

Reserve Component Employment Study



Study Report



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
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MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE *Hamm 7/15*

THROUGH: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY *603 7/14*
 PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY *AN 7/15*

FROM: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR STRATEGY AND THREAT REDUCTION *ELH*
 Prepared by Christine Wormuth, 614-0421

JUN 11 1999

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESERVE AFFAIRS *che*

DIRECTOR FOR FORCE STRUCTURE, RESOURCES, AND ASSESSMENT, THE JOINT STAFF *JP*

SUBJECT: Final Report of the Reserve Component Employment Study 2005 -- ACTION MEMORANDUM

DISCUSSION:

As required by the FY 2000-2005 Defense Planning Guidance, we have conducted a comprehensive study on Reserve component employment and drafted a final study report that highlights the following key themes:

Homeland Defense. Given the increasing threats to the territory, population and infrastructure of the United States, the Reserve component should play an expanded role in providing homeland defense capabilities. The study suggests new ways for the Reserve component to:

- Assist in managing the consequences of attacks within the United States involving nuclear, chemical or biological weapons;
- Protect critical infrastructure throughout the United States from physical and information operations attacks; and
- Participate in manning a national missile defense system should one be deployed.



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Smaller-Scale Contingencies. While U.S. participation in smaller-scale contingency operations (SSCs) will continue to be selective, the demand for SSC operations is likely to remain high over the next 15-20 years. Increasing the role of the Reserve component in SSCs where feasible will provide some operational tempo relief for the Active component, and build RC operational skills. The study recommends initiatives enabling the Reserve component to:

- Provide additional high-demand/low-density capabilities for SSCs; and
- Assume a greater role in sustained operations like the one being conducted in Bosnia.

Major Theater Wars. The most stressing requirement for the U.S. military remains our commitment to being able to fight and win two major theater wars in overlapping timeframes. While substantial portions of the Reserve component are already integral to the warfighting effort, the role of the entire Reserve component, in particular the combat units of the Army National Guard, can be further clarified. The study highlights new ways to:

- Augment critical combat capabilities in specific warfighting areas;
- Develop post-mobilization training standards and deployment timelines for Army National Guard Divisions; and
- Integrate the Reserve component more fully into the deliberate warplans.

The CJCS has concurred with the study; his endorsement is at Tab A. The draft report and its accompanying annexes are attached at Tab B for your approval. The study report makes several recommendations for in-depth follow-on efforts to be conducted by various organizations within DoD. These efforts will facilitate greater participation of the Reserve component in all DoD missions and will improve its integration into the Total Force. A memorandum directing that these studies be undertaken is attached at Tab C. Coordinations from study participants are attached at Tab D.

RECOMMENDATION: Approve study conclusions and direct follow-on actions.

DECISION: Approved WJSC Disapproved _____ Other _____

Attachments:
As stated

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Executive Summary

In April 1998, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen issued the *Fiscal Years 2000-2005 Defense Planning Guidance*, which directed the Department to conduct the Reserve Component Employment 2005 (RCE-05) Study. The study reviewed employment of the Reserve Component (RC), and developed several recommendations to enhance the role of the RC in the full range of military missions from homeland defense to major theater wars (MTWs). The study examined how to make the RC easier to access and use, and how to better train, equip, and manage it to ensure effective mission fulfillment.

In examining the RC role in the future, the RCE-05 Study focused on three areas: homeland defense, smaller-scale contingencies, and MTWs. While the study evaluated several initiatives in each area, certain key themes emerged as particularly important to ensuring an effective future Total Force.

Homeland Defense. Given the increasing threats to the territory, population, and infrastructure of the United States, the RC should play an expanded role in providing homeland defense capabilities. The study suggests new ways for the RC to:

- Assist in managing the consequences of attacks within the United States involving nuclear, chemical or biological weapons;
- Protect critical US infrastructure from physical and information operations attacks; and
- Participate in manning a national missile defense system should one be deployed.

Smaller-Scale Contingencies. While U.S. participation in smaller-scale contingency operations (SSCs) will continue to be selective, the demand for SSC operations is likely to remain high over the next 15-20 years. Increasing the role of the RC in SSCs where feasible will provide some operational tempo relief for the Active Component (AC), and build RC operational skills. The study recommends new ways for the RC to:

- Provide additional high-demand, low-density capabilities for SSCs; and
- Assume a greater role in sustained operations like the one being conducted in Bosnia.

Major Theater Wars. The most stressing requirement for the U.S. military remains our commitment to being able to fight and win two MTWs nearly simultaneously. While substantial portions of the RC are already integral to the warfighting effort, its role, particularly that of the combat units of the Army National Guard (ARNG), can be further clarified. The study highlights new ways to:

- Augment critical combat capabilities in specific warfighting areas;
- Develop post-mobilization training standards and deployment timelines for ARNG divisions; and Integrate the RC more fully into the deliberate warplans.

Study Background and Methodology

The *Fiscal Years 2000-2005 Defense Planning Guidance*, issued in April 1998 by Secretary of Defense William Cohen, mandated that the Department of Defense conduct a study examining RC employment in support of the defense strategy across the full range of employment options including homeland defense, SSCs, and MTWs. The DPG language stated:

“By February 26, 1999, the CJCS and ASD (S&TR), in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (ASD (RA)), D (PA&E), the CINCs, and the Services will conduct a study of alternative concepts for employing Reserve component forces in the future. The study will: (1) review the full range of combat and support RC roles in current operational plans and assess currently planned employment; (2) identify and assess potential RC missions in the continental United States (CONUS) and outside CONUS in peacetime and across the full spectrum of conflict, including the RC’s role in the strategic reserve; (3) develop and assess alternative employment roles and force-mix concepts, including an evaluation of costs, benefits and risks for each option; and (4) assess RC resourcing for current and recommended requirements.”

A Senior Steering Group (SSG), cochaired by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction, the Director, Joint Staff J-8, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, was established to oversee the study. The SSG included representatives from OSD(PA&E), all components of the Services, the Coast Guard, the Service Secretaries, the National Guard Bureau, and the Assistant to the Chairman for National Guard and Reserve Matters. A copy of the RCE-05 study plan, which was approved by the SSG, can be found in Annex A.

The SSG created four panels to conduct the study -- Missions and Capabilities, Force Mix Employment Alternatives, Assessment, and Resources -- to examine the range of issues mandated by the FY 2000-2005 Defense Planning Guidance. Each panel had discrete tasks, although in many cases the panels conducted their work simultaneously. The SSG regularly reviewed and refined the work of the panels.

During its review, the study's Missions and Capabilities panel found that the Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard RCs are capable of executing the same missions as the AC, with only a few exceptions such as extremely short-notice non-combatant evacuations and some special operations missions. Availability of RC units to execute these missions is resource dependent, and varies by Service and mission requirement. As noted in the U.S. defense strategy, the number of SSC operations is likely to remain relatively high over the next 10 to 15. Threats against the United States homeland also are a serious concern. While carrying out SSCs and homeland defense missions is not entirely new for US forces, they are emerging as increasingly important for the Department of Defense. The study determined that the RC can make important contributions in both areas, in addition to its traditional role of helping to fight and win

the nation's wars. A summary of the Missions and Capabilities Panel work was retained by JCS/DJ8 for reference as required.

Drawing on its examination of current and emerging missions for the RC, the study's Force Mix Employment Alternatives panel developed a variety of force mix employment concepts that were eventually consolidated and prioritized into 13 alternative concepts. Of the many alternative concepts that were developed, the Senior Steering Group determined that the study would devote most of its attention to evaluating the concepts that concerned RC employment in homeland defense missions, SSCs, and MTWs. Because of the importance of these missions, the report discusses the study's assessment of these alternatives in detail below. The study examined several of the remaining concepts and refined them for possible future consideration, and recommended that 2 of the 13 concepts analyzed in detail be dropped from the RCE-05 study because they were being addressed through other Department efforts.

In addition to the work on these specific alternatives, the study's Resourcing Panel examined a wide range of RC resource challenges that affect the Services' ability to integrate and employ their RC effectively. The panel's review of initiatives to address these resource challenges is discussed in greater detail later in the report.

Assessment of Alternative Employment Concepts

As noted earlier, the Assessment panel focused primarily on examining how the RC could be better employed in homeland defense missions, SSC, and MTWs. In each area, the study reviewed several different initiatives and for each one either recommended a near- or mid-term action, or determined that the particular initiative did not merit implementation in the foreseeable future. Recommendations for follow-on actions are described in detail in Annex B.

Homeland Defense

Because homeland defense is becoming an increasingly important mission for the Department of Defense, the study examined several initiatives to increase RC participation in homeland defense missions in considerable detail. In many cases the RC is particularly well-suited to homeland defense missions because the RC infrastructure exists throughout all 50 states, and RC units are already quite familiar with disaster response requirements, a significant component of the homeland defense mission.

Dual Mission RC Units for WMD Consequence Management Missions. The study also examined whether selected RC units could be assigned homeland defense-related missions in addition to their existing mission of fighting the nation's wars. Specifically, the study assessed whether existing RC units could be tasked to provide physical security for key national critical infrastructure facilities and consequence management capabilities in the event of an incident involving nuclear materials, chemical or biological weapons.

Several studies are underway within the Department of Defense to better define the requirements for consequence management and critical infrastructure physical security, and the RCE-05 study drew on this ongoing work to examine whether "dual-missioning" certain RC units might be productive. Many consequence management and critical infrastructure tasks require capabilities that already exist in the RC, such as providing support to civil authorities. Because many RC units already maintain these capabilities to support their existing State missions, they are well suited to being dual-missioned for both warfighting and homeland defense. However, other tasks in this area, for example the capability to conduct chemical weapons detection and provide mass decontamination, require significant additional equipment and skills that are not widely available in typical RC units today. Though there are several RC units organized for nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare-related tasks, all are apportioned to overseas theaters in the event of major theater war. Though they could be made available in peacetime to provide WMD consequence management support at home, they might be unavailable should a WMD attack on the United States occur during a period of overseas conflict. Making such units available for CONUS WMD consequence management support may require remissioning them from their existing MTW-related commitments. Providing such capabilities with RC units, not currently organized to perform such specialized tasks, would require restructuring, equipping, and training those units for the new missions. Given the significant additional requirements for certain homeland defense tasks, it may be impractical and costly to maintain skills for both warfighting and specialized homeland defense missions in a large number of RC units. Remissioning or restructuring a certain number of RC units to focus solely on specialized homeland defense tasks could be a more cost-effective solution. Additional discussion of how RC units might support these requirements is contained in Annex C.

To determine more precisely if dual-missioning and remissioning or restructuring certain RC units to focus on homeland defense missions such as consequence management would be beneficial, the study recommends tasking the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) and JCS/DJ5, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I, the Joint Staff, OACJCS(NG&RM), the CINCs, and the Services and their components to determine by March 2000 the mission requirements for homeland defense. This follow-on study also would examine which RC units could be dual-missioned to meet these requirements, and which units might need to be remissioned or restructured to focus solely on homeland defense tasks.

Convert Air National Guard Bare Base Air Wings to RAID-like Teams. Air National Guard Bare Base Wing support elements, which during the Cold War supported the establishment of operational capability at austere locations, are no longer needed because the bare base mission has become an integral part of the Expeditionary Aerospace Force concept. As a result, the study examined whether these bare base air wing support elements could be converted into teams structured to provide additional consequence management capabilities, similar to the concept applied with the currently programmed Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) teams in the Army National Guard. These units are on-call in the event of an attack within the United States that

involves nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. RAID teams provide a rapid-response capability to assess what type of agent might have been used in an attack and provide recommendations and assistance to local authorities in managing the consequences. As indicated earlier, providing support for WMD consequence management is likely to require a broad range of capabilities, some of which will be highly specialized. Existing Bare Base Wing support elements, which include engineering units and other specialized mission support elements, provide an appropriate foundation upon which to build the specialized capabilities that consequence management missions are likely to require.

There are as many as 6,000 Air National Guard personnel in Bare Base units who could be made available through unit conversions to organize into mission-specific units similar in concept to RAID teams. While the study was not able to determine the precise cost, this kind of conversion would provide the Department of Defense with needed additional homeland defense capabilities. Finally, while it appears that the Air Force may have specific personnel available for such a conversion, the concept of converting RC support units into units specifically responsible for homeland defense tasks could be applied to all of the Services.

To better determine whether the Bare Base air wing support element conversion would be beneficial and cost-effective, the study recommends tasking the Air Force in coordination with ASD(RA) to assess the conversion in detail and examine how it might be implemented by March 2000. Drawing on the work of the previously addressed USD(P) study on homeland defense requirements, the Air Force will determine whether the Bare Base Wing support elements conversion could cost-effectively fill a portion of these requirements. The Air Force will report its findings, including any implementation plans, to OSD/RA by March 2000.

Create A Joint RC Virtual Information Operations Organization. To further explore how the RC can contribute to the homeland defense mission, and how to capitalize on RC existing skills, the study examined the costs and benefits of developing a 400-person joint integrated RC "virtual organization" for information operations and information assurance. The Defense Information Systems Agency, the Joint Staff, OACJCS(NG&RM), and the Services developed the concepts for the "virtual organization." It would consist of individuals with information technology skills who could perform their duties from dispersed locations rather than working as a single consolidated unit at a specific training center. A "virtual organization" could support the JTF Computer Network Defense, which the Secretary of Defense established in December 1998 to monitor and protect DoD computer networks and Internet sites from unauthorized access, as well as other DoD organizations focusing on information operations and information assurance. The RC members of this unit would communicate with their headquarters elements through classified DoD information systems such as SIPRNET, from existing Reserve centers or other DoD-controlled facilities located in regions where high concentrations of information technology skills are established

Forming a "virtual organization" to concentrate on information operations and information assurance would enable the Department to recruit and retain highly skilled

technology professionals into the RC, which might reduce the need to rely on external contractor support for these missions. Some members of the "virtual organization" could be drawn from the current RC personnel pool, others might be recruited from the civilian sector and be asked to join the RC for a specific number of years in exchange for high technology training provided by the Department of Defense. A "virtual organization" may generate costs savings due to reduced reliance on contractors, though it is difficult to quantify the exact costs of such an organization without a more detailed assessment. Moreover, personnel management for a "virtual organization" would present a set of unique challenges for the Department, including how to monitor unit and individual performance, how to ensure sufficient security measures, for unit equipment and personnel, and how to retain quality personnel over the long term.

To explore this concept, the study recommends tasking the Joint Staff J-1, J-3, and J-6 Directorates and the ASD(RA), in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I, OACJCS(NG&RM), DISA, USSPACECOM, USACOM, and the Services to implement this initiative on a small scale. The study will evaluate its effectiveness and examine in more detail how to address the management challenges such a unit would pose. The study and proof of concept will be completed by 30 June 2000 and provided to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Increase RC Participation in a Joint Task Force Headquarters for Homeland Defense. To better determine how the RC might contribute to the command and control of homeland defense missions, the study examined how RC personnel might participate in a joint task force (JTF) headquarters for homeland defense. While there is not yet an official JTF structure for homeland defense requirements, a JTF homeland defense headquarters would likely be responsible for coordinating homeland defense missions involving DoD organizations in conjunction with civilian agencies. Moreover, a JTF homeland defense would likely be subordinate to a main operations center run by the Federal Emergency Management Agency or National Domestic Preparedness Office. For the purposes of this assessment, the study posited a prospective JTF headquarters of 300 personnel, structured similarly to existing JTF headquarters with domestic support missions, such as Joint Task Force 6.

The balance between AC and RC personnel in a JTF headquarters for homeland defense could vary significantly, so the study examined three options to determine broadly which AC-RC ratios would be most cost effective. Manning the JTF headquarters using 100 percent AC personnel would cost approximately \$18 million in annual personnel costs. Manning the JTF using 70 percent AC and 30 percent, RC personnel would cost approximately \$13.5 million annually. Finally, manning the JTF using 30 percent AC, 30 percent full-time support (FTS) and 40 percent selected Reserve personnel would cost about \$13.3 million annually.¹

In addition to providing measurable savings compared to manning a JTF headquarters using only the AC personnel, significant RC participation in the headquarters could also increase the organization's effectiveness. RC participation in the

¹ Army Forces Cost Model.

JTF headquarters for homeland defense would increase the JTF's expertise because the organization would be staffed with a significant number of personnel, assigned for relatively long periods of time, who are familiar with the specific organizations that are most likely to perform various homeland defense missions

The study will provide its assessment to USACOM for consideration as it continues to develop homeland defense-related command and control architecture. The study also recommends that USACOM report to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and ASD(RA) by October 1999 how to best incorporate the RC into homeland defense-related command and control systems, including structures like the JTF civil support.

Use RC Personnel for National Missile Defense Missions. If the United States deploys a limited national missile defense system in the next few years, the RC may be able to participate significantly in this mission. While there is not yet a final program decision outlining the precise design of a national missile defense system architecture, the final DoD concept is likely to include deployment in the United States of ground-based interceptors, X-band radars, and upgraded early warning radars. Because these elements would be ground-based and would have regularly programmed activities, staffing such a system with a significant number of RC personnel appears feasible. As part of its Total Army Analysis 2007 (TAA-07) process, the Army is examining how it might use RC personnel in implementing the national missile defense mission.

Recognizing that a final decision on the type of national missile defense system the United States might deploy has not been made, the study recommends that the USD(A&T), in coordination with the Ballistic Missile Defense Office (BMDO), and its National Missile Defense program office, and the Army consider how the RC could be used most effectively to staff a future system.

Convert AF National Preparedness Office from AC to RC Personnel. The Air Force National Preparedness Office currently provides disaster response assistance such as weather tracking for the Director of Military Support Office (DOMS). Because a major portion of the Preparedness Office's work consists of preparing for disaster response efforts, and the RC plays such a significant role in disaster response, the study analyzed whether it would be efficient to staff the Center using primarily RC personnel.

Converting approximately 80 percent of the current Preparedness Office staff into RC positions would require replacing 11 AC officers and 9 enlisted AC personnel with the same number of Air Force military technicians. This conversion would generate \$335,000 in savings annually due to the lower personnel costs for military technicians and a reduced number of permanent changes of station required for RC personnel.² Moving RC personnel from other current missions to staff the Preparedness Office, however, is likely to have a negative effect on some existing missions, but in the absence

² AF/XPXQ.

of specific offsets, the study was not able to determine the precise negative effects of these offsets.

Converting the majority of the Preparedness Office staff to RC positions would not only generate cost savings, but would also enhance the office's ability to respond to disasters. Because the RC has so much experience with disaster response efforts, increasing the number of staff personnel in the Preparedness Office familiar with these skills is likely to strengthen the office's ability to coordinate effectively with RC units charged with implementing disaster response missions. Because this conversion had significant, though relatively small-scale, potential benefits, the study recommended the Air Force consider including this initiative in its Program Objective Memorandum (POM). If the Air Force does not include the initiative in its POM, the Department will consider the initiative for implementation in the summer Program Review.

Transfer Alaska Regional Operations Control Center to Air National Guard. The Air Force has successfully transferred responsibility for two regional operations control centers (ROCC) from the AC to the RC. The study examined whether the Alaska ROCC, the third center of this type, also should be transferred to the RC. The Alaska ROCC is currently manned by 57 active duty officers and 311 active enlisted personnel. Using the same conversion process that was applied to the two other ROCCs, transferring the Alaska facility from the Air Force to the Air National Guard would require staffing the Center with 45 full-time Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) officers and 266 AGR enlisted personnel. The transfer also would require 12 drilling, or part-time, officers and 45 drilling enlisted personnel. The transfer would increase manning costs by approximately \$1.7 million annually, but the assessment indicated that over time the transfer would generate savings due to less frequent permanent changes of station and some infrastructure and base support savings.³

Ensuring a sufficient pool of RC personnel to staff the Alaska ROCC could be challenging due to the Center's remote location. The study also determined that there would be costs associated with retraining and relocating personnel assigned to the ROCC. In the absence of more detailed information, the study was not able to definitively determine whether sufficient personnel would be available to staff the Alaska ROCC, nor was it able to quantify possible retraining and relocation costs. To determine whether to proceed with the transfer, the study recommended that the Air Force examine the staffing issue in detail and consider this initiative for their POM. If the Air Force does not include the initiative in its POM, the Department will review the initiative for implementation during the summer Program Review.

Increase RC Participation in Counter-drug Operations. Currently, operational tempo for AC and RC personnel participating in JTF counter-drug operations is substantial. In some cases mission requirements in these areas go unfilled because of AC and RC resource shortfalls. The study examined whether increasing RC participation in these types of operations could fill some of the existing shortfalls and relieve some of the operational tempo for the AC at a reasonable cost. For approximately \$20 million

³ HQ/ANG/XPPI.

annually, RC participation in these operations could be increased by up to 25 percent over existing levels, which would generate an additional 237,000 man days of additional small unit and individual Reserve support for the counter-drug mission.⁴ This additional support might relieve operational tempo for some AC elements.

The Services' ability to support a 25 percent increase varies. In some cases, Service RC personnel are already providing significant support to JTF-6 missions and could not provide additional support without increasing end strength. For example, the Navy already provides significant RC aviation support to counter-drug missions and could not increase its existing participation by an additional 25 percent. Other Services whose RC are not already providing the majority of personnel for particular missions could provide some additional support. Increasing the amount of RC participation in these missions would likely create additional opportunities for individual RC personnel who would be interested in volunteering for specific positions.

Some individuals and units assigned to these operations due to the increase in RC participation would spend less time preparing for wartime requirements. Because the study did not identify which small units and individuals would be redirected to these kinds of missions, it was not able to determine the negative effects these shifts would have on the original missions or on the ability of individuals and units to train for wartime requirements.

Finally, while additional funding for DoD support of the counter-drug mission would sustain additional activities in this area, the Assessment panel could not determine if the benefits of additional counter-drug activities would outweigh their cost. Moreover, the Department increased funding for counter-drug activities substantially in the FY 1999 budget so it is not clear if an additional \$20 million of activity is required.

To more fully analyze the costs and benefits of such an increase, the study recommends that ASD(SOLIC) coordinate a Service-by-Service review of the proposed initiative. The review should be completed by October 1999. If the increase would clearly be beneficial, the follow-on study will determine where offsets could most efficiently be made to accommodate the increase. ASD(RA) will then submit the results of the follow-on study to the Director for Programs, Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) for consideration during the summer Program Review.

Smaller-Scale Contingencies

Because the demand for U.S. participation in SSC operations remains high, the Department of Defense is looking for new ways to conduct these operations as efficiently as possible and manage operational tempo effectively.⁵ Increasing the RC role in these operations may make more effective use of the range of skills available in the RC, and provide an important mechanism to help manage operational tempo for the AC.

⁴ Army Forces Cost Model.

⁵ During the assessment phase, the study based its assumptions of likely SSC requirements in 2005 on the FY 2000-05 DPG illustrative planning scenarios, supplemented by supporting Services input.

Alternate AC and RC rotations for Interpositional Peacekeeping Operations. RC assumption of every other rotation for interpositional peacekeeping operations like the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) mission in the Sinai could also increase RC participation in SSCs while relieving some operational tempo for the AC. The FY 2000-2005 DPG illustrative planning scenarios anticipate that in 2005 there will be an ongoing requirement for two interpositional peacekeeping operations. Manning every alternate 6-month rotation for these two operations would require approximately 1400 RC personnel each year, at a personnel cost of approximately \$32 million annually above already programmed costs .⁶

To provide forces for interpositional peacekeeping operations like MFO mission in the Sinai, the United States provides sufficient personnel and equipment to station a light infantry battalion in Sinai throughout the entire year. Meeting this obligation requires that at any given time during the year, one light infantry battalion is currently serving in the Sinai, another is undergoing reorganization and preparing to deploy to the Sinai, and a third battalion is reconstituting its combat readiness from having served the previous rotation. By manning every other rotation using RC personnel, fewer active battalions would be needed for this type of mission. The DPG illustrative planning scenarios call for light infantry battalions for interpositional peacekeeping operations, and 17 percent of the total number of light infantry battalions would be involved in supporting these types of operations. If RC personnel filled every alternate rotation, only 8 percent of the AC light infantry battalions would be required to man the remaining rotations. Because 39 light infantry battalions are in the programmed Army RC structure, there would be sufficient RC personnel to provide one battalion for 6 months for up to two missions each year. The study recommends that the Army(all components), in coordination with the USD (P&R), ASD(RA), Joint Staff, and OACJCS(NG&RM), conduct a detailed study to determine whether such an initiative is feasible, and if so, the optimum frequency for RC rotations.

RC Assume a Bosnia-like Peacekeeping Operation. The study also examined whether the RC could provide forces sufficient for one continuous rotational large peace implementation operation similar to the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia. Based on the extended duration of such operations, the study determined that meeting such a requirement would not be possible using only volunteers, and would require repeated use of a Presidential Select Reserve Call-up (PSRC). Using force requirements drawn from the FY 2000-2005 DPG illustrative planning scenarios, the study assumed that such an operation would require a force package comprised of approximately a brigade. It would include supporting combat support and combat service support assets, about 60 fighter and support aircraft, forces to conduct a maritime interception operation (MIO), and possibly additional support from embarked USMC amphibious elements. A review of the programmed RC force structure indicates that there are adequate combat forces to meet the rotational requirement. However, the RC does not have sufficient units in several high-demand areas to sustain a rotational force package of this size under existing law regarding the use of a Presidential Select Reserve Call-up (PSRC). In examining

⁶ Army Forces Cost Model.

what RC force structure would be available for this type of operation, the assessment also considered the requirement to provide support to other missions as described in the DPG illustrative planning scenarios. Specific force structure shortfalls are shown at Annex D.

Even if the RC had sufficient units to meet these requirements, the financial costs associated with manning this mission using only RC personnel are very high. Bringing sufficient RC personnel on active duty to fulfill such a mission would cost approximately \$350 million more in personnel costs annually than would supporting the mission using AC personnel already in the force.⁷ In addition to significant financial costs, current RC personnel policy, which does not allow RC units to serve in operations for more than one period of up to 270 days under a single PSRC, would have to be revised before this initiative could be legally implemented. If the provisions of the PSRC were adjusted, operational tempo and associated retention issues would be a significant concern.

Based on the high financial costs of this initiative and its probable impact on RC operational tempo, the study recommends that no further action be taken on this initiative.

Review CINC Rotational Timeline Restrictions. Currently both US European Command and US Central Command set minimum rotation lengths for personnel serving in contingency operations in those theaters. US Central Command requires that individual RC personnel serve at least 120 days. US Central Command allows RC units serve a minimum of 90 days, but prefers that units serve for 120 to 179-day rotations. US European Command requires individual RC personnel to serve in 90-day rotations, while RC units serve a minimum of 29 days. The study examined whether shortening the required number of rotation days would facilitate increased RC participation in SSCs operations such as SFOR in Bosnia.

Each Service sets a different policy for providing RC personnel to operations overseas. Under current Army and Marine Corps policy, RC units that deploy overseas for a SSC spend considerable time at their home stations or other training sites preparing and training for the specific mission once they are notified of the impending deployment. For example, personnel in units who will deploy overseas are often required to receive special vaccinations, learn specific rules of engagement, and complete other specialized training. Shortening the minimum rotational requirement so that these personnel can be moved in and out of theater more quickly is not more efficient because given the extensiveness of the predeployment preparations, it is more cost-effective to keep them in theater for a longer deployment than to deploy them for only a few months. Because most Air Force personnel operate from bases outside the direct area of most SSC operations, the Air Force does not have to invest as much time in predeployment preparations and is able to move personnel in and out of theater more quickly. While the Air Force can already move flight crews in and out of theater to a greater degree than the Army and Marine Corps can move ground-based personnel, shortening the rotational requirements would enable it to move individual RC personnel in and out of the theater even more frequently, increasing the pool of individuals who could serve in these

⁷ Army Forces Cost Model.

operations. This concept could be of value to selected personnel specialties in other services, as well, such as medical professionals. Increasing the number of RC personnel who can serve in SSC by shortening the rotational requirements may also relieve some of the stress on AC personnel serving in these operations, which would could help lower attrition rates in the AC.

Shortening the rotational requirements so that personnel can move in and out of theater more frequently will be more expensive, and may make management of SSCs more complicated for the theater CINCs. Savings from lower attrition rates in the AC may offset increased operational costs, although the study was unable to quantify how much attrition rates might decrease. To better assess the impact of shortening rotational requirements, the study recommends tasking the Joint Staff J3 and J5, in coordination with ASD(RA), OACJCS(NG&RM), CINCs, and Services, to complete a review of rotational policies by September 1999. The review will examine in detail the impact of shortening rotational requirements, including costs and operational risks that might be incurred, and recommend exceptions to rotational policies where merited.

Meet Initial SSC Requirements with AC Only. When the U.S. military deploys today for a SSC, units found largely in the RC must meet several of the initial mission requirements. Because the RC is not designed to respond as rapidly overall as the AC, calling up specialized units on short notice is complicated and stressful for RC personnel. Establishing an AC only capability to meet all mission requirements for the first 60 days of SSCs could have beneficial effects in reducing the stresses on the RC of short-notice deployment. First, such a policy would give the RC units needed for the mission additional time to plan their contribution to the mission and prepare for deployment. The 60-day policy would also allow time to implement the PSRC, which is required to activate RC personnel involuntarily and to ensure that sufficient personnel are provided for the operation. Without the PSRC, the Services must find volunteers to fill the requirements in the first 60 days, which can be challenging and is much more complicated than using a PSRC to call up entire units, who have also had the advantage of training together over time.

Instituting a 60-day policy would also have significant disadvantages. Such a policy would not be consistent with the current Total Force policy. The Total Force policy grew out of DoD's determination in the wake of the Vietnam War to structure the RC to include a significant number of units needed for the first two months of an operation. This policy limits the Executive Branch's ability to commit troops to substantial overseas contingency operations without ensuring there was sufficient political support for the mission. Under the Total Force policy, each time the President sends a significant number of troops overseas, the Services must draw on AC and RC personnel. As a result, the American public is always aware when its leadership sends troops to a conflict overseas. If the Army restructured to meet all requirements in the first 60 days of an operation using only active duty personnel, this political "check and balance" would no longer exist.

A 60-day, active-only policy would also entail significant financial costs. Comparing the types and numbers of forces required for SSC operations through 2005 to the existing programmed AC force structure shows that there are approximately 62 different types of organizations. The total is 244 fewer available active force units than required to meet the DPG illustrative planning scenarios. To allow SSC missions to proceed for 60 days without using RC units to supplement the active units, these additional 244 units would need to be created or converted from existing AC assets. The specific units required are shown in Annex E.

Given the significant financial costs, the policy shift involved, and the lack of endorsement for this initiative among AC or RC leadership, the study recommends no further action be taken along these lines.

Expand RC Use in Meeting High Demand/Low Density (HD/LD) requirements. Because certain high demand, low density (HD/LD) units in the AC are experiencing high operational tempo due to the volume of ongoing operations, the study examined whether expanding RC participation in these areas would relieve some of the tempo concerns. The study first examined whether there were RC units that could be used to meet HD/LD requirements. In the existing RC structure, there are several HD/LD assets, including A-10, HC-130 cargo plane, and EA-6B Prowler crews; civil affairs and psychological operations units; and Patriot batteries. Assessment showed that the Services already use these RC units as much as possible to alleviate AC tempo levels with the exception of the Patriot batteries in the Army National Guard (ARNG). Increased use of the Patriot batteries in the ARNG could help relieve a portion of AC tempo. The study endorses the Army's existing plans to employ these units in meeting SSC requirements once they have attained an appropriate operational status.

Individuals in the RC have HD/LD skills that could be used to relieve personnel tempo on an individual level for the AC, but with the exception of the Air Force, the Services do not currently comprehensively track high demand skills data on an individual level. To facilitate drawing on the RC to relieve personnel tempo for HD/LD AC individuals, the study recommends tasking the Services, in coordination with the ASD(RA), Joint Staff J-1 and J-3, and OACJCS(NG&RM), to develop a mechanism by November 1999 to track individuals with HD/LD skills and identify potential actions for relieving high tempo demands.

Increase RC Manning in USMC staffs. SSCs frequently require splitting headquarters staffs and Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) command elements into a forward-deployed echelon and a rear echelon that remains behind to support the deployed forces and supporting CINCs. Today, when headquarters staffs and command elements deploy for these types of operations, active personnel deploy with the command element and few additional personnel are available to backfill the positions that have been vacated. Headquarters staffs and command elements also participate frequently in other CINC activities and exercises, and are not replaced when they leave the headquarters for these operations. Increasing the number of reservists assigned to these headquarter staffs, command elements, and their associated deploying elements could

enhance the Marines' ability to provide support when active duty personnel deploy for both SSCs and shorter TDY assignments.

Currently, RC personnel already provide approximately 85,000 man-days of support to Marine Corps staffs. Increasing this manning support by 25 percent would provide 21,250 additional man-days of support to provide some incremental backfill capability, but would cost approximately \$3 million dollars annually.⁸ The additional RC personnel would be assigned to specific positions for 3 to 5 years, and while they would not serve full-time, these RC personnel would acquire experience in the same position over a relatively long period of time, which would provide greater operational continuity in the headquarters staffs. The study recommends tasking the Marine Corps to evaluate this initiative in more detail by July 1999 to determine its utility as a force management tool. The Marine Corps will report its findings, including any implementation plans, to the USD(P&R).

Increase RC Participation in SSCs Using the Expeditionary Aerospace Force Concept. As part of its Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) concept, the Air Force envisions substantial RC participation in SSCs. Increased RC participation will be critical to sustaining an adequate rotational base. Beginning in January 2000, when the first two Air Expeditionary Forces will be fully operational, RC crews and personnel will start rotating into SSC operations on a 90-day deployment basis (with 15-day in-theater RC personnel swaps). The Air Force AEF concept makes broad use of RC capabilities in SSCs, and the study recommended that as the Air Force fully implements the AEF program, it continue to refine RC participation in these types of operations.

Major Theater Wars

The RC has always played an important role as part of the Total Force when the United States goes to war. Today the U.S. defense strategy requires that the Total Force be able to fight and win two MTWs in overlapping time frames, in addition to performing other important shaping and responding missions. As the entire Total Force strives to fulfill all the requirements of the U.S. defense strategy within the context of limited available resources, ensuring that the RC's role in MTW is optimized is essential. To facilitate this optimization, the study examined a range of possible initiatives to increase the role of the RC in MTW.

Examine Post-Mobilization Training and Integrated Division Employment for Enhanced Separate Brigades (eSBs). Drawing primarily on FORSCOM/ARNG Regulation 350-2, and the Army's AC/RC integrated division concept, the study also examined post-mobilization training and incorporation of eSBs into the Army's integrated division concept.

Existing war plans envision sending eight of the fifteen eSBs to fight in the second MTW within 140 days after mobilization. The eSBs first-to-fight status requires a higher state of readiness than many other large RC units. This applies particularly in

⁸ USMC RAC.

terms of equipment and manning levels, so that the brigades can achieve full combat proficiency more quickly. The Army plans to send the mobilized eSBs in sequential waves to the four major post-mobilization training sites the Army maintains for use during war time. Three sites, Fort Irwin, California, Fort Hood, Texas, and Yakima, Washington, would be used to train heavy brigades. The fourth site, Fort Polk, Louisiana, would be used to train light brigades. Existing plans envision training and validating the 15 eSBs at these training sites. With current resources, only four brigades can be trained and validated at one time, hence four eSBs will be ready 90 days after mobilization and four additional eSBs will be mobilized 35 days later. The remaining seven eSBs would cycle through the training and validation sites using the same timelines. Each eSB is expected to be ready for deployment 90 days after its mobilization.

In addition to the existing four training facilities, other sites, such as Fort Carson, Colorado, Fort Riley, Kansas, and the USMC training facility at Twenty-Nine Palms, California, may be available to expand mobilization training capacity for the enhanced separate brigades. For example, under current post-mobilization timelines, Marine Operational Forces located at Twenty-Nine Palms will be fully deployed within a short time after the initial C-day, leaving the facility potentially available for use to train-up eSBs. Additional training facilities would enable the eSBs to move through the training pipeline more quickly and deploy, or could be used to begin post-mobilization training for the ARNG divisions.

The study endorses the Army's efforts to ensure it provides sufficient resources through its budget to ensure that the eSBs can deploy as required by FY 2000-2005 according to DPG readiness guidance. The study also recommends that the Army examine by February 2000 whether to provide additional training sites such as Fort Carson and Fort Riley and, in particular, consider establishing a memorandum of agreement (MOA) with the U.S. Marine Corps to facilitate use of Twenty-Nine Palms. If there are other existing non-Army sites like Twenty-Nine Palms that may be available for training soon after mobilization, the Army should consider developing MOAs with the relevant Services to secure their use in the event of a war as well.

Finally, the study examined how the eSBs are being incorporated into the Army's AC/RC integrated division concept. The integrated division concept establishes an active duty division headquarters to oversee the training and readiness of its associated three eSBs. While this arrangement provides readiness and training benefits to the eSBs, under this concept the integrated division is not deployable because it lacks a division combat support (CS)-combat service support (CSS) base. Although the AC/RC integrated divisions currently are not deployable as division-sized combat formations, the Army has identified deployability as a possible future evolution of this concept. The study endorses the Army's plan for the continued evolution of this concept as more experience is gained with the organization.

Create Round-Up Relationships for eSBs. Establishing round-up relationships between certain eSBs and selected active Army combat divisions could prove beneficial

in terms of increasing the role of the RC in MTWs and in increasing the combat power of certain Army divisions. As established in Army doctrine during the 1980s, the concept of rounding-up a combat division envisions designating an ARNG brigade as the fourth ground maneuver brigade included in a division during wartime. This linkage is distinct from the concept of a round-out or up relationship, which entails designating an ARNG brigade as the integral third ground maneuver brigade of an active combat division.

Once a round-up relationship is established between an ARNG brigade and a combat division, the ARNG brigade could target its training efforts on mission-specific requirements to enhance its integration into its affiliated combat division. If round-up relationships were established between eSBs and active combat divisions, eSBs could better focus peacetime planning and training to prepare for possible deployment to a war. For example, an eSB with a round-up relationship could incorporate the relevant standing operational procedures (SOPs) and tactical techniques of its parent division into its training plan. This would raise training quality and facilitate integration of the ESB into the division structure once the brigade is in the theater of operations.

The benefits of round-up relationships between eSBs and divisions are offset by the current multi-apportionment of divisions in the warplans that significantly complicates efforts to create these relationships. Each active combat division is assigned to a specific theater of operations. For example, if war breaks out in Southwest Asia (SWA) first, certain divisions are scheduled to go to that theater, while others are scheduled to go to Korea in the event of a second war. Likewise, certain divisions scheduled to go to the SWA if war breaks out there first are simultaneously scheduled, or multi-apportioned, to go to Korea if war breaks out first there instead. Unlike multi-apportioned divisions, eight of the fifteen eSBs are scheduled to fight in the second war, no matter where the war occurs. As a result, establishing round-up relationships between the divisions and the eSBs may be challenging because the eight eSBs could only establish “round-up” relationships with divisions fighting in the second war, but due to multi-apportionment, most divisions could fight in either the first or second war, depending on which war breaks out first.

In some cases the round-up relationship could limit the flexibility of theater commanders during a major conflict. For example, a round-up eSB would train during peacetime to operate with a specific division in theater during wartime. In wartime, however, a CINC might determine that the round-up eSB would be more useful performing a different mission than that of its “parent” division, or is needed to operate with a different division entirely. The eSB’s division-focused training program, while better preparing the eSB to fight with its affiliated division, could result in the eSB being less well prepared to execute a broader range of missions.

The RCE-05 Study recommends that the Army (all components), in coordination with ASD(RA), ASD(S&TR), ODP&E, the Joint Staff, OACJCS(NG&RM) and the CINCs, conduct a review by November 1999 to determine the number of optimum cases for eSB round-up relationships.

Examine Post-Mobilization Training for the ARNG Divisions. While the eSBs are being sufficiently resourced to meet current war plans requirements, there are no current formal post-mobilization training requirements for the ARNG divisions. For the ARNG divisions to be included fully in existing war plans, the Army will need to establish post-mobilization training standards and timelines for division deployments.

The existing operations plans (OPLANs) do not describe how the ARNG divisions would be employed in a MTW, nor are any of the divisions currently apportioned to a specific theater. It is difficult to determine how quickly the ARNG divisions could be available for deployment to the warfighting theater since there is no official post-mobilization training for these divisions.

Several factors clearly will impact how quickly an ARNG division can prepare to deploy for MTWs. The factors include missions the division will be required to conduct, its peacetime training and readiness, the availability of training sites and personnel, the prioritization of the divisions relative to the eSBs at the post-mobilization training sites, and the level of training validation required prior to deployment.

ARNG and AC divisions are not maintained at the same level of readiness. The higher readiness rating an ARNG division has during peacetime, the faster it can achieve the desired readiness level for mobilization to the theater during wartime. Historically, the ARNG divisions have been funded to provide sufficient individual, crew, and squad level training. However, resourcing constraints have reduced available funding for training, which has resulted in severe readiness shortfalls and nondeployability rates.

The number of training sites and personnel available to support post-mobilization training sites also are a major factor in how quickly an ARNG division could be ready to deploy. Existing Army plans envision training and validating each of the 15 eSBs at one of its four training sites, but these plans do not address whether or where the ARNG divisions would be trained. Further assessment would be required to determine how many training sites would be needed to accommodate the ARNG divisions, and whether there would be sufficient personnel available to send the divisions through the training sites while the majority of AC personnel deploy to the theater for combat. While there are advantages to training an entire division at a single location, the ARNG divisions would be available for deployment more quickly if subordinate battalion and brigade task forces could train simultaneously at multiple sites. If additional sites were established, the divisions could finish training faster, though activating additional post-mobilization training sites clearly has resource implications.

Similarly, the order in which the ARNG divisions proceed through available training centers relative to the 15 eSBs will also affect how quickly training could be completed. The Army currently envisions training all 15 eSBs at the four training sites described in its FORSCOM/ARNG Regulation 350-2. Using concurrent training, the ARNG divisions would be ready more quickly than if they were sequenced after all eSBs had completed training.

Finally, mission requirements will affect how quickly the ARNG divisions can be ready to deploy to the theater in wartime. Upon mobilization, each division subordinate unit has some level of intrinsic capability based on its existing training. As the division headquarters and its subordinate elements undergo additional post-mobilization training, they become progressively more proficient, gaining skills and achieving validation standards for combat operations at each echelon, culminating in validation of the division as a whole. However, there may be situations where the urgency of need and low anticipated threat would permit consideration of deploying divisions prior to achieving full combat capability. Such situations may include post-conflict operations, disaster relief, or humanitarian assistance missions. If these missions require only battalion or brigade-level combat validation to enable mission accomplishment at acceptable levels of risk, divisions given these missions could potentially deploy to the theater before completing full division-level combat validation, and hence be available earlier to the theater CINCs. Clearly, deploying units that are not fully validated at the division level to the theater would entail some risk. If war broke out anew after an apparent surrender, for example, units deployed early for post-conflict operations, may not be fully prepared to participate in division-level maneuver operations that might take place in the event of renewed hostilities. As a matter of policy, divisions will attain full combat validation, although earlier deployment could be considered in exceptional cases.

The assessment conducted by the RCE 05 study considered the above factors, and made tentative determinations for the availability of ARNG divisions for MTW requirements. The study lacked the time or resources to perform a detailed analysis of this subject, and the results of this assessment do not reflect the concurrence of all participants in the study. The results will be considered as a foundation for further, more comprehensive analysis and will be provided separately to the Army and other RCE study participants as a reference for the follow-on study discussed below.

Nevertheless, the assessment indicated that with enhanced pre-mobilization readiness (equivalent to that maintained currently by the eSBs), training its brigades simultaneously at three post-mobilization training sites, a division could be validated for combat in significantly less time than currently estimated. With additional post-mobilization training sites, training at multiple locations, enhanced peacetime readiness, and/or adjusted sequencing, availability could be accelerated even further. Specific timelines are dependent on many factors, and definitive answers will require more detailed analysis.

While currently in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) as available forces, no apportionment of the ARNG divisions to the theater CINCs is envisioned until they have established post-mobilization training standards and a clear timeline under which they can train and deploy to the warfighting theater.⁹ As a result, the study recommends tasking the Army (all components), in coordination with ASD(S&T), ASD(RA), OSD(PA&E), Joint Staff DJ8, OACJCS(NG&RM), and USACOM, to formulate

⁹ The 1998 JSCP shows eight ARNG divisions as available to the CINCs. However, the ARNG Division Redesign Study has determined that two of the eight divisions will be converted into CS and CSS units by 2009, leaving only six divisions available for possible apportionment to the warfighting CINCs.

standards and guidelines for the validation of ARNG divisions, based on common deployment standards for Active and Guard divisions, and to establish post-mobilization preparation and deployment plans for the ARNG divisions. The study would identify associated training and resource requirements (including analysis of options for the provision of additional post-mobilization training sites, facilities, and capabilities); potential enhancements to existing levels of peacetime readiness in ARNG divisions; and integration of ARNG divisions with eSBs into the post-mobilization training sequence. This study will be completed by February 2000. The Mobility Requirements Study 2005 will conduct supporting lift analysis for the Army-led study. After the deployment timelines and strategic reserve requirements studies are completed, the RCE-05 study recommends that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff build on the results of these two studies to apportion ARNG divisions to the MTW CINCs in the next JSCP review cycle.

Define the Strategic Reserve. Throughout the Cold War, all RC combat forces played critical roles in the deliberate war plans and provided an important hedge as a strategic reserve in the event of global war. Given the threat posed by the Soviet Union, it was prudent to have a significant reservoir of personnel who could augment active and reserve forces if a U.S.-Soviet conflict proved more challenging than the war plans predicted. In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, U.S. defense strategy called for the reconstitution of military capabilities in the event the security environment proved to be substantially more challenging than predicted. This reconstitution would have drawn heavily from a strategic reserve of military capabilities. A survey of post-Cold War DoD strategy and planning documents reveals that today there is no official Department-wide definition outlining the potential need or employment concept for a strategic reserve.

Nevertheless, potential requirements may exist for additional, relatively, low-cost capabilities as a hedge against MTW risks in two mission areas.

First, MTWs may generate unanticipated requirements, or foreseen requirements may be more demanding than initially anticipated. Existing theater force requirements are based on scenarios positing the most likely conditions and threats versus the most dangerous ones. Greater than expected use of weapons of mass destruction, effective attacks on our strategic deployment infrastructure, or asymmetric attacks using means for which we are not fully prepared could generate requirements for forces or capabilities beyond those currently programmed. Further, existing OPLANs do not comprehensively address requirements for the post-conflict stages of MTWs. While meeting these unanticipated or more demanding requirements undoubtedly would be accomplished with the assistance of allies or coalition partners, the need for additional U.S. forces remains a distinct possibility.

Second, meeting the mobilization challenges associated with responding to two near-simultaneous MTWs, will place exceptional demands on all military services, in particular the Army. Providing the Total Force combat, CS, and CSS capabilities critical to success in the MTW theaters will require the support of a substantial base generating

and sustaining force, much of which will come from forces not apportioned in existing OPLANs.

As a result, DoD needs to determine the requirements and mission for a strategic reserve in the overall U.S. defense strategy. Only then can the Department determine the capabilities needed to meet that mission. Accordingly, the study recommends that the ASD(S&T), ASD(RA) and Joint Staff DJ8, in coordination with the DPA&E, Joint Staff DJ5, OACJCS(NG&RM), CINCs, and Services (all components), conduct a two-part study by December 1999 to define the strategic reserve concept, determine the military requirements, and develop associated force options.

Create More Air Force Associate Program Units. Within the Air Force, the study examined whether it would be useful to establish a certain number of associate program squadrons comprised of Reservists to fill shortages to fully man active A-10, OA-10, F-16, and F-15C squadrons in wartime. For example, creating associate A-10 squadrons will require additional personnel to fly and maintain the aircraft, but would not require additional A-10 platforms.

Current AC shortfalls prevent some squadrons from being fully manned. Establishing associate program units would fill shortfalls by converting 20 percent of AC positions into associate reservist positions. This includes high demand assets, which could be filled by the RC. Because AC personnel are not manning these positions currently, the RC personnel would increase the number of available crews to fly missions. This would distribute the operational tempo demands more equitably among the AC personnel. In turn this would increase the ability of the total force to retain skilled Air Force personnel in the Air Force Reserve and ANG. Developing these associate program relationships would increase personnel and training cost by approximately \$12 million annually, not including O&M costs.¹⁰ Because this initiative appeared to have potential benefits, the study recommends that the Air Force (all components), in coordination with ASD(RA), conduct a study by March 2000 to evaluate the potential for establishing associate units in the tactical fighter force.

Similarly, augmenting the planned joint surveillance, target attack radar system (JSTARS) squadrons with RC personnel through an associate program may also increase Air Force's ability to respond effectively during MTWs. Not only would such an increase provide a more robust JSTARS capability during MTWs, such an increase could also prove beneficial in peacetime. Increasing the number of available RC personnel by 30 percent would reduce operational tempo for AC personnel assigned to JSTARS platforms. However, as the JSTARS is expected to be a high demand asset, operational tempo for the associate reserve personnel is likely to increase. If the JSTARS squadrons are deployed frequently overseas, the Air Force may be challenged to ensure a sufficient RC pool to man the platforms as required by the theater CINCs. Even with a large RC pool, CINCs may prefer to avoid rotating associate crews in and out of theater. Therefore, a small group of reservists would experience very high operational tempo for extended periods, which could jeopardize employer relations and retention rates.

¹⁰ AF/REXP.

Establishing associate program units with JSTARS squadrons would cost approximately \$8.6 million annually and does not include the operations and maintenance costs associated with additional use of the JSTARS platform.¹¹

Associate program organizations have been successfully established for AWACS platforms, and could be appropriate for other similar high demand assets such as RC-135 Rivet Joint, etc. Because the associate program relationship appeared to offer potential benefits at minimum cost, the study recommends that the Air Force also consider this initiative for its upcoming POM, and if not so programmed, that the initiative be considered for implementation during the summer Program Review.

Transfer AC Bombers to RC Units. Transferring one B-52 and one B-1B squadron from the AC to RC may generate cost savings and could mitigate the current shortage of active duty pilots for these platforms. Transferring one B-52 squadron to the Air Force Reserve and moving one B-1B squadron to the ANG will save approximately \$54 million annually.¹² Shifting these squadrons into the RC will reduce the number of aircraft that must be manned by AC pilots, mitigating AC aircrew shortages. Moreover, these assets are not used frequently in peacetime, which means manning the platforms with RC pilots should not have a negative affect RC pilot retention. Converting these bombers from the AC to the RC would create management challenges -- determining how to certify RC personnel under the Personnel Reliability Program, the monitoring process all personnel who have access to nuclear weapons or nuclear-capable systems must undergo. Transferring these squadrons from the AC to RC also would result in fewer planes for active duty pilots to fly and would increase career competition. Fewer bombers for active duty pilots to fly also means that fewer pilots will ultimately separate from the Air Force with these skills, resulting in a smaller pool of potential pilots who will join the Reserves. Finally, transferring the bombers from the AC to RC will generate costs due to changing basing configurations and conducting additional personnel retraining. The study recommends that the Air Force (all components), in coordination with DPA&E and ASD(RA), conduct a study by November 1999 to jointly evaluate whether this transfer is feasible. At a minimum, this follow-on study would examine the operational impacts, and basing and conversion costs associated with the transfer. The study also recommends that USD(P), in coordination with USD(P&R), resolve the Personnel Reliability Program issues affecting use of drilling reservists in nuclear weapons-related programs.

Convert 1 Air Force Fighter Wing from AC to RC. Finally, the study considered whether converting one AC fighter wing to the RC would enhance the U.S. ability to respond effectively during a MTW. The AC wing could be converted into aircraft and personnel that are used to plus-up existing F-16 and A-10 squadrons, for example, or the active wing could be converted into 3 new ANG F-15 squadrons and a number of additional plus-ups to existing RC F-16 squadrons. Either conversion option would entail substantial near term costs, \$40 million and \$125 million respectively, due to expenses associated with retraining pilots and crews, ensuring proper equipment is available and

¹¹ AF/REXP.

¹² SABLE Model v. 2.0 (AF CAA), HQ ANG/XPPI and AF/REXP.

changing base arrangements as needed.¹³ Over the long term, however, conversion costs would decrease and the total cost of maintaining the fighter wing capability would be less than the current costs because reserve personnel are generally less expensive than active duty personnel. Importantly, converting a fighter wing to the RC would significantly increase operational tempo for the remaining AC pilots and crews because fewer wing assets would be available to fly the same number of missions during peacetime. Finally, RC pilots assigned to fly the upgraded and more sophisticated F-16 platform after the conversion would face additional training requirements that might negatively affect long-term retention for this group. While such a conversion might have significant negative impacts on active duty operational tempo and would incur substantial near-term costs, the study recommends that the Air Force (all components), in coordination with the Joint Staff, OACJCS(NG&RM), and ASD(RA) conduct a study to examine the costs and benefits of this conversion in more detail. The study will be completed by March 2000.

Shift RC Echelon Above Division Elements from second to first MTW. Shifting a percentage of RC CS and CSS units that are apportioned for echelon above division (EAD) requirements in the second MTW to fill similar requirements in the first MTW also could prove beneficial. The study examined the impact of shifting units comprising 10 percent of RC personnel who serve in EAD CS/CSS roles from the second to the first war. The shift would create greater flexibility for using the AC units, which are relieved by the RC shift, in meeting contingency operational requirements during peacetime, at less risk to potential MTW commitments.

The study determined that the Army already accomplishes the intent of this initiative through its force management process. This system routinely identifies both AC and RC units to fill early-deploying requirements generated by the commitment of MTW-apportioned units to peacetime contingencies. Formally reapportioning assets, as called for under this initiative, does not appear necessary, and might constrain the existing flexibility with which the Army meets requirements. The study endorses the existing Service efforts to use its total force capability in meeting peacetime and wartime requirements and requires no further study of this issue.

Increase RC Participation in Logistics Management. Increasing the RC role in logistics transportation management during MTWs could provide useful additional support to U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). Currently, personnel assigned to Military Traffic Management Command, Military Sealift Command, Defense Contracting Service, and Air Mobility Command are the core logistics and transportation management personnel during MTWs. Increasing the number of RC personnel who serve in these commands in the event of a MTW by 25 percent would provide additional support for USTRANSCOM at a lower cost than providing this increase using active duty personnel.

Increasing logistics and transportation management personnel by 25 percent, or about 956 personnel, would cost an additional \$5 million per year if the increase were accomplished by adding these personnel to the total number of personnel currently in the

¹³ AF/REXP.

RC.¹⁴ Given the size of the RC and current budget constraints, increasing the size of the RC for this specific purpose may not be cost effective. Alternatively, the Department could provide USTRANSCOM the same increase by moving existing RC personnel out of current positions into logistics management positions at USTRANSCOM. Shifting personnel out of other current mission areas could have an adverse impact on those missions, hence potential offsets for the USTRANSCOM positions would need to be studied carefully to ensure the benefits outweighed the risks. Finally, shifting personnel from other mission areas into positions at USTRANSCOM would require some retraining, which while not extensive, would entail some costs.

The study recommends a study by November 1999 to determine whether increasing the number of logistics management personnel at USTRANSCOM would be beneficial. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and USTRANSCOM, in coordination with its AC and RC components would conduct the study of whether additional personnel would facilitate moving equipment, supplies and forces to the warfighting theaters. If logistics and transportation management personnel shortages are a significant choke point that could be eased by adding personnel in wartime, the Service Components will then identify personnel offsets to facilitate the increase. The study also will determine the impact of these offsets on existing missions as well as the training requirements and associated costs such offsets would generate.

Provide RC Support for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. To further explore how RC personnel might be used more frequently in support of MTWs, the study examined the impact of using RC personnel to operate half of all strategic unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), a platform currently under development. While using the RC for this mission may be promising, the Department has not decided which UAV program to procure. Uncertainty over the future of the Global Hawk UAV program made it difficult to determine the costs and benefits of using RC personnel to oversee a significant number of UAV missions. If strategic UAVs become a high-demand asset, which many experts predict, using RC to man 50 percent of these missions may have an adverse impact on RC retention. If Global Hawk is developed as currently envisioned, using RC to support half the UAVs would save \$35 million annually. However, RC end strength would need to be increased, or offsets would be required to generate the necessary RC positions.¹⁵ These savings and manning levels could vary significantly based upon how the strategic UAV program is implemented. The study recommends that the Department not pursue this initiative until official decisions are made concerning UAV programs under development.

Refinement of Remaining of Alternative Employment Concepts

In addition to examining the RC role in homeland defense, SSCs, and MTWs, the study also refined a handful of employment concepts that, while not yet sufficiently developed for major analysis or implementation, merited further examination. The study examined increased RC participation in Prepare, or Department-wide transformation

¹⁴ USTRANSCOM; Army Forces Cost Model.

¹⁵ AF/REXP.

activities, increased RC participation in the strategic nuclear deterrence mission, greater AC/RC integration, and using the RC to provide greater operational and personnel tempo relief for the AC. Some of the following portion of the study overlaps with those examined in detail, and there were no fundamental inconsistencies in the findings. The study results for these concepts are summarized below, and covered in detail in Annex F.

To increase RC participation in Prepare activities, the study determined that the Services should examine the potential benefits of increasing RC participation in support of joint experimentation activities by 25 percent. The study also examined whether developing a standardized database of individual RC skills would facilitate increasing RC support for information operations and other missions. While such a database would enable the Services to more easily provide targeted RC support for Prepare activities, the database would likely be expensive and highly complex. As a result, Services may not choose to pursue this initiative.

The RC also may be able to participate more broadly in the strategic nuclear deterrence mission. The Services may examine whether to convert 50 percent of current manning for U.S. Strategic Command's alternate mobile command and control facility to the RC. This conversion would generate some costs savings. The study also considered transferring a squadron of AC Air Force nuclear-capable B-52 bombers to the RC to provide tempo relief for the AC units that fulfill the SIOP mission. However, the increased RC training costs and increased tempo likely to be incurred will be significant. As a result, the Air Force may not choose to study this initiative.

To increase integration of RC and AC, the study refined a variety of alternatives for Services to consider. Each Service should examine increasing the number of RC personnel able to take the Joint Professional Military Education II course by 10 percent, which would produce more joint qualified RC personnel. Increasing the number of full-time Service reservists and Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) on major staffs by 30 would also facilitate greater RC integration, as would increasing the level of RC representation in Department decision-making processes. The Marine Corps may increase the number of RC augmentees to Division and higher-level staffs by 30 percent for all Marine and major joint exercises, which would incur some costs, but also would provide tempo relief for the AC.

To increase RC integration, the Army may consider increasing integration of RC personnel into corps and echelon above corps (EAC) positions. The Army is establishing several multicomponent units that combine of AC, RC, and ARNG soldiers into single units. The Army is applying this concept on a test basis to combat, CS, and CSS units. While this concept may present training challenges, it creates greater stability within units because RC personnel do not generally change units as frequently as AC personnel. The Army is also planning to assign six eSBs to an AC-RC integrated division structure, as previously discussed.

Finally, the study examined a variety of mechanisms to increase the RC role in providing tempo relief for the AC. While not all of these mechanisms merited further

analysis, the study did recommend that a few be examined in more detail. For example, while forecasting the requirements for linguists is challenging, the study recommended that each Service consider ways to increase recruitment and retention of these specialists. As programmed in the ARNG Division Redesign Study (ADRS), the Army has planned increases in RC CS and CSS capabilities (e.g., engineer, ordnance, and military police units) to relieve tempo for HD/LD AC units. The Navy may consider increasing U.S. Navy Reserve support for interdeployment training cycle activities to increase integration of its RC into the active duty Navy. The study recommended that the Marine Corps examine converting RC division and wing headquarters staffs and HD/LD units into an IMA structure, under operational control of the AC and command element staffs. This would facilitate filling these positions efficiently because the Marine Corps could draw on individuals from various units rather than being required to identify an entire unit to be assigned to the staff. Finally, the Air Force may examine whether to enlarge its associate reserve AWACS squadron by 50 percent to provide additional tempo relief for these HD/LD active units.

The study determined that two alternative employment concepts it developed did not need further examination within the RCE-05 study because they are being addressed by other ongoing Department efforts. The theater engagement process (TEP) is fundamentally restructuring how the Department prioritizes, plans, and funds its engagement activities. Once the TEP is firmly in place, the Department can determine whether an effort to expand RC participation is needed. Finally, the ongoing ARDS is addressing how to increase the number of CS and CSS units in the RC, the last initiative the study raised for possible examination.

Resource Challenges for the RC Employment

The study's Resourcing panel also examined resource challenges for RC employment. The study assessed more than 30 resource issues confronting the RC, including RC accessibility, utilization, mobilization, training, staffing, and management. Several of the highest priority RC resource challenges are discussed below. For additional information on other resource challenges and the study's assessment of those issues, see Annex G.

Lifting the 180 Day Limit Requirement. Title 10, United States Code, Section 115(d)(6), states that volunteer reservists who have been on active duty for more than 180 days must be counted against the active military end-strength levels, which are set by law. The Services are unwilling to violate the Congressional end-strength authorizations, therefore, the Services are often hesitant to use reservists where their employment might otherwise be clearly beneficial. In some cases, the Services have terminated active duty tours for reservists near the end of a fiscal year to avoid violating the end-strength authorizations, even if this disrupted mission performance. Lifting this restriction would facilitate greater and more effective use of the RC, particularly in cases where RC personnel are providing tempo relief for AC personnel. As a result, the study supports the proposal in the DoD FY2000 Omnibus to modify this legislation. The modification would allow reservists to serve for 181 days or more as long as the total number of

reservists on active duty does not exceed .2 percent of the authorized active duty end strength.

Expediting Supplemental Appropriations Reimbursements. Each Service's budget includes funding to cover the costs of volunteer RC personnel and unit participation in peacetime operational missions. However, the Services requirement for RC personnel participation in these operations often exceeds the available funding. Supplemental appropriations may be used to cover these costs for the Army, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. But there is not always sufficient time left in the fiscal year to use the supplemental funds, and opportunities to employ RC personnel must be limited in scale or cancelled entirely. Because the supplemental funds cannot be used beyond the fiscal year in which they were issued, these opportunities to employ RC personnel are lost permanently. In other cases, sufficient funds to cover the costs of RC active duty support may exist, but the rules governing use of those funds may preclude transferring the funds between accounts.

Given the challenges to funding RC participation in SSCs, many active duty commanders are reluctant to use RC personnel and units even when they could make a clear contribution because the commander's limited ability to cover the costs of participation. The study examined whether a mechanism could be created to ensure that contingency operation costs are reimbursed more quickly. Currently, obtaining reimbursement once a supplemental appropriation is granted is a lengthy process that can up to 2 years. The study recommended that USD(C), ASD(RA), and the Services review current reimbursement processes and develop recommendations to increase how quickly reimbursements can be made.

Modify Limitations on Use of O&MA, O&MAR and O&MARNG Funds. In the Army's proposed multi-component units, soldiers from all three components will be assigned to units with an active unit identification code (UIC). Some interpretations of current law imply that only O&MA funds can be applied to units with an active UIC. The study recommends that the law be clarified to permit expenditure of O&MAR and O&MARNG funds on active UIC multi-component units to support Army and ARNG personnel assigned to those units.

Improving AC/RC Interoperability. In many cases, RC units and personnel do not have equipment that is interoperable with the equipment of AC counterparts. The DoD "first-to-employ, first-to-equip" policy, which underlies the Services' equipment distribution policies, requires that equipment be provided to units commensurate with their planned wartime deployment or employment. Compatibility and sustainability shortfalls in later-deploying units that have resulted from this policy have reduced unit effectiveness even as they continue to play a greater role in contingency and other ongoing operations. Particular concerns are in the areas of communications, utility helicopters, specific aircraft modifications and upgrades, tactical wheeled vehicles, engineering and construction equipment, and night vision devices. Currently, the Services use alternative resourcing methods that include borrowing equipment or rotating personnel while equipment is left in place, but readiness shortfalls remain for the loaner

units. While it is not financially feasible to equip AC and RC units with identical equipment, the Services have begun to identify specific acquisition funding for RC equipment within their POM submissions.

The FY 2000 National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report identifies the Services' plans to address RC shortages and incompatibilities, and as part of the FY2000-2001 Presidential budget, the Department plans to spend nearly \$6.6 billion for RC equipment between 1999 and 2002. The ASD(RA) has developed a RC equipping strategy to ensure that RC units are equipped in the future to support the National Military Strategy, to include crisis response and peacetime engagement activities. The long-term goal of the equipping strategy is to provide RC units with modern, compatible equipment.

Smart Cards to Minimize Processing Delays. Mobilizing RC personnel and units for active duty is sometimes delayed due to concerns over personnel data and deployment qualification records for RC personnel. When personnel records are incomplete, or their status is unclear, processing must often be completely redone, which can cause significant mobilization delays. The study determined that providing RC personnel with smart cards, or identification cards that contain a computer chip to store personnel information and other data, would help ensure that essential mobilization data is up-to-date and accurate, and would reduce unnecessary mobilization delays. The OSD Smart Card Technology Office issued a report to Congress on 31 March 1999 and to SecDef by September 1999 on the feasibility of implementing smart cards for the Uniformed Services. The Services, using a variety of test case mechanisms, are already examining the feasibility of providing smart cards to RC personnel.

Simplifying RC Peacetime Employment Procedures. Many AC commanders find it difficult to access RC personnel for use in joint military operations because of the lack of uniformity among the Services' RC structures and mobilization systems. The Joint Staff J-4 Mobilization Division has made significant progress in simplifying the mobilization process. However, the process is still complicated and poorly understood by many AC and RC commanders and staffs. The ASD(RA) is leading a working group to examine simplification and revision of the mobilization and deployment process. DoD Instruction 1235.12 and Joint Pub 4-05.1 address access to the RC during war, national emergencies, and contingency operations, so the working group is focusing on peacetime, non-PSRC access to RC personnel. The working group will complete its work by November 1999.

Establishing a Joint Professional Military Education Course for the RC. While there is a professional military education program to prepare AC personnel for service in joint assignments, a similar program for RC personnel does not exist. As a result, many RC personnel who serve in joint assignment begin those duties less prepared than is desirable. While RC personnel in joint billets do receive some on-the-job training in joint assignments once they arrive, these experiences rarely provide a solid or standardized foundation in the fundamentals of joint operations. To address this concern, the Department has proposed in its FY2000 Omnibus Legislation that a professional military

education course for the RC on joint assignments be established, specifically focused on the joint professional military education (JPME) phase 2 program. Currently no billets are allocated to the RC for JPME phase 2. The proposal also calls for an increase in RC billets for JPME phase 1 curriculums.

Benefits Equity Between the AC and RC. While much progress has been made in recent years to ensure equity in the benefit packages that are provided to AC and RC personnel, the study determined that disparities continue to exist for RC personnel. The study reviewed a variety of benefit issues and determined that commissary visits for IDT or AT category RC personnel and family members were recently increased from 12 to 24 visits annually. IDT or AT category RC personnel and family members also currently have unlimited access to exchanges. National Guard members responding to a federally-declared disaster now have full access to commissaries and exchanges while on active duty. The ASD(RA) is currently negotiating a GSA contract for drilling reservists to obtain the government contract airfare discount when travelling to drill sites. Space available travel, which is a benefit normally given to the AC for emergency leave or regular leave, does not apply to RC personnel in the IDT or AT status because RC personnel in this status do not accrue leave.

The study also determined during its review of benefits policies that the USD(P&R) is preparing a report to Congress on AC and RC pay and benefits parity that will be submitted by January 2000. Required by Defense Authorization Act, 1997, Section 1256, this report will focus on disparities in benefits for RC personnel who have been on active duty for more than 30 days. The report will address the following issues in detail: basic allowance for housing for reserve members without family members, the 140 day threshold for reserve entitlement to the full basic allowance for housing rate, CONUS COLA, use of leave accrued during short tours of active duty, medical care for family members, and disability severance pay.

In addition, OSD(RA) has been involved in two studies to address RC health care issues, a report to Congress required by the Defense Authorization Act, 1997, Section 746, and the RC Health Care Summit. Both studies will address RC-AC parity for health benefits and entitlements. The Section 746 study is currently in the final draft stage and will be submitted to Congress before August 1999. The RC Health Care Summit will make recommendations to improve the medical readiness of RC members, to provide appropriate health care and medical entitlements for those who become ill or injured as a result of service, and to ensure uniformity and consistency among the Services. The report will be submitted to the SecDef following the submission of the Section 746 study.

Lifting the Restraint on Operational Duties for Full-Time Reservists. Currently, full-time reservists with administrative responsibilities for maintaining RC units are expected to continue those duties when the unit is deployed, rather than assuming other operational or command duties. Title 10, United States Code, Section 101(d)(6)(A), states that AGR duty should be used for the purpose of organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, or training the RC. This policy evolved from a philosophy that envisioned full-time reservists performing significant unit administration so part-time

reservists could focus almost exclusively on training. In today's environment, full time reservists are being used increasingly to augment the AC during operational missions; however, existing legal and policy constraints governing use of full-time reservists in operational missions have in some cases precluded reservists from serving in these missions as effectively as possible. The study determined that these issues are being addressed by a congressionally directed study being conducted by the ASD(RA) and the Services that will be completed in November 1999.

Creating More RC Staff Positions at Headquarters. Unfamiliarity within the AC with RC missions, capabilities, structures, and resource procedures hampers the ability of the Department to use the RC most effectively. Increasing the integration of the RC leadership into the decision-making processes within the DoD would reduce this unfamiliarity and facilitate more comprehensive and effective employment of the RC. To integrate RC leadership personnel more fully into the DoD, the study recommended increasing the number of full-time National Guard and reserve officers and senior noncommissioned officers into unified command headquarters and joint activities. The study also recommended raising the number of National Guard and Reserve general and flag officers serving in these organizations. The Reserve Forces Policy Board supports both of these recommendations.

Conclusion

Due to its broad mandate, the RC Employment 2005 Study examined a wide range of issues and drew participants from virtually every organization interested in the future of the total force. Not only did the study generate a variety of new initiatives that will enhance the role of the RC across the spectrum of DoD missions, the study process strengthened relationships between the AC and RC. The follow-on studies resulting from RCE-05 will build on this enhanced relationship, and are likely to generate additional mechanisms to increase AC and RC integration.

GLOSSARY

AAN	Army after next
AAR	After action report
AC	active component
ADSW	active duty for special work
AEF	Air Expeditionary Force
AFSC	Air Force Specialty Code
AGR	active guard and reserve
ALO	authorized level organization
ANG	Air National Guard
AOR	Area of Operational Responsibility
ARNG	Army National Guard
ADRS	Army National Guard Redesign Study
ASD(C3I)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence)
ASD(RA)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)
ASD(SOLIC)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict)
AT	annual training
C2	command and control
CB	chemical-biological
CINC	commander-in-chief
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CM	consequence management
COLA	cost of living allowance
CONUS	continental United States
CONPLAN	contingency plan
CS	combat support
CSS	combat service support
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DASD	Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
DepSecDef	Deputy Secretary of Defense
DEPTempo	deployment tempo
DISA	Defense Information Systems Agency
DMDC	Defense Manpower Data Center
DoD	Department of Defense
DoDD	Department of Defense Directive
DoDI	Department of Defense Instruction
DPAG	Defense Planning Advisory Group
DPG	Defense Planning Guidance
DPP	Defense Program Projection
DRI	Defense Reform Initiative

DoD	Department of Defense
EEA	essential elements of analyses
EAC	echelon above corps
EAD	echelon above division
ESB	enhanced separate brigade
FWE	fighter wing equivalent
FORSCOM	Forces Command
FTS	full-time support
FY	fiscal year
FYDP	Future Years Defense Program
GO/FO	general officer/flag officer
GOSC	general officer steering committee
HD/LD	high-demand/low-density
HQ	Headquarters
IA	information assurance
IDA	Institute for Defense Analysis
IDT	inactive duty for training
IMA	individual mobilization augmentee
IO	information operations
IPS	illustrated planning scenarios
IRR	individual ready reserve
JMETL	joint mission essential task list
JOPEs	joint operations planning and execution system
JPME	joint professional military education
JRAM	joint readiness automated management system
JSCP	joint strategic capabilities plan
JTD	joint table of distribution
JTF	joint task force
JTF-CND	joint task force for computer network defense
JTMD	joint table of mobilization distribution
JWRAC	joint web risk assessment cell
MFO	multinational force and observers
MIO	maritime intercept operations
MOA	memorandum of agreement
MOE	measurement of effectiveness
MOS	military occupational specialty
MOU	memorandum of understanding
MRS	Mobility Requirements Study

MTW	major theater wars
MAGTF	Marine Air-Ground Task Force
N/A	not applicable
NCO	noncommissioned officer
NEC	naval enlisted code
NMD	national missile defense
NMS	National Military Strategy
NSIPS	Navy Standard Integrated Pay System
OACJCS(NG&RM)	Office of the Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (National Guard and Reserve Matters)
OCONUS	outside continental United States
O&MA	operations and maintenance Army
O&MAR	operations and maintenance Army Reserve
O&MARNG	operations and maintenance Army National Guard
OPLAN	operations plan
OPSEC	operational security
OPTEMPO	operational tempo
O&M	operations and maintenance
PAA	primary assigned aircraft
PERSTEMPO	personnel tempo
PIM	pre-trained individual manpower
PME	professional military education
POE	posture of engagement
POM	Program Objective Memorandum
PPBS	Planning, Programming and Budgeting System
PRP	personal reliability program
PSRC	presidential selected reserve call-up
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
RAID	rapid assessment and initial detection
RBA	revolution in business affairs
RC	Reserve Component
RFPB	Reserve Forces Policy Board
RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs
RML	revolution in military logistics
ROC	required operational capabilities
ROCC	regional operations command center
SecDef	Secretary of Defense
SMCR	Selected Marine Corps Reserve
SOS	support to other Services
SRC	standard requirements code

SSC	smaller-scale contingency
SSG	senior steering group
TEP	theater engagement plan
TPFDD	time-phased force deployment data
TTAD	temporary tour of active duty
UAV	unmanned aerial vehicle
UIC	unit identification code
UJTL	universal joint task list
ULB	unified legislative budget
USACOM	United States Atlantic Command
USCINACOM	Commander-in-Chief, United States Atlantic Command
USCINCCENT	Commander-in-Chief, United States Central Command
USCINCSpace	Commander-in Chief, United States Space Command
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command
USEUCOM	United States European Command
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
USSOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command
USNR	United States Naval Reserve
USMCR	United States Marine Corps Reserve
USD(A&T)	Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology
USD(C)	Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller
USD(P)	Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
USD(P&R)	Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
UTL	universal task list
WEAR	wartime executive agency requirements
WMD	weapons of mass destruction

ANNEX A

STUDY PLAN RESERVE COMPONENT EMPLOYMENT – 2005

1. Purpose. This study plan for the DPG-directed RCE-05 describes the study's background, objectives, scope, limitations, key assumptions, constraints, essential elements of analysis, methodology, organization, and coordination activities.
2. Background. To support the imperatives of engagement and leadership set forth in the National Security Strategy, the DoD has developed a strategy and defense program -- defined in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) -- that promotes the nation's interests throughout the 1997-2015 period. The strategy requires DoD to help shape the international security environment in ways favorable to U.S. interests, to respond to the full spectrum of crises when directed, and to prepare to meet the challenges of an uncertain future. These three elements -- shape, respond, and prepare -- define the essence of the U.S. defense strategy between 1998 and 2015.¹⁶ The United States must size, shape, and manage its forces effectively to be capable of meeting the fundamental challenge of the nation's defense strategy. This assessment will develop additional insights and potential alternatives for employing the RC forces in support of the defense strategy, from homeland defense and SSCs through MTWs.¹⁷ Additionally, the study will explore opportunities to enhance the integration of the RC within the scope of their total force missions.
3. Objectives. This study will fulfill the DPG tasking to study alternative concepts for employing RC forces in the future. The study will address four specific objectives:
 - a. Review the full range of combat and support RC roles in current operational plans and assess currently planned employment.
 - b. Identify and assess potential RC missions in CONUS and outside CONUS (OCONUS) in peacetime and across the full spectrum of conflict, including the RC's role in the strategic reserve.
 - c. Develop and assess alternative RC employment roles and force-mix concepts, including an evaluation of costs, benefits, and risks for each option.
 - d. Assess RC resourcing for current and recommended requirements.
4. Scope and Limitations.
 - a. This study will provide alternative for consideration at senior levels of AC-RC force mixes and employment concepts that are assessed and compared with respect to costs, benefits, and risks. It will not reach definitive conclusions or recommend one set

¹⁶ Defense Planning Guidance FY 2000-2005 p. 9

¹⁷ DPG FY 2000-2005 pp 26, 35-36.

of alternatives over another. The senior steering group (SSG) will determine the set of alternatives.

b. This study will also provide alternative solutions with respect to resourcing RC activities, The SSG will provide the final recommendations.

c. Force structure data as of 1 October 1998 will be used as the baseline for determining existing capabilities.

d. The final report will be sent to the SecDef

5. Assumptions.

a. All solutions will be supportable through an all volunteer force.

b. Services will identify their wartime executive agency requirements (WEAR) and support to other services (SOS).

c. Amending United States Code, Titles 10, 14, 32, and other applicable legislation will be examined.

d. Cost analysis will be done in FY 1999 constant year dollars, and will use POM 00-05 and associated Defense Program Projection (DPP) as the force structure baseline.

e. Coast Guard will be considered throughout the spectrum of military operations.

f. Force structure and budgets can flow between all DoD elements.

g. The study will use scenarios consistent with the DPG FY 2000-05 illustrative planning scenarios (IPS) where available. For emerging missions, where IPSs are not available, the latest threat data available from Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the intelligence centers or historical data will be used in coordination with the CINCs.

(1) Level of SSC participation will be per the DPG postures of engagement IPSs.

(2) Domestic support participation will be based on the last ten years.

h. The study will use the force structure for all Services and components as reflected in the POM 00-05 force structure as the evaluation base.

i. Strategic lift capabilities per POM 00-05 will be based on the best data available. There will be no significant changes to the programmed DoD strategic lift capability.

j. Overseas troop levels are likely to remain constant.

k. Current operational concepts will be used for baseline analysis.

l. Wartime host-nation support requirements per existing negotiated agreements will be used for baseline analysis.

6. Constraints.

a. Proposed roles, missions, and force mixes will be limited by the top line of the Defense budget.

b. Proposed roles and missions, including homeland defense, will not be expand into roles and missions currently executed by other Federal Government departments and agencies. However, new emerging potential missions can be explored.

c. The study baseline is bounded by: CINC estimates, existing treaties, alliances, Memoranda Of Agreement (MOAs), and Memoranda Of Understanding (MOUs) with foreign nations and inter-Service agreements.

d. Current Service recruiting quality standards will not be lowered.

7. Variables for analysis of alternatives. The study will address the primary variables followed by secondary variables as time permits.

a. Primary

- (1) Ability to disengage.
- (2) Accessibility to RC, to include volunteers.
- (3) Unit readiness.
- (4) Lift timelines.

b. Secondary

- (1) Availability of volunteers.
- (2) Timeliness.
- (3) Resources.
- (4) Technology insertion.
- (5) Capability.
- (6) Host-nation support.

8. Organization.

a. The study will be conducted by four panels: Missions and Capabilities, Mix Employment Alternatives, Assessment, and Resources. Membership of each panel will include representatives from USD(S&TR), Joint Staff, OSD(PA&E), ASD(RA), each Service and RC, Coast Guard, and CINCs. See figure 1.

b. A study support team co-chaired by Deputy Director for Force Structure, Resources and Requirements (J-8), Joint Staff, and DASD(S&TR) will oversee the day-to-day efforts of the panels.

c. The SSG, co-chaired by the Director, J-8, ASD(S&TR), and ASD(RA) will be comprised of OSD(PA&E), Service component representatives to include the Coast Guard, Service Secretaries, the National Guard Bureau, and OACJCS(NG&RM).

d. The Defense Planning Advisory Group (DPAG) will review the study plan, and provide guidance to the study team. They will receive a final report briefing.




Figure A-1.

e. The Missions and Capabilities Panel will meet first. The panel will focus on study objectives one and two. They will identify the current required missions, required capabilities, and existing capabilities for shaping, responding and preparing; and the potential RC CONUS and OCONUS missions across the entire spectrum of conflict, including homeland defense and the strategic reserve.

f. The Mix Employment Alternatives Panel will take the output from the first panel and develop 10 to 20 themes of alternative force mixes and employment concepts to meet the National Military Strategy (NMS) missions. These themes will be presented to the SSG who will select three to five for the assessment panel to focus on.

g. The Assessment Panel will analyze the selected alternative force mixes and employment concepts, determining costs, benefits, and risks of each. Additionally, the panel will perform sensitivity analyses of the alternatives using the study variables.

h. The Resources Panel will assess the resourcing implications of each of the alternative force mixes and employment concepts and examine a range of resourcing initiatives to address RC resourcing challenges.

9. Essential Elements of Analysis (EEAs). The EEAs were derived from the four objectives established in the DPG (Para 3). Representatives from each of the Service components, OSD, Joint Staff, Coast Guard, CINCs, and Service Secretariats for Manpower and Reserve Affairs developed the EEAs.

a. Objective One -- Addressing Current Requirements -- has four EEAs:

1.1 What missions and capabilities does the NMS of shape, respond and prepare require of the total force?

1.2 What total force capabilities currently exist to meet the missions required by the NMS of shape, respond, and prepare?

1.3 How have the Services assigned those capabilities to their AC and RC?

1.4 To what extent are the capabilities of the RC recognized in current Joint and CINC operational planning documents?

b. Objective Two -- Addressing Potential Missions -- has three EEAs:

2.1 What are the potential RC missions to support the shape aspects of the NMS?

2.2 What are the potential RC missions to support the respond aspects of the NMS?

2.3 What are the implications of the prepare activities of the NMS for DoD's RC?

c. Objective Three -- Addressing Force-Mix Alternatives -- has two EEAs:

3.1 What are alternative AC-RC force mixes and employment concepts to support the NMS?

3.2 What are the costs, benefits, and risks of each alternative AC-RC force mix to execute the NMS?

d. Objective Four -- Addressing RC Resourcing -- has five EEAs:

4.1 What are the resourcing implications of the force mixes and employment concepts assessed under Objective 3?

4.2 What resource initiatives would improve funding processes for military operations in support of the NMS?

4.3 What are the challenges in current RC resourcing? (To be examined prior to Objective 4.2)

4.4 How could legislative authority be adjusted to provide more effective early, rapid, and continuous access to the RC?

4.5 How could the Individual Ready Reserve be more effectively used in the alternatives described in Objective 3?

10. Methodology.

a. The study will use the results of Workshop III (annex A) as a guide and apply the following analytical approach to meet its objectives:

- Review current AC-RC missions, force structure, employment, and resourcing.
- Describe potential RC missions in support of the requirements of the NMS.
- Develop alternative force mixes and alternative employment concepts based on those identified potential missions.
- Analyze alternative force mixes and employment concepts using cost, benefit and risk criteria.
- Conduct sensitivity analysis using defined variables listed in paragraph 7.
- Determine the resourcing implications of alternative force mixes and employment concepts.
- Develop resourcing initiatives to address the identified resource implications.

b. The effort begins with a data call to the CINCs and Services, as well as a scrub of existing data, to gather a comprehensive list of required missions and capabilities as well as existing force structure to provide those capabilities. The Missions and Capabilities Panel will compare requirements against existing structure and validated shortfalls and identify potential new areas for RC employment.

c. A range of alternative force mixes and employment concepts will be developed and assessed using Service force mix criteria, Service future concepts, CINC requirements, ideas from stakeholders, and study variables to determine viable alternatives. Cost, benefit, and risk analysis for each viable alternative will then be completed.

d. A detailed algorithm for analysis of the alternative force mixes and employment concepts will be determined once specific analytical and modeling tools have been selected by the assessment panel.

e. Required resources, legislative changes and policy changes will be considered for each alternative.

f. The final report will provide decision makers with a set of alternative RC force mixes and employment concepts with supporting analysis, as well as potential resourcing initiatives to enhance RC employment within the total force.

12. Reports. The report will be submitted to CJCS on 15 February 1999 for transmittal to the SecDef. It will provide a set of alternative force-mixes and employment concepts with associated costs, benefits, and risks, and a set of potential resourcing initiatives to enhance RC employment within the total force.

13. Responsibilities. Joint Staff Director for J-8 and ASD(S&TR) will co-chair the study with the coordination of ASD(RA), Director (PA&E), the CINCs, and the Services. The study will be completed by 26 February 1999.

a. The panels will be led by the Joint Staff and ASD(S&TR). Representatives from each CINC, Service, and RC (including the Coast Guard), ASD(RA) and Director(PA&E) will be members of each panel.

b. The Study Support Team will provide oversight and resolve conflicts.

c. The SSG will provide guidance and oversight of the study.

14 Plan of Action and Milestones.

Required Completion

a. Initial Data Call	25 September
b. Objectives 1, 2 and 4.3	9 October
c. Objective 3.1	23 October
d. In-Process Review (validate alternatives and tools)	29 October
e. Objectives 3.2 and 4.1	4 November
f. Objectives 4.2, 4.4 and 4.5	11 December
g. In-Process Review	16 December
h. Draft Report	18 January
i. Draft Report brief to SSG	21 January
j. Out-brief the DPAG	29 January
k. Final Draft Report	5 February
l. Final Report brief to SSG	10 February
m. Final Report to SecDef	26 February

15. Coordination Activities.

a. Joint Staff J-8 is responsible for coordination among Service and CINC planners, Military Secretaries, and OSD principals. A final briefing and report presenting the

alternatives developed by the study group will be provided to the SSG and the DPAG before going to the SecDef.

b. Coordination among panels is to be accomplished directly by the panel chairs. Unresolved issues will be raised to the Study Support Team.

c. Coordination between analysis groups, Services, and CINCs for required Service data and other issues requiring formal Service positions is to be accomplished at the planner level. The panel members should expedite this coordination. Service representatives will keep the Service planners informed.

d. OSD(S&TR) and J8 will coordinate briefings with the SSG.

RCE-05 Study Methodology

Researchable Question(s)	Measures of Effectiveness	Information Required	Information Source(s)	Data Collection Methods
Objective 1: Review full range of combat and support RC roles in current operational plans and assess currently planned employment.				
Issue 1.1: What missions/capabilities does the NMS of shape, respond and prepare require of the total force?	None identified	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focus on requirements (unconstrained) • Emerging areas (pulse other agencies) • JVCS established common frames of reference <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CINC Inputs • Executive/ • Congressional directed support • Federal/Domestic missions • Planning data • Peacetime data • 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NMS, DPG, JSCP, QDR, UJTL, DPG, CORM, Titles 10/32/14, Goldwater-Nichols • DOE, FEMA, FBI, etc. (for emerging areas) • PDDs/DoDDs • JSCAP/JMETL • UCP/"Forces For" • Warplans • CINC, Services, JCS (for planning data) • TPFDD • Services and CINCs (for peacetime data) • Historical data • Guard and Reserve • Theater Engagement Plan (TEP) • Integrated Priority List 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Comprehensive research of input documents • Task Services, Joint Staff, and CI NCs for input • Ensure clear direction at outset (written and verbal) • Use common frames/terms of reference for the Services

Researchable Question(s)	Data Analysis Methods	Sequence and Relationship	Limitations	Product/Output
Issue 1.1: What missions/capabilities does the NMS of shape, respond and prepare require of the total force?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Descriptive analytical method • Post missions lessons learned (AAR) • Historical look to determine SSC/Other requirements • Mission area analysis (No MOEs) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This issue must be addressed first -- provides foundation for issues 2, 3, and 4. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Differences among the Services (e.g., terminology, data fields, etc.) • Addressing availability could limit the scope of the study 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Matrix of required missions vs. required capabilities • Inventory of capabilities required to support NMS statement of capability (# if possible) • A list of total force missions capability required by NMS • Service capabilities required by JCS, CINC, Services • Cross Service Requirement

RCE-05 Study Methodology

Researchable Question(s)	Measures of Effectiveness	Information Required	Information Source(s)	Data Collection Methods
<p>Issue 1.2: What total force capabilities currently exist to meet the missions required by the NMS of shape, respond, prepare?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Size and depth of capability 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FY 2000 snapshot of Services list/structure • Service identification of multi-mission units (where used) • Forces for unified commanders list (Forces For) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • JSCP, white papers, posture statements, Annual Defense Report, Mobility Requirements Study, Defense Manpower Requirements Report • JMETL/Service METLs, UJTL • UTC • ROC/POE • SRC/UIC • Service IRR • FYDP • OSD FAA • Army – DCSOPS, Navy – OPNAV, USMC- Total Force Structure Division, Air Force – XP (Planning, Programming) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Define capability first • Obtain and store data • Task Services for lists

Researchable Question(s)	Data Analysis Methods	Sequence and Relationship	Limitations	Product/Output
<p>Issue 1.2: What total force capabilities currently exist to meet the missions required by the NMS of shape, respond, and prepare?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Descriptive analytical method • Translate existing POM force into existing capabilities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Early in the process, but not before issue 1. Can be done simultaneously with issue 1 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Differences among the Services 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Matrix of required missions vs. existing capabilities -- identify differences • List of existing capabilities • Table/list of Service units for each NMS capability (including force/unit levels)

RCE-05 Study Methodology

Researchable Question(s)	Measures of Effectiveness	Information Required	Information Source(s)	Data Collection Methods
Issue 1.3: How have the Services assigned those capabilities to their AC and RC?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> All forces accounted for (completeness) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> SORTS unit level and SORTS equivalents Type of units by Service and component Service provided AC/RC mix 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Service Annual Report (force list, roll up, etc), Annual Report to Congress Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) Service statement -NMS: Shape, Prepare, Respond -Policies -Employment Concepts Army – DCSOPS Force Programs, Navy – OPNAV, Marines - PPO, Air Force - XP 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Task Services for inputs (quantity and process)

Researchable Question(s)	Data Analysis Methods	Sequence and Relationship	Limitations	Product/Output
Issue 1.3: How have the Services assigned those capabilities to their AC and RC?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Focus on unit level of capability (rather than individual) Determination of ratio of AC to RC for each existing capability 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Early in the process Follows issues 1 and 2 Follows issue 2 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Differences among the Services 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> List of current Service capabilities resident in AC and RC force structures Proportional share of each capability -Reflection of IRR and IMA participation in unit capabilities Existing capabilities split by Service and component Service statements of force mix approach Factors, constraints, limitations Table of AC/RC mix for each unit Discussion/ Process by Service

RCE-05 Study Methodology

Researchable Question(s)	Measures of Effectiveness	Information Required	Information Source(s)	Data Collection Methods
Issue 1.4: To what extent are the capabilities of the RC recognized in current Joint and CINC operational planning documents?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • None identified 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 6 OPLANs/ • CONPLANs with TPFDDs and integrated TPFDDs • Inputs derived from issues 1-3 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Army – MTOF/Total Army Analysis (TAA) 07 process (DAMO-FD has data) • USAF – XO, XP; • Navy – OPNAV; • Marines – PP&O • Services, CINCs, and Joint Staff (for explanations) • Deliberate plans, current troop lists, historical data 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TPFDD and OPLAN Annex A, Appendix 5 extraction • Allow services, CINCs, and Joint Staff to provide results and comments

Researchable Question(s)	Data Analysis Methods	Sequence and Relationship	Limitations	Product/Output
Issue 1.4: To what extent are the capabilities of the RC recognized in current Joint and CINC operational planning documents?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TPFDD broken out by UIC (goes into SORTS) • Redefine relevancy of units--not just those in MTW • Summation of MTW requirements • Compare Q1 results to Q2 and Q3 • Use Joint Readiness Automation Management System (JRAM) • Utilize base generating force and CONUS sustaining base • List by OPLAN <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -A&T -Task not TPFDD'd -Backfill -None of the above 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • After issue 1 • After issues 1, 2, and 3 • After deltas in RC capabilities have been identified 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Differences among the Services 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AC/RC units listed in support of theater CINC plans by TPFDD • Matrix of planning documents by RC existing capabilities <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • percent extent use • Forces that Services require to deploy the TPFDD • RC units not specified in current plans not used – Why not? • To get answer as to what CINCS RC requirements are <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • List of RC units not used and why • List of requirements not satisfied or sourced and why • List of dual or multiple-use units • Extent that RC capability is reflected in planning documents (e.g., OPLANs, CONPLANs, TEP)

RCE-05 Study Methodology

Researchable Question(s)	Measures of Effectiveness	Information Required	Information Source(s)	Data Collection Methods
Objective 2: Identify and assess potential RC missions in CONUS and OCONUS in peacetime and across the full spectrum of conflict, including the RC's role in the strategic reserve.				
Issue 2.1: What are the potential RC missions to support the shape aspects of the NMS?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Predictability • Resources • Urgency (time to prepare) • Duration • Combat-Terminate • Unique Skills • Cost (life cycle) • Size • CINC MOEs • Unit benefits derived 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Definition of Shaping missions • Outputs from objective 1 • Definition/ scope of "Shape" • Identification/ • Assessment of new and emerging missions not in objective 1 (fund look) • AC-RC assessment considerations • Service assessment of best AC-RC adaptability 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NMS • Shape missions list • ANG Study of MOEs, Air Force Mix Study, JV 2010 (emerging missions) [for historical data] • Base documents from objective 1 • Policy documents (OSD-RA, JCS pubs, etc.) • Documents from RFPB, Services, CINCs, RC Headquarters • RC OPTEMPO reports • PDDs • DPG IPS, TEPs, Service/contract studies (for identification and assessment of new and emerging missions) • Terms of Reference • Joint Pub 1.02 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Obtain documents from Services, CINCs, RC Headquarters, RFPB, etc. • Extract data from policy documents, reports, etc.

RCE-05 Study Methodology

Researchable Question(s)	Data Analysis Methods	Sequence and Relationship	Limitations	Product/Output
<p>Issue 2.1: What are the potential RC missions to support the shape aspects of the National Military Strategy?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Create matrix to identify whether current shaping missions are done by the AC or RC • Develop AC and RC considerations (template) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -urgency, duration, sills, cost, size, CINC requirements -different weights for shape, respond, prepare • Determine capabilities required for new and emerging issues • Screen and assess all shape missions by AC and RC considerations • Measure of AC OPTEMPO relief • Develop a flow chart/PERT diagram to capture the decision progress to select RC missions • Diagram decision process to select RC missions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Follows objective 1, issue 3 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Short time frame to prepare study 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • List of military shaping missions • List of military capabilities • List of full range of missions supporting shape <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Missions for shape by capability and availability -Identify key considerations for each mission • Identify forces required for shaping missions • Identify constraints and benefits to RC participation • Recommendations for potential RC missions

RCE-05 Study Methodology

Researchable Question(s)	Measures of Effectiveness	Information Required	Information Source(s)	Data Collection Methods
Issue 2.2: What are the potential RC missions to support the respond aspects of the NMS, including in CONUS?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • None identified 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Output from objective 1 • AC/RC assessment considerations • Definition/ scope of Respond • Identification and Assessment of new and emerging missions not in objective 1 • Definition for strategic reserve • Homeland defense documents • New unvalidated missions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CINCs (war plans, campaign plans), • JCS (JSR), Services, think tanks, CIA, FBI, DIA, NSA, FEMA, DOT (for new and emerging missions) • CONPLANs • Functional plans • DMRR • Published documents • NSS, NMS, JV 2010 • Service data (e.g., MTOF) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Obtain information on emerging missions through existing DoD study efforts

Researchable Question(s)	Data Analysis Methods	Sequence and Relationship	Limitations	Product/Output
Issue 2.2: What are the potential RC missions to support the respond aspects of the NMS, including in CONUS?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Service assessment of best AC-RC adaptability • Develop AC-RC considerations • Screen all respond missions by AC-RC considerations • Determine capabilities required for new/emerging missions • Assess SSC OPTEMPO • Assess transition requirements from SSC to MTW • Develop AC-RC considerations template (see previous issue) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Follows objective 1, issue 3 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assessing relevancy of RC to perform missions could be problematic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Output matrix • List of full range of existing and emerging missions supporting respond <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -identify key considerations -missions for respond by RC capability and/ availability • Identification of respond missions • Identification of forces required, constraints to participation, benefits of participation • List of military respond missions and capabilities • List of strategic reserve respond missions

RCE-05 Study Methodology

Researchable Question(s)	Measures of Effectiveness	Information Required	Information Source(s)	Data Collection Methods
Issue 2.3: What are the implications for DoD's RC of the Prepare aspects of the NMS?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Level of RC involvement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • List of skills in RC • List of activities (RMA, RBA, RML) • Joint experimentation/modernization • RMA and SSC information • OSD Net Assessments 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Defense Reform Initiative (DRI), NSS, NMS, JV 2010 • Army After Next (AAN) • USAF long-range planning • Service doctrine centers • War colleges • Joint Staff • Think tanks/contractors • Battle lab charters 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Task Services to provide inputs • Obtain studies • Brainstorming

Researchable Question(s)	Data Analysis Methods	Sequence and Relationship	Limitations	Product/Output
Issue 2.3: What are the implications for DoD's RC of the prepare aspects of the NMS?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Analysis to identify timeline/size/steps taken • Gaming models (e.g., JCATS, BOGSAT) • Relate skills to future activities • Descriptive analysis • Description of implications • Consideration of modernization in the integration of the "fight" • Analysis that will result in a matrix showing relationship among mission, who (AC or RC), and consideration 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • After objective 1, issue 3 • Follows first objective • Independent of but coordinated with objective 2, issues 1 and 2 • After objective 1 (need list of new and emerging issues and activities to be collected with data from objective 1) • Output feeds into objective 3 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • None identified 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Matrix showing relationship between "Prepare Now" activities and AC/RC capabilities • List of implications • Service assessment -Civilian unique skills -Possible RC enhancements • Revised definition of "reservist" • List of activities to support prepare requirements and • Identify RC-unique individual skills • Unique unit capabilities • Identify potential RC roles • Identification of cross-over skills embedded in RC populations • Identification of potential RMA, RBA, RML requirements • List of all potential missions and capabilities in prepare phase

RCE-05 Study Methodology

Researchable Question(s)	Measures of Effectiveness	Information Required	Information Source(s)	Data Collection Methods
Objective 3: Develop and assess alternative RC employment roles and force mix concepts, including an evaluation of costs, benefits, and risks for each option.				
Issue 3.1: What are alternative AC/RC force mixes and employment concepts to support the NMS?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Duration • Predictability • Accessibility • Deployability • Time • Training (to include post-mob) • Impact of 2 MTWs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Current employment concepts • Current force mix • Mission requirements • Service planned and current concepts • Outputs from objectives 1 and 2 • Ideas from stakeholders • Service concept of AC/RC integration • Alternative employment concepts from Services and RCs • Potential missions by M/S/L • Other employment concepts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RFPB output • RAND and Service studies • Services and RCs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Viable alternative RC force mix concepts and employment roles (shape and respond) -Mix described by Service • Key issues affecting RC integration initiatives (prepare) • Alternative RC employment roles and force mix concepts by Shape, Respond, and Prepare • Key issues affecting RC integration

Researchable Question(s)	Data Analysis Methods	Sequence and Relationship	Limitations	Product/Output
Issue 3.1: What are alternative AC/RC force mixes and employment concepts to support the NMS?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Duration • Predictability • Accessibility • Deployability • Time • Training (to include post-mob) • Impact of 2 MTWs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Current employment concepts • Current force mix • Mission requirements • Service planned and current concepts • Outputs from objectives 1 and 2 • Ideas from stakeholders • Service concept of AC and RC integration • Alternative employment concepts from Services and RCs • Potential missions by M/S/L • Other employment concepts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RFPB output • RAND and Service studies • Services and RCs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Wargame • Brainstorm (flows from objectives 1 and 2) • Service and RC responses • Bounce off CINC requirements • Review literature and previous studies

RCE-05 Study Methodology

Researchable Question(s)	Measures of Effectiveness	Information Required	Information Source(s)	Data Collection Methods
Issue 3.2: What are the costs, benefits and risks of each alternative AC/RC force mix to execute the NMS?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Costs, benefits, and risks 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Output from objective 2 and objective 3, issue 1 • Benefit and risk assessment criteria (Services and CINCs) • Service comparison criteria • Study variables • TEMPO history 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cost models • Deployment models and Service inputs • PERSTEMPO/ • OPTEMPO models • SADE and other models • Service costing data • Services and CINCs (for benefit and risk assessment criteria) • JMRR 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Obtain information generated from cost models • Obtain Service and CINC inputs

Researchable Question(s)	Data Analysis Methods	Sequence and Relationship	Limitations	Product/Output
Issue 3.2: What are the costs, benefits and risks of each alternative AC/RC force mix to execute the NMS?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conduct cost, benefit, and risk analyses (NOTE: Costing will be done by an independent source. Categories will include fiscal, personnel, political, operational, etc.) -Compare alternatives against existing force mix and employment concepts -Determine relationship between costs, benefits, and risks -Apply cost models Sensitivity analyses using study variables • Consider CINC and Service • Customer risk assessments 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • After objective 3, issue 1 and objective 4, issue 1 • After objective 3, issue 1 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Time constraints 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Set of costs, benefits, and risks for each alternative developed in objective 3, issue 1 - Include summary comparison

RCE-05 Study Methodology

Researchable Question(s)	Measures of Effectiveness	Information Required	Information Source(s)	Data Collection Methods
Objective 4: Assess RC resourcing for current and recommended requirements.				
Issue 4.1: What are the resourcing implications of the force mixes and employment concepts assessed under objective #3?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cost • Time • Personnel requirements • Equipment • Environmental impact 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Force mixes and concepts from objective 3 (as applicable for each resource implication) • Policy and legislative changes required to meet alternative mixes • Costing resource factors • Service current mission deployment criteria • Base timelines 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • OSD, Services and Legislative Affairs (for policy and legislative changes) • Current TOA, budget and end strength • Services (for mission deployment criteria) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Collect data on Service processes • Use Dynamic Commitment type of process

Researchable Question(s)	Data Analysis Methods	Sequence and Relationship	Limitations	Product/Output
Issue 4.1: What are the resourcing implications of the force mixes and employment concepts assessed under objective #3?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Use cost models to compare end strength • Compare cost analysis of different timelines • Describe implications across resource areas • Validate objective 3, issue 2 analysis • Use descriptive and comparative analyses • Test alternatives against implications • Use standardized costing • Use tools as appropriate 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • After objective 3, issue 1 in conjunction with objective 3, issue 2 • After objective 3 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • None identified 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Personnel Requirements- End strength, Recruiting, - Retention, FTS, TOA, equipment, time, training, infrastructure, statutory changes, environmental impact, and resourcing implications for objective 3 force mix and employment concepts • Identify resources that need to be changed • Resourcing factors <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -inter-Service implications -cross service reallocations -IPS wargame -roles and missions allocations • Resulting readiness levels

RCE-05 Study Methodology

Researchable Question(s)	Measures of Effectiveness	Information Required	Information Source(s)	Data Collection Methods
Issue 4.2: What resource initiatives would improve funding processes for military operations in support of NMS?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capability • Accessibility 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Current policies and procedures <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -OSD, Service, CINC policies -Rules for use of TTAD/ADSW • List of barriers to utilization • Historical research <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -- shortfalls for days vs. dollars • Funding of RC contingency usage • Service process for funding (educational shortfalls) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • OSD, Services, and CINCS (policies and procedures) • GAO, RAND, etc. (for studies) • RFPB • RC • Think Tanks • Ongoing and historical studies • Legislation • Objective 4, issue 1 and 3 output • Services (for educational shortfalls) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Review information (e.g., Integrated Priority List (IPL), basic policies, research specific laws and legislation, examine other agency best practices)

Researchable Question(s)	Data Analysis Methods	Sequence and Relationship	Limitations	Product/Output
Issue 4.2: What resource initiatives would improve funding processes for military operations in support of NMS?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Funding track: ADSW/TTAD/IT/AT • Assess time requirements via Service to process requirements • Categorize list of initiatives 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conclusions follow objective 4, issue 3 • Independent of objectives 1, 2, and 3 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • None identified 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • List of initiatives <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Legislative: OSD, Service, and CINCS -Review policies on executing funds • List of resource funding initiatives • Identify <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Service program process changes for funding RC activities Service variations -Initiatives affecting PPBES • Programming funds for contingencies • Initiatives applicable to support of missions to support, respond, prepare • List of Improvements <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Fee for service Inter-Service and Agency as well as Service contracts -RPA increase -Multiyear continuity carry over FY process -Explore standardizing funding process

RCE-05 Study Methodology

Researchable Question(s)	Measures of Effectiveness	Information Required	Information Source(s)	Data Collection Methods
Issue 4.3: What are the challenges in current RC resourcing?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None identified 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> OSD/Service/CINC Policy Studies Barriers to RC utilization POM 00-05 funding FTS funding and manning POM inputs by RC and Service RC training and mobilization (timeline and tiering) Service statements for RC share of Shape, Respond, and Prepare 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Legislation OSD, Services, and CINCs (for policy) GAO, RAND, etc (for studies) Think Tanks RC and Services (for POM inputs) RFPB POM 00-05 TPFDD/Service CONUS sustaining base and generating base 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Task input sources Research legislation and policy

Researchable Question(s)	Data Analysis Methods	Sequence and Relationship	Limitations	Product/Output
Issue 4.3: What are the challenges in current RC resourcing?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Description and categorization (by level and resource areas) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Start Now Before objective 4, issue 2 and independent of everything else 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None identified 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> List of challenges <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Legislative barriers -OSD, Services, CINC policies and procedures -Inconsistencies between Services -Terminology -RC training time -Funding -Training -FTS Use resource areas in objective 4, issue 1 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Description of why this is a challenge

RCE-05 Study Methodology

Researchable Question(s)	Measures of Effectiveness	Information Required	Information Source(s)	Data Collection Methods
<p>Issue 4.4: How could legislative authority be adjusted to provide more effective early, rapid and continuous access to the RC?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Time • RC access sufficiency • Cost • Benefits • Risk 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Input from Legislative Affairs and Congress • Definition of access use <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -TTAD use prior to PSRC • Legislative challenges from objective 4, issue 3 • Studies • Objective 4, issue 1, 2, and 3 output <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Address special legislative Requirements for homeland defense and disaster relief 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Past and current legislation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Statutes (e.g.,) Title s 10, 14, 32 • Legislative Affairs • Congress • JULLS • RFPB • GAO, RAND, etc. (for studies) • Federal Response Plan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Brainstorm incremental then comprehensive legislative and policy adjustments to address • Obtain DoD legal advice

Researchable Question(s)	Data Analysis Methods	Sequence and Relationship	Limitations	Product/Output
<p>Issue 4.4: How could legislative authority be adjusted to provide more effective early, rapid and continuous access to the RC?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Examine timelines, sufficiency of RC access • Test all solutions through OSD/CINC/ Service legal and Legislative Affairs channels • Cost/benefits/risk assessment • Categorize by functional area • Examine provisions <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -History -Interpretation • Use variables in analyses • Use FEMA/DOMS model 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some background early-Final after objective 4, issue 3 • Concurrent with objective 1-Feeds into objective 3 • Start now-interactive with objectives 1,2,3, and 4 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Level of analysis may be insufficient 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recommended changes to legislative language • Legislative initiatives that improve total force utilization and access • Identification of revisions needed to allow early, rapid, continuous access <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Categorize into Shape, Respond, and Prepare • Proposed modifications to legislative authority

RCE-05 Study Methodology


Researchable Question(s)	Measures of Effectiveness	Information Required	Information Source(s)	Data Collection Methods
Issue 4.5: How can the IRR be more effectively used in the alternatives that were described in objective #3?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pros and cons • Costs • Benefits 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Current Service, OSD, JCS initiatives • Historical and ongoing studies • Results of inter-Service IRR conferences. • Objective 4, issue 3 challenges • Inputs from objectives 3, 2, and 1 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • OSD, JCS, and Services (for initiatives) • IRR conferences • Service IRR experts • IRR manpower reports • Legislative guidance and policy • IRR databases • OSD (RA) prepared IRR group reports 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • None identified

Researchable Question(s)	Data Analysis Methods	Sequence and Relationship	Limitations	Product/Output
Issue 4.5: How can the IRR be more effectively used in the alternatives that were described in objective #3?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assessment of initiatives <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Institutional knowledge of plan -Pros and cons • Examine cost/benefit for IRR integration to each applicable force mix alternative • Propose initiatives to address • Inventory to requirements • Analyze historical/past call-ups 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some early work • After objective 4, issue 3 • With objective 4, issue 2 and 4 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IRR issues can be thorny 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cost/benefit assessment of IRR integration (where applicable)



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

JUL 16 1999



MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
ACQUISITION AND TECHNOLOGY
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
PERSONNEL AND READINESS
COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF, UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED
COMMANDS
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS,
AND INTELLIGENCE
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND
EVALUATION
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS
AGENCY

SUBJECT: Follow-on Requirements to the Reserve Component Employment – 2005
(RCE 05) Study

The RCE 05 Study highlighted a number of areas of Reserve component employment requiring further review and analysis. The study report incorporated recommendations for follow-on efforts to address these issues in detail sufficient to support associated policy and program initiatives.

The attached document provides guidance for these follow-on actions. Departmental components identified for leadership and participation in these efforts will accomplish these tasks in accordance with the indicated suspense dates. Progress toward completion of these efforts will be reviewed by the RCE 05 Senior Steering Group, which will convene as necessary to ensure that the recommended studies and analyses are carried out as intended.

Attachment:
As stated



ANNEX B

GUIDANCE FOR FOLLOW-ON ACTIONS

1. The RCE 05 study recommends a number of follow-on studies, reviews, and other assessments. These efforts are intended to address in detail many of the areas that the study panels lacked the time or resources to analyze in depth. Follow-on efforts should use the preliminary work done by the study panels, as reflected in the study report and applicable annexes, as a foundation for further analysis.

2. Guidance for follow-on actions for each study recommendation is contained in the indicated tabs. The guidance provides a brief background summary, description of specific action required, lead office or offices (co-leads are indicated by the term “in conjunction with”), participants (indicated by the term “in coordination with”), and applicable suspenses. Specific tabs are as follows:

Tab 1: RC Missioning for WMD Consequence Management (WMD/CM) and Providing Physical Security for Critical Assets

Tab 2: Air Force Bare Base Wing Conversion

Tab 3: Joint RC Virtual Unit for IO/IA Mission Support

Tab 4: RC Participation in Homeland Defense Command Structures – Joint Task Forces

Tab 5: Incorporation of RC into the NMD Architecture

Tab 6: Increase in RC Support for Counter-narcotics Activities

Tab 7: RC Use in Interpositional Peacekeeping Operations

Tab 8: Exceptions to CINC Rotational Timeline Restrictions

Tab 9: Expanded RC Use in Meeting LD/HD Requirements

Tab 10: Increase USMC RC Augmentation to Deploying Units and HQs

Tab 11: Post-Mobilization Training Sites

Tab 12: ARNG Enhanced Separate Brigade (eSB) “Round Up” relationships with AC Divisions

Tab 13: ARNG Division Availability for Major Theater Wars

Tab 14: Guidance on Conduct of Lift and Disengagement Sensitivity Analysis by MRS
05 Study

Tab 15: Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) Apportionment of ARNG Divisions

Tab 16: Strategic Reserve Definition, Missions, and Requirements

Tab 17: Associate Program Units in Fighter Squadrons

Tab 18: Transfer of one B-52 and B-1B Squadrons to the RC

Tab 19: Air Force Fighter Wing Conversion to RC

Tab 20: Increase in RC in Transportation Management

TAB 1

RC MISSIONING FOR WMD CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT (CM) AND PROVIDING PHYSICAL SECURITY FOR CRITICAL ASSETS

1. The Service RCs have been significantly involved in addressing potential DoD requirements driven by emerging WMD and other unconventional threats to the territory and population of the United States. The RC are dispersed regionally throughout the nation, are populated with community residents, and have established ties with local authorities. These unique characteristics make them prime candidates for supporting missions such as assisting civil agencies in the management of the consequences of a WMD attack (WMD CM) or providing physical security for critical assets such as key infrastructure nodes.
2. Several of the tasks inherent in providing such support are similar to the activities currently performed by most RC units under existing relationships for providing support to civil authorities. The ability to perform these tasks in response to a WMD attack or threats to the physical security of critical infrastructure can be maintained without significant risk to the wartime combat capabilities of the RC units. Such tasks may be candidates for dual-missioning of selected RC units, providing the NCA with available capabilities should a WMD attack occur.
3. However, some of the tasks involved in providing WMD CM support require specialized equipment and training (e.g., mass chemical decontamination, mass casualty treatment). Though some RC organizations may be able readily to perform such tasks (i.e, chemical or medical units), these capabilities currently are allocated to MTW theaters under existing war plans. There may be a requirement to remission some of these RC units, to focus them primarily on WMD CM-related requirements vice MTW tasks. As such remissioning might raise risks to forward deployed units to unacceptable levels, providing capabilities required for WMD CM may require the restructuring of other RC organizations to provide the support required for these specialized CM tasks.
4. Accordingly, by 31 March, 2000, USD(P) and Joint Staff J-5 director , in coordination with ASD(RA), ASD(C3I), OACJCS(NG&RM), USCINCOM, and the Services (all components), will conduct a study to assess the potential for missioning RC units for WMD CM and critical infrastructure physical security tasks. The study will consider the impact of dual-missioning or remissioning existing RC units on established MTW requirements.

TAB 2

AIR FORCE BARE BASE WING CONVERSION

1. Recent work on potential DoD missions in support of emerging homeland defense requirements has illuminated many areas of insufficient capability to manage the likely consequences of attack on the territory or population of the United States using WMD. Several of these potential missions require unique skills and equipment that generally are available only in specialized units, such as the rapid assessment and initial detection (RAID) teams currently being established.
2. There are a number of potential sources for providing the capabilities necessary for WMD CM. One of the areas showing significant promise was the conversion of some or all of the existing Air Force RC bare base wing assets into specialized organizations structured to support WMD CM requirements.
3. Accordingly, by 31 March 2000, the Air Force, in coordination with ASD(RA), will conduct a study of the feasibility and desirability of conversion of some or all of these units to provide WMD CM capabilities. This study should be coordinated with and informed by parallel USD(P) and CJCS efforts.

TAB 3

JOINT RC VIRTUAL ORGANIZATION FOR IO/IA MISSION SUPPORT

1. The JTF for computer network defense (JTF-CND) charter was approved by the SecDef on 4 December 1998. JTF-CND is the primary agent for the defense of DoD computer systems and networks. The Defense Information Support Agency (DISA) is the supporting agency for JTF-CND. The Vice Director, DISA, currently serves as the Commander, JTF-CND. JTF-CND currently is a full-time standing JTF with 10 permanently assigned personnel collocated within the DISA Global Operations and Security Center (GOSC), though effective 1 October 1999, JTF-CND will be assigned to USCINCSpace. National Guard and Reserve personnel will be requested by JTF-CND for augmentation.

2. On 12 February 1999, the DepSecDef approved the Joint Web Risk Assessment Cell (JWRAC) plan to use RC assets to conduct ongoing operations security and threat assessments of component web sites. The JWRAC is currently manned with two full-time support and 20 RC personnel. The JWRAC is responsible for vulnerability analyses and threat assessments of Web content on DoD publicly accessible Web sites using Operations Security (OPSEC) methodology. The JWRAC operates as a cell within the DISA Joint Reserve Unit. After 6 months, the program will be evaluated by DISA for funding, full-time support requirements and progressive expansion of the JWRAC to a distributive (virtual) capability.

3. These efforts are important steps towards full utilization of the broad array of sophisticated information skills resident in our RCs. The DoD must continue to move towards full integration of RC capabilities in the information operations mission area. This issue is further discussed in the homeland defense section of the RCE-05 Final Report. Accordingly, Joint Staff directors of J-1, J-3, and J-6, and ASD(RA) in coordination with ASD(C3I), OACJCS(NG&RM), DISA, USSPACECOM, USACOM, and Services, will:

a. By 31 March 2000, examine the personnel management issues associated with establishing a joint RC organization based on distributive (virtual) technologies, including military specialty (MOS/AFSC/NEC) balance, retention, career progression, performance monitoring technologies and policies, adequate security measures and required levels of military training. Provide an interim report to DepSecDef in the form of a long-range plan for a joint virtual RC information operations (IO) and information assurance (IA) organization.

b. By 30 June 2000, conduct a proof of concept test to assess the validity of a virtually integrated RC IO and IA organization of up to 400 personnel, and submit a final report to DepSecDef for approval.

TAB 4

RC PARTICIPATION IN HOMELAND DEFENSE COMMAND STRUCTURES AND JTFs

1. The DoD faces increasing concern over emerging potential threats to CONUS. USACOM will play a key role in efforts to address these concerns within the broad context of the homeland defense mission and its associated requirements. The unique characteristics, dispersed regional locations, and established ties with local authorities that are available in our RC organizations make them prime candidates for homeland defense mission support.
2. As elements of the DoD develop and establish the structures for the command, control, and management of DoD homeland defense responsibilities, it is important that the RCs be fully integrated into the manning of these structures. In particular, USACOM should incorporate RC manning allocations within the evolving structure of a civil support-related JTF. Accordingly, by 31 October 1999, USCINACOM will provide to ASD(RA) an assessment of RC integration and participation in the intended structure for JTF-Civil Support.

TAB 5

INCORPORATION OF RC INTO THE NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE (NMD) ARCHITECTURE

1. The NMD architecture being developed by the DoD will incorporate a significant amount of fixed infrastructure within the territorial boundaries of the United States. In the past, the DoD has found that such missions can be supported with a substantial contribution from the RCs. The current force structure for providing the air defense of CONUS is a powerful example of the contribution the RCs can make within a total force approach to the mission.
2. Accordingly, the USD(A&T) will insure that RC capabilities are fully considered in the program decisions for the manning of the NMD architecture. RC participation in this program should be addressed specifically in future program decision methodology.

TAB 6

INCREASE IN RC SUPPORT FOR COUNTERNARCOTICS ACTIVITIES

1. The United States continues to face challenges from the smuggling of illegal narcotics across our borders. The DoD has provided support to law enforcement authorities to curtail this illicit activity. The RCs have played an important supporting role.
2. Though RC efforts in this mission area have been substantial, including increases in counter-narcotics support funding last year, illegal narcotics traffic remains a serious concern. However, the utility of further increases in RC support to counter-narcotics activities is unclear.
3. Accordingly, by 31 October 1999, ASD(SOLIC) will coordinate a review by each Service concerning the potential utility of an increase by up to 25 percent over existing levels of RC support to counter-narcotics mission activities. This review should address any potential AC OPTEMPO mitigation, as well as the potential impact of any increases on other RC mission requirements.

TAB 7

RC USE IN INTERPOSITIONAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

1. As the demand continues for U.S. participation in SSC operations, every effort should be made to enhance the use of and integrate RC forces so that overall force readiness is maintained and OPTEMPO improved. Interpositional peacekeeping deployments to implement the provisions of a peace accord, such as the MFO mission in the Sinai desert, are a likely driver of deployment tempo in the foreseeable future. The DoD has in the past integrated RC organizations and personnel in fulfilling these requirements. Using more RC capabilities may be advisable as these missions continue.
2. Accordingly, by 30 November 1999, the Army (all components), in coordination with USD(P&R), ASD(RA), and Joint Staff J-3 Director, and OACJCS(NG&RM) will conduct a study to assess the feasibility and frequency of RC assumption of rotational force requirements for extended interpositional peacekeeping operations.

TAB 8

EXCEPTIONS TO CINC ROTATIONAL TIMELINE RESTRICTIONS

1. Rotational timeline policies for CENTCOM and EUCOM limit turbulence in the theater and optimize deployment periods. Current rotational policies limit an individual to a minimum of 120 days in CENTCOM and 90 days in EUCOM. For a unit, 120-179 days is preferred for CENTCOM and 29 days is the minimum in EUCOM. PACOM does not have a published rotation policy.
2. There may be some benefit to waiving these policies in certain cases. Providing more flexibility for individual rotations increases the opportunities for Reservists to participate. The Air Force, for example, prefers to rainbow unit deployments when feasible, rotating aircrews and support personnel to the theater for shorter periods to maintain manning in a deployed unit. These personnel can provide PERSTEMPO relief at little additional cost, at the same time enhancing individual proficiency through increased operational experience. Other Services, particularly the Army, could gain more utility from their RC populations of technical professionals, such as medical specialists, if they had the flexibility to cycle larger numbers of RCs into the theater for shorter intervals. Such rotational options may be feasible at acceptable levels of risk.
3. Accordingly, by 31 September 1999, Joint Staff J-3 and J-5 directors, in coordination with ASD(RA), OACJCS(NG&RM), CINCs and Services, will review rotational policies, including an assessment of the impacts of increased rotation, associated costs, and risks. The study should make recommendations for policy changes and exceptions where merited.

TAB 9
EXPANDED RC USE IN MEETING
HD/LD REQUIREMENTS

1. As demand continues for U.S. participation in SSC operations, every effort should be made to enhance the integration and contributions of the total force so that overall force readiness is maintained and tempo improved for both the AC and RCs. Long-term peacekeeping operations and other global requirements have stressed both active and Reserve units and individual skills. The DoD will continue to take appropriate actions to assess potential tempo relief measures, including data collection to identify high-demand units and skills, and conduct of comparative analysis of the total force to determine any alternatives to relieve high tempo demands.

2. Accordingly, by March 31, 2000, the Services (all components), in coordination with ASD(RA), Joint Staff J-1, J-3 directors, and OACJCS(NG&RM), will determine high-demand units and individual skills and identify potential actions for relieving high tempo demands, to include employing similar units and skills from other Services or components. Service studies will consider the impact of high demand on AC and RC mission participation and retention.

TAB 10

INCREASE USMC RC AUGMENTATION
TO DEPLOYING UNITS AND HQS

1. The Marine Corps provides augmentation to units that deploy in support of global mission requirements. A portion of this augmentation currently is provided by the Marine Corps Reserve, relieving active units from the requirement to provide this support. Increasing RC augmentation by as much as 25 percent over existing levels could provide benefits from additional tempo relief, enhanced operational continuity due to greater RC personnel stability, enhanced training for individual Reservists, and other factors.

2. The table below shows the current levels of support by type activity, the quantitative effect of a 25 percent increase in each area, and associated personnel costs. Baseline data provided by the Marine Corps reflects FY 1998 contributions of the Marine Corps Reservists.

Increase in RC by Activity						
Activities	Enlisted Baseline	Manday Increase	Cost (\$)	Officer Baseline	Manday Increase	Cost (\$)
CINC Opn'l Support	1,362	341	27,611	10,659	2,665	468,969
Contingency Ops	719	180	14,511	7,463	1,866	345,910
MPMC (ADSW)	8,535	2,134	182,670	17,407	4,352	779,660
Exercise Support	4,825	1,206	104,401	5,759	1,440	262,035
Warfighting Lab	1,461	365	31,116	3,606	902	152,813
Deployments						
Desert Thunder (Kuwait)	1,211	303	26,203	4,849	1,112	220,630
Joint Forge (Bosnia)	6,357	1,589	137,550	10,774	2,694	490,217
Totals	24,470	6118	524,062	60,517	15,129	2,720,233
Additional 25% = 20,832 mandays @ \$3.25M						
Increase to baseline cost: \$12.8M + 3.25M = \$16M						

2. Considering the impact of high OPTEMPO and DEPTTEMPO on retention, quality of life, and other factors, this proposal may provide the Marine Corps with a cost-effective means of mitigating tempo concerns. Accordingly, the Marine Corps will assess an increase of up to 25 percent above existing levels of RC augmentation to deploying units and headquarters as a force management tool. The Marine Corps should provide the results of this assessment to USD(P&R) by 31 September 1999.

TAB 11

ADDITIONAL POST-MOBILIZATION TRAINING SITES

1. A principal constraint on the Army's ability to prepare and validate ARNG units for combat operations is the availability of major training sites suitable for large unit (battalion and brigade task force) combined arms maneuver training, to include live-fire exercises. Current plans, as contained in FORSCOM/ARNG Regulation 350-2, provide for the establishment of brigade-level post-mobilization training capability at four sites: Fort Irwin, CA; Fort Hood, TX; and the Yakima Training Area, WA, for heavy units, and Fort Polk, LA, for light units.

2. If additional sites could be established, the availability of brigade, and potentially division-sized units, could be accelerated. Accordingly, the Army (all components) will review the potential availability of additional post-mobilization training sites beyond the four currently designated by February 2000. This review should consider appropriate locations, facilities at those locations, and the availability of qualified personnel to support post-mobilization training requirements. The review should address the resource implications associated with each of these considerations. The review should specifically consider a MOA with the USMC to provide for use of the facility at Twenty-Nine Palms, CA, after USMC units have completed use of that site.

TAB 12

ARNG ESB "ROUND UP" RELATIONSHIPS WITH AC DIVISIONS

1. The 15 existing eSBs are "teamed" with CONUS-based AC divisions for peacetime training enhancements only. Current plans flow eSBs into theater as separate brigades, with a general mission focus. This provides the theater component commander with flexibility in employment of these forces as they arrive. As an alternative to the separate employment of these brigades, establishing a wartime "round-up" relationship with an AC division would provide a fourth brigade to that division for operations within an MTW theater. The peacetime training of the eSB would be oriented specifically on integration with the operational concept of the associated round-up division, allowing more focused preparation for wartime requirements.
2. Currently, most AC divisions and all eSBs are multi-apportioned to both potential MTW theaters in existing OPLANS. This dual apportionment complicates the establishment of any permanent round-up relationships. Additionally, fixed round up relationships may detract from eSB preparation for the wider range of potential employment that is currently conceived, affecting the flexibility of the theater component commander. Nevertheless, the potential value for establishment of round up relationships remains. In particular, divisions apportioned to a single theater may be likely candidates.
3. Accordingly, by 31 November 1999 the Army (all components), in coordination with ASD(RA), ASD(S&TR), D(PA&E), Joint Staff J8, OACJCS(NG&RM), and the CINCs, will review existing operational concepts to determine the number of cases, if any, where a round-up relationship between an eSB and an active division could be beneficial. This review should include assessment of any required changes to post-mobilization training; estimated cost related to any required modernization, measures to insure interoperability, and changes to training as a result of this relationship; and assessment of risks, if any, resulting from the fixed relationship.

TAB 13

ARNG DIVISION AVAILABILITY FOR MTWs

1. The FY 99 JSCP lists eight ARNG divisions as available forces for employment. To plan for the possible use of these divisions in meeting potential MTW requirements, the DoD must have baseline parameters for division availability.
2. Availability timelines for the divisions will depend on interrelated factors, including divisional mission requirements, pre-mobilization readiness levels, post-mobilization training support resources, and post-mobilization prioritization and sequencing. At a minimum, future detailed analysis of ARNG division availability should take these factors into account.
3. By 15 February 2000, the Department of the Army (all components), in coordination with ASD(RA), ASD(S&TR), DPA&E, Joint Staff J-8 Director, OACJCS(NG&RM), and USCINCCOM, will complete a three-part study to define the availability of ARNG divisions for use in MTW planning.
 - a. By 15 September 1999, the Department of the Army (all components), in coordination with ASD(RA), JCS/DJ8, OACJCS(NG&RM), and USCINCCOM, will formulate standards and guidelines for validation of ARNG divisions for combat operations, based on common deployment standards for active and National Guard divisions, and formulate means for incorporating these standards and guidelines into Service policy and regulations.
 - b. By 15 January 2000, the Department of the Army (all components), in coordination with ASD(RA), DPA&E, Joint Staff J-8 Director, OACJCS(NG&RM), and USCINCCOM, will formulate post-mobilization and deployment plans for preparing ARNG divisions for MTW requirements. Planning will identify and address resource issues associated with post-mobilization training requirements for ARNG combat units. Assessment should include analysis of options for the provision of additional post-mobilization training capability, enhancements of existing levels of peacetime readiness of ARNG divisions, and integration of ARNG divisions with ARNG eSBs into the post-mobilization training sequence.
 - c. By 15 February 2000, all Department of the Army components, in coordination with the ASD(S&TR), ASD(RA), Joint Staff J-8 director, OACJCS(NG&RM), and USCINCCOM, will publish planning timelines for the availability of ARNG divisions for various mission requirements. These planning timelines will be used as the basis for potential incorporation of the ARNG divisions made available in the JSCP into MTW planning by theater

CINCs, and will inform the possible JSCP apportionment of these divisions to the CINCs.

TAB 14

GUIDANCE ON CONDUCT OF LIFT AND DISENGAGEMENT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS BY MRS 05

1. The MRS 05 is intended in part to provide lift timelines for a range of MTW scenarios, based on DPG IPS. Previous and ongoing analytical efforts have pointed to the significant impact of lift capabilities and constraints on every aspect of strategic planning and force structure design. The MRS 05 projections will make a critical contribution in providing a baseline for use in assessing various other aspects of joint force capabilities to execute our NMS.
2. Reflecting the significance of strategic lift considerations, it is important that the MRS 05 offers to the defense planning community the ability to consider strategic lift capability under a range of conditions. Providing a picture of lift considering only best case or most likely conditions will detract from the ability to use the MRS 05 output in analytical efforts exploring varying scenarios and threat postures.
3. Accordingly, the MRS 05 effort will incorporate analysis of the impact of variables affecting lift capability and timelines. These variables should include consideration of the impact of the use of WMD against sea- and air-ports of debarkation; temporary interdiction of critical sea lines of communication with mines; and degraded operational rates among lift platforms. Analysis should include variable timelines for initiating and executing disengagement from an overseas posture of engagement.

TAB 15

JSCP APPORTIONMENT OF ARNG DIVISIONS

1. The FY 99 JSCP lists eight ARNG divisions as forces available. These divisions may have utility in meeting theater CINC requirements under MTW scenarios and for responding to homeland defense requirements. CINCCENT and CINCUNC/CFC continue to evolve concepts for the execution of all phases of their MTW OPLANS. The Joint Staff, USCINACOM, and the Services are examining emerging requirements for homeland defense. Additionally, the Department of the Army is leading a study to establish the post-mobilization requirements and timelines associated with the availability of these divisions by 15 February 2000.

2. To define the potential use of ARNG divisions, the Joint Staff will incorporate into the FY 2000 Annual JSCP process a review of the apportionment of ARNG divisions. This review should consider apportionment to theater CINCs, for possible integration in MTW warplans, as well as apportionment for use in meeting homeland defense requirements. This review should incorporate the results of ongoing CINC and Service efforts to further define potential requirements as well as ARNG division availability.

TAB 16

STRATEGIC RESERVE DEFINITION, MISSIONS, AND REQUIREMENTS

1. While DoD plans for responding to two MTWs in overlapping timeframes are based on assessments of the most likely MTW threats, the challenges associated with such conflicts could prove to be more demanding than originally anticipated. For example, operations in a counteroffensive phase may become protracted, or post-conflict requirements could become more extensive than foreseen. A small, well-defined strategic reserve of forces, centered primarily on the RCs, is likely necessary to mitigate MTW risk by providing the capability to meet these requirements.

2. Current DoD policy does not define or establish requirements for strategic reserve forces. To plan for the employment and maintenance of a strategic reserve the DoD must adequately define strategic reserve force roles and missions, and specify strategic reserve force requirements.

3. By 15 November 1999, ASD(S&TR), ASD(RA), and Joint Staff, Director J-8, in coordination with DPA&E, Joint Staff, Director, J-5, OACJCS(NG&RM), the CINCs, and all Services components, will complete a two part study to provide strategic reserve definitions, missions, and necessary capabilities for inclusion in the FY 2002-09 DPG.

a. By 15 October 1999, ASD(S&TR), in coordination with ASD(RA), joint Staff, Directors for J-5 and J-8, OACJCS(NG&RM), DPA&E, CINCs, and all Services components, will formalize the DoD definition and requirements for strategic reserve forces and their designated roles in support of the NMS.

b. By 15 November 1999, Joint Staff, Director for J8, in coordination with ASD(S&TR), ASD(RA), D(PA&E), Joint Staff J-5, OACJCS(NG&RM), CINCs, and all Service components, will develop specific capabilities necessary for meeting strategic reserve requirements.

c. By 31 November 1999, ASD(S&TR), ASD(RA), and Joint Staff J-8 will develop appropriate guidance on the roles, missions, and required capabilities of a strategic reserve for incorporation into the FY 2002-06 DPG.

TAB 17

ASSOCIATE PROGRAM UNITS IN FIGHTER SQUADRONS

1. Currently, Air Force fighter squadrons and wings are operated and manned by the AC, ANG, or the Air Force Reserve. There are no associate program or equivalent organizations in this community. The associate unit concept, using Air Force Reserve personnel, has proved valuable in meeting AWACS manning requirements. Applying this concept to tactical fighter manning, including the incorporation of ANG personnel, could relieve current and projected crew shortfalls, improve crew ratios, and potentially mitigate peacetime AC PERSTEMPO concerns. Additionally, associate units could provide additional opportunities to recruit departing AC into Reserve associate units, retaining existing skills.
2. Accordingly, by 31 March 2000, the Air Force (all components), in coordination with ASD(RA), will conduct a study to evaluate the potential for establishing associate units in the tactical fighter force. The study will examine possible units and locations to be augmented, and should consider training, operations, maintenance, and conversion costs.

TAB 18

TRANSFER OF ONE B-52 AND ONE B-1B SQUADRONS TO THE RC

1. Peacetime OPTEMPO for Air Force bomber squadrons is relatively low when compared to other Air Force squadrons. This factor may support consideration of an increased RC contribution to this mission area. By transferring a B-52 squadron and a B-1B squadron or their equivalent to the RC, the potential exists for the Air Force to retain its wartime capacity while lowering its peacetime costs.
2. Accordingly, by 31 November 1999, all Air Force components, in coordination with DPA&E and ASD(RA), will conduct a study to assess the benefits and risks of transferring one B-52 squadron or equivalent (12 PAA) to the Air Force Reserve and one B-1B squadron or equivalent (12 PAA) to the Air National Guard. This study should include as a minimum an assessment of:
 - a. Cost comparisons for peacetime operations and maintenance, training, basing and conversion if required.
 - b. The peacetime tempo impacts for AC and RC as a result of these transfers.
 - c. Any active duty career management issues resulting from fewer AC squadrons.
3. By 31 November 1999, USD(P), in coordination with USD(P&R), will review existing Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) provisions that constrain participation by part-time selected reserve personnel in nuclear-related missions, and recommend appropriate adjustments to provide for such participation.

TAB 19

AIR FORCE FIGHTER WING CONVERSION TO RC

1. Peacetime OPTEMPO for Air Force fighter squadrons is relatively low when compared to many other Air Force organizations, facilitating RC contributions to this mission area. By converting the equivalent of an additional fighter wing to the RC, the potential exists for the Air Force retain wartime capability while lowering peacetime costs.
2. Accordingly, by 31 March 2000, all Air Force components, in coordination with OACJCS(NG&RM), Joint Staff J-8, and OASD(RA), will conduct a study to examine the costs, benefits, and risks of conversion of one fighter wing equivalent (FEW) from AC to RC. The study should include:
 - a. Costs comparisons for peacetime operations and maintenance, training, and basing.
 - b. The peacetime TEMPO impacts for AC and RCs as a result of any conversion.
 - c. Any active duty career management issues resulting from fewer AC squadrons.

TAB 20

INCREASE IN RC IN TRANSPORTATION MANAGEMENT

1. Supporting a two near-simultaneous MTW scenario will place exceptional surge demands on our strategic mobility infrastructure. To ensure that the current transportation control, coordination, and management architecture can meet these wartime demands, the DoD should conduct a review of the current manning of this infrastructure.
2. Accordingly, by 31 November 1999, OACJCS(NG&RM), Joint Staff J-4, and TRANSCOM, in coordination with the Military Sealift Command, Air Mobility Command, and the Military Traffic Management Command, will conduct a study of transportation command, control and management requirements to determine if an increase of up to 25 percent in existing levels of RC manning to meet wartime surge requirements is warranted. The study will include an assessment of whether additional management and coordination capabilities can overcome constraints imposed by existing port and airfield capacities, and the extent to which additional manning in transportation management echelons would improve our strategic mobility posture. USTRANSCOM components should identify personnel costs or specific manning offsets for any additional personnel, as well as associated training and conversion costs.

ANNEX C

MISSIONING RC UNITS FOR WMD CM AND CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PHYSICAL SECURITY

1. DoD roles and missions in Consequence Management (CM) of a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) attack on the United States are not formalized. Nevertheless, several ongoing efforts provide an assumption base to analyze potential DoD support requirements.

2. Existing local, state, and federal capabilities to respond to a domestic WMD attack vary, reflecting gaps in many areas. Though some metropolitan areas are equipped and trained to deal with an attack at all phases of a crisis, others need improvements. The inadequacies span requirements prior to an attack, during the initial response, and in post-attack recovery. The most significant DoD concerns are:

a. Pre-attack:

- (1) Inadequate WMD response planning.
- (2) Inadequate WMD response training.
- (3) Inadequate specialized WMD CM equipment.
- (4) Inadequate threat information and dissemination.

b. Attack response:

- (1) Inadequate chemical-biological (CB) agent identification capability.
- (2) Inadequate CB agent detection-reconnaissance capabilities.
- (3) Inadequate WMD response coordination capability.
- (4) Lack of medical preparedness.

c. Post-attack recovery:

- (1) Limited mass decontamination facilities.
- (2) Inadequate quarantine operations plans.

3. These shortfalls indicate a number of potential roles for DoD elements. Among the more prominent are:

a. Training:

- (1) Train RC personnel and units in WMD emergency procedures and other CM tasks.
- (2) Provide training for specialized CM equipment.
- (3) Exercise support and participation.

b. Planning and Prevention

(1) Provide input on RC capabilities to state and local emergency planners.

(2) Military support detachment (i.e., RAID) sustainment.

c. Incident Response

(1) C4 infrastructure support.

(2) Augmentation of physical security.

(3) Augmentation of law enforcement.

(4) Provide emergency mobile medical assets.


(5) Augment RC command structure with WMD reconnaissance, assessment, and monitoring capabilities.

(6) Aerial sampling and reconnaissance support.

(7) Provide and employ other specialized equipment.

(8) Assist mass evacuation operations.

4. An organizational structure to integrate WMD CM capabilities would combine existing and programmed elements with functional capabilities in unaddressed areas. The size and shape of such structures will depend on which WMD CM roles and missions DoD assumes. The structure for a WMD response task force could resemble that shown in figure 1, below:



5. Several of the tasks associated with potential WMD CM missions are similar to tasks currently performed by most RC units under existing domestic support arrangements. Examples include population control and evacuation, assisting

law enforcement authorities, and providing temporary shelter and food. Providing physical security to key infrastructure assets that may be threatened by terrorist action also falls into this category. These tasks are likely supportable within the existing RC force structure, requiring little additional training, equipment, or preparation. RC are potential candidates for the dual-missioning wherein the current structure and focus on support for overseas MTW requirements remains the unit's primary focus, with support for CM tasks provided as necessary in response to WMD attack.

6. Support for some WMD CM tasks requires specialized capabilities. In general, only units specifically organized, equipped, and trained can provide these capabilities. Examples include chemical agent reconnaissance and detection, decontamination, and emergency water purification. Some RC units have these capabilities, though virtually, all are apportioned to overseas theaters in support of OPLANS. Should a WMD attack occur after the RCs have been deployed, domestic response capabilities clearly would suffer. One alternative is to "remission" such units to support WMD CM requirements in the United States. This would raise the risk to deployed forces, which are perhaps more likely to suffer WMD attack and may not be acceptable. Alternative is to restructure some RC units to provide capabilities exclusively for domestic WMD CM, similar in concept to the currently planned RAID teams.

7. Restructuring existing capabilities clearly has resource implications and would involve trade-offs in other mission areas. For example, meeting a notional requirement to provide a backup or surge chemical decontamination capability for every sizeable metropolitan area in the United States. Such a requirement would presume a DoD role in assisting state and local authorities with the CM of a major incident, on a scale that overwhelms the ability of specialized local first response assets to handle. This study used the 76 metropolitan areas with populations of more than 200,000 as a guideline. The study used as its baseline for assessment the Army's existing chemical company organization. These units have an assigned strength of approximately 131 soldiers and about \$2 million worth of specialized equipment. The RC have 42 such companies (9 in the ARNG and 33 in the Army Reserve). All are apportioned to MTWs under existing warplans. The study assumed that the risks to deployed troops of re-missioning any for domestic WMD CM requirements would be unacceptable, and that WMD CM requirements would have to be met by restructuring 76 existing organizations located in the vicinity of the respective metropolitan areas. Forming these units would have an array of resource implications. The most significant, in addition to the procurement of specialized equipment, involves retraining assigned personnel in chemical specialist tasks. A rough estimate of the cost is approximately \$600,000 per company. In summary, meeting this notional requirement, without raising risks to deployed forces, would involve restructuring 76 company-sized organizations, with a total of approximately

9,950 personnel, at a cost of approximately \$200 million. The study noted the following issues associated with this option:

- a. Training pipeline capacity.
- b. Procurement requirements for specialized equipment and material certified for domestic use.
- c. Costs for non-specialized equipment unavailable from existing stocks.
- d. Infrastructure costs for specialized training facilities.
- e. Risks in other mission areas that lacked the resources to assess.

8. Some highly specialized potential WMD CM tasks cannot be adequately addressed by dual missioning, remissioning, or restructuring existing capabilities. Most examples are in biological agent management. Providing these capabilities will require further development of technologies and organizational structures.

9. The result of DoD participation in the interagency process to identify and assign appropriate roles in support of WMD CM will require the allocation of resources for missions DoD has not previously performed. The DoD should not assume that a concept such as dual-missioning RC units will be adequate to provide many of the specialized capabilities potentially required for WMD response. Providing such support could require substantial remissioning or restructuring of existing organizations and could have significant impact on current missions and resources.

SRC	Short Title	Units Required	GD Avail	Res Avail	Total Avail
01305	Gen Supt Bn	1	4	0	5
01835	Med Hel Bn (SOA)	1	0	0	1
44602	HHC ADA Bde	1	0	0	1
87004	HHC, Inf Div (Mech)	1	7	0	7
03437	Chem Co (Smoke Gen)	1	0	4	4
03476	HHD, Chemical	1	0	8	8
03477	CM Co (Bio Det)	1	0	3	3
08456	Area Spt Med	1	5	0	5
08457	Area Spt Med	1	0	0	0
09447	EOD Co	2	5	0	5
09503	Mod Ammo Ord, Hvy Lift Plt	2	0	0	0
09567	Patriot Bn DS/GS Aug Tm	2	2	0	2
09567	Ordnance Co	1	0	0	0
10416	HHC, QM Petr'l Op Bn	2	0	2	2
10560	QKM Petr'l Liaison Tm	1	2	4	6
11668	Signal Co, Tropo Hvy	1	2	2	4
11673	Area Sig Co ADA (MSE)	1	0	0	0
12447	Hqtrs Postal Co	1	0	2	2
12448	Postal Svcs Plt	3	0	0	0
19283	MP Det	1	0	0	0
19476	HHD MP Bn	1	4	0	4
19710	MP Det (Law & Order)	1	0	7	7
31802	HHC, ABN SF Gp	1	2	0	2
31803	Spt Co, SF Gp	1	2	0	2
31805	SF Bn ABN SF Gp	1	6	0	6
33747	Psyop Co, Psyop EPW Bn	1	0	0	0
34xxx	Intel Tms	13	0	0	0
41570	CA CINC Spt Tm	4	0	0	0
41735	CA Bn (Gen Spt)	1	0	0	0
42518	QM Perishable Sub	2	0	0	0
43607	Maint Co DS Patriot	1	2	0	2
55560	Cargo Documentation	3	0	1	1
55560L	Automated Cargo Doc	2	0	7	7
D					
55560L	Port Ops Cargo Det	1	0	5	5
F					
55580	Mov Con Tm & Cntl (CORPS)	1	0	1	1
55816	HHC Tran Term Bn	1	0	5	5
55819	Trans Cargo	1	0	6	6
63422	HHC, Spt Gp (CORPS)	1	0	4	4

Active Unit Shortfalls

SRC	Type Unit	Units short	Pers Asnd
01855	Combat Aviation Bn (SOF)	1	301
01857	Asslt Helo Company	1	
03057	Chemical Company	1	126
05510	Engr fire fighting Team	3	60
05617	Engr Company, Prime	1	20
08028	Med Air	1	
08498	Preventive Med Sanitation	1	11
08705	Combat Support	1	604
09487	Ordnance Co, Ammo	1	228
09503	Mod Ammo Ord Hvy Lift Pltn	2	54
09529	Patriot Bn GS/DS aug tm	2	14
10468	QM water supply company	7	396
10469	QM water purification Company	4	160
10560	QM Petrol Liaison	2	22
10570	QM Water purification Det (12,000 GPH)	2	16
11068	Signal Spt Company MSE	1	59
11413	Signal Visual info Company	2	349
11570	Signal Det Repo	1	9
11637	Area Signal	1	104
11668	Signal Company, Tropo Heavy	1	60
11707	Spec Ops Signal Company	1	
12417	Pers Det, Pers Svcs	5	179
12426	HQ, Pers Svcs Bn	2	83
12447	HQ Postal Company	1	5
12448	Postal Services	7	33
12648	Postal Operations	1	18
14423	Finance Detachment	5	84
14426	HHD Finance Bn	1	61
16500	Chaplains	7	9
19177	MP Company CMBT	1	
19183	CID Detachment	2	
19187	CID Detachment	1	
19537	MP Unit 12-man det	20	12
19546	HHC MP Bn (I/R)	7	203
19547	MP Det (I/R) (EPW/CI)	17	18
27512	Legal Support	1	27
27522	Military Judge Team	2	73
30714	Land IW Center	1	111

Active Unit Shortfalls

31806	HQ Det SF Bn	2	38
31807	SF Co, SF Bn	8	82
33717	Print Company, Psyops Dissmen Bn	1	
33718	Broadcast Company, Psyops Bn	1	
33719	Psyops Spt Company, Psyops Bn	1	
33727	Tactical Support Co	2	174
33736	H&S Company, Psyops Bn	1	59
33737	Psyops Tactical Co	4	171
33747	Psyops Company, Psyop EPW Bn	1	112
34XXX	Intell Teams	77	469
41570	CA CINC support	5	32
41700	Civil Affairs	1	
41702	HHC , Civil Affairs	1	131
41705	Civil Affairs Bn (general)	2	281
41737	Civil Affairs Co (Direct Support)	3	42
42424	QM Force provider	1	432
42518	QM Perishable Subsistence	1	181
43509	SP Arty Repair Team	2	35
43549	Power generator Repair Team	1	43
45413	Mobile Public Affairs	2	49
45423	Press Camp HQ	1	
55560	Transporation Contracts Team	5	236
55580	Movement Contrl Team (reg)	2	45
55604	Trans Movement Contrl Center, (CORPS)	1	
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62		244	

ANNEX F

ALTERNATIVES DESIGNATED FOR REFINEMENT

1. This annex describes the refinement and abbreviated assessment of four alternatives for which time and resources did not permit more detailed analysis. These alternatives were for an increase in the role of the RC in prepare activities of the defense strategy; expanded use of the RCs in tempo relief; increasing the RC contribution to the nuclear mission; and initiatives to increase RC to AC integration in general. The Assessment Panel identified the significant benefits and risks of each element of these alternatives through structured workgroup sessions. They are provided for information only.

2. The alternatives discussed in this section involve greater use of the RC to perform tasks which RC assets are integrated with AC organization, as well as some AC only tasks. These initiatives generally have several benefits and risks in common:

a. Increased use of RC assets should improve unit readiness and performance due to greater AC-RC integration and interoperability, and improved total force planning.

b. Increased use of the RC will in many cases mitigate tempo burdens on like-type AC units.

c. Greater use of the RC would likely incur some initial transition costs, would increase annual personnel and O&M costs, and may require tradeoffs with the traditional RC unit tasks.

3. The following sections describe benefits and risks associated with each element of the four alternatives, in addition to the common benefits and risks described above. The Services are noted parentheses if the alternative applies.

a. Increase the RC role in prepare activities

(1) Standardize personnel databases across all Services and components to use of civilian skill sets (all Services). Emerging nonmilitary missions in the information age will require additional highly skilled personnel, and to identify personnel to fill these needs standardize personnel codes that catalogue civilian skills across all Services and components are required.

(2) Incorporate RC participation to support joint experimentation (all Services). Drawing on the military and civilian skills of RC personnel, could enable the DoD to shorten the development times of joint experimentation projects. RC tempo and costs would rise.

b. Use of RC assets in tempo relief

- (1) Increase incentives to recruit separating AC linguists into the RC(all Services). This would relieve the PERSTEMPO and costs of training replacement AC linguists.
- (2) Increase RC involvement in responding to CINC C2 staff augmentation requirements in contingencies (all Services). Assigning RC personnel to C2 staffs would increase CINCs' crisis response capability by providing greater awareness of the available RC unit capabilities. However, timely access to RC personnel could be a concern. This option could divert IMAs currently assigned to other tasks.
- (3) Increase RC participation and support to joint exercises (CAT II) and interoperability training (all Services). This option could provide relief in AC tempo and improve AC to RC integration and interoperability. It requires that the RC participants have the needed level of expertise, and could potentially increase training costs.
- (4) Increase the number of RC civil affairs, medical, public affairs, psychological operations, engineering, ordnance, and military police units, and reliance on RC special forces units for peacetime operations (Army). The expanded population of available units in these high-demand areas could provide AC and RC tempo relief, but could increase cost due to conversion requirements, as well as potential risks in the mission areas from which any converted units were taken.
- (5) Increase Naval Reserve support to interdeployment training cycle activities (Navy). Increasing use of USNR assets for these activities would reduce demands on the AC for support, freeing AC personnel for other activities. The USNR, however, already is facing PERSTEMPO concerns in meeting some current demands, and may not be able to meet expanded support in the future without adverse effects. In addition, personnel costs for additional Selected Reservists on active duty would increase.
- (6) Enlarge the Associate Reserve AWACS Squadron (Air Force). Enlarging the AWACS Reserve unit would offer increased opportunity for departing AC AWACS aircrew to maintain and use their skills as members of the RC, thus enabling the Air Force to maintain higher readiness in this mission area.
- (7) Transfer some AC weapons control ground facilities to the RC (Air Force). This option would relieve ground facility demands on the AC, providing additional personnel to fill high demand airborne control requirements. However, cutting AC billets would degrade the base of AC positions available for rotational assignment to lower tempo positions.

(8) Transfer one tanker squadron to the RC to allow increase of AC aircrews in AWACS (Air Force). Transferring the tanker aircraft to the RC would free AC personnel to provide additional personnel to support the HD/LD AWACS mission. However, as the RC already is heavily integrated into the air refueling mission, the initiative might increase PERSTEMPO for the AC tanker pilots performing extended missions that are more difficult for the RC to support.

(9) Convert USMCR division and wing headquarters staffs and selected HD/LD organizations from Selected Reserve units into the IMA structure; use to augment AC organizations and command element staffs (USMC).

Supplementing current staffs with IMA personnel could avoid the dollar costs and political concerns associated with the requirement to mobilize units, when mission requirements may better be met with individual augmentation to deploying organizations. However, this conversion would adversely impact existing administrative support to reserve units.

c. Increase the RC Contribution to the Nuclear Mission

(1) Convert one strategic missile squadron per wing to associate RC status (Air Force). The ability to maintain mission alert and nuclear technical proficiency requirements do not appear sustainable on a less-than full-time service basis. Nevertheless, this option could relieve the AC of some security force and facility management requirements. However, PRP certification as well as training costs would increase.

(2) Convert portions of the existing STRATCOM alternate mobile C2 facility to RC manning (Air Force). Increased RC manning could reduce cyclic personnel turnover, with associated cost savings from reduced AT and permanent change of station (PCS) requirements.

(3) Transfer one AC B-52 squadron assigned to the nuclear mission to a RC B-52 squadron (Air Force). This initiative could increase AC tempo, since there would be fewer AC squadrons to meet required deployments unless the RC squadron deploys. PRP certification and training costs would increase.

d. Increase RC to AC integration

(1) Increase the number of RC students and faculty members in basic and professional development courses, including JPME phase II (all Services). Greater RC participation in professional education programs would satisfy increasing DoD needs for highly trained professionals at every echelon, especially in the joint arena. Other benefits would be enhanced integration with the AC, improved retention, and expanded qualification for joint service. Increasing the throughput of the courses would cost money and time, and take RC faculty from other tasks until recruiting could fill the gap.

(2) Increase representation of RC full-time staff IMAs on major staffs and at decision making levels (all Services). Using RC personnel could free AC personnel for other assignments. It would increase awareness of RC capabilities and concerns at high levels. However, it would increase the rank structure at senior levels, and would require reprogramming funds. It would also reduce the number of RC personnel for other missions.

(3) Increase RC participation in CINC staff functions and exercises (e.g., intelligence) using remote linkage (all Services). Remote linkage would allow CINCs access to a wider and potentially more experienced personnel base, while increasing participation and decreasing travel cost. It would also free AC personnel for Service needs, and increase the level of RC experience with CINC activities and AOR matters. There would be risks of increased RC tempo and initial costs for communications equipment.

(4) Increase RC integration at corps and EAC; establish multicomponent units at appropriate levels (Army). This initiative would make the RC personnel available when required, lead to a standardized AC and RC approach to mission planning, and increase the readiness of the involved RC units. Greater use of RC personnel at corps and EAC levels would require additional training and staffing effort.

(5) Team RC combat elements with an AC equivalent (Army). Teaming RC with AC would improve total combat readiness by increasing unit integration and interoperability. This option would also permit mentoring in both directions. Exchanges and training costs would increase.

(6) Increase the number of AC personnel in co-located support of RC combat units (Army). Collocating AC support personnel with RC combat units would ensure that the AC personnel would be available when required, thus increasing readiness above that of pure RC units. The initiative would increase the daily interactions between the two components at the unit level, thus promoting the general goal of integration and interoperability. It would mitigate some of the shortfall in the Authorized Level of Organization (ALO), and lead to broader AC awareness of RC concerns and issues. The action would, however, lead to increased costs for permanent change of station, and there would be some loss of AC support to higher staffs.

(7) Establish ARNG-ANG augmentation detachments (approximately 40 personnel each) and incorporate into unified command joint reserve units (Army and Air Force). This initiative, which is being incorporated into USACOM and USSOCOM plans, promises to increase the surge capability of the CINCs and provide RC training in area of responsibility

issues. It would also relieve post-mobilization manning requirements, but may require policy changes for the Army IMA program.

(8) Assign 6 eSBs to an integrated division structure (Army). The enhanced training readiness oversight and preparation for deployment would lead to increased AC and RC readiness and lower post-mobilization training times.

(9) Increase USMCR (SMCR/IRR) augmentation on division/wing level and higher staffs for all Service/joint major exercises (USMC). Augmenting staffs for major exercises would increase surge capability and IRR affiliation with division and wing level staffs. It may require conversion of some SMCR units to individual augmentation detachments.

ANNEX G

RESOURCING PANEL REPORT

RCE-05 Resourcing Panel Report is based on the results of a workshop conducted on 6-7 October and 9 December 1998. During the workshop representatives from the unified commands, Services, RC, OSD, and Joint Staff met to consider how to improve the ability of the RC to assist the Services to meet the needs of the NMS.

Objectives

The Resourcing panel considered the objectives shown below. Each objective is related to the issue approved by the SSSG.

- Develop a list of challenges or barriers to RC resources. (Issue 4.3)
- Develop a list of resource initiatives to improve funding processes for military operations in support of NMS. (Issue 4.2)
- Develop proposed legislative changes that would provide for the more effective use and access to the RC, thereby improving total force effectiveness. (Issue 4.4)

Methodology

The workshop framed the issues for the discussion, obtained the perspectives of the participants, then refined, prioritized, and elaborated on the substantive issues.

Agenda

The process of challenge identification began with ASD(RA) and the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) providing an initial list of challenges to effective use of the RC. The panel participants were divided into three working groups for the CINCs, Army, and Air Force, respectively. The Coast Guard and Marine Corps participated in the CINC working group. (Navy provided input in later sessions.) Each group compiled a list of challenges or barriers to effective RC participation and initiatives to deal with the challenges. The subgroups lists of challenges and associated initiatives were then consolidated and prioritized in subsequent meetings.

Challenges and Initiatives

The challenges have been organized for presentation into six categories: accessibility, utilization, mobilization, training, staffing, and management. The challenges are numbered sequentially in no order of priority. Each initiative is associated with a particular challenge and lettered in sequence. The CINC and Service priorities (high, medium, low, no, or N/A) are shown in table one. The top ten challenges and initiatives, presented to the SSG and in the executive summary, were calculated using the assigned priorities on a point scale of high-3 points, medium-2 points, and low-1 point. Two top-20 lists were compiled for the top 20 CINC and Services' initiatives. The two lists were then compared and common initiatives were identified, resulting in the ten initiatives.

Accessibility

Accessibility refers to the authorities used to activate the RC in peace and war. The role of the RC is to augment and reinforce the AC and to assist in accomplishing the missions of the respective Services. The Services need to be able to access RC members and units for placement on involuntarily or voluntarily active duty to meet DoD needs. The capability to do this rests on the laws that govern the involuntary call-up of RC members and units. The panel identified three challenges to accessibility.

Challenge 1: Inflexible involuntary call-up authorities.

The involuntary call-up authorities currently available in law were designed for the cold war and despite recent changes are still not regarded by panel members as entirely appropriate for the needs of the post-cold war world. The participants eschewed a total revision of involuntary call-up authorities in favor of changes in the laws that are helpful and perhaps possible. There are three initiatives for this challenge. (Navy comment: The challenges and initiatives as written do not indicate accessibility barriers, rather, they are indicative of force structure problems resulting from decreased funding and increased OPTEMPO.)

Initiative 1-A. Extend the limit on involuntary call-up authority from 15 days to 30 days in Title 10, United States Code, Section 12301(b).

This initiative is included in the FY 2000 OMNIBUS Legislative Proposal (17 November 1998 package).

Initiative 1-B. Revise the PSRC authority to allow repetitive and extended PSRC tours for reservists and RC units.

The study recommends that this item be deferred. PSRC has been extremely timely in the last few SSC scenarios. Allowing repetitive PSRCs could jeopardize military-civilian employer relations and thus negatively affect

recruiting and retention. PSRC is not meant for support of peacetime operations, rather, it is a vehicle to support the war-fighting CINC in a crisis response scenario.

Challenge 2. Reservists whose period of active duty exceeds 180 days or extends over the end of a fiscal year are counted in the AC fiscal year end strength authorized by Congress.

The current requirement, per 10USC115(d)(6), is that volunteer reservists be counted against active end strength when activated for more than 180 days. (Involuntary call-up under PSRC does not count toward active end strength per 10USC12304.) Faced with a possible violation of congressional strength authorizations, Services have been reluctant to use reservists or have terminated active duty tours arbitrarily near the end of a fiscal year. Current use of reservists to augment the AC in heavy peacetime tempo makes it desirable that the reservists be available continuously for operations without regard to the end of the fiscal year. There is one initiative for this challenge.

Initiative 2. Revise the law to specify that RC personnel serving voluntarily on active duty for special work in support of military operations do not count against the fiscal year end strength authorized by Congress for the AC of a Service.

This initiative is included in the FY 2000 OMNIBUS Legislative Proposal (17 November 1998 package).

Challenge 3. The process for gaining access to Reservists and RC units varies widely within DoD.

The Services have different processes and terminology for RC members and their duty status. This adds confusion and delay when the Joint Staff and the CINCs want to use RC members from different Services.

Initiative 3-A. Standardize DOD-wide processes for gaining access to RC members and units. Establish common terminology, forms, and flows.

Initiative 3-B. Publish a how-to handbook with recommended procedures for accessing and using the RC.

The study found that an ASD(RA) working group is establishing guidelines on peacetime, non-PSRC access to RC personnel. Anticipated date for guidelines is November 1999. Recently published DODI 1235.12 and Joint Publication 4-05.1 address access to the RC during war, national emergencies, and contingency operations.

Utilization

Use of RC personnel and units to augment and reinforce AC is the fundamental reason for the RC. How the RC is deployed depends on laws, policies, and attitudes, many of which are legacies of earlier eras. Some of these laws, policies, and attitudes are barriers to effective utilization and need to be changed. The panel identified six challenges to utilization.

Challenge 4. Funding and processes to pay for use of RC on active duty are insufficient, unavailable, or untimely.

All the Services budget AC MilPers funds to pay the costs of using volunteer RC personnel and units to augment the AC for peacetime operational missions. However, not all the Services are able to fully resource this need. When the costs of contingency operations are reimbursed by supplemental appropriations, the time remaining to execute the funds within the fiscal year often means that opportunities to use the RC have to be curtailed or cancelled. Since the funds don't carry across the FY, the training and support opportunities lost cannot be recovered later.

Sometimes there is sufficient money to pay for RC active duty support but the rules preclude transferring funds between accounts. In addition, the transition from one FY to the next often creates apparent funding shortages because of the rules for spending money in the final quarter of a FY. The result of this situation is that AC commanders are reluctant to use needed RC. This places an unnecessary additional tempo burden on the AC.

The four initiatives for this challenge are:

Initiative 4-A. Create a DOD-level contingency fund that the CINCs could use to pay for RC active duty support.

This initiative would create a pool of purple funds to reimburse the RC for man-day contributory support provided to the CINCs. It would establish a process by which the CINCs could distribute funds from a DOD-wide fund cite to pay for services provided by the RC.

Initiative 4-A1. (USSOUTHCOM) The CINC's should be permitted to convert O&M dollars to fund RC man-days.

This would increase CINC access to the National Guard and Reserves, e.g., during emergency operations such as disaster relief, the CINC could access the RC volunteers using reimbursable O&M funds. Emergencies or other operations that may not warrant PSRC may nevertheless warrant individual or unit RC augmentation. Excellent examples are the current disaster relief operations in the Caribbean and Central America where

USCINCSOUTH could not use available O&M funds to reimburse the Services for Reserve Pay and Allowances. Due to Service shortfalls in these accounts, participation was limited to AT support, normally only 14-15 days.

Initiative 4-B. Establish for each CINC a pool of purple funds that the CINC could use to pay for RC personnel augmenting the unified command headquarters or joint activities.

The study found that both initiatives 4A and B are currently addressed in the Reserve Forces Policy Board top 20 CINC AC-RC integration issues.

Initiative 4-C. Expedite supplemental appropriations reimbursements.

Though all of the Services budget AC MilPers funds to pay the costs of using RC personnel and units to augment the AC for operational missions, to include SSCs, not all the Services are able to fully budget this need. Supplemental appropriations may be used to cover these costs for the Army, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. However, there may not be sufficient time left in the FY to use the supplemental funds, and as a result, opportunities to employ RC personnel must be limited or cancelled entirely. Because the supplemental funds cannot be used beyond the FY in which they were issued, these opportunities to employ RC personnel are lost permanently. In other cases, sufficient funds to cover the costs of RC active duty support may exist, but the rules governing use of those funds may preclude transferring the funds between accounts.

Given these challenges to funding RC participation in SSCs, many active duty commanders, concerned about their ability to cover the costs, are reluctant to use RC personnel and units even when the RC could make a clear contribution. The study examined whether a mechanism could be created to ensure that contingency operation costs are reimbursed more quickly. Currently, obtaining reimbursement once a supplemental appropriation is granted is a lengthy process that can take from several months to two years. The study recommended that USD(C), the ASD (RA) , and the Services review the current reimbursement process and develop recommendations to increase how quickly reimbursements can be made.

Challenge 5. There is uncertainty about the availability of trained individual manpower, including the IRR.

Recent legislation authorizing up to 30,000 IRR members to be called up under PSRC. However, there is still some concern that the IRR and other sources of trained individual manpower will be unable to provide enough of the right skills to bring both AC and RC units to full strength when needed.

Initiative 5-A. Establish a process for estimating demands for personnel requirements to meet a two-MTW situation. (Army comment: The Army is already doing this).

Initiative 5-B. Preassign IRR to selected early deploying units.

Initiative 5-C. Preassign IRR to selected bases and support organizations.

The study recommends that no action be taken on this item due to the low overall CINC and Service priority rating.

Challenge 6. There is difficulty in tailoring units to meet the real needs of the CINCs.

The CINCs believe that the process the Services use to respond to requests for forces and units too often provides capabilities other than those the CINCs really want. This is evident when it comes to making more and better use of Reserve members and units. Conversely, the CINCs need a better appreciation of how RC assets can be used to meet operational requirements.

Initiative 6. Ensure RC representation at all decision making levels concerning the allocation of Service resources to CINCs.

The study recommends that no action be taken on this item due to the low-medium CINC and Service priority rating.

Challenge 7. Different manpower and personnel systems and service policies make it difficult to manage personnel from different Services working at unified command headquarters and joint activities.

The CINCs representatives reported that they have great difficulty managing manpower and personnel from their multi-Service, multi-component headquarters and joint activities. Each Service and each RC has different systems, forms, and procedures. Because of these differences, the CINCs' staffs spend more time than necessary arranging for RC employment, resulting in increased staffing costs and decreasing the effectiveness. These differences cause significant inefficiencies for those tasked with managing these joint organizations.

Initiative 7. Standardize manpower documentation systems and require all Services to follow a common command billet control numbering system.

The study recommends that this item be deferred. The study found that this problem is not unique to the RC and any solution would involve the total force and each of the Services' particular requirements. The CJCSM 1600.01

provides the CINCs and Services a process to use to update the Joint Table of Distribution (JTD) and Joint Table of Mobilization Distribution (JTMD) which updates RC forces available to the CINCs.

Challenge 8. Incompatibility of AC and RC equipment makes it difficult to work together on military operations.

All participants recognized that equipment incompatibility and a lack of interoperability makes it hard for units of different components to work together effectively. However, the participants also realized that it would seldom be possible to equip all units of a Service with the latest models. They also noted that there are ways to circumvent equipment incompatibility. Nevertheless, the participants believed that efforts should be made when procuring and distributing new systems to achieve interoperability. It ought to be possible also to distribute equipment rationally among the components to minimize incompatibility when the RC augments and reinforces the AC.

Initiative 8-A. Improve AC and RC compatibility of equipment and weapons systems.

Initiative 8-B. Equip and train the RC at levels closer to the AC.

The study endorses ongoing Service efforts in this area. For example, the Services plan to equip RC with \$9.3 billion in new and cascaded equipment during the period FY 1999-2002. The first-to-employ, first-to-equip policy, which underlies the Services' equipment distribution policies, requires that equipment be provided to units commensurate with their planned wartime deployment or employment. Compatibility and sustainability shortfalls in later-deploying units that have resulted from this policy have reduced the units' effectiveness in contingency and ongoing operations. Particular concerns are in the areas of communications, utility helicopters, specific aircraft modifications and upgrades, tactical wheeled vehicles, engineering and construction equipment, and night vision devices. Currently, the Services use alternative resourcing methods that include borrowing equipment -- rotating personnel and leaving equipment in place-- but readiness shortfalls remain for the loaner units. While it is not financially feasible to equip each AC and RC unit with identical equipment identical, the Services have begun to identify specific acquisition funding for RC equipment within their POM submissions.

The FY 2000 National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report identifies the Services' plans to address RC shortages and incompatibilities, and the as part of the FY 2000-2001 Presidential budget, the DoD plans to spend nearly \$6.6 billion for RC equipment between 1999 and 2002. The ASD(RA) has developed the RC equipping strategy to ensure that RC units are equipped in the future to support the NMS, to include crisis response and peacetime engagement activities. The equipping strategy's long-term goal is to equip RC units with modern, compatible equipment.

Challenge 9. Lack of flexibility in providing required capabilities to the CINCs.

The CINCs are responsible for preparing and implementing OPLANS for MTWs and SSCs. As part of this responsibility, they specify the forces required to accomplish the missions. USACOM and the Services then provide these forces. The Air Force believes that the CINCs should not specify units or numbers of aircraft by type, but should instead request a capability. This would allow the Air Force to employ its new Expeditionary Air Force concept to provide that capability in the manner the Air Force believes appropriate. The other Services did not comment on this challenge.

Initiative 9. Change the JSCP to direct CINCs to list required capabilities rather than specific units and allow the Services to source the units to provide the required capability. (USSPACECOM comment: Allow Services to source the units to provide the required capability only if the designated units meet the CINCs required capabilities, for continuity, liaison, peace time support and required training.)

This initiative is beyond the scope of this study. Therefore, the study recommends that this item be deferred and the Air Force raise any issues concerning Air Expeditionary Force units, aircraft types, and capabilities within the current ongoing Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) review and FY 2000 JSCP planning cycle.

Mobilization

Mobilization brings RC members to active duty, processing them administratively, and qualifying them for overseas deployment or employment. A mobilization process that is quick, easy, and yet performs the essential tasks to bring the reservists to active duty and employ them improves the effectiveness of the RC augmentation and reinforcement role. The panel identified five challenges to mobilization.

Challenge 10. Pay and personnel systems are incompatible among the AC and RC.

Despite years of effort, the Services continue to have different pay and personnel systems for the AC and RC. This causes problems when RC members are mobilized.

Initiative 10. Expedite efforts to establish one pay and personnel system for all members of a Service.

The study endorses Service efforts such as the Navy's Standard Integrated Pay System (NSIPS). USMC and USCG already have one pay system for AC and RC.

Challenge 11. There is uncertainty about the validity of data concerning mobilizing reservists.

Initial processing and qualification for deployment of reservists entering active duty has been delayed in some instances by the reluctance of AC authorities to accept the records and data compiled by RC authorities. This causes repetitive work with consequent delays. Also some reservists report for active duty with incomplete records. It is possible that new technology could reduce the uncertainty over the validity of RC personnel data.

Initiative 11. Provide all RC members with smart ID cards that incorporate essential mobilization data.

Mobilizing RC personnel and units for active duty is sometimes delayed due to concerns over personnel data and deployment qualification records for RC personnel. When personnel records are incomplete, or their status is unclear, processing must often be completely redone, which can cause significant mobilization delays. The study determined that providing RC personnel with smart cards, or identification cards that contain a computer chip to store personnel information and other data, would help ensure that essential mobilization data is up to date and accurate, and would reduce unnecessary mobilization delays. The OSD Smart Card Technology Office issued a report to Congress, 31 March 1999. The report will be provided to SecDef by September 1999 on the feasibility of implementing smart cards for the uniformed Services. The Services, using a variety of test case mechanisms, are already examining the feasibility of providing smart cards to RC personnel.

Challenge 12. There is unnecessary duplication of activities at various stages of mobilization.

Some participants were concerned about the time it takes to activate and employ RC members and units on SSCs. The sequential nature of the processing results in the Reservists repeating some processing steps, including post-mobilization training, in different places under different commands. The effect of this duplication of activities is usually that the CINC gets the forces later than desired.

Initiative 12. Allow CINCs to coordinate directly with RC units designated to augment the CINC for SSCs.

The study recommends that no action be taken on this item due to low CINC and Service priority.

Challenge 13. Service mobilization and deployment administration lacks standardization.

The CINCs and the Joint Staff report that each Service has dissimilar rules for mobilization and deployment planning and execution that make it hard to perform in the joint world. This lack of uniformity in RC structures and systems makes it especially difficult for AC members to know how to access RC assets outside their own Service.

Initiative 13-A. Standardize mobilization and deployment administration among the Services and RC, to include simplification of forms, fund cites, and procedures.

Initiative 13-B. Conduct a detailed study of the mobilization process in the same manner as the RCE-2005 Study is being conducted. (USSPACECOM comment: A mobilization study was completed in May 1998, and these results need to be reviewed prior to initiating another study.)

The study found that many AC commanders find it difficult to access RC personnel for use in joint military operations because there is so little uniformity among the Services' RC structures and mobilization systems. While the Joint Staff J-4 Mobilization Division has made significant progress in simplifying the mobilization process, the process is still complicated and poorly understood by many AC and RC commanders and staffs. The ASD(RA) is leading a working group to examine whether the mobilization and deployment process could be further simplified and revised to meet current and future needs. DoDI 1235.12, which was recently completed, and Joint Publication 4-05.1 address RC access during war, national emergencies, and contingency operations, so the working group is focusing on peacetime, non PSRC access to RC personnel. The working group will complete its review by November 1999.

Challenge 14. CINCs lack knowledge of RC backfill and mobilization support required to be included in OPLAN, Annex A, Appendix 5.

Initiative 14. Designate a single headquarters to identify backfill and mobilization requirements to be included in CINC OPLANS, Appendix 5, Annex A.

The study recommends that this item be deferred. The study found that the CJCSM 3122.03 requires that CINCs include in their OPLANS the RC forces for backfill requirements in CONUS and OCONUS. The responsibility to identify and provide forces to the CINCs for backfill requirements lies with the Services.

Training

The quality and content of pre- and post-mobilization training and equipment determines the effectiveness of RC members and units. The better the training, the better the ability of the RC to augment and reinforce the AC. The panel identified six challenges to training.

Challenge 15. Lack of linkage between peacetime training programs and post-mobilization training requirements.

Initiative 15. Enhance the opportunity for skills training and reduce non-mission related training.

The study recommends that no action be taken on this item due to CINC and Service low priority.

Challenge 16. There is a lack of coordination between AC and RC employment and training plans.

Some participants expressed concern that the AC tends to regard the RC merely as a manpower pool to fill in gaps in the AC. This approach diminishes the value of the civilian skills, military training, and previous AC service of many reservists.

Initiative 16. Encourage the AC to use reservists for their expertise and not just as a manpower pool.

The study recommends that no action be taken on this item due to CINC and Service low priority.

Challenge 17. The length of required post-mobilization training program is excessive since advantage of modern training technologies is not taken.

Initiative 17. Establish a streamlined training process including the use of modern information technology.

The study recommends that no action be taken on this item due to low to medium CINC and Service priority.

Challenge 18. There is a lack of CINC involvement in the post-mobilization training process.

The CINC's representatives contended that their headquarters had little involvement in the determination of the content and length of post-mobilization

training. They also agreed that the force providers do not sufficiently consider the CINCs needs.

Navy indicated that CINCs need to clarify requirements to the Services then could the requirements be addressed in the Service training plans to the degree required.

A remedy for lack of input on the content and length of the post-mobilization training for RC units was to allow the CINCs to waive or curtail post-mobilization training schedules as necessary to meet deployment schedules or influence the outcome of a military operation being conducted by a CINC.

Initiative 18-A. Allow CINCs to waive mobilization training time for selected units or individuals. (USSPACECOM comment: This initiative assumes that the CINCs are allowed to coordinate on training requirements.)

The study recommends that no action be taken on this item due to CINC and Service low priority.

Challenge 19. Too few RC personnel are adequately trained for joint assignments.

A comprehensive program exists to train AC officers and NCOs for joint assignments; however, there is no such program for the RC. As a result, RC personnel assigned to joint headquarters and activities report for duty less well prepared than their AC colleagues. Moreover, joint activities do not provide courses on the fundamentals of joint operations to RC personnel even after assignment to joint positions.

Initiative 19. Develop a Joint PME accreditation program for RC members recommended for assignment to or actually assigned to joint staff or command billets.

The study found that while RC personnel in joint billets do receive some on-the-job training in joint assignments once they arrive, these experiences rarely provide a solid or standardized foundation in the fundamentals of joint operations. To address this concern, DoD has proposed in its FY 2000 Omnibus Legislation that a PME course for the RC on joint assignments be established, specifically focused on the JPME phase 2 program. There are currently no billets allocated to the RC for JPME phase 2. The proposal also calls for an increase in RC billets for JPME Phase 1 curriculums. The RFPB sponsored a RC education summit on behalf of the CINCs in May 1999 that will explore RC joint education.

Challenge 20. The presence in RC units of personnel who are not qualified in a skill at the entry level makes it difficult to deploy whole units.

Current personnel accounting standards include unqualified personnel assigned to RC units without recognizing that they are non-deployable. During mobilization, units have to leave behind those members who are not qualified in their skills or whose actual skill does not match exactly the skill specified in the authorized billet. This policy leaves many units under strength just prior to deployment. There are three aspects to this challenge. One is that strength authorizations do not differentiate between RC members who are skilled qualified and those who are not. Second, RC units find it difficult to complete initial skill (MOS) qualification under current training policies and funding limitations. Third, rigid application of the requirement that actual skills match authorized skills exactly may be inappropriate.

Initiative 20-A. Study the impact of authorizing early deploying RC units an overstrength equal to the number of non-skill qualified personnel waiting to complete their initial skill qualification.

Initiative 20-B. Examine the relative emphasis in RC premobilization training between collective training and initial skill qualification and consider how to place more emphasis on speeding up initial skill qualification.

Initiative 20-C. Establish a waiver policy for RC personnel who have completed initial entry training but whose skill qualification does not match exactly the skill called for in the unit establishment. In many cases the general experience and previous skills of an RC member make it more sensible to mobilize and deploy the reservist with the unit rather than disqualify the member and bring in a new person with the required skill. (Navy comment: Service training requirements cannot be overlooked in some cases, such as, for example, firefighting school for OCONUS Navy deployers.)

The study recommends that this no action be taken on these items due to low to medium CINC and Service priority.

Staffing

The strength of the RC and the quality of the RC personnel are important factors in the ability of RC members and units to train effectively in peacetime and perform effectively when mobilized. Meeting authorized staffing levels in a high-operating tempo environment is a major factor in maintaining the effectiveness of the RC. The panel identified nine challenges to staffing.

Challenge 21. Constraints on the availability of RC members for active duty tours because of heavy demands on their available time are poorly understood.

Reservists are being used more than ever before to perform operational missions in peacetime. This is happening because the high OPTEMPO to meet the missions assigned to the Services by SecDef and CINCs exceeds the capability of the AC. Up to now, the RC missions have been assigned and accepted without a firm understanding of just how much active duty the RC can perform without impacting seriously on the ability of the RC to retain old members and recruit new ones. There are three initiatives to meet this challenge.

Initiative 21-A. Study the impact of high demand on the availability of key personnel.

Although all the RC is providing more peacetime augmentation to their respective AC than ever before, little is known about the impact of this high demand on their continued availability for active duty and their retention in military service.

Initiative 21-B. Improve predictability of RC use by requiring consideration of RC utilization as part of the planning process for SSC.

Predictability -- advance knowledge of an operation in time to permit coordination with families and employers -- helps reservists to go on active duty. The Air Force has attempted to meet the need for predictability by instituting the Expeditionary Air Force concept.

Initiative 21-C. Publish a how-to guide on RC use for OSD and CINCs to improve the process by which missions are assigned to the RC.

The study found that initiatives 21A and B will be evaluated as part of the alternative for increased use of RC in SSCs, expanding RC use in meeting HD/LD requirements.

Initiative 21C will be addressed by an ongoing ASD(RA) working group to simplify the peacetime employment and deployment process.

Challenge 22. There are disparities in benefits between AC and RC personnel.

There was general agreement that, despite recent progress, there are still real and perceived disparities between AC and RC benefits. The CINCs and the Air Force said that it would be a good idea to establish a policy of benefits parity for AC and RC. Lesser entitlements available to RC personnel while on active duty performing on operational assignments contribute to the feeling they are second-class citizens. Increasing the RC OPTEMPO compounds the problem. There were several initiatives advanced to remedy this challenge.

Initiative 22-A. Improve RC eligibility for space-available travel while on active duty to be comparable for that for the AC.

The study recommends that no action be taken on this item since space-available travel is a benefit given to the AC for emergency leave or regular leave. RC personnel in the IDT or AT status do not accrue leave unless the active duty period exceeds 30 days, so the normal one weekend per month and 2 weeks per year reservist is not eligible.

Initiative 22-B. While in IDT and AT status, provide RC members the same benefits as the AC for commissary, exchange, reduced airfares, and space-available travel. This would include unlimited use of the commissary system. (USAF disagrees with providing transportation to and from the training location on parity with AC due to increasingly limited airlift assets. USAF is reviewing upgrade of IDT and AT space-available transportation.)

While much progress has been made in recent years to ensure equity in the AC and RC benefit packages, the study determined that disparities continue to exist in some cases for RC personnel. The study reviewed a variety of benefit issues and determined that commissary visits for IDT/AT category RC personnel and their dependents were recently increased from 12 to 24 visits annually. This increase establishes near-parity between AC and RC personnel in this area. IDT and AT category RC personnel and their family members also currently have unlimited access to exchanges. National Guard members responding to a federally-declared disaster now have full access to commissaries and exchanges while on active duty. The ASD(RA) is currently negotiating a GSA contract for drilling reservists to obtain the government contract airfare discount when travelling to drill sites.

The study also determined during its review of benefits policies that the USD(P&R) is preparing a report to Congress on Parity of Pay and Benefits for AC and RC that is expected to be submitted by January 2000. Required by Section 1256, Defense Authorization Act 1997, this report will focus on disparities in benefits for RC personnel who have been on active duty for more than 30 days. The report will address the following issues in detail: Housing allowance for reserve members without family members, housing allowance rates for reserve members, CONUS COLA, leave entitlement, medical care for family members, and disability severance pay.

Initiative 22-C. Implement RC Health Care Summit initiatives.

In addition, OSD(RA) has been involved in two studies to address RC health care issues, a Report to Congress required by the Defense Authorization Act, 1997, Section 746, and the RC Health Care Summit. Both studies will address RC-AC parity for health benefits and entitlements. The Section 746 study is currently in the final draft stage and will be submitted to Congress

later this year. The RC Health Care Summit will make recommendations to improve the medical readiness of RC members, to provide appropriate health care and medical entitlements for those who become ill or injured as a result of service, and to ensure uniformity and consistency among the Services. The report will be submitted to the Secretary of Defense following the submission of the Section 746 study.

Initiative 22-D. Establish an effective family support network for RC personnel who have been mobilized and deployed on SSC. Army comment: Army is already making good progress.

The study endorses ongoing Service efforts in this area.

Initiative 22-E. Allow Reservists to start receiving military retired pay when they actually retire instead of waiting until age 60.

The study recommends that no action be taken on this item due to low to medium CINC and Service priority.

Challenge 23. There are impediments to personnel transfers between the Active and Reserve components of a Service and among the seven RC.

As the RC approach a high level OPTEMPO, Reservists may want to transfer from one RC to another to seek career enhancement or job satisfaction. Some panel participants assert that it is still too difficult to transfer between RC or to the AC and back. Other panel participants, however, reported that it is now easier to make these transfers than before. It is quite possible that being able to transfer between RC organizations or to AC status would persuade some members to do that instead of leaving military Service entirely.

Initiative 23. Make it easier for military personnel to transfer between the AC and RC and among the other Services.

The study recommends that no action be taken on this item due to low CINC and Service priority.

Challenge 24. It is harder to retain reservists in high-demand military occupations.

The nature of SSCs means that military personnel with certain skills are used much more frequently than those with other skills. This leads to a situation in which RC personnel with certain high-demand skills are being called up to active duty frequently. This high PERSTEMPO for reservists with high-demand skills may cause problems with employers and families and is likely to decrease their propensity to remain in the RC. At the same time, AC

and RC personnel of other Services with similar skills may be under utilized and less stressed by a high PERSTEMPO. It is possible that the situation could be eased with more equitable tasking within DOD.

Initiative 24. Increase the opportunity for cross assignments of AC and RC members.

The study will address this issue in the alternative to increase RC in SSCs, expand RC use in meeting LD/HD requirements.

Challenge 25. Pay grade constraints make it difficult to access key personnel for specific operational support missions.

When reservists are ordered to active duty for special work voluntarily in support of military operations for more than 180 days, their strength is included in the AC strength subject to grade limitations by Congress. In some cases, this means that the Services cannot have the grades they want because the total of AC and active duty RC personnel exceeds the grade ceilings. However, grade ceilings were established on the basis of the AC strength and may be inappropriate when RC augmentation is sought for a military operation. The Air Force and USTRANSCOM report that they have been unable in some instances to obtain enough experienced aviators for operational support because of this challenge.

Initiative 25. Obtain relief from congressional ceilings on active duty grades for reservists being voluntarily called up for operational missions.

This initiative is included in the FY 2000 OMNIBUS Legislative Proposals (17 November 1998 package).

Challenge 26. There are constraints on the accumulation of leave by reservists on active duty.

At present, Service members who have left active duty and accepted at that time a lump-sum payment for the maximum amount of accrued leave to one-time sell back by law (60 days) are not permitted to sell back additional accrued additional leave while on active duty as reservists. This is a disincentive for reservists to seek active duty assignments.

Initiative 26. Prepare legislation that allows RC members to sell back all accrued leave earned during active duty for military operations regardless of whether or not they previously sold back the maximum 60 days allowed by current law. Also establish a DoD policy that requires consistency by the military Services in allowing the option for reservists to take earned leave during periods of active duty or receive payment. (Air Force comment: The Air Force supports leave entitlement parity.

The USAF believes parity currently exists in leave entitlements between RC and AD.) (Navy comment: This would be a benefit the AC does not receive and represents a lack of parity between RC and AC. Potentially consider applicable change for both RC and AC.)

The study found that there is a waiver for RC personnel to sell back accrued leave in excess of 60 days while on active duty and assigned to a contingency operation. A Unified Legislative Budget (ULB) process to address the issue for non-contingency operations is currently in the staffing process. The outcome may focus on developing a clear policy to afford reservists, on active duty over 30 days, the opportunity to use this legitimately earned entitlement..

Challenge 27. The current system for RC recruiting is unsatisfactory.

The Coast Guard suggested this challenge because it is apparently having difficulty meeting its authorized strength with the present system of using AC recruiters to recruit also for the RC. There was some appreciation for the validity of this challenge from the other RC. The National Guard was generally satisfied with the current system that makes unit commanders responsible for recruiting. It was agreed that there was insufficient emphasis on persuading personnel leaving the AC to continue their military service in the RC. The Services discussed current and potential procedures for identifying exiting AC personnel and informing them of RC opportunities.

Initiative 27-A. Improve and streamline RC recruiting process.

Initiative 27-B. Emphasize the value of having members leaving the AC continue their military service in the RC.

Since this item was a low priority for all except the Coast Guard, the study recommends the USCG to conduct a review of its RC recruiting process.

Challenge 28. Reservists who have foreign employers are subject to sanctions by them.

Reservists who are employed by foreign firms are not covered by US law that requires US companies to grant military leave and reemploy reservists that go on active duty periodically. Moreover, foreign employers tend to be unsympathetic to U.S. reservists. Continued retention of reservists employed by foreign firms would benefit from actions to cover them for financial loss due to involuntary call-ups to support U.S. military operations.

Initiative 28. Provide financial assistance to RC members who lose their jobs with a foreign employer due to an involuntary call-up.

The study recommends that this item be deferred and endorses the Department of State initiative to support reservists employed by foreign employers abroad.

Challenge 29. It is too difficult to involve reservists in the nuclear weapon PRP.

The Air Force would like to use more RC to augment its strategic forces but is limited in its ability to do this by the PRP requirement. The PRP is a necessary program to assure that personnel with access to nuclear weapons are trustworthy and sound. OSD is dubious about RC for this duty because of the concern part-time military personnel would not be under positive military control at all times and could thus pose problems not clearly visible to commanders.

Initiative 29. Modify DODD 5210.42 to allow for RC certification, while still meeting the spirit and intent of the directive.

As tasked by the study's Alternative Panel: RC in MTWs and the transfer of one B-52 and one B-1 squadrons to RC, USD(P) in coordination with USD(P&R) will review the existing PRP constraints for the participation of selected part-time RC personnel by 31 November 1999.

Management

The RCs are managed in accordance with a body of laws, policies, procedures, and traditions. Many of these are legacies of past situations and strategies and are no longer appropriate for the current situation and strategy. Many of the challenges posed by the panel are concerned with how the RCs are managed. The panel identified four challenges to management.

Challenge 30. Constraints on the use of full-time reservists hamper performance of operational missions.

There was considerable discussion of how current constraints on the use of full-time reservists hamper operations. The original intent of providing full-time reservists was to perform the unit administration to allow the part-time reservists to focus on training. However, the current employment of the RC to augment the AC on operational missions requires at times that full-time reservists perform operational assignments as well as provide support to the drilling reservists. The constraints in law and policy ought to be modified to permit the full-time reservists to participate in operational missions as appropriate.

Initiative 30. Modify legal and policy constraints to permit the use of full-time reservists on operational missions.

The study found that currently, full-time reservists with administrative responsibilities for maintaining RC units are expected to continue those duties when the unit is deployed, rather than assuming other operational or command duties. Title 10, United States Code, Section 101(d)(6)(A), states “The term ‘active Guard and Reserve duty’ means active duty or full-time National Guard duty performed by a member of a Reserve component of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps, or full-time National Guard duty performed by a member of the National Guard, pursuant to an order to active duty or full-time National Guard duty for a period of 180 consecutive days or more, for the purpose of organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, or training the Reserve components.” In today's environment, full-time reservists are being used increasingly to augment the AC during operational missions; however, existing legal and policy constraints governing the use of full-time reservists in operational missions have in some cases precluded reservists from serving in these missions as effectively as possible. The study found that the issues relating to the use of full-time Guard and Reserve forces are being addressed in a congressionally-directed study that is being conducted by OASD(RA) in conjunction with the Services.

Challenge 31. Current training, retirement and active duty categories for the Ready Reserve are too complicated.

There was general agreement that the current management structure for the Ready Reserve was unduly complicated and contributed to the difficulties reported in administering and using reserve personnel and units. While there was no consensus on what should be done about this, there was sentiment for addressing this challenge.

Initiative 31. Examine the management structure of the Ready Reserve and determine how to simplify it.

The study recommends that this item be deferred due to low Service priority. Overall CINC priority was medium to high.

Challenge 32. RC leaders are not integrated into the decision making process at the appropriate level.

The panel participants concluded that the RC could be used more effectively if they were represented appropriately at all levels of the decision making process on RC missions, structure, resourcing, and employment. They proposed three initiatives to remedy this situation.

Initiative 32-A. Increase the number of full-time National Guard and reserve officers and senior NCOs at unified command headquarters and joint activities.

Initiative 32-B. Assign more National Guard and Reserve general and flag officers to unified command headquarters and joint activities.

The study found that unfamiliarity within the AC with RC missions, capabilities, structures, and resourcing procedures hampers DoD's ability to use the RC most effectively. Increasing the integration of the RC leadership into the decision making processes within DoD would reduce this unfamiliarity and facilitate more comprehensive and effective employment of the RC. To integrate RC leadership personnel more fully into the DoD, the study recommended increasing the number of full-time National Guard and Reserve officers and senior NCOs into unified command headquarters and joint activities. The study also recommended raising the number of National Guard and Reserve general and flag officers serving in these organizations. The RFPB supports both recommendations.

Initiative 32-C. Promote reserve chiefs and the directors of the Army and Air National Guard to lieutenant general and Navy to vice admiral.

The study recommends that this item be deferred for now due to CINC and Service low to medium priority.

Challenge 33. Lack of understanding on the part of the AC of the potential value of the RC.

There was general agreement among the panelists that the AC did not understand or appreciate the RC. This is due to the lack of understanding of RC fundamentals. This lack of understanding and appreciation was considered the reason for the cultural differences that hamper effective integration in the Services. The more aware Services are better transacting with their reservists, but all believed that there is a significant problem in DOD and in the unified commands.

Initiative 33. Establish an education program at military educational institutions to teach AC officers and NCOs about the RC.

The study recommends that this item be deferred and endorses the Services efforts in this area.

Positions and Priorities

This section of the final report provides the views of the panel participants on the priorities assigned to the challenges and initiatives presented above. The priorities shown in the table below are derived from the discussion of priorities at the October and December workshops and later input by the CINCs. The challenges were ranked: high, medium, low, no, and N/A where initiatives had already been implemented. The priorities of each of the Services and CINCs are shown in the Table 1.

Table 1: Priority Ratings for Challenges and Initiatives

Challenge																	
Initiative																	
		USA	USN	USMC	USAF	USCG	ACOM	PACOM	CENTCOM	TRANSCOM	EUCOM	SOUTHCOM	SOCOM	SPACECOM	STRATCOM		
Accessibility																	
1 Involuntary call-up authority																	
A	Extend 12301(b) to 30 days	Low	No	High	Low	N/A	High	Med	High	High	Med	Low	Low	Low	Med		
B	Extend PSRC beyond 270 days	No	No	No	No	No	High	Med	Med	Low	Med	Low	High	Low	Med		
2 Counting Reservists on AD in FY end strength																	
	Change law to count RC separately	Low	Med	Med	High	High	High	High	High	High	High	Med	High	High	Med		
3 Variations in accession process																	
A	Standardize accession process in DOD	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	High	High	High	High	Med	High	High	Med		
B	Publish handbook on accession rules	Low	Low	Low	Med	Low	Low	High	High	Med	High	Med	High	High	Med		
4 Lack of funding for RC on active duty																	
A	DOD level purple contingency fund	No	No	No	No	No	High	High	High	Low	High	High	High	High	High		

	B	CINC level purple contingency funds	No	No	No	No	No	High	High	High	Low	High	High	High	High	High
			USA	USN	USMC	USAF	USCG	ACOM	PACOM	CENTCOM	TRANSCOM	EUCOM	SOUTHCOM	SOCOM	SPACECOM	STRATCOM
	4 Lack of funding for RC on active duty															
	C	Speed up reimbursement for AD	High	High	High	No	High	High	High	High	Med	High	High	Med	High	High

Challenge																
Initiative																
		USA	USN	USMC	USAF	USCG	ACOM	PACOM	CENTCOM	TRANSCOM	EUCOM	SOUTHCOM	SOCOM	SPACECOM	STRATCOM	
Utilization																
5	Uncertainty about availability of PIM, especially IRR															
	A Develop method for estimating PIM requirement	Low	Low	Low	Low	High	Med	Med	Low	Low	Med	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low
	B Preassign PIM to selected early deploying units	Low	Low	Low	No	Med	Med	Med	Med	Low	Med	Low	High	Low	Low	Low
	C Preassign PIM to selected non-deployable support organizations	Low	Low	Low	No	Med	Med	Med	Med	Low	Med	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low

		USA	USN	USMC	USAF	USCG	ACOM	PACOM	CENTCOM	TRANSCOM	EUCOM	SOUTHCOM	SOCOM	SPACECOM	STRATCOM
6	Difficulty in tailoring units for CINC's needs														
	Ensure RC representation in decisions	Med	Low	Low	High	Med	Med	Low	High	High	Low	Low	Low	High	Med
7	Different service systems hard for joint HQs														
	Standardize manpower documents	Med	Low	Low	No	Med	Low	High	High	High	High	High	High	High	High
8	Incompatible equipment between AC and RC														
	A Improve AC and RC equipment match	High	Med	No	High	N/A	High	High	High	Med	High	High	High	High	Low
	B Equip and train RC at level closer to AC	High	Med	No	High	High	High	High	High	Low	High	Med	Low	High	Med
9	Lack of flexibility in meeting CINC's needs														
	Require CINC's to request capabilities	Low	Med	Med	High	Med	-	-	High	-	-	-	Low	High*	Med

Challenge																	
Initiative																	
		USA	USN	USMC	USAF	USCG	ACOM	PACOM	CENTCOM	TRANSCOM	EUCOM	SOUTHCOM	SOCOM	SPACECOM	STRATCOM		
Mobilization																	
10 Incompatible pay and personnel systems																	
	Expedite one system per service	High	Med	N/A	Med	N/A	High	Med	High	High	Med	Low	High	Med	High		
11 Uncertainty about data on mobilizing reservists																	
	Provide all reservists smart cards with data	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Low	High	High	High	High	Med	Med	High	High		
12 Duplication of activities during mobilization																	
	Allow CINCs to work directly with SSC-allocated RC units.	No	No	No	No	No	Med	Med	High	Low	Med	High	Low	Low	Med		
13 Service mobilization/ deployment administration not standard																	
A	Standardize mob/dep administration	Low	High	Low	Low	Med	Low	Med	Med	Med	Med	High	High	High	Med		
B	Conduct study of mobilization process	No	No	Low	Low	Med	Low	Med	Med	High	Med	High	High	No*	Med		

Challenge																
Initiative																
			USA	USN	USMC	USAF	USCG	ACOM	PACOM	CENTCOM	TRANSCOM	EUCOM	SOUTHCOM	SOCOM	SPACECOM	STRATCOM
Training																
14	CINCs do not know about backfill and support needs															
	Designate single Hqs for backfill/support data (ACOM)	Med	Med	Med	No	Med	Low	Med	High	High	Med	Low	Low	Low	Low	Med
15	Poor linkage between pre- & post-mob training															
	Increase skill tng & cut nonmission training	Low	Low	Low	N/A	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	High	Low
16	Poor coordination between AC & RC training															
	AC to use RC for skills and not labor	Low	Low	Low	Low	Med	Low	Low	High	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	High	Low
17	Excessive post-mob training requirements															
	Streamlined post-mob training process	Low	Low	Low	Low	Med	Med	Low	High	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	High	Low

		USA	USN	USMC	USAF	USCG	ACOM	PACOM	CENTCOM	TRANSCOM	EUCOM	SOUTHCOM	SOCOM	SPACECOM	STRATCOM
18	Lack of CINC involvement in post-mob training														
	Let CINCs to waive/cut post-mob training	No	No	No	No	No	Med	Low	High	Low	Low	Low	Low	High*	Low
19	Few Reservists trained for joint assignments														
	Develop Joint PME course for RC	Med	Low	Med	Med	High	High	Med	High	High	Med	High	High	Med	Med
20	Untrained personnel in RC units hampers mobilization														
	A Study overstrength for early deployers	Med	Low	Low	N/A	N/A	Low	High	High	Low	High	Med	High	Low	Low
	B More emphasis pre-mob on skill tng	Med	Low	Low	N/A	N/A	Low	High	High	Low	High	Med	High	Low	Low
	C Set up waiver policy for skill match	Med	Low	Low	N/A	N/A	Low	High	High	Low	High	High	High	Low	Low

Challenge																
Initiative																
			USA	USN	USMC	USAF	USCG	ACOM	PACOM	CENTCOM	TRANSCOM	EUCOM	SOUTHCOM	SOCOM	SPACECOM	STRATCOM
Staffing																
21 Poor understanding of impact of high RC usage																
	A	Study impact of high demand on RC	High	Med	High	High	High	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	High	Low
	B	Improve predictability of RC use	High	Med	Med	High	High	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	High	Low
	C	Publish guide on RC use of volunteers	High	Med	Med	Med	High	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	High	Low
22 Disparities in benefits for AC and RC																
	A	Make RC space-A travel same as AC	Low	Low	Med	N/A	Low	High	Med	Med	Med	Med	Med	Low	Med	Med
	B	AC benefits for RC on IDT or AT	High	High	Med	Med	High	High	Med	High	High	Med	Med	Low	Med	Med
	C	Implement RC Health Summit actions	Med	High	Med	High	Med	High	Med	High	Low	Med	Med	Low	Med	Med
	D	Establish family support network for RC	Low	Med	N/A	Med	N/A	High	Med	High	Low	Med	Low	Med	Med	Med

		USA	USN	USMC	USAF	USCG	ACOM	PACOM	CENTCOM	TRANSCOM	EUCOM	SOUTHCOM	SOCOM	SPACECOM	STRATCOM	
	E	Adjust RC retirement for immediate pay	Low	No	Med	No	Med	Med	Med	High	Low	Med	Med	Low	Low	Med
23	Impediments to transfers to AC and among RCs															
		Make it easier for reservists to transfer	Med	Low	Low	Low	Med	High	Low	Low	Low	Low	High	High	Med	Low
24	Hard to retain reservists in high demand skills															
		Increase cross-service assignments AC & RC	Med	Low	Med	Med	Med	Med	Low	High	Low	Low	High	Low	Med	Low
25	Pay grade constraints limit use of RC on AD															
		Obtain relief from grade limits for RC	Med	No	Low	Med	Med	High	Med	Med	High	Med	Med	Low	Med	Low
26	Constraints on RC accumulation of leave on AD															
		RC to be paid/sell back for leave over 60 days	High	High	High	Med	Med	Low	Low	High	Low	Low	High	Low	High	Low

		USA	USN	USMC	USAF	USCG	ACOM	PACOM	CENTCOM	TRANSCOM	EUCOM	SOUTHCOM	SOCOM	SPACECOM	STRATCOM
27	Current RC recruiting system is unsatisfactory														
	A Improve RC recruiting process	Med	Low	N/A	Low	High	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low
	B Reemphasize AC losses going to RC	Low	Low	N/A	Low	High	Low	Low	Med	Low	Low	Low	Med	High	Low
28	Reservists with foreign employers unprotected														
	Financial help for RC w/foreign employers*	High	High	High	High	N/A	High	Low	Med	Med	Low	Low	Low	No	Low
29	Difficult to obtain PRP approval for RC members														
	Modify DOD policy to allow PRP for RC	Low	Low	N/A	Low	N/A	Med	High	High	High	High	Med	Low	High	High
Management															
30	Constraints on use of full time reservists														
	Change Policy on full-time reservists	High	Med	Low	High	Med	High	High	High	High	High	High	High	Low	High

		USA	USN	USMC	USAF	USCG	ACOM	PACOM	CENTCOM	TRANSCOM	EUCOM	SOUTHCOM	SOCOM	SPACECOM	STRATCOM
31	Current RC management structure is complex														
	Simplify RC management structure	No	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Med	Med	High	Med	High	High	High	Med
32	RC leaders not integrated into decision loop														
A	Increase full time reservists in joint HQ	High	Med	Low	High	Med	High	Low	High	High	Low	High	Low	High	Med
B	Assign more RC GO/FO to joint HQ	Med	Med	Low	High	Med	Low	Low	High	Low	Low	High	Low	High	Med
C	Promote RC chiefs to Lieutenant General	Med	Med	No	High	Med	Low	Low	Low	Med	Low	Med	Low	No	Low
33	The AC does not understand the RC														
	Education program about RC for the AC	Med	Med	Low	Med	High	High	Low	High	Med	Low	High	Med	Low	Low