Secretary Wynne: Thank you all very much for coming today. General Moseley and I have the same vision for America's Air Force -- a lean, lethal and agile force that will continue to dominate air, space and cyberspace for the joint team and enable joint warfare together with us.

I put out enough correspondence I think to our Airmen as well as to the Congress to talk about the mission and goals that we've set, and we have for you a card that lists all those missions and goals that's going to be made available to everybody so that you don't have to kind of go down the list. But they very much emphasize better business management, lean tools, use of lean tools to husband resources. We have also talked a little bit about sovereign options for the nation's defense. Sovereign options is really to communicate to an audience that we have been at war for 15 years, offering essentially the nation options as to use kinetic, non-kinetic, just knowledge and/or actions or diplomacy at their whim.

We realize that we are the force that would hold hostile nation's intentions hostage, and we recognize that that's a real thing we share, by the way, with other services in this joint team.

In the same way, we talked about air, space and cyberspace, and we talk about that in recognition that we have a lot of people working in cyberspace who were otherwise unrecognized and didn't have a career path, although we have the strategic commander who in fact has been given the wartime mission but there is nobody who is assigned the Title 10 mission, if you will, to train, organize and equip. We also do not husband this particular mission space by ourselves, recognizing that it's all going to be part of the joint fight, and we share the table with a lot of smart people from the Army, the Navy, as well as the Marine Corps.

I would say that this is a very interesting time for the Air Force. We have been at war for 15 years, and in that time we've
learned a lot of things about first, how do you fight in the long war? Things have happened over those 15 years. We were just talking about we recognize that during the time we've been engaged, which I think was April of 1991, the whole internet had gotten invented. Things happened. GPS started to come around and help us. All of these things that we did not have when we first entered the engagement are available now. We look at that and we think to ourselves, what does that mean?

Well now it all of a sudden means that we fight distant wars and we never leave America. For things like space control, for things like information fusion, for things like sometimes Predator and Global Hawk. Whole squadrons are here in the United States on control. So the whole concept of reachback has suddenly exploded on us, if you will, for us to figure out how to get the benefit of it.

This has allowed us to look at ourselves in a very different way and see if we can't extract more efficiencies and more effectiveness from the force structure that we have. I think that's probably one of the keys to the difference in our approach to where we see we want to place the 21st Century Air Force.

With that, I'm going to turn it over to my partner here. I'm very proud to introduce a really terrific warfighter, General Mike Moseley.

**General Moseley:** Guys, thanks for the opportunity to share some thoughts with y'all today and thanks for taking the time to come over and sit with us. I look forward to y'all's questions and y'all's comments also.

Let me briefly parallel the Secretary with a reminder that it was actually August of 1990 when the first wing deployed into the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia for Desert Shield, with hostilities that began in January. Since then the United States Air Force has been in solid combat -- 12 years of no-fly zones, Bosnia, Kosovo, Desert Fox, Vigilant Warrior, Afghanistan, Iraq, and now.

So out of all of that comes an incredible amount of combat experience and an incredible amount of expertise in looking at requirements and looking at opportunities to be more joint in looking at ways to be moving from deconfliction into the world of
interdependence which I believe we are now. And in this time period we've also seen things, as the Secretary mentioned, about the internet. We've seen things about space, we've seen things following Goldwater/Nichols and out of all of that comes a much more capable joint force and a much more interdependent joint force operating alongside the Navy and the Marines and the Army.

But for the most part your Air Force has been engaged since that first deployment in August of 1990 and has not come off of that combat level.

So sir, let me close by saying we've got 30,000 Airmen deployed into Central Command's AOR this afternoon. We've got 35,000 in European Command's AOR and we've got 45,000 in Pacific Command's AOR that are outside of the CONUS. The remainder of the Air Force is under US Northern Command or Strat Command operations while we have people this afternoon in missile silos and operating spacecraft out of Colorado and sitting in those missile silos in Montana and North Dakota, Wyoming.

So for 15 years of combat and the things that the Air Force does every day for this great country, I'm thankful to be a part of it.

Mr. Secretary, like you I'm looking forward to y'all's questions.

Media (Defense News): Recently there's been some back and forth regarding FCA (future cargo aircraft) or the LCA (light cargo aircraft), whatever you want to call it. I just want to see where you feel you and the Army fit together or apart in this whole intra-theater kind of development. Do you see that you'll get the airplanes, we'll get airplanes later on, or is that a --

Secretary Wynne: The Army has for years operated the Sherpa fleet and I think that we are looking at how we can help them. I know that General Jumper had made sort of pronouncements about whether or not the Future Cargo Aircraft or the Smaller Cargo Aircraft, which I think is approximately the size of a C-123, the old C-123, as far as carrying capacity, should be a replacement of the Sherpa or should it be a replacement of the C-123 fleet which we don't have any more? I think that debate is still ongoing.
I think the Army is perfectly satisfied with the service that the Air Force provides, but on the other hand we have no possession of that particular thing and we want to talk to them about what...their...needs are and tell us the flexibility that (they) need. We'd like to help (them).

**General Moseley:** What you're really talking about is intra-theater lift, not inter-theater lift.

**Media:** I was saying intra. With the accent --

**General Moseley:** Yes. You can actually go inter-theater lift with the asset, but you wouldn't be able to carry much.

We've actually spent a lot of time with the Army talking about this. When they get into their world of modularity in their Future Combat Systems and they look at a non-linear battlefield, the challenge is how to supply those units through that white space and how to get things that they need when they need it without having to be road dependent.

We've looked at vertical lift, we've looked at fixed wing, we've looked at a variety of things and we've spent a lot of time with them looking at something that is beyond just a Sherpa replacement. While the Sherpa replacement is valid for them for sure, what do you do in the future on a non-linear battlefield and how do you survive the threat array and how do you get at the resupply of those forces? Which is not much different than if you think for the early phases of Afghanistan, actually for the first year and a half plus of Afghanistan, everything that went into that piece of the theater went in by air because there was no ground LOC open. And as the commander there I would have given anything to have an aircraft with the capability that we're talking about with Light Cargo Aircraft that you can get in and out of places with 2500 or 3000 feet and you can do that on a routine basis because it offers you so many more options.

So I'd say I'm partnering with the Army on this. We're looking at the opportunities and the options here, and it makes a lot of sense across the board, even when you think about homeland defense and homeland security. You think about disaster relief and you think about what's going on on the Gulf Coast. To be able to operate out of smaller airfields, and to be able to do
that with a higher sortie generation rate seems to be an inherent good.

**Media (Defense News):** As a follow-up, sir, then do you see that kind of need growing as time goes on?

**General Moseley:** We don't know yet. We're looking at -- On our end of this we're looking at the equivalent of the beginning of an analysis of alternatives. We're looking at how to partner with an existing program that the Army's got. But we're also stepping back from this with U.S. TRANSCOM and Air Mobility Command to see what we've got out there for emerging requirements.

I know what I would have done with something like this in Afghanistan and Iraq, but I don't know that that's the conclusion for 20 years from now. Or I know what I would have done with this during Katrina and Wilma and Rita. But I don't know that that takes you down the road 20 or 25 years from now. It might. But I'm not willing to negate any of those opportunities.

**Media (Reuters):** There are several space programs that are up for recertification and those decisions have been made and letters gone up to the Hill on SBIRS and NPOESS. There will be a notification soon that that program's going to breach the 25 percent mark.

Can you speak to the programs and give us your vision for fixing those programs and also whether it makes sense to develop an alternative program for SBIRS? Doesn't that just add to cost rather than putting the resources in?

**Secretary Wynne:** What we really have learned as a lesson is that we had a lack of systems engineering talent and a lack of fundamental engineering design that has plagued both the SBIRS and the NPOESS and some other programs that are in space.

What we have got to get back to is we have a higher level of technical maturity before we launch. And I think we also seem to have spent ourselves trying to perfect these ill-designed products when we could have stopped and boxed them up and actually launched them and had them available and learned something and then gone on.
The original cost of SBIRS was $2 billion. It's now around $6. If you think about it, we could have packaged up what we could have gotten for the first $2 billion and launched it and then still had, if you will, $4 billion left to design a new craft. I think that's where the AT&L Under Secretary, Ken [Krieg] came down. That is that it is time for us to freeze configurations at a mature level and get what we can get out of that robust satellite.

I know that he is thinking also about holding hostage, if you will, GEO #3 to see whether or not the design comes to fruition that he has now been promised. I think that is a really good move. It also bridges us over to where we can do a lot of risk reduction on the new payload that he's got.

I know that Dr. Ron Sega, who is my Under Secretary, is really hot on improving the technical reliability of the payloads so that he doesn't get caught again on integrating on a fast schedule a bad product.

**Media:** Can you speak to the creation of an alternative program or competitor capability? At a time when resources are limited, how much money will you earmark for that program?

**Secretary Wynne:** You have to remember that one of the things that we are plagued with on the Space-Based Infrared System for sure is it's ADA based. ADA is a program that is not popular any longer. It is a software design that was literally invented around the time that DOS was invented. DOS is no longer even talked of, nor should ADA be, but we still have ADA based programmers trying to do it.

So I would tell you that a new start here, it would actually probably be an acceleration of the design element for the software which is where we really ran into our problems.

I'm convinced that the technology has also moved on an additional seven year which is going to give us, I think, the ability to configuration manage the next generation a lot better than we did the last one.

**Media (Inside the Air Force):** A two part question on the mission statement. I'm wondering first if you all believe that the statement is clear just on its face and does not require
additional explanation. Secondly, if you could explain a little
bit more about the sovereign options and the sense that some
people have that it has a really unilateralist bent.

Secretary Wynne: We fight on a joint basis. We fight on an
interdependent basis. I think our mission space is fairly clear
and our mission is to deliver options on behalf of the nation and
the President in the areas where we're assigned missions. It is
the same for the Army, the Navy and the Marines, that they are to
deliver options on behalf of the President and the nation as they
did, by the way, when the Marines went off-shore in Liberia,
offering the President the option of forced entry and the option
of negotiation. As we do when we offer the President the option
of knowledge, i.e., that something is going on but he can reserve
action; or the option of going in kinetic or non-kinetic or
through a cyber medium if that's the desired outcome.

I think the flying and fighting in space and cyberspace and
air is a mission that we truly do understand and that was a
mission aimed at our Airmen and I think they understand that
mission very well and they've always understood that it has been
their mission ever since my friend Curt LeMay sent a SAC bomber
all the way around the world to let people understand that the
Air Force was responsible for holding hostile nations hostage.

Media: Could you just address the second part? I'm sorry,
the first of my question was you believe the mission statement
itself, just the one sentence, should be clear to everyone on the
face of it? Or does it really require additional explanation?

Secretary Wynne: I think it speaks to various segments of
our audience in different ways. You're talking to the author, so
I can honestly say it was very clear.

[Laughter].

Media: The two of you wrote that yourselves or did you have
your staffs write it?

General Moseley: The simplicity of that is our job is to do
business in two separate mediums and merging into the third. The
first is space, the second is the atmosphere, and then we're
merging into this cyberspace in a joint and interdepartmental
way. But this is not to be ignored. This is the world that we live in.

Our job fundamentally is different than a land component or a maritime, in (that) we fly and fight. Whether that's a spacecraft or a UAV or an atmospheric platform. And we're merging into this third domain of cyberspace. It's a reality. I believe it's valid to address that.

Secretary Wynne: It's actually another reachback medium, too, if you think about it. Nobody who, if you will, fights cyberspace or plays defense in cyberspace necessarily has to leave the continental United States.

Media (Ft Worth Star-Telegram): Thanks for having us.

Could you address what you say is the future of both the F/A-22, or I understand it's now the F-22, and the Joint Strike Fighter? There's been so much speculation about what's going to happen to those two aircraft programs.

Secretary Wynne: The message that I have been working hard on is that I think it's a national imperative that we continue to have a fifth generation fighter line warm until we get a second fifth generation fighter line. Let me explain what a fifth generation fighter is.

There was a request that was put out before the Department of Defense in the early '80s by I think Johnny Foster and David Packard, and it was to pursue stealth, speed and precision. Speed came about, if you will, when the F-15 was promoted and was pretty well admired. Precision was brought to us by GPS in the '90s. The capstone is the supercruise and the stealth of the F-22. That is the definition of a fifth generation fighter. A second fifth generation fighter is the Joint Strike Fighter, the F-35, as it's coming out.

It is not here yet. We would like to see it go through its tests and essentially be certified as to mission. Right now the F-22 has gone through its tests and it's frankly exceeded our expectations on tests.

Speaking to the outcome as to how it goes, I would say this. I think right now that the Joint Strike Fighter has gone through
tremendous analysis, as it should have because it is a very large, high dollar program.

I think at this point it appears to me, and it is not a done deal, that the Joint Strike Fighter program will stay intact and that there has been some receipt of the intention to maintain a warm F-22 line at least until we get a Joint Strike Fighter line.

What that means in terms of rate is still being determined, but I have a feeling that the rate will diminish so as to allow an extension. The specifics are still being worked out within the context of the President's budget.

**Media:** There's been a lot of talk about the F-22 spanned about 180, stretching it out a couple more years from I think originally last year's budget called for cancellation in '08 and this scenario would stretch it out to 2010. Is that sort of what you're expecting?

**Secretary Wynne:** So far I would say that that's certainly something that we would vote for. I don't know that it has been totally accepted by everybody, but certainly it fits the merits of my requirement that we have a warm, fifth generation fighter line.

**Media:** Although that number's a lot less than y'all originally wanted when --

**Secretary Wynne:** I don't know about numbers, and I try not to get into those kind of arguments. Those are really the realm of my partner here. But what I do know is that it seems to me it was a very bad signal if our sole fifth generation fighter line was not available to the President as an option.

**General Moseley:** You asked about how's the airplane doing. We've deployed the airplane from Langley out to Hill to operate on the Utah test and training ranges. We've flown it against all the IADS, integrated air defense systems, that we could simulate. We've flown it against as many of the fourth and existing airplanes that we could fly against. We've flown it against the SAM systems that we could fly against. We've dropped Joint Direct Attack Munitions off of it -- thousand pounders. We've dropped them sub-sonic, we've dropped them super-sonic. We've fired all the missiles off of it. The airplane's performing in a
magnificent manner, and it is today the finest air dominance airplane ever built. It is the personification of that fifth generation technology.

So the F-22A is the definition of that air dominance airplane to do air-to-ground against that IADS and to do air-to-air against the remaining piece of the flying threats.

**Media (UPI):** Pam Hestert, UPI. Could you mention just in light of the global war on terrorism and the budget crunch that the Army and the Marine Corps is under, and the likelihood that those battles will continue to be fought on the ground, could you explain why you think these two fighter programs are still necessary when they take up such a huge part of the budget? One of the things the Marines are fond of pointing out is that there are more fighters in the Air Force and the Navy than there are rifle companies, which is what they think.

Could you --

**Secretary Wynne:** Can I start a little bit by saying that we've been at war for 15 years and we feel like there has been nobody strafed on the ground for 54 years. The reason for that is because we have such a powerful air dominance. We believe that the Marines really do look forward to fighting on terrain without any incoming pilot fire which they experienced last in Korea.

We understand that our joint, interdependent group -- in fact they have taught us a lesson that we've learned, and we have in fact integrated into the Army the same kind of tactical air control that the Marines have. We have reinstated that as a lesson learned through this engagement and we are expanding the Airmen that are on the battlefield in a, I think in a clear bow to the need for close air support.

So I would say that, the other thing I would say is it's an interesting article that Seymour Hersch came out with, and his question was if everything comes true, who would be on the battlefield, if you will, in 2015 or 2012 or whatever timeframe? And it really was a wakeup call to us that perhaps at the call of the President we may still be there protecting airspace in a very unique way.
General Moseley: Let me follow up on that. Are you sure the Marines have said there are more fighters in the Air Force than there are riflemen in the Marines?

Media: No, not --

General Moseley: Does the Commandant say that?

Media: No. It's something they knock around I think in rifle companies.

General Moseley: Well I wouldn't want to in any way critique how they organize or train themselves with the numbers of riflemen per support personnel, but I would tell you that for the entire time that we have fought as a joint team, the air component commander has unique responsibilities, and that today we're flying close to 300 combat sorties. Yesterday we delivered ordnance off of F-16s, AC-130s and Predators. This week we've delivered ordnance off of B-52s, F-15Es, F-16s, Predators, AC-130s while flying about 300 intra-theater missions to keep people off of roads and away from IEDs.

Secretary Wynne: I think we've flown over 203,000 during this engagement.

General Moseley: All either doing direct close air support or interdiction in support of the land component commander, which the Marines work for, or the Army as well as Special Ops and unconventional warfare.

But remember while all of that's going on we're still doing the business in space, still providing connectivity with communications, with early warning, with sensors, with weather. Still providing Global Hawk, U2, Rivet Joint, Compass Call, Predator, JSTARS, coverage of the battlefield with three-dimensional coverage for signals intelligence, electronic intelligence, et cetera, while providing bomber support from Diego Garcia to targets over Afghanistan. And the distance from Diego Garcia to targets around Kabul and Kandahar is the same distance from Tampa to Juneau, Alaska. While providing the air bridge that moves things back and forth. While providing combat rescue for the entire theater.
In fact this last week we gave the MacKay Trophy to two combat rescue crews that picked up an Army crew shot down southeast of Baghdad.

The other book end of that was the classic combat rescue mission during the peak of OIF where a Navy F-14 crew jumped out with a bad engine that disintegrated, it took the other engine out. One hundred minutes from the time the kids went up the rail in the ejection seat, they were in the combat rescue helicopter and on their way home.

So the Joint Strike Fighter is a joint aircraft. There is an A model, B model, C model. There's a C model to operate off of a carrier. There's an A model to provide the bulk of theater interdiction and close air support. And there's a B model to do Marine things which is the STOVAL version. That exists. And there's an F-22A that is the insurance for air dominance for the entire theater against any air-breathing or any surface threat. Because we all know that the first job in a theater is to establish air dominance and space dominance, or else nothing on the surface is possible.

The Secretary's right. It was April 1953 the last time someone was killed on the ground from an attack from the air.

I'd be willing to have that discussion with those folks.

Media (Bloomberg): Fifteen years or more -- I'd ask you to play this out. What are the implications for two issues. One, what's your planning scenario for Iraq? Do you anticipate being there in some kind of capacity for the next three or four years? The country's fixated on withdrawal of ground troops.

Two, on the modernization budgets, if you're at war for 15 years, OpTempo, O&M, what's the implication of cuts to the Joint Strike Fighter program? I'm hearing [rumors] on 1100 is the figure now for the Air Force, versus 1763.

General Moseley: Let me take the Iraq piece first.

I don't know that we know three years from now what it will look like. I know that we're in the process of looking at a set of options that John Abizaid is playing with and the department's playing with.
But let me go back to the spring of 1991. Who would have thought we'd have been in no-fly zones for 12 years? Who would have thought we'd have spent hundreds of thousands of hours of engines and flying time in the presence of those no-fly zones? The preponderance of that Air Force, but some Navy and some Marine electronic warfare. But also at that time we had Army Patriot batteries deployed to protect the airfields, as well as we had the tankers and JSTARS and AWACS and the full measure of support to be able to do the no-fly zones. So I don't know if we were sitting around here in March or April of 1991, whether we would have predicted 12 years of no-fly zones. Well, that's what we do, we do no-fly zones because we maintain air supremacy and air dominance.

So what will it look like three years from now? I would predict we will still be, Air Force will still be in some partnership in the region. We will still be doing things like surveillance. We will still be providing some form of intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance. We will still be working in some form of integration to provide pictures and provide some situation awareness. I suspect we'll still be in the region doing normal security cooperation and training which will take us to a presence of main operating bases. I suspect we will still be doing airlift. I suspect we'll still be prepared to do aero-evac --

Secretary Wynne: Although we have turned over three C-130s to the Iraqi Army.

Media: What about CAS though? This level of effort you rattled off a little while ago about Predators, F-15s. Do you anticipate that level of effort three years from now?

General Moseley: I don't know. I think you would be proud of us to say we are prepared to do that. We're organized and equipped to do that, and we are trained to do that. So if we are asked to be in that position we'll certainly be able to do it.

Secretary Wynne: On your second question, it was about, the way you phrased it, we have been flying all those airplanes and we have been using the engines and it has been an extraordinary event for maintenance and for just the wear and tear on the aircraft.
We have, and we have actually optimized our maintenance to essentially take care of that. We believe that it is time for us to modernize into lower manpower intensive equipment. I would tell you that the difference in maintenance even from the F-16 which is a pretty highly reliable airplane, to the Joint Strike Fighter is just a total [jump discontinuity]. From the F-15 to the F-22 is a total [jump discontinuity].

We probably don't need, for example, the number of people that are in a maintenance squadron on a Joint Strike Fighter as we have on the F-16. Why? Because most of it's going to be pull out and plug back. It's not fixable. It's very similar to the fact that if you ever had a '66 MG, you could have a chance of fixing it. If you have a 2006 MG you don't have as much of a chance of fixing it because it's all computer controlled. That's pretty much the same way the aircraft is.

As to the rest of our fleet, we have an aging fleet. We are also on the fourth step of a twelve step program, recognizing that we are going to have an aging fleet for the rest of our careers, if you will, and know that we have to replace about 180 airplanes a year, I think, in order to maintain and decrease the age. We are actually replacing on the order of 80. So there is no doubt that what we have to do is learn to live with an aging fleet. We are on the road to do that. Part of the process of trying to understand how do you do maintenance better and less expensively is, if you will, accommodating an aging fleet. We can learn a little bit from our Australian friends for sure about how to do that, and I've also asked the Wright-Patterson folks to come to me with an instrumentation program so that we can have the critical parameters of the airplane monitored over time as we live with this aging fleet.

It's been sort of an eye opener for both of us when we came to realize during a conversation that the Air Force has never sat down an airplane because of age before. We've always set it down because of obsolescence. So this may be the first time that we have to actually have a criteria for setting down things because of age.

Media: Eighty airplanes versus 180, is that your plan for the next X number of years? We'll be buying 80 airplanes roughly a year?
**Secretary Wynne:** I don't see it changing much. It's certainly not going to go up to 200. I don't think that's in our future. So I would say that in any scenario we paint, some of the equipment that we have is going to be older.

Now that gets you to another thing which is I believe that what we need to do is re-engine some of our airplanes. Fortunately the Congress also sees it that same way so we may get to re-engine like AWACS and perhaps some JSTARS along the way. I think we need to think about any of our large airplanes, how do we re-engine to get the benefit of the 20 years of technology breakthroughs that has a lot of the 777s that fly from Hong Kong to London in one swoop? This would change things fairly dramatically.

**Media:** General, I need to ask on the Joint Strike Fighter, have you settled on about 1100 versus 1700?

**General Moseley:** No. We're looking at higher numbers, but we're not there yet.

**Media:** Higher than 1100?

**General Moseley:** Yes. Let me go back, when you're asking are we still going to be there, I don't know that. But I will tell you that with the processes that we have on our Air Expeditionary Force rotations and the rotation bases that we have and on our warfighting headquarters -- in this case the U.S. CENTAF. And on our Combined Air Operation Center, in this case the CAOC that's at Al Udeid, we're prepared for that wide set of options as the SecDef and the Commander, U.S. Central Command ask us to perform. The rotation is set, the warfighting headquarters is set, the CAOC is set, the main operating bases are set. So whatever happens, we're ready to execute that task.

**Media:** I know you're ready but you're providing a lot of CAS for Iraqi troops over there. I can't see them doing that in three or four years on their own.

**General Moseley:** I don't know. They've not asked yet for fighters. They've not, to my knowledge they've not come out and asked. You know, we've got three C-130s that we've handed over. They're into some surveillance aircraft, and they're doing a
great job of that. In fact we have one Iraqi officer at Air Command and Staff College this year.

We had a get-together at the house yesterday for the attaché wives and the Iraqi attaché’s wife was at my house yesterday. Who would have thought that 10 or 15 year ago?

**Media (AF Magazine):** Gentlemen, one of the talking points for the F-22 over the years has been for 300-some-odd airplanes. We can take out a whole bunch of other airplanes, not just the fighters, but tankers and support aircraft. Now it looks like the 180 number, more or less, it seems like it’s locked in for a while. Does that mean you have to go back to larger numbers of tankers, legacy fighters, and the people that go with them? Or is there some way to get around that? Can you reorganize to still streamline the Air Force in terms of bodies?

**General Moseley:** That's a great question. The 183 number still gives me an opportunity to field seven squadrons. And with those seven squadrons of the finest air dominance fighter that's ever been built, we can get at the theater tasking and we can respond to that tasking.

And by looking at keeping the line now open, that fifth generation line open, and bridges over to the Joint Strike Fighter, we now have that connectivity from fifth generation to fifth generation.

I don't know that either one of us are willing to talk to you about legacy aircraft yet, because we haven't seen the final PBDs and PBMs and we haven't had a chance to run that analysis yet.

**Secretary Wynne:** But John, it makes some sense to think that we want to extend, because of just fact of life changes, we probably want to extend some of those, for example, the later models of the F-16 and the F-15, to get the maximum we have out of them. Many of the F-15s have not even passed half their life as an aircraft, so we really have quite a phenomenal weapon system in that regard that can be, if you will, quite a partner to an F-22 after the F-22 does its business.

So as to how we organize, I think you're right. We're going to have to take into account that the Air Force that we had
planned on a few years ago may not come to fruition, but I will tell you that has been a fact of life in the Department of Defense for some time now. That the budgets that you planned for may not come to fruition and the programs that you planned for are a little bit delayed.

We just had a great discussion on SBIRS and NPOESS and it's kind of -- Our planners are very good at accommodating that.

**General Moseley:** The seven squadrons that are combat coded squadrons, not the training squadrons that are down at Tindall. So the seven full-up combat coded squadrons.

But another part of this that's playing out that we didn't have ten years or so ago is the J-UCAS and the UCAVs and the ability to get into some really interesting unmanned systems.

We are firing missiles off of the Predators and dropping off the Predators almost every day in Afghanistan and Iraq, so we know how to do unmanned vehicles in combat.

Remember in December or so of '02 we even loaded air-to-air missiles on a Predator and shot at Iraqi fighters. So the adaptability and flexibility of this force, to be able to look at these unmanned systems and see what's possible, creates another set of opportunities that were unforeseen ten years ago. That persistence and that range and the ability to drop laser-guided or to fire precision munitions off of a UAV, or look at a new generation of UCAVs was not in that equation a few years ago.

I don't know if that helps.

**Media:** Yes.

Real quickly, are we close to IOC on an F-22? And why the designation change from F/A to just plain F-22?

**General Moseley:** Let me take that one.

I think we're within days of announcement of IOC. The airplane, again, has performed magnificently on its deployment out to Utah and all the things that I talked about before.
The change of the name, the F/A is not an Air Force bit of nomenclature. We have F for fighters. In a sense of heritage to horizon, this airplane bridges that heritage to the horizon. We had F-111s that do multi-task; we had F-4s that did multi-task; we have F-16s that do multi-task; and this airplane, an F-22A, is just that. It does air-to-ground, it does air-to-air, but it is in the lineage of Air Force fighters, an F. We've decided on an A model to make it very clear to everyone that we are fielding, we are holding this program fixed and we are holding the cost of this program fixed, and our desire is to field the A model and be able to get the A model into the field and be able to get the A model into the combatant commander's portfolio as soon as we can.

Secretary Wynne: So John, for two reasons I would say. One is the reversion to heritage, because this is, as the Chief said, this is the heritage to horizon's perfect example. The second is to tamp down any enthusiasm for change. We want to make sure that we have a --

Media (AF Magazine): Tamp down enthusiasm for change?

Secretary Wynne: That's right. In other words we want to make sure that we have an airplane that we can reproduce. It is the finest fighter and it has exceeded our expectations in test, and right now what we want to do is just repeat it over and over again. So we are holding configuration relatively constant. Except for safety changes, and I've communicated that very well.

And although this was not in the Chief's mind, as far as I was concerned it was a pretty good signal to the program manager that we want him to just repeat the configuration and not come in with too many major changes.

General Moseley: Let me follow up. You can take this a bit to an extreme about the F/A, because it's equally capable as a Rivet Joint; it's equally capable as a Compass Call; it's equally capable as all these other aircraft when you look at the wide variety of things that it does. But we had no desire to call it an RC or an EW or an F/A/EW/RC-22 something. So the simplicity of this is the Air Force has fighters with the nomenclature of F which should be in the lineage of the rest of the fighters.
Media: (AF Times) I wanted to go back to the force structure. Forty thousand people are going to have to come out of your ranks over the next several years, and I wanted to know if you could give us some details about how you're going to do it, what methods you're going to use, and the timeline over which you'll accomplish that.

Secretary Wynne: The first thing we should realize, and then I'd like to turn it over to the Chief, is that this is comprised of all of the Air Force, our total force. This is active, this is civilian, this is Reserve and National Guard, so we are looking at over the course of, if you will, starting actually in FY06 through FY11, so over the course of six years we're talking about 40,000 people or approximately 6,700 or 6,800 a year.

Every effective organization I've ever been associated with can do this through accession and/or through attrition approximately that number, two or three percent of their people. This is out of a total force of about 800,000 if you add all of the components up. So it's manageable.

Now the question is if we get to the point where we have in fact get to involuntary, I would tell you that we are, we have a very, I think, structured plan and a good one to try to minimize any disruption in people's lives. I'll turn over the specifics to the Chief here.

General Moseley: We're working our way through the accessions piece of this to get a better grip on what do we reduce on accessions as far as officer and enlisted.

On the officer side you've got 950, 960, 965 that come out of the Academy every year. You've got a set number that come out of ROTC with scholarships and non-scholarship. Then you have OTS as a bit of a buffer as the elasticity.

So what do we do with fixed graduates of the Academy and some elasticity in ROTC and OTS? We don't know the answer to that yet, but we'll get that soon.

On the enlisted side, how many less can you bring on accessions without creating a bathtub through certain career fields and year groups downstream? That part we're working our
way through. And how then do you maintain the facilities for basic military training and tech schools and keep those at the highest level possible?

To be honest, I've asked General Looney to look at extending basic military training out to something much more robust than six weeks, and to look at including ground combat skills and expeditionary training in both basic military training and tech school to make that much more aggressive than it has been in the past. I don't have an answer for you on that yet. But before junior officer or junior enlisted leaves, there's also a set of cascading opportunities that we want to provide options for. For instance, 13 percent of the officer career fields are stressed and you know the definition of that is multiple deployments, back to back deployments, or lack of skill sets inside that up to seven levels or nine levels on the enlisted side.

Twenty percent of the enlisted career fields are stressed. So before anybody leaves I want to make sure that we have opportunities to move people into those stressed career fields and balance those across that entire spectrum of deployable ops -- air battle managers, navigators, PJs, air traffic controllers, security forces, some services, et cetera.

So first would be to balance the critical stressed AFSCs. Second would be to look at movement into the reserve component, starting with the reserve, and those stressed career fields also. Third would be the Guard, by state and those stressed career fields also. Fourth would be opportunities to move into Air Force civilian billets.

So if you think about what I've just said, we move from individual potentially leaving into stressed career fields active, stressed career fields Reserve, stressed career fields Guard, civilians, and we've not lost any of the opportunity on the people, nor have they left the Air Force.

Secretary Wynne: I will tell you that every one of the people that are in the Air Force or in the civilian workforce for the Air Force, have opted into the Air Force to provide value to us. We value them in turn. We've in fact paid for their education, we've invested in technical schools, training schools, and in some cases upper education and graduate schools.
The junior officers that we have have volunteered to come join us and have volunteered to lend their skills to make a better Air Force. We value every one of these people and we have no intention, if you will, of having them leave with a bad feeling in their heart. So we want to make sure that we do everything in our power to manage this problem on a level by making them proud to have been a part of the United States Air Force throughout their career.

**General Moseley:** There's more. The last part of that beyond the civilian piece is inter-service transfer to facilitate movement -- Coast Guard, Navy, Army, Marines. And only then, if all of those cascading sets of options are not attractive or a person is not qualified, then out. But the out part is what the Secretary's talked about. How do we work that across the spectrum of educational finances or scholarships, et cetera? How do we either recoup or not recoup that if we ask the person to leave? But before the person goes, that whole set of thinking is what we want to bring to bear in this problem.

**Media (AF Times):** Just to follow up, what was the -- Just a few years ago you were talking you only need to get rid of 10,000 people, and now that number's jumped by 30,000. Is it set at 40,000 now? What brought on the expeditional people need to be removed?

**Secretary Wynne:** Right now it's a lot of lessons learned that we've learned over the time of how we can better manage the Air Force, and when you choose to go down, if you will, an application of lean principles, unfortunately in our budgeting system you have to actually begin to claim out-year and set up out-year budgets.

In a normal situation we probably wouldn't try to set goals for FY11, if you will, on a process that we're simply entering into. But since we are entering into it, I wanted to establish firm goals so that we could have goals to pass down to the major commanders to make this achievement and to, if you will, force a catalyst into the system to gain these efficiencies and effectiveness.

Our overall goal remains to have an effective and efficient Air Force on behalf of the taxpayer.
Media (Janes Defense): Gentlemen, I'm clear about what you're saying about the role the Raptor can play in future conflict and kick down the door in establishing air supremacy. But what I'm not so clear about is its role and relevance in scenarios like the ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. So I'm wondering if you could just kind of explain the role you see the Raptor playing once the squadron comes on-line in those environments, and also if you could tell us like what kind of feedback or just what kind of eagerness there is amongst the combatant commanders to get the Raptor into the fray in the CENTCOM AOR?

General Moseley: Let me start by telling you prior to hostilities in March of '03, prior to the kickoff of H Hour for OIF, here's what I did not know as the air commander. The Iraqi air force had 400 fighters or fighter equivalents. I knew mostly, or at least I thought I knew where they were. I knew the airfields, the main operating airfields.

And so as we developed a plan for OIF I brought several people over from Nellis, since I used to command that wing and have a great deal of faith in the Fighter Weapons School, to bring those folks out and look at the plan. The F-15 folks said boss, you don't have enough air-to-air here. If they salvo those 400 airplanes you'll eventually kill them all but it could be reasonably dislocating for 72 to 96 hours. They were right. We asked for another set of 18 F-15Cs to be able to do this. So we had the two squadrons at Tobuk and the one squadron at PSAB. So there were the three squadrons of air-to-air. We had the British F-3s and we had some F-14s and some F-18s.

But what you don't know is what, because this warfighting business is interactive. The opponent gets to choose. I didn't know if the Iraqis would actually salvo 400 aircraft in that first few hours and if they did, what would be their targets? Would they be the main staging areas in Kuwait? Would they be chem or bio capable? Would they be fleet forces in the North Arabian Gulf? Would they be the airfields? Would they be the command and control centers? What would it be that they would target themselves against?

And in the middle of all of this remember a fairly robust IADS. We had about 1700 SAMs fired, and on the 2nd of April we had 200 SAMs fired on the first day, or on that one day. It
averaged out that the day after that was about 100 or so. So you're dealing with a large amount of surface-to-air missiles. You're dealing with a large number of fighters. You're dealing with a fairly in-depth system. Even though it is third generation it is of some substance and some risk. And a variety of mobile systems to include Rollins, SA-6s, et cetera.

So against that threat array I would have been very happy with having a squadron or so of F-22s to be able to go into that threat array and take apart that IADS.

As it turns out, remember on about day three or four we transitioned from C to D. But we were using Block 52 F-16s to do that. So you've got to wade into this system where you're having hundreds of SAMs fired per day, to go in and take the airspace away so Marines or Army or Navy operations can occur.

So with the F-22 you have a much higher probability of success, a much higher probability of survival, and a much higher level of lethality.

So there's a case of if I'd have had it, I would have been very happy to use it.

It is also, in the role that we're in now with F-15Es carrying 2000 pounders and F-15s carrying 500 and 2000 pounders, does the F-22 bring something significantly different to this fight this afternoon? The answer is no. But you would use it to establish air dominance, set the stage for this, and then bring it back and reset it if you had to use it for something else. And the possession of it is an inherently dissuading and deterrent value.

**Secretary Wynne:** I'm not sure, are we using very many B-2s right now?

**General Moseley:** No, but we are using the B-52 out of Diego and the B-52s and B-1s that are forward at Guam.

So the notion of it's a relic of the Cold War is just not true. If I am a single seat fighter pilot in the midst of 200 SAMs being fired at me, it is an inherent good to be very small and very fast and for the SAM not to hit me. And if there are 400 fighters out there that are going to fly, there is an
inherent good in being so dominant that you can harvest them at such a high rate that you don't have to worry about them tomorrow.

You know all this, but it's useful for you to hear me say it.

**Media:** So there's no like real urgent need to get them over to Afghanistan and Iraq once the squadron is declared operational?

**General Moseley:** No. The more urgent need is to get them into joint and combined exercises to be able to demonstrate the capability of this to our joint partners, and to be able to exercise in a more robust manner to get the logistics base down. And we do have the first one behind us, to Hill; the second one is planned for next spring in an overseas location so we can get it out and do just that.

**Secretary Wynne:** And perhaps also to our coalition partners who probably don't have an idea of what came out of the test program because we probably haven't told them.

**Media:** Can you say the overseas location or at least the region or --

**General Moseley:** Not yet. We're close.

Well, if I have my way it will be in the PACOM region, but we're still working our way through that.

**Media (Aviation Week):** You talked a lot about fighters, but I want to talk a little bit about mobility forces. There's been a big discussion about potentially the C-17 line closing also at the magic number of 180. General Schwartz laid out a pretty coherent argument for the press last week saying this depends on C-5As and Bs being [inaudible], this depends on craft being made robust today, and a multi-role tanker. Those are a lot of if's.

**General Moseley:** And 500 C-130s.

**Media:** Okay. Is that new C-130s?
General Moseley: No. That's how many we have now. C-130Js, 80, but remember we're having some issues with the E models as we get the Js in, but there's about 500 C-130s.

Media: Okay.

General Moseley: Not an insignificant piece of the mobility piece.

Secretary Wynne: No.

Media: My point is, in laying out his argument is to say he acknowledged, a lot of people acknowledge there are a lot of if's here.

On the fighter side of the house you've said you can't let those if's be there. That this is a strategic imperative. It's a natural imperative. We need to bridge the fifth generation fighter production line.

What's going on on the mobility side with regard to the risk of [inaudible], all these things materializing, that gives the Pentagon the confidence to go ahead and allow that C-17 line to shut down? Or are you looking at a warm status? And how would you define a warm status?

Secretary Wynne: They are in fact, they did, I think one of the more robust analyses that has been done including the availability of ships for overseas transport, the availability of the fast transport ferries that are coming on-stream, to try to transport both intra-theater and in some cases over some fairly robust water. And then added in the airlift. So it wasn't just only airlift. It was also all about how do you get forces deployed overseas. So MCS was not just about, which was by the way, I'm sorry, the Mobility Capability Study. I'm falling into the acronym, I apologize. But in fact the Mobility Capability Study that they did for this '05 deployment order I guess, or whatever it is, maybe it was just unit number five, took into account every available mobility asset, scored it for the likelihood of usage, had to count on the C-5A coming through, just as you have said, and the C-5B coming through because those are funded programs and mandated by Congress to stay around. There was no way for the mobility people to discount in any way that those wouldn't be.
Once that occurred, then it became really very obvious that we had an overage, a margin available to us in this. Now what General Schwartz said, and I think in a good way, is his hedge on the MCS, which was really not their hedge, but his hedge was the dual use tanker program which would add significantly to the capability to move cargo as well as the capability to refuel, and I think that was what his point was, is that he would feel like he had protected or a sufficient margin when that program became real. It is really the only "if" though, in the equation that I could tell you. The Craf people are in fact robust.

The other thing you should remember, Amy, is that this is a company that actually has large airplanes in their inventory. They have the engineering talent to go back. It isn't quite the same as, if you will, closing down a fighter line with no available engineering support.

I guess I would say that right now we've accepted pretty much the output of the Mobility Capability Study. We're on track we think, for a tanker program to emerge within the timeframe that General Schwartz had talked about, and we're feeling not uncomfortable.

**General Moseley:**  Amy I think if you look at it in total, 180 C-17s, 112 C-5s, close to 500 C-130s. A program of record on the tanker that looks like a beefed-up floor and doors for a cargo-carrying tanker that's dual role. And the notion of a Light Cargo Aircraft in some numbers for intra-theater lift once you deploy. That's a pretty healthy piece of a bigger notion of U.S. TRANSCOM with surface lift, fast ships, rail, et cetera.

**Media:**  Could I ask a follow-up? On this multi-role tanker, the people that I've spoken to in the mobility world so to speak generally say that you can have a multi-role tanker and that it's nice to have, but in the experience of the KC-10 and in their experience, when you have to surge and you've got to get maybe a future [digital] Army from point A to point B, or you've got to get a whole bunch of squadrons of fighters somewhere, you aren't hauling cargo at the same time as you're refueling.

So while it's multi-role, it's not necessarily multi-role in its surge capacity that some commanders would like to see. So how does that play in? Does that add risk to the equation?
General Moseley: Having actually done some of this, the KC-10 has been very useful in moving squadrons of fighters because you can put a spare engine on there plus your crew chiefs. You can put a deployable maintenance package on there.

Now is that the entire number of C-141 or C-17 equivalents to move a squadron? For an F-15 squadron, it's about 15 C-17s. For an F-22 it's going to end up being about seven. So the reduction, the modernization of the inventory reduces the amount of airlift that you need to be able to move this.

Media: What about the Army which is relying on mobility?

General Moseley: But remember, you move an Army by surface. If we're flying brigades of tanks and airplanes, we're doing that for a special reason like we did for Hudaitha Dam when we moved a dozen M1 tanks by C-17 into an area that we could off-load and be able to do that for a specific location. Moving thousands of heavy pieces of armor in airplanes is not the way to do this. We have prepositioned, we have prepositioned stocks of munitions, prepositioned stocks of hardware. So you move that amount of bulk by surface.

Remember for OEF and for OIF and even for Desert Shield/Desert Storm, we moved the bulk deliveries by surface. We moved the people by air.

So the cargo-carrying tanker, when you need a tanker, it is a tanker. When you don't need hundreds of tankers, then you use it in the mobility. Every day that Air Mobility Command flies its mission, it's out there flying standardized canisters. So to build an air bridge, if you need an air bridge for B-2s for global strike, you need it as a tanker. You don't need it as a cargo carrying airplane. That's the beauty of having it both ways. That's what the KC-10 has meant to us all these years.

Media: The thrust of my question is, the future Army as it's been explained to us, the thrust is that it has to be very mobile, which doesn't rely on surface. We're pulling our forward [inaudible] back from Europe which would directly diminish our prepo stocks. So do we have those prepo things to rely on in the future?
Media: That's why they went to the Stryker. That was their justification for the Stryker. You could put it on a C-130.

Media: And now a C-17.

General Moseley: But I still think there will be prepositioned munitions and prepositioned stockpiles of things like we have in Kuwait and like we have in Oman and like we have in Qatar. I still think the fast sealift that the Army and the Navy and U.S. TRANSCOM have worked is an incredible capability.

I still say, though, that 112 C-5s, until we know more about [results] in the Fleet Viability Board and 180 C-17s and close to 500 C-130s and a CRAF that could use a little modernizing, but the CRAF is there. That's enough air piece of the airlift than the equation of moving bulk things to a theater.

Secretary Wynne: And I would say to the point that I think the Army is right to move to more agility. I do think though that it's a tactical move. I think when you're talking about a strategic lift you're going to be moving by sea.

We've been talking about trying to reorient tactically, I think that's where the Army wants the agility designed in the Stryker. They can't get both, so they're trying very hard to make sure they are maximally agile, but they recognize that if it's a major muscle move, it's going to go by surface.

General Moseley: And Amy, remember, we moved a dozen M1 tanks for that Hudaitha Dam western fight business. It worked like a champ. The airplane is stressed to take it. The tank roles on, the tank rolls off. But you're not going to launch all 180 C-17s with one tank aboard. You will move what the Army needs. You can get X number of Strykers inside a C-17 or inside a C-5. That is perfect. But to think in terms of moving heavy armor that way -- We can do that, but that's not the best way to do that.

So the isolated case of the western fight and the Hudaitha Dam and a dozen tanks, perfect. The movement of divisions of armor by air, that's a different issue, and that's not what Norty's ever talked about or John Handy or Tony Robertson or anybody that's in U.S. TRANSCOM.
Media (Reuters): So how many multi-role tankers do you envision needing?

Secretary Wynne: We're still examining that. The reason we're still examining that is we've done some business case analysis that shows that re-engining will actually reduce the quantity of tankers that we do. I'm convinced still it's going to be more than 100 but I have a feeling it's going to be far less than 500.

General Moseley: When we get the AOA, when we get the sufficiency study of the AOA and the IDA review or the sufficiency study of the AOA, and we know where we are with the KC-135E, then -- And we get the RFP out on the tankers and get industry looking at this, I think we'll have a much better idea of what's possible, which then takes you back to how many of the R models do you re-engine, which is what the Secretary's been talking about.

Media (Space News): I wonder if you folks could go back to SBIRS for a minute and talk about competition for a new system, and why it was the purchase of satellites to be cut short at this point when the decision on the last recertification, 2002, had been that program was too far along to [inaudible] option.

Secretary Wynne: Let me see if I can start on that one a little bit.

In 2002 I think we had not appreciated the extent of the problems that they were running into. In 2002 there was a major concern about how you get the capability that SBIRS would bring you.

We have gone on now three or four years and we found out that the life of our satellites has in fact been extending almost year to year. We no longer have the sort of rampant enthusiasm that this is the be all and end all. And the problems that they ran into were so systemic that we were very concerned that if we were to ever go for GEO-3, 4 and 5 we would essentially be rebuilding a brand new satellite anyway. So that's one of the reasons that we restricted the configuration to what 1 and 2 is, or at least that's what my understanding of the Under Secretary's decision is.
And the quest after a risk reduction program almost immediately will probably start in the following couple of years. Will it result in an actual satellite? Probably not for several years. But I think what we're trying to do now is trying to cover and get the technology risk levels to a point where we're far more comfortable about the integration expense than we are even now. We're still a little bit worried about how GEO-1 and 2 are coming together and I think that's why he's held GEO-3 hostage, which could be subject to cancellation if, if you will, GEO-1 and 2 don't go together well.

**Media:** Do you have a sense of when you, at what point you make the decision about GEO-3? [After] the performance of the first two. Is it once they're on orbit and they're working fine? Or is it once they're in a lab and they test out well?

**Secretary Wynne:** That part I would say that we are right now requiring a lot more direct reporting from the program manager as to progress, and I think there has been no fixed date, if you will, that is a do or die situation. I think it's going to be more of the evidence of the frustration of just can't get the satellite to come together as you have predicted, which is kind of what we've been into here recently.

So I would say while there's been no fixed date, it's clearly, I think the industry breathed a lot easier because there was some feeling that GEO-1 and 2 would be also canceled, as they were subject to the numbers [inaudible].

**Voice:** Thank you, folks, I appreciate you coming out today.

**General Moseley:** Can I make one more statement to y'all?

Let me tell you how proud I am of this Air Force. When I say Air Force, this is a total force of Guard, Reserve and active. On any given day they're out there doing Operation Noble Eagle over the top of the country with about 50-55 fighters, two or three AWACs, and a dozen tankers. They're in Afghanistan and Iraq. They're doing the things that you would expect them to do, and they are some of the finest people we've ever had. They're the most well trained, they're the most flexible and adaptable, the most educated, the most professional that any Air Force at any time's ever had.
To get to a certain notion of what I believe an Air Force does for a combatant commander with these great people, I'll tell you on any given day an air commander has several simultaneous events that are ongoing. The first is air dominance; the second is space dominance; combat rescue, to go pick up any member of the joint team that is down; strategic attack; ballistic missile suppression; interdiction; SOF; unconventional warfare support; close air support; inter-theater lift; intra-theater lift; command and control; ISR; air refueling; medical air evac; in support of the combatant commander's theater-wide time sensitive targets; joint critical targets; and dynamic targets. That's what an Airman does for a combined force commander and that's what your Air Force is out there doing every day.

So I'm particularly proud to be a part of it and I'm particularly proud to be partnered with Secretary Wynne because we've got the best kids in the world and they're just awesome.

Secretary Wynne: And if I could, I'd like to offer you a great holiday, a great new year. It's going to be an adventure for all of us, and we appreciate your coverage. Thanks for coming today.

Media: Thank you for having us. Good luck.