complex, diverse and growing, encompassing terrorism, proliferation, narcotics trafficking, transnational organized criminal groups, and other threat finance networks which threaten the security and
stability of the region. Countering these threat finance activities is critical and we should examine the potential expansion of counter-threat finance capabilities in the region.

Quality of Life

Combatant commanders have an interest in the quality of life of military personnel and their families assigned within their AOR.

In your view, what is the role and responsibility of combatant commanders for the quality of life of personnel assigned to their AOR?

The Combatant Commander is a strong advocate for programs which will ensure the needs of our Service members and their families continue to be met, even during an era of fiscal constraint. The Commander advocates for sustainment of critical quality of life programs and for improvement where needed in the quality of life (QoL) of assigned personnel. The Commander ensures that QoL issues are articulated to community leaders, military installation commanders, DoD policy makers, and members of Congress.

If confirmed, what would you do to enhance quality of life programs for military members and their families within the USPACOM AOR?

If confirmed, I would make QoL for the Service members and families of U.S. Pacific Command a top priority; our Service members and their families deserve nothing less. People are our most important resource and constant focus on QoL initiatives is vital to effectively implementing a "partnership, readiness and presence" strategy in the region. Tailored and effective QoL programs and services demonstrate our commitment to our personnel, both at home and deployed, by appropriately supporting their service and providing for their families. Our fighting forces deserve exceptional access to such QoL programs and services; I stand committed to ensuring they get them.

What is your view of the challenges associated with global rebasing on the quality of life of members and their families in the USPACOM AOR (including adequate health care services and DOD schools)?

The biggest challenge will be preserving the QoL for our service members and their families while we realign our forces in theater. Throughout the transition process, we should focus efforts on maintaining quality housing, DoD schools, commissary and exchange services, medical/dental facilities, higher education, work life, family and community support programs for our people. We should sustain current levels of service during the transformation and ensure to the greatest extent possible that these systems are in place before families arrive in an area.
Joint Professional Military Education

What is your assessment of the value of and current requirements for joint professional military education for military officers? What changes, if any, would you recommend in this regard?

I believe that the last ten years of conflict have proven the value of JPME for our military officer corps. Our joint forces have made huge strides in synchronizing their efforts and capabilities to bring about desired effects on the battlefield. I believe that the incorporation of JPMEII into the Senior Service College curriculum was a good decision, and recommend we continue to look for opportunities to identify efficient ways to prepare our officers for the joint and interagency challenges ahead.

Preventing and Responding to Sexual Assaults

What steps do you plan to take, if confirmed, to ensure that military forces assigned to U.S. Pacific Command comply with Department of Defense policies aimed at preventing and responding adequately to sexual assaults and the recent changes announced by Secretary of Defense Panetta?

Sexual assault is criminal conduct punishable under the UCMJ, and must be taken very seriously. If confirmed, my commitment is to zero tolerance of sexual assault or related behaviors within the USPACOM AOR. To ensure this, I will establish clear policies and procedures for my leaders, at all levels, to take action to prevent sexual assault, protect and support victims, hold offenders accountable, and to ensure a safe and healthy environment for those in their charge. As is the case in most major commands, subordinate commanders in U.S. Pacific Command are required to immediately notify the combatant commander of any sexual assault incidents. In line with Secretary Panetta's recent changes, I will ensure all personnel (military and civilians) at every level are fully aware, trained, and committed to eradicating sexual assault.

What methods for monitoring overall trends and gauging the sufficiency of component commanders' efforts in preventing and responding to incidents of sexual assault do you consider appropriate and intend to implement as Commander, U.S. Pacific Command?

I will ensure Commanders comply with all requirements in accordance with DoD Directive 6495.0 and other established Department policies. Additionally, I will require commanders provide me assessments of their prevention efforts as well as their responsiveness to incidents. From these assessments, I will monitor trends and provide further guidance and direction as necessary. I will emphasize the importance of commanders monitoring their command climate with respect to sexual assault and ensuring sexual assault response capabilities be available at all locations in my AOR. I will demand victims be treated with fairness and respect and that sexual assault incidents be given the highest priority and treated as
emergency cases. I will not allow sexual assault to injure our personnel, our friends, our families, destroy our professional values, or compromise readiness.

**Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief**

What should be the role for the U.S. military in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the Asia-Pacific region?

**USPACOM** continues to provide Foreign Disaster Relief in the USPACOM AOR on an “as needed” basis. When countries request assistance, USPACOM either provides immediate assistance within the initial 72-hours of a disaster based on life and limb or after USAID validates the country request against an urgent and unique capability that USPACOM can provide. USPACOM continues to assist Asia-Pacific nations with their disaster preparations by engaging in multinational forums to share best practices, participating in various bi/multilateral HA/DR exercises, as well as partnering with the Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance and USAID in country resiliency training. Overall, USPACOM should be viewed as a quick response force for countries in dire need with an ability to respond rapidly, for short duration, and to provide assistance when requested.

Additionally, steady-state Humanitarian Assistance activities are an important part of USPACOM’s Theater Campaign Plan. USPACOM provides humanitarian assistance annually to countries within its AOR. These HA activities are low cost, non-obtrusive, but highly effective efforts that improve DoD access, visibility and influence in a partner nation or region, generate positive public relations and goodwill for DoD, and build collaborative relationships with the partner nations’ civil society.

Are the resources necessary to fulfill this role currently available to the U.S. Pacific Command commander? If not, what additional resources are necessary?

Yes, USPACOM receives adequate funding from the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) appropriation, under 10 USC 2561 for humanitarian assistance activities, and 10 USC 404 to respond to disasters within the USPACOM AOR.

**Science and Technology**

As with other combatant commands, a Science and Technology (S&T) advisor is assigned to support USPACOM.

If confirmed, what would be your priorities for the USPACOM Science and Technology advisor?

*If confirmed, I will rely on my Science and Technology (S&T) Advisor to support our strategic mission with three priorities:*
(1) Discover, develop and demonstrate solutions to war fighter challenges;
(2) Avoid surprise by adversary technology;
(3) Build defense partnerships with regional allies and partners.

To accomplish these priorities, I will direct my S&T Advisor to continue to expand USPACOM’s S&T collaboration with the national research enterprise composed of service, DoD, and Department of Energy laboratories, and international partners, and to provide expert advice to my staff on new and emerging capabilities that can aid us in meeting theater objectives.

The Department of Defense has, in recent years, put greater emphasis on research and development of persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.

In your view, how can persistent ISR improve operations in the Pacific theater, and how would you utilize new platform and sensor technologies?

Persistent ISR has proven an enduring challenge globally, and is especially difficult considering the “tyranny of distance” faced in the vast Asia/Pacific region. Technology continues to play a critical enabling role in addressing this challenge. I am following with keen interest developments in several technologies that promise to mitigate ISR challenges. In all the warfighting domains, advances in unattended sensors and autonomous systems promise to revolutionize how we conduct ISR, especially in environments where risk mitigation and cost-benefit analysis favors their implementation. Finally, I will continue to promote the principle of working by, with and through our allies and partners in areas such as shared regional maritime domain awareness.

Do you believe that airship platforms can be effectively employed in the Pacific theater?

I see a need for a broad spectrum of platforms to effectively conduct ISR in the Asia/Pacific. Airship-based platforms have shown promising capabilities to fill part of this need, especially in permissive environments, in support of missions such as air and surface domain awareness. Furthermore, airships of sufficient scale also offer a promising capability to conduct mobility operations independent of traditional aerial or seaport facilities; a useful capability for missions such as disaster response.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes.

Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command?

Yes.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes.

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis of any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes.