Dear Chairman Warner and Chairman Hunter:

The Commission on the National Guard and the Reserves is pleased to submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, and to the Secretary of Defense, the following 90-day report on the status of our work.

As specified in the body’s authorizing statute, Public Law 108-375, the Commission has 13 members, appointed by the chairs and ranking minority members of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees and by the Secretary of Defense. We are tasked to undertake a comprehensive, independent assessment of the reserve components of the United States military: specifically, the Army Reserve, Navy Reserve, Air Force Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Army National Guard, Air National Guard, and Coast Guard Reserve.

The overall objective assigned by the founding statute is captured by the mission statement we have adopted to focus our work:

To identify and recommend changes in policy, law, regulation, and practice to ensure that the National Guard and Reserves are organized, trained, equipped, compensated, and supported to best meet the national security requirements of the United States.
The Commission’s work will culminate in the issuance of a final report setting forth the findings of our comprehensive study. We will focus particularly on findings and proposals that might point to the need to change current plans and practices.

In addition to a final report, the law requires the Commission to submit the following report to Congress within 90 days of its first official meeting, including

- A description of the Commission’s strategic plan for completing its work
- A discussion of the activities of the Commission
- The initial findings of the Commission

The Commission’s first official meeting was held in Washington, DC, on March 7, 2006. Accordingly, this report describes how we will proceed, and it summarizes our findings to date. It also includes a list of the major policy questions we will attempt to answer. As our work progresses, we are certain that our activities, focus questions, findings, and conclusions will evolve.

The Commission notes with sadness the recent passing of a great American patriot and champion of the National Guard and Reserves, U.S. Representative G. V. “Sonny” Montgomery. During his 30 years of representing Mississippi’s third congressional district, Congressman Montgomery became known as the principal author of the expanded GI Bill benefit program that bears his name; as a dedicated steward of the House Veterans Affairs Committee, which he chaired for 13 years; as a 12-term member of the House Armed Services Committee; and perhaps most of all as a steadfast proponent of strengthening the National Guard and Reserves. He had the vision to promote the Montgomery GI Education Bill as “a tremendous incentive for bright young men and women to join our armed forces”; so too will the Commission be seeking innovative ways to ensure the continuing strength of the reserve components in the years ahead. His legacies of bipartisanship and public service are ones the Commission will strive to emulate as it conducts its business in the months to come.

We appreciate the significant cooperation we have received from the executive and legislative branches. We thank you for your leadership, and we look forward
to continuing to work with you as we fulfill the important mission vested in us by Congress.

Respectfully,

ARNO LD. PUNARO, CHAIRMAN

WILLIAM L. BALL, III

LEE BROWNLEE

RHETT B. DAWSON

LARRY K. ECKLES

JOHN M. KEANE

PATRICIA L. LEWIS

DAN MCKINNON

WADE ROWLEY

JAMES E. SHERRARD III

DONALD L. STOCKTON

E. GORDON STUMP

J. STANTON THOMPSON

cc: Senator Carl Levin, Congressman Ike Skelton
COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES
90-DAY REPORT

PREAMBLE

As we undertake our assignment, the Commission is mindful of the long and honored history of the National Guard and Reserves. More than a hundred years before the birth of the United States military, the concept of the reserves was adopted in the American colonies. Then, as now, citizen-patriots were called on to provide for the common defense and to secure the homeland in time of need.

America’s founding fathers recognized the importance to our young nation of a well-regulated militia composed of citizens trained in military skills, and they enshrined this doctrine in the United States Constitution. Yet they disagreed over the policies governing these pioneer reservists, including the issues of control, funding, roles, and preparedness. Many of those questions have remained unresolved over the life of our Republic, persisting to this day.

Throughout these debates, however, one constant has remained. Americans have always answered the nation’s call. In times of war and peace, at home and abroad, they have remained faithful guardians of the country’s freedoms, safety, and security. As Senator John Warner told the Commission, “They took up arms when they were most desperately needed, and returned to civilian life to imbue our society with a greater sense of patriotism, service to others, and self-sacrifice.”

That storied tradition of service and sacrifice continues today. In the words of Congressman Duncan Hunter, America’s citizen-soldiers serving in the National Guard and Reserves are “the heart and soul of our country... good Americans who come together for the purpose of helping the country. And shaping the Guard and Reserve is something that is now increasingly critical to our national security future.”

Ours is a time of unprecedented challenge for the reserve components. Since September 11, 2001, more than half a million reserve and National Guard members have been activated for Operations Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom, and they have fought with distinction beside the active forces. As Congressman Ike Skelton told the Commission at its initial hearing: “The fact of the matter is that over the past decade the reserve components have become an integral and vital operational reserve force, and the active duty components would not be able to successfully carry out their mission requirements without them.”
Senator Carl Levin similarly stressed, “Members of the Reserve Components are critical to the success of military operations of the Department of Defense. National Guard and Reserve personnel have been called upon to serve in ongoing military operations far more extensively than anyone expected, and they have performed magnificently.”

At a time when the reserve components are so critically important, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has noted, adjustments have to be made: “We have the active force, we have the Reserve and the Guard, and then we have the Individual Ready Reserves, and all of them are part of this great institution and the total force. We need them all. We need them all to be rearranged so that we have the right skill sets on active duty and the right skill sets in the Reserve component and the Guard, which we’re in the process of rearranging right now.”

The far-reaching implications of these developments and their effects on the reserve components demonstrate the timeliness and importance of the Commission’s charter, as summed up by Senator Warner:

The continuing operational demands placed on Guardsmen, Reservists, and their families, at home and abroad, during a time of transformational change for the Armed Forces, have raised critically important questions about the appropriate roles for the state National Guards and our Reserve forces. Careful consideration needs to be given to the missions assigned to the Guard and Reserves, to the level of resources and equipment that must be provided for their use, and other career paths and benefits that should be available to Guardsmen and Reservists. The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves was established to assist the Congress and the Administration in gaining essential perspectives on these vital issues.

The American people owe a tremendous debt to the men and women of the reserve components and their families, as well as to the businesses and communities that support them. General Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, speaks for the country when he says, “We should take great pride and they should take great pride in the fact that we have soldier citizens like the National Guard and the Reserve who are willing to serve their country and they are serving their country extremely well.” We dedicate our efforts to them. Their service and sacrifice will continue to inspire our work.
STATUTORY MANDATE

Assigned duties. The duties of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves are set forth in the Commission’s founding statute and fall generally under the following five major categories of work: study, assess, identify, recommend, and report.

Study –
(1) To study the roles and missions of the National Guard and the other reserve components of the Armed Forces
(2) To study the compensation and other benefits provided for members of the reserve components under the laws of the United States

Assess –
To assess the purposes, organization, structure, capabilities, equipment, preparedness, compensation, benefits, and funding of the National Guard and Reserves

Identify –
To identify alternatives with respect to
(1) Future roles and missions of the reserve component
(2) How reserve component units and personnel may best be used to support military operations and national security objectives
(3) How reserve component training is organized and funded to achieve training objectives and operational readiness
(4) Improved compensation and benefits and how they might affect readiness, recruitment, and retention among all military personnel, both regular and reserve
(5) Career paths to enhance professional development of reserve component personnel

Recommend –
To recommend changes to legislation, policies, regulations, direction, and practices bearing on the National Guard and Reserves

Report –
To issue reports as necessary, including the two reports required by statute:
(1) A mandatory 90-day report describing our activities, a strategic plan for completing our mission, and any initial findings
(2) A mandatory final report setting forth the Commission’s assessments, findings, and policy recommendations
**Implied duties.** While certain key policy areas bearing on the National Guard and Reserves are not specifically identified in the statute, the Commission believes they require our serious attention if we are to achieve the mission assigned to us. Our approach will therefore include

**Overall strategic vision.** The Commission will identify the current and future threats to national security as specified by the experts in current defense planning and strategy documents, as well as by outside experts. We will identify America’s homeland protection and emergency response needs as established by the relevant federal, state, and local authorities. These studies will serve as our basis for assessing the proper roles and missions of the reserve components, and for determining the capabilities they must possess to meet the nation’s requirements. In turn, roles, missions, and capabilities—in effect, what America needs its reserve services to do—will dictate the optimal manner in which the National Guard and Reserves should be tasked, organized, structured, trained, equipped, compensated, and supported.

**Mobilization/demobilization.** The Commission will assess the current policies, laws, regulations, and practices governing the activation and deactivation of reserve component personnel. Mobilization is the efficient transition of a well-trained, well-equipped, and ready guardsman or reservist to active duty. Demobilization is the efficient transition of a guardsman or reservist back to civilian life or to other military duty. These transitions determine the reserve components’ ability to fulfill the roles and missions assigned to them. Mobilization and demobilization should not be considered as isolated, onetime events in a reservist’s career. Rather, they must be viewed as steps in creating a seamless, integrated force. The relevant policies and procedures must be adjusted accordingly.

**Command and control.** The Commission will assess the historical balance of power between federal and state authorities in guiding the activities of the National Guard, which has both federal and state responsibilities. We also will seek ways to improve the command and control of reserve components so that they can respond more effectively to emergencies at home.

**Overhead, infrastructure, and efficiency.** As the Commission studies the reserve components’ current organization and structure, we will seek to identify significant inefficiencies, redundancies, and other institutional burdens that impede the optimal performance of these services. This effort will include an examination of command structure to identify unnecessary overhead, duplicative headquarters, and inefficient manning and organization in the Department of Defense, whether such inefficiencies involve the active component that supports the reserves or the reserves themselves.
STUDY APPROACH

Our duty is to gather the facts, assess them independently, follow them to logical conclusions, and develop the short-term and long-term recommendations that will ensure that the National Guard and Reserves are able to carry out their assigned roles in providing for the national security of the United States and the American people.

We have adopted a set of fundamental tenets to direct us as we fulfill our obligations. These guidelines fall into three categories: operational principles, the ethical precepts that will govern how we conduct our work; methodological framework, the tenets that will guide our policy analysis; and recommendation criteria, the overarching set of objectives that the Commission’s recommendations must meet.

OPERATIONAL PRINCIPLES

The Commission’s operational principles describe the manner in which we will carry out our mission.

Nonpartisan and objective—The Commissioners have pledged to be nonpartisan and objective in our work, to be devoted to serving the national security interests of the United States, and to be free of political agendas or parochial interests. We come to our work with no predetermined conclusions. We maintain open minds. We will be guided by facts and will evaluate proposals for change solely by weighing the pros and cons, the costs and benefits. We will listen carefully to individuals and organizations that have considerable objective expertise in these areas.

Inclusive and comprehensive—We are committed to inclusiveness throughout this process. The Commissioners know that policies regarding the reserve components concern many different constituencies, whose valuable input, perspectives, and expertise must be taken into account. These stakeholders include reserve personnel and their families, veterans, Department of Defense officials, policymakers at all levels of government, representative organizations, state governors and adjutants general, local governments, communities and businesses, the general public, and the media. Seeking input across the spectrum of interested persons and groups as it develops its findings and recommendations, the Commission is undertaking an aggressive outreach program to them. At the same time—and consistent with its statutory charter—the Commission intends to be comprehensive in its approach to issues. In formulating our conclusions, we will consider the full range of policies affecting the reserve components.
Rigorous and disciplined—Sound and responsible recommendations must be supported by a disciplined approach to fact-finding, as well as by rigorous analysis. We will work closely both with the relevant agencies of the executive branch of government and with Congress to agree, with as much consensus as possible, on the facts relevant to our assessments. As the Commission analyzes the issues that Congress directed us to explore, a concerted effort will be made to draw on the best available data and a complete record as we critically evaluate which changes would constitute the best public policy for the country and the reserve components. Similarly, the Commission will endeavor to keep the focus on essential matters and not stray or waste time reviewing peripheral issues.

Transparent and accountable—The Commissioners are committed to ensuring that the work of the Commission is open and accessible to all interested parties. Accordingly, the Commission will hold multiple public hearings so that the American people may be informed of its work. By maintaining a public Web site (www.cngr.gov), remaining accessible to the press, and periodically briefing members of Congress and officials from the Department of Defense, the Commissioners hope to keep the public and policymakers fully apprised of our progress. To that end, we are maintaining complete records of all contacts and activities.

To guarantee procedural fairness and the participation of all Commission members, we have adopted a set of rules that mirror those of the Armed Services Committees in both the House and the Senate. Moreover, as a congressional body, the Commissioners and staff members are complying with the rules and precedents of the Senate Ethics Committee (our designated oversight body), including public disclosure of and limitations on outside income, prohibitions on conflicts of interest, and restrictions on the receipt of gifts.

Principled—By adhering to the principles laid out in this report rather than addressing issues on an ad hoc basis, the Commission seeks to ensure that its findings and recommendations serve an overarching strategic objective; are properly conceived, collectively and individually; and contribute to sound public policy that above all furthers the national security interests of the United States.

METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

The following tenets reflect the analytical approach that will guide the Commission’s work.
• **Be future oriented.** The solutions proposed by the Commission must be sustainable over time. The goal is to achieve long-term, systemic improvements to our national defense apparatus that will prepare the Department of Defense, the reserve components, and partner agencies to meet future challenges. Assessments that ignore future conditions or recommendations that target current problems alone cannot meet this objective.

• **Think macro, not micro.** In the vast and complex defense bureaucracy, myriad challenges exist at every level. Attempting to address every inefficiency, issue, or challenge affecting the reserve components would be neither feasible nor consistent with the Commission’s mandate, schedule, and resources. Rather, we will focus on the big picture, striving to identify and address significant and systemic issues affecting the reserve components. We intend to keep our focus on the horizon and not on the grains of sand on the beach.

• **Find the facts.** To render sound and responsible recommendations, we must know the facts that provide the truest picture of reserve components today. The Commission will endeavor to base its judgments and recommendations on facts, as opposed to conventional wisdom, myth, anecdotes, ideology, or wishful thinking. Once the essential facts are known and understood, the Commissioners will endeavor to distill the key issues and substantive policy principles that are at stake.

• **Think outside the box.** The Commission must challenge long-standing assumptions and conventional approaches to problems. Given existing plans for a smaller active and reserve component force, a likely continuation in the rapid pace of operational deployments, and an increased emphasis on evolving roles in such areas as homeland security, stability operations, and counterterrorist activities, it is imperative that the Commission think creatively in crafting its recommendations. A concerted effort will be made to identify how the operation of the reserve components can be made more effective and efficient.

• **Recognize success.** It is important to acknowledge policies and practices that are working well and have proven successful over time. As the Commission formulates its findings, it will make every effort to take stock of what is going well and to reinforce success, not to focus only on what needs to be fixed.

• **Think smarter, not richer.** Money will not solve every problem. Policy solutions considered by the Commission must be assessed with budgetary
realities firmly in mind. Our defense policy cannot simply be to write ever-larger checks.

- **Understand that one size does not fit all.** Each of the seven reserve components is unique. Each is sized and structured differently, possesses different capabilities, has a different relationship with its parent service, and is employed differently by that service. These inter-component differences must be evaluated and taken into account as the Commission decides what changes in the status quo are warranted and feasible.

- **Minimize scorecarding.** The Commission will focus on making constructive policy recommendations to benefit national security now and in the years ahead. While it will be necessary to make judgments on current policies, it is not our objective to assess the performance of past or current policymakers. The Commission’s orientation is toward the future, not the past.

- **Be mindful of unintended consequences.** Although foreseeing the future is never easy, the Commission will try to understand, and account for, second- and third-order effects that flow from its recommendations. Each of the reserve components is organized and operates differently, and the Commission must try to ensure that the policies it recommends will work well across the Department of Defense and in the reserve components, without producing harmful collateral effects today or in the future.

**RECOMMENDATION CRITERIA**

As the Commission considers what recommendations to make to Congress and the Department of Defense, it will be necessary for us to make a series of judgments about which reforms are worthy of putting forward in the final report. A set of guiding criteria are necessary so that the Commission does not propose policy or programmatic changes that are unwise, impractical, or fail to support an overall, objective strategic vision. To that end, the merits of the reforms considered will be judged by how well they meet the following goals:

- **Serve the national security interests of the United States.** The foremost criterion that must be met by any proposed change in policy, law, regulation, or practice is that—if adopted—it must materially enhance and serve the national security interests of the United States now and in the future. The recommendations must substantially enhance the nation’s ability to protect our homeland, and our interests and values around the globe; to prevent conflict by remaining strong, capable, and ready; and to prevail swiftly and decisively.11
Proposals that serve the broader security interests of the country will be put before those that may narrowly benefit individual reserve components or a segment of the Department of Defense.

- **Account for important new and evolving mission requirements.** The Commission’s recommendations will be made in the wake of several major planning documents, including the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, the National Military Strategy, the National Homeland Security Strategy, the National Response Plan, and the Pentagon’s most recent defense master plan, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). In response to today’s unique threat environment, national planning strategies identify a number of evolving roles and requirements that will draw extensively on the reserve components, including homeland defense, counterterrorism, and stability operations. In order to ensure the salience and practicability of its recommendations, the Commission will take such new and emerging roles into account.

- **Improve the capabilities and readiness of the reserve components.** The recommendations adopted by the Commission should aid the reserve components in fulfilling their assigned roles and missions and operating in today’s dynamic threat environment. Each of the seven reserve components has unique capabilities and characteristics. The Commission’s recommendations must capitalize on these assets and improve the ability of the reserve components (a) to augment active component forces, (b) to be most useful to combatant commanders by meshing as a component of the total force, or (c) to perform unique critical tasks, such as functions involving homeland security or, in the case of the National Guard, state missions. New and evolving procedures for measuring the readiness of all forces and for assessing improvements, particularly in training and equipping, must be transparent to both the active and reserve components to benefit command decision-making.

- **Take costs into account.** The Department of Defense’s resources are not limitless. Like all public institutions, the department operates in a cost-constrained environment. Proposals with budgetary implications must be scrutinized in light of this reality. Trade-offs will be necessary, and the Commission will endeavor to be sensitive to fiscal concerns in our recommendations. Such considerations must be informed by historical spending patterns.
• **Recommend changes that are practical and executable.** Solutions proposed by the Commission must be realistic. They must be analytically supportable, as well as logistically, operationally, and fiscally feasible. For example, it makes little sense to recommend dramatic increases in the size of the reserve components to meet new operational requirements if the components would be unable to recruit and retain enough individuals to reach those new levels. This focus on achieving practical solutions to real problems will shape all of the Commission’s recommendations.

• **Support an efficient, integrated total force.** The myriad and multifaceted threats to U.S. national security make it difficult for policymakers and planners to anticipate force requirements. Moreover, many essential capabilities that are necessary to address modern threats reside within the reserve components. For these reasons, the Commission’s recommendations must recognize that reliance on the reserve components may increase further, particularly if current plans to reduce the active force are carried out. Accordingly, our recommendations must promote the seamless integration of the reserve force as the nation builds the total force of tomorrow.

• **Promote jointness.** The wisdom of joint military operations, and of laws such as the Goldwater-Nichols Act that further them, has been validated on the battlefield time and again. The American military is the best in the world largely because of its skill in operating jointly. Current military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are more “joint” than ever before, and under current defense plans, future U.S. success on the battlefield will depend on increased “jointness.” Therefore, it is vital that the Commission’s recommendations be consistent with this continued reliance on joint operations. Moreover, we believe it is clear that in crucial areas, including stability operations and civil affairs, jointness must be promoted not just among the military services but among all agencies of the federal government, so as to bring to bear all instruments of our national power to achieve U.S. objectives.

• **Recognize the current reality—and the profound implications—of having the reserve components function as an operational force.** The reserve components have increasingly been relied on to meet critical operational requirements, as illustrated most recently by the unprecedented number of national guardsmen and reservists who have been mobilized and deployed to support the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Commission is mindful of the use of the reserve components as an operational force and will take these circumstances and factors into account as it formulates its recommendations.
• **Respect the differences between service in the reserve components and service in the active components.** America’s reserve component service members provide an invaluable contribution to their country while balancing the competing demands of country, family, and civilian employment. It is an extraordinary feat by any measure. There are myriad valid reasons why our reservists do not choose active duty, but there are qualitative and quantitative differences between active and reserve component service. Maintaining appropriate distinctions between service in active and in reserve components is a key consideration in achieving proper overall force balance.

• **Be fair to service members and their families.** The United States cannot maintain the finest military in the world without the continuing support of the people who serve, including their family members. As we review proposals to revise the structure and elements of the compensation and benefits package available to reserve component service members and their families, the Commission will strive to ensure that available benefits are commensurate with their level of commitment. It is critical that members of the reserve components receive full and fair compensation for the dedicated service they provide our country.

• **Ensure that the Army and Air National Guard will be able to fully meet their state obligations.** These two National Guard components are unique among the seven reserve components because of their obligation to the states, territories, and possessions as well as to the federal government. The Commission will fully consider how proposed reforms will affect the ability of the Army and Air National Guard to perform state duties that may have little or no military analogue. The Commission’s recommendations must support the continuing ability of National Guard units to meet their state responsibilities.

• **Ensure that the reserve components will be effective at home and abroad.** A key task for the Commission will be to develop policy recommendations that enable the reserve components to successfully perform important homeland-oriented missions while at the same time preserving operational capabilities that will be needed when deployments to overseas theaters occur.

• **Take advantage of the fact that the National Guard and Reserves are forward stationed throughout the United States.** The National Guard and the other reserve components are uniquely situated to understand what their communities require and what military capabilities are available to support civil
authorities in the event of natural or human-made disaster. The extensive local knowledge of their leaders is a desirable asset and should be utilized when homeland-related roles and missions are assigned to the reserve components.

- **Take advantage of the civilian skills of reserve component service members.** The diverse civilian occupations of reserve service members provide a rich pool of skills, experiences, and capabilities of use to the military. Many of these skills are uniquely acquired and maintained in the civilian sector but are critical to successful military operations and careers. Classic examples include health care professionals who serve in reserve component medical units, and police officers who serve in reserve component military police units. In Iraq, when an antiquities expert with investigative, prosecutorial, and military experience was required, the reserve components were able to provide the right person. Reserve component service opportunities and career paths must continue to encourage and maintain this rich and vital resource. A concerted effort will be made by the Commission to ensure that suggested changes to our military policies, laws, regulations, and practices take maximum advantage of crossover skills, so that the country is able to fully utilize the many critically important talents of our reserve component service members to meet national security requirements.

- **Understand and respect the impact of reserve component policies and practices on families, communities, and employers.** The policies directing the operations of the reserve components have ramifications for those in the chain of support for our reservists and national guardsmen. Individuals in the reserve components cannot serve unless their families, communities, and employers are willing to endorse their participation and cope with the accompanying hardships. The Commission pledges to be keenly sensitive to this fact in the recommendations it makes to Congress and the Secretary of Defense.
WORK PLAN AND DISCUSSION OF ACTIVITIES

Guided by the precepts and principles laid out above, our strategy for achieving the objectives assigned to the Commission by Congress can best be described by the following eight phases of work:

- Identify
- Organize
- Mine
- Analyze and assess
- Formulate
- Reassess
- Report
- Advocate

IDENTIFY. The first phase of our work has been to identify the **key issue areas** specified in or implied by the Commission’s authorizing statute. In other words, what major questions has Congress asked us to answer? What are the first-, second-, and third-order policy questions that must be addressed in order to make the most relevant and informed possible assessments?

As part of this phase, the Commission has worked to identify the **key data** required to accurately understand the status of the National Guard and Reserves in those various issue areas. These data will help to establish baseline facts necessary to make informed and accurate assessments.

We have also identified an evolving set of **criteria**, as detailed above. They will guide us so that our recommendations serve the national security requirements of the United States.

ORGANIZE. Having taken stock of the issues we are required to examine, the Commission has organized its 13 commissioners and 11 research and analysis staff into discrete work groups. Such a division enables a subset of four or five Commissioners and designated staff to delve deeply into the assigned subject areas.

**Commissioner work groups**—The Commission has six work groups:

- Requirements and Organization
- Personnel and Compensation
- Readiness, Training, and Equipping
• Homeland Defense/Homeland Security
• Mobilization and Demobilization
• Funding Analysis

Work plans—Each work group has drafted a comprehensive work plan for identifying the key issues, finding the relevant facts, answering the critical policy questions in its area, and providing the analysis necessary for the Commission to submit the wisest possible reform proposals in support of well-conceived objectives. In general, the work plans are designed to provide the full Commission with answers to the following four main questions:

• What are the key challenges facing policymakers in the particular policy area?
• What have policymakers done to date to address these challenges?
• What remains to be accomplished to achieve desired goals?
• How should relevant policies, laws, regulations, directives, and/or practices be reformed to achieve those goals?

Each work plan spells out and prioritizes the chief policy questions that must be answered and the data that must be developed. It identifies the policymakers, policy implementers, frontline personnel, and subject matter experts who must be interviewed to garner the full array of relevant perspectives and expertise. It specifies the official reports and studies that must be considered. And it lists the installations, commands, and other sites that must be visited to develop the most accurate picture of the status quo and to make the best possible recommendations for positive change.

MINE. As the Commission’s principles spell out, a vital part of our work—and the focus of the work groups—is to research and find the relevant facts, perspectives, opinions, and ideas we need to make well-informed assessments and recommendations.

Experts, policymakers, and personnel—This process requires identifying and interviewing the key subject matter experts, relevant policymakers, and frontline personnel who can provide the Commission with the most accurate information and diverse points of view. In the first three months of its existence, the Commission has conducted more than 110 meetings, briefings, and interviews with policymakers, subject matter experts, and other stakeholders. We are continuing to conduct these activities in accordance with the work plans discussed above.

Data requests—A vital part of the information-gathering portion of our work requires assembling the data and mining the many reports, studies, and other material that contain information bearing on the key policy questions and issues we are
chartered to study. For help in providing data and analysis essential to our work, the Commission has established excellent liaison with the Department of Defense and other institutions. They include the Congressional Research Service, the Government Accountability Office, the Congressional Budget Office, think tanks, academic bodies, military associations, and other key stakeholder groups. The Commission is making data and briefing requests of these institutions and submitting official “questions for the record” to obtain written responses.

Studies and reports—At various institutions, at least six major studies and reports bearing on the National Guard and Reserves are under way, several at the direction of Congress or the administration. These include two studies on service member compensation, as well as a major policy study on the reserve components sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. A full listing of the major analyses in progress that are relevant to our work is provided as an attachment to this report.

The Commission will consider the information, findings, and recommendations provided in these various studies to ensure that our conclusions reflect the best thinking across government, throughout academia, and in other institutions about policy issues and challenges affecting the National Guard and Reserves.

Stakeholder outreach—To obtain the most comprehensive array of ideas, viewpoints, and relevant information, the Commission is undertaking a program of maximum outreach to the numerous groups that have an interest in matters affecting the National Guard and Reserves. In March, the Commission sent out more than 500 letters to groups and individuals requesting their input. A partial listing of the stakeholder groups we have contacted is provided as an attachment to this report. The Commission is particularly eager to solicit the recommendations of service members and their families, and will use mechanisms such as focus groups to gain their input. The Commission continues to receive much helpful material from the various stakeholder groups, and we are carefully considering the information we are provided.

Hearings—The Commission has determined that its work will be anchored by a series of major public hearings whose principal topics will roughly correspond to the work group assignments. Each hearing is intended to serve as a culmination to the bulk of our other work in the topic area, so that the information garnered in our studies, interviews, and site visits can be used to sharpen the hearing’s focus on the key issues and to make the most of our time with important witnesses.

On March 8 and 9, 2006, the Commission conducted its first public hearing, which involved congressional leaders, senior civilian and military defense officials, and top subject matter experts. A witness roster from the hearing has been provided as an
attachment to this report, and transcripts of all our hearing records can be found on the Commission’s Web site (www.cngr.gov). The focus of this initial hearing was to examine the current and future roles of the reserve components, as well as to receive input on the Commission’s mission.

The Commission determined that such a hearing would be a logical starting point for its work because the decisions related to how the reserve components should be tasked, organized, equipped, trained, compensated, and supported will rest largely on what the nation wants its National Guard and Reserves to do. It sought to gather information pertaining to the following policy questions:

- Given the Commission’s broad charter, what do the expert witnesses think are the most important issues for the Commission to address, and what principles should govern our policy recommendations?
- Is the reserve operational, strategic, or both? What are the policy implications?
- How can an operational reserve be sustained?
- What are the future roles and missions of the reserve components?
- Should the National Guard and Reserves modify their organization and training to make homeland security a “priority mission”? What are the implications of the recent White House report on Hurricane Katrina?
- Given the considerations above, are the reserves sized and structured appropriately?
- What are the major problems with mobilization, and what steps are being taken to fix them?

The Commission held its second major public hearing on May 3 and 4, 2006, to continue exploring the question of roles and missions. The emphasis in this hearing was on the role of the National Guard and Reserves in dealing with both terrorist attacks and natural disasters. The Commission focused on the following policy questions:

- What changes should be made to existing laws, policies, and procedures to enhance the ability of the National Guard and Reserves to support homeland security, homeland defense, and civil support requirements?
- What is the appropriate “balance of responsibility” among organizations involved in these domestic requirements—including the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, the military services and their reserve components, and state and local governments—and how can we improve “unity of effort”? 
• How are the roles and missions of the National Guard and Reserves affected by the recommendations of the White House report on Hurricane Katrina?
• What is the consensus regarding the congressional recommendations on aligning the National Guard Bureau with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Northern Command, and other combatant commanders?
• Is there a need for separate budgetary authority for the National Guard Bureau?
• How adequate are manning, readiness, training, equipping, and resourcing for the National Guard and Reserves?
• Are the governors and their adjutants general confident that the National Guard and other state forces are adequate to meet homeland security needs at the state level?

Additional hearings—The Commission has planned a full slate of public hearings in the major topic areas relevant to our charter. Further, each of the work groups will be conducting focused examinations, which will include taking testimony, in their specific issue areas.

ANALYZE AND ASSESS. The analysis and assessment phase is an ongoing process as the Commission organizes the extensive input we are receiving and studies the facts bearing on our objectives. Our goal is to establish the clearest possible picture about the condition of the National Guard and Reserves and to identify the improvements and reforms that should be considered in the policy areas assigned to us.

The Commission has a research and analysis staff that will aid the Commissioners in this phase; further, as mentioned previously, we have established liaison to gain additional assistance and expertise from the Government Accountability Office, the Congressional Research Service, the Congressional Budget Office, and other institutions.

The Commission’s analyses and assessments will establish the basis for a set of findings on the policies, laws, regulations, and practices governing the National Guard and Reserves. These findings will in turn indicate the areas in which we should make recommendations for change.

FORMULATE. After the most comprehensive possible record has been developed, and our work of assessment and analysis is complete, the Commission will develop a set of recommendations in keeping with our statutory mandate and consistent with a
final set of objectives, principles, and criteria as discussed earlier in this report. In rendering its recommendations, the Commission will fully vet the alternatives we consider and the proposals we endorse with policymakers and outside experts to avoid unintended consequences and the pitfalls of groupthink.

**REASSESS.** The Commission’s reassessment phase will entail reviewing our work with a critical eye, including the use of “red teams” to provide independent critiques. Did we ask the right questions? Have we gathered the necessary information and taken into account all relevant viewpoints and considerations? Are we sure of our facts? Are our findings well supported by the factual record? Have we stayed faithful to our statutory mission, precepts, and principles? Have we achieved what Congress asked of us? The Commission will seek to remedy any shortcomings the reassessment might uncover.

**REPORT.** The Commission’s authorizing statute requires that we prepare a final report sharing our assessments, findings, and recommendations with the Armed Services Committees of the House and Senate and with the Secretary of Defense. While the content of the report will be shaped by our ongoing research, analysis, and deliberations, we have already begun to discuss the principles that will determine how we ultimately present our work.

We believe it is important not only that the final report provide Congress and the Secretary with our findings about the status quo, desired end states, and recommendations, but also that it supply the full justification for our decisions. To that end, the final report will furnish the background, pertinent facts, strategic objectives, and rationale behind our positions. It will be detailed and contain full references, thereby enabling the reader to learn not just our determinations on the issues assigned to us but why we came to the conclusions we did. It will paint an accurate and vivid picture of the status quo, using telling facts, representative anecdotes, and real-life scenarios. It will state desired outcomes and the path to achieving them in clear and unambiguous language. Our aim is to produce a report that is comprehensive, cogent, simply told, clearly argued, well documented, and, most important, worthy of implementation by virtue of its logic and its compelling necessity. In addition, in an effort to be of maximum assistance, we are planning, where appropriate, to provide Congress with the legislative language necessary to implement the recommendations we make.

**ADVOCATE.** The Commission believes that the true measure of the value of our work will be the extent to which its recommendations are implemented. Accordingly, the Commission sees collaboration with those who can act on its proposals—including policymakers, stakeholders, and the public—as part of its mission.
FINDINGS TO DATE

At the Commission’s first hearing in March 2006, intended to help the panel determine which major issues should be addressed during the course of our work, we specifically asked witnesses—members of Congress, officials from the Defense Department, and outside experts—to identify the pressing issues on which we might offer recommendations in this interim report. The input we received has been very useful in helping to shape the Commission’s agenda.

The issues and topics raised by congressional leaders involve complex and major policy questions that require careful study and analysis. Because we are focusing on many of these questions in work currently under way, we believe it would be premature to offer proposals before a complete record has been established, and until such time as we can present findings and recommendations that fully reflect all the pertinent facts, a careful consideration of all relevant viewpoints, and the most informed deliberation.

While mindful of the urgency of addressing these questions, we know that Congress’s charge to the Commission is to make the soundest and most useful findings and recommendations based on a thorough and comprehensive record of study. The Commission looks forward to working with Congress to ensure that our final report is filed in a timely manner, meets the needs of policymakers, and furthers our national security interests. Meanwhile, drawing on our work to date, we have developed a list of findings that, while basic, will help serve as a foundation for the remainder of our work. They are purposefully general, because at this early stage the Commission is still gathering information; it would be inappropriate for us to express our more detailed ideas until they are fully developed. These interim findings are seven:

1. America faces the most diverse, complex, and unpredictable security environment in our history. The policies, laws, regulations, and practices governing the nation’s military, particularly the National Guard and Reserves, must ensure that America possesses the capabilities and readiness necessary to counter numerous evolving threats at home and abroad.

According to the nation’s security and military planning documents, America faces the most diverse, complex, and unpredictable security environment in our history. The threats range from disaffected individuals possessing technology capable of inflicting massive damage and disruption to rogue nation-states capable of striking out and engaging in warfare out of desperation or despotism.
Militant Islamic extremists hostile to our values and freedoms have declared jihad against the United States. Numerous ethnic, tribal, and regional conflicts around the globe can flare up at any time, destabilizing fragile and strategically important areas. Failed and failing states, and vast ungoverned areas, continue to provide opportunities for militant extremists to recruit, train, and operate.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, whether in the hands of terrorists or nation-states, will remain a significant security challenge. Disease—whether naturally occurring (especially in the form of a global pandemic) or spread intentionally by our enemies—threatens to kill millions of people and cripple the international economy. Catastrophic natural disasters, including hurricanes, tsunamis, and earthquakes, can destabilize large regions of the country and the globe. The accelerating competition for finite natural resources also promises to intensify security perils in the coming decades.

In addition to the numerous threats to national security we can identify, Americans must never forget one of the most important lessons of September 11, 2001—to expect the unexpected. The National Military Strategy identified “uncertainty” as the principal characteristic of today’s security environment. We must anticipate that technological advances will lead to weaponry that is more diverse, accessible, and lethal, and that expanding freedom and global economic integration will heighten the effects on America of destabilizing events that occur far from our shores.

This growth in the number and complexity of security dangers facing the United States, together with the ever-present factor of uncertainty, promises to place increasing demands on all instruments of our national power, including the military. Accordingly, the need for ready and capable forces—including the reserve components—with multifaceted capabilities and competencies will remain high for the foreseeable future.

2. The United States is engaged in what national security policymakers believe to be a “long war,” which is likely to last for many years to come. As a result, we must be prepared to respond to the new, emerging threats associated with this war, including conventional military attacks, terrorist attacks, human-made disasters, and threats from militant Islamic radicalism and the forces of tyranny. Responding to these challenges will have profound and lasting implications for the nation, the military services, and their reserve components.

The most notable and immediate phenomenon with an enduring impact on the employment of the reserve components is what the Pentagon’s Quadrennial Defense Review and presidential statements call our engagement in a “long war” against
militant Islamic extremists and the forces of tyranny. These documents indicate that the “United States is in the early years of a long struggle, similar to what our country faced in the early years of the Cold War.”\textsuperscript{16} As part of this new security paradigm, military planning documents have set forth a policy reserving the right of the United States to act preemptively in exercising the nation’s inherent right of self-defense.\textsuperscript{17}

Our engagement in a “long war” and the associated policy of preemption mark a substantial shift in the nature of U.S. military strategy. This new strategy recognizes that we are engaged in a lasting struggle for security, and over ideology, that will require the coherent and integrated use of all elements of our national power, including the reserve components of our military.

Although it may be impossible to predict the need for military forces associated with a “long war,” the reserve components clearly must be prepared to face many and varied challenges. Making them ready for these challenges will require the adoption of new policies that are sustainable over time and that are designed to ensure that the reserve components have the right organizational structure and skills—and enough people, equipment, and training—to continue to be what they have been throughout our nation’s history: a vital element of national power.

Finally, the daunting requirements of the “long war” must be explained to the American people. They must understand that it is they who ultimately will be required to provide the necessary funding, material, moral, and political support to prevail over the long haul in the war against terrorism, militant radicalism, and other security challenges.

3. The sustained operational use of and potential future demands on the reserve components pose challenges that must be addressed.

The origins of an operational reserve can be traced to the implementation of the all-volunteer force in 1973. In the absence of a draft, the military has come to rely on a total force consisting of volunteers. The Abrams Doctrine, which was advanced following the Vietnam War, further developed the concept by implementing a force structure that depends on reserve component participation to project sustainable forces overseas.

The first significant use of an operational reserve came a generation later during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, when large numbers of reserve component members were called up to support operational missions. Operational deployments continued through the 1990s, though at reduced levels. Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, unprecedented numbers of reservists and
national guardsmen have been involuntarily recalled to active duty and have served for longer periods than at any other time since the Korean War.

In his March testimony before the Commission, Dr. David Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), indicated that the legislative basis for an operational reserve was clarified by a provision in the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005. As members of Congress noted in their conference report, “By eliminating statutory reference to planned mobilizations, the provision more accurately reflects the operational mission, responsibilities, and contributions of the National Guard and Reserve members and the manner in which the reserve forces will be employed in the future.”

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The contributions of the National Guard and Reserves, as individuals and as organizations, have been critical to the military successes achieved in Iraq, in Afghanistan, and in other post-9/11 actions. But the service vice chiefs of staff have testified before the Commission that despite their enthusiasm and vast capabilities, the reserve components have been stretched to their limits.19 Recruiting rates in recent years and changes to accession standards in certain reserve components may be the initial evidence of strain from increased operational use20 and may presage serious sustainability problems.

The feasibility of continued reliance on an operational reserve must be examined; such use will require more than legislative and policy reform that focuses on the authority to access a part-time force. We must also carefully consider how this force will be funded, staffed, trained, equipped, and employed in order for it to remain robust and capable in the fast-paced operational environment that may characterize the “long war.”

4. A balance between the use of the reserve components as an operational and as a strategic reserve, as necessary to meet national security objectives, must be achieved, and the reserve components must be tasked, organized, trained, equipped, and funded accordingly.

Testimony the Commission has already received and information gathered thus far in its work make clear that substantially increased use of the reserve components for operational missions has become a reality—a reality that may continue, depending on future contingencies. One need look no further than the sheer number of reservists and national guardsmen mobilized for Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom to find conclusive evidence of the degree to which our military now relies on the reserve components in an operational context.
At the same time, the more conventional role of the reserve components as a strategic reserve—a pool of replacement manpower and capability to be employed in a large-scale conflict with a peer or near-peer military competitor—cannot be ignored. The rising economic and military power of China, the continuing belligerence of North Korea, and the now overt nuclear ambitions of Iran each raise the prospect of major regional military contingencies for which our military must be prepared. In such large-scale conflicts, the National Guard and Reserves may need to be employed as a strategic reserve, providing large numbers of replacement personnel, equipment, or brigade- and larger-sized units to augment active forces.

Although the reserve components have made invaluable contributions to the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, they have been deployed to those theaters as integral parts of frontline operational forces from the inception of the conflicts, rather than as a force held in reserve until unforeseen battlefield events make large-scale mobilization and deployment imperative. Policymakers must strike an appropriate and sustainable balance between the operational and strategic use of the reserve components that will be necessary to achieve national security objectives in a long war. Moreover, the reserve components must be tasked, organized, trained, equipped, and funded to fulfill the requirements associated with both roles.

5. Statutes and policies that adversely affect the reserve components must be revised and updated.

As the National Security Strategy states, “the major institutions of American national security were designed in a different era to meet different challenges. They must be transformed.” The scope of this transformation includes the reserve components, which are guided by outdated policies and laws, some of which were aimed at fulfilling the predominant Cold War need for the force’s rapid expansion in time of peer-to-peer war.

Examples of anachronisms that must be reviewed include

- The Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act, a reserve officer personnel management structure based on the post-Vietnam drawdown experience, which has not been updated since its passage in 1994
- The standard reservist training requirement of 39 days per year, which may not yield sufficient force readiness for the high operational tempo that current and future uses of the reserve components may demand
- The package and structure of compensation and benefits—the product of decades of legislation and policy, including some recent reforms—which may differ between active and reserve components in ways that may result in unfair
treatment of service members performing substantially the same service but in
different duty statuses

- The array of personnel policies and regulations that impede the efficient and
  seamless transitions necessary to support a continuum of service by military
  personnel

At the Commission’s hearing in March, Under Secretary of Defense David Chu stated
that a key characteristic of an operational reserve force is that it is more “seamless” in
its integration with active component forces. Accordingly, policies and laws in every
area—personnel, compensation, readiness, training, equipping, organization,
mobilization, and funding—must be carefully scrutinized to ensure they support and
sustain a reserve component that is relevant to the nation’s needs today and in the
future, including the seamless continuum of service that is necessary for today’s total
force.

6. There is confusion regarding chains of command when federal, state,
   and local authorities respond to domestic disasters, as Hurricane Katrina
   and other recent emergencies have demonstrated. The adverse
   operational consequences of this confusion, including those for the
   reserve components, must be remedied.

The White House lessons-learned report on the federal response to Hurricane Katrina
states that “active duty military and National Guard operations were not coordinated
and served two different bosses.” According to this study, reliance on these separate
chains of command hindered unity of effort, created inadequate situational awareness
in both federal and state leadership, and caused redundancy and inefficiency in how
military resources provided support to civil authorities. These problems must be
resolved. One important solution is to institute a clearly defined chain of command
for domestic emergencies that takes advantage of core competencies; engenders unity
of effort among federal, state, and local authorities; and ensures that constitutionally
based authorities are respected.

7. The Defense Department’s and other federal agencies’ engagement with
governors regarding decisions affecting reserve component personnel,
equipment, funding, and operations can contribute to national security
and should be strengthened.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that the Department of Defense has not always
consulted with governors on decisions that affect National Guard and Reserve
personnel, equipment, and funding. Consultation and collaboration facilitate decision
making and can improve overall national security and the ability of the states to
respond effectively to domestic contingencies. In view of the importance of state safety and security issues, care must be taken to support and strengthen collaborative relationships between the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, and the states in which so much of our military capability resides. At a minimum, suitable processes should be established to aid information sharing between governors and the federal government regarding the potential effects on national security, homeland defense, homeland security, and emergency response capabilities caused by deployments and other decisions affecting National Guard personnel and equipment.
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MAJOR POLICY QUESTIONS

The Commission’s charter and our work to date, described above, lead us to focus on the following primary, overarching policy areas:

• **Roles and missions.** What roles and missions are best suited to the characteristics of a part-time force employed operationally, taking into account that reservists and national guardsmen want to serve the nation but must keep that service in equilibrium with civilian careers and family demands?

• **Purposes.** How can we balance the ongoing need for a strategic reserve with requirements associated with the continuing operational use of the reserve components?

• **Capabilities.** What capabilities can be provided by the reserve components, which are required for national security objectives in the “long war” and are also valuable for improving homeland security and responding to natural and human-made disasters at home?

• **Organization and structure.** What changes in the organization and structure of the reserve components will ensure they are appropriately sized and will enhance their readiness, capabilities, availability, and sustainability as they carry out the missions assigned to them?

• **Organization and structure.** How should reserve service differ from active service?

• **Command and control.** Are command authorities, capabilities, and responsibilities affecting the reserve components properly aligned? And are accountability and authority affecting the reserve components properly aligned?

• **Training.** What changes to the 39-day-per-year training paradigm are required to ensure readiness of the reserve components for operational employment and to aid these service members in acquiring and maintaining the variety of skills needed across the continuum of service?

• **Readiness.** How can readiness—of units and individuals—be maintained in a way that facilitates operational use overseas and preserves their strategic value while providing needed capabilities for on-call homeland security requirements?
• **Equipment.** What can be done to better furnish the reserve components with first-rate, dual-capable equipment that will maximize their effectiveness in accomplishing the missions assigned to them—including expediting the replacement of equipment, particularly high-priority items, no longer available to them because it is being used overseas?

• **Homeland defense/homeland security.** What, if any, changes should be made in the U.S. Northern Command’s organizational structure and mission approach to meet its responsibilities effectively?

• **Mobilization.** Do existing mobilization statutes provide adequate authority to effectively mobilize the reserve components? What changes in policy and practice can be made to improve the process of mobilization, activation, and demobilization?

• **Compensation and Benefits.** What changes in the compensation and benefits offered for reserve service are needed to maintain an operational force that is adequately staffed on a sustainable basis and with the proper mix of experienced leaders, junior officers, and enlisted members?

• **Career paths.** How will the “long war” and the operational reserve affect career paths and opportunities for reserve members? And how can migration between active and reserve components—a continuum of service—be optimized?

• **Funding.** What changes, if any, in the levels or allocation of funds for the reserve components should be made to meet the current and future missions assigned to them?

• **Equipping and funding the National Guard.** How should National Guard equipment and funding requirements be validated? In what ways should the processes now used to make these decisions be changed? What improved procedures and practices, if any, should be implemented to take into consideration the views of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the 54 adjutants general in determining necessary equipment and funding?

• **National Guard leadership and related issues.** What should be the future role of the National Guard Bureau vis-à-vis the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense? What should be the rank of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau? Should the deputy commander of United States Northern Command be a National Guard officer?
During our first hearing, key members of Congress urged the Commission to examine several ideas regarding the military leadership of the National Guard. Included were proposals to make the Chief of the National Guard Bureau a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to make the Chief of the National Guard Bureau the principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on National Guard matters, to increase the grade of the position from lieutenant general to general, and to require that the deputy commander of United States Northern Command be a National Guard officer. These and other National Guard–related proposals have been introduced in legislation pending before the House of Representatives and Senate, and they touch on major policy questions that the Commission is examining in detail.

In conducting our work in this area, the Commission will apply the operating principles, methodologies, and recommendation criteria set forth in this report.

In assessing these proposals and any potential alternatives, the Commission will consult with Congress, including the sponsors of the legislation and will work with past and current senior military leaders, as well as other subject matter experts and stakeholders, to be sure that all relevant objectives, outcomes, facts, viewpoints, considerations, and anticipated effects are understood and factored into the Commission’s assessment and final recommendations. Any major relevant changes that the Department of Defense and/or Congress may make in this time frame will certainly be taken into account. Legislation pending in the House would require us to report our findings and recommendations on these specific proposals by March 1, 2007, and we fully intend to meet that deadline should it be established.
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MOVING FORWARD

This 90-day report provides a useful point at which to take stock of what has been accomplished by the Commission so far. Aside from the administrative process of standing up the Commission, hiring a staff, securing office space, establishing administrative procedures, creating a Web site, and undertaking similar logistical tasks, considerable preliminary work has taken place.

Commissioners have become acquainted with one another and have gained a sense of purpose and direction for the Commission’s work. We have organized ourselves into work groups that will enable us to focus concertedly on the topics most vital to the Commission’s ultimate findings and recommendations.

Moreover, as this report signifies, the key principles that will shape the Commission’s approach to issues, and will help frame its findings and recommendations, have been identified. Major substantive areas that must be examined also have been identified. Interviews, research, field trips, and other fact-finding activities have begun in earnest.

Two public hearings have been conducted, both of which have yielded useful insights into critical topics that must be addressed—on future roles and missions, and on the role of the reserve components in homeland defense and homeland security. In short, the Commission has made steady progress, and a strategic framework is in place that will allow the conduct of its business in an organized, thorough, open, and deliberate way.

Of course, this is only a beginning. Much remains to be done. It is apparent to every Commissioner that the task before us is both enormous and complicated. Given the large and growing list of areas that Congress has charged us to examine, the Commission may need additional time to accomplish our mission successfully. We will remain in close contact with lawmakers to make certain that everything is done to ensure that the Commission can fulfill its duties and provide the timely input required.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs testified in March that there have been numerous changes in the laws affecting the reserve components. And major policy decisions must no doubt continue to be made. We state the obvious in noting that Congress created this Commission for a very specific purpose, and we hope that policymakers will take full advantage of the work we have been chartered to perform. To that end, we would like to express our hope that the Defense Department would see fit to delay taking any major and irreversible policy actions bearing on the National Guard and Reserves until we report, where it can do so consistent with national security and the public interest. Such postponement would enable decision makers to receive the Commission’s input before committing the
reserve components to some crucial policy that might benefit from our findings and recommendations.

As we have heard from every one of our hearing witnesses, the reserve components will continue to play a critical role in providing for the safety and security of the United States. Each member of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves is devoted to fulfilling our mission to the best of our abilities. Our commitment is to make sound, practical recommendations that will improve our national security, our military, and our reserve components for the benefit of this and future generations of Americans.
NOTES


5. Senator Carl Levin, statement provided to the CNGR, March 2006.


7. Senator John Warner, statement provided to the CNGR, March 2006.


9. The term national security includes the mission of homeland defense. For purposes of the Commission’s work, our mission statement also includes the current and future roles of the National Guard and the Reserves in homeland security and emergency response.


20. Lieutenant General Frank Hagenbeck, the U.S. Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, testified before the personnel subcommittees of both the Senate Armed Services Committee (April 5, 2005) and House Armed Services Committee (July 19, 2005) that the Global War on Terrorism, the lower propensity to serve, and negative feedback from influencers, coupled with the improving economy and lower unemployment, have presented a very challenging recruiting environment. Additionally, defense analyst Michèle Flournoy, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, expressed considerable concern regarding military recruiting at the Commission’s public hearing on March 9, 2006, referring to recruiting and retention as “the long pole in the tent” (see transcript, p. 95).


APPENDICES

- Commission on the National Guard and Reserves authorizing legislation
- Commissioner biographies
- Public hearing panels to date
- Concurrent studies
- Partial list of stakeholder organizations contacted
APPENDIX 1

COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES
AUTHORIZING LEGISLATION

108 Congress
Public Law 108-375
(As amended by 109 Congress Public Law 109-163)

An Act
To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2005 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the “Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005”.

SEC. 513. COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES.
(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established in the legislative branch a commission to be known as the “Commission on the National Guard and Reserves”.
(b) COMPOSITION.—(1) The Commission shall be composed of 13 members appointed as follows:
(A) Three members appointed by the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.
(B) Three members appointed by the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.
(C) Two members appointed by the ranking minority member of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.
(D) Two members appointed by the ranking minority member of the Committee on Armed Service of the House of Representatives.
(E) Three members appointed by the Secretary of Defense.
(2) The members of the Commission shall be appointed from among persons who have knowledge and expertise in the following areas:
(A) National security.
(B) Roles and missions of any of the Armed Forces.
(C) The mission, operations, and organization of the National Guard of the United States.
(D) The mission, operations, and organization of the other reserve components of the Armed Forces.

(E) Military readiness of the Armed Forces.

(F) Personnel pay and other forms of compensation.

(G) Other personnel benefits, including health care.

(3) Members of the Commission shall be appointed for the life of the Commission. A vacancy in the membership of the Commission shall not affect the powers of the Commission, but shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment.

(4) The Secretary of Defense shall designate a member of the Commission to be chairman of the Commission.

(c) DUTIES.—(1) The Commission shall carry out a study of the following matters:

(A) The roles and missions of the National Guard and the other reserve components of the Armed Forces.

(B) The compensation and other benefits, including health care benefits, that are provided for members of the reserve components under the laws of the United States.

(2) In carrying out the study under paragraph (1), the Commission shall do the following:

(A) Assess the current roles and missions of the reserve components and identify appropriate potential future roles and missions for the reserve components.

(B) Assess the capabilities of the reserve components and determine how the units and personnel of the reserve components may be best used to support the military operations of the Armed Forces and the achievement of national security objectives, including homeland defense, of the United States.

(C) Assess the Department of Defense plan for implementation of section 115(b) of title 10, United States Code, as added by section 416(a)(4).

(D) Assess—

(i) the current organization and structure of the National Guard and the other reserve components; and

(ii) the plans of the Department of Defense and the Armed Forces for future organization and structure of the National Guard and the other reserve components.

(E) Assess the manner in which the National Guard and the other reserve components are currently organized and funded for training and identify an organizational and funding structure for training that best supports the achievement of training objectives and operational readiness.

(F) Assess the effectiveness of the policies and programs of the National Guard and the other reserve components for achieving operational readiness and personnel readiness, including medical and personal readiness.

(G) Assess—

(i) the adequacy and appropriateness of the compensation and benefits currently provided for the members of the National Guard and the other reserve components, including the availability of health care benefits and health insurance; and
(ii) the effects of proposed changes in compensation and benefits on military careers in both the regular and the reserve components of the Armed Forces.

(H) Identify various feasible options for improving the compensation and other benefits available to the members of the National Guard and the members of the other reserve components and assess—

(i) the cost-effectiveness of such options; and

(ii) the foreseeable effects of such options on readiness, recruitment, and retention of personnel for careers in the regular and reserve components the Armed Forces.

(I) Assess the traditional military career paths for members of the National Guard and the other reserve components and identify alternative career paths that could enhance professional development.

(J) Assess the adequacy of the funding provided for the National Guard and the other reserve components for several previous fiscal years, including the funding provided for National Guard and reserve component equipment and the funding provided for National Guard and other reserve component personnel in active duty military personnel accounts and reserve military personnel accounts.

(d) FIRST MEETING.—The Commission shall hold its first meeting not later than 30 days after the date on which all members of the Commission have been appointed.

(e) ADMINISTRATIVE AND PROCEDURAL AUTHORITIES.—(1) Sections 955, 956, 957 (other than subsection (f)), 958, and 959 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-160; 10 U.S.C 111 note) shall apply to the Commission, except that—

“(A) in applying the first sentence of subsection (a) of section 957 of such Act to the Commission, ‘may’ shall be substituted for ‘shall’; and

(B) in applying subsections (a), (c)(2), and (e) of section 957 of such Act to the Commission, ‘level IV of the Executive Schedule’ shall be substituted for ‘level V of the Executive Schedule’.”

(2) The following provisions of law do not apply to the Commission:

(A) Section 3161 of title 5, United States Code.

(B) The Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.).

(f) REPORTS.—(1) Not later than three months after the first meeting of the Commission, the Commission shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a report setting forth—

(A) a strategic plan for the work of the Commission;

(B) a discussion of the activities of the Commission; and

(C) any initial findings of the Commission.

(2) Not later than one year after the first meeting of the Commission, the Commission shall submit a final report to the committees of Congress referred to in paragraph (1) and to the Secretary of Defense. The final report shall include any recommendations that the Commission determines appropriate, including any recommended legislation, policies, regulations, directives, and practices.
(g) TERMINATION.—The Commission shall terminate 90 days after the date on which the final report is submitted under subsection (f)(2).

(h) ANNUAL REVIEW.—(1) The Secretary of Defense shall annually review the reserve components of the Armed Forces with regard to—
(A) the roles and missions of the reserve components; and
(B) the compensation and other benefits, including health care benefits, that are provided for members of the reserve components under the laws of the United States.
(2) The Secretary shall submit a report of the annual review, together with any comments and recommendations that the Secretary considers appropriate, to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.
(3) The first review under paragraph (1) shall take place during fiscal year 2006.
APPENDIX 2

COMMISSIONERS

• **Arnold L. Punaro, Chairman** – Chairman Punaro is a retired Marine Corps major general who served as Commanding General of the 4th Marine Division (1997–2000) and Director of Reserve Affairs at Headquarters Marine Corps during the post-9/11 peak reserve mobilization periods. Following active duty service in Vietnam, he was mobilized three times: for Operation Desert Shield in the first Gulf War, to command Joint Task Force Provide Promise (Fwd) in Bosnia and Macedonia, and for Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. He worked on Capitol Hill for 24 years for Senator Sam Nunn and served as his staff director of the Senate Armed Services Committee for 14 years. He is currently Executive Vice President of Science Applications International Corporation.

• **William L. Ball, III** – Commissioner Ball is currently Managing Director of The Loeffler Group, a government affairs practice in Washington, DC, and Texas. He also serves as Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Asia Foundation, an international NGO operating in 18 Asian countries. He served in the Navy for six years followed by 10 years’ service on the U.S. Senate staff for Senators Herman Talmadge and John Tower. He joined the Reagan administration in 1985, serving as Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs, Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs at the White House, and Secretary of the Navy in 1988–89.

• **Les Brownlee** – Commissioner Brownlee was confirmed as the Under Secretary of the Army in November 2004 and served concurrently as the Acting Secretary of the Army from May 2003 to November 2004. He was appointed by both Senators Strom Thurmond and John Warner to serve as the staff director of the Senate Armed Services Committee. He is retired from the United States Army and served two tours in Vietnam. He is currently President of Les Brownlee & Associates LLC.

• **Rhett B. Dawson** – Commissioner Dawson is currently President and CEO of the Information Technology Industry Council. He is the former Senior Vice President, Law and Public Policy, for the Potomac Electric Power Company. During the last two years of the Reagan administration, he was an Assistant to the President for Operations. He also served as staff director of the Senate Armed Services Committee. He served on active duty as an ROTC-commissioned Army officer from 1969 to 1972.

• **Larry K. Eckles** – Commissioner Eckles retired as the Assistant Division Commander of the 35th Infantry Division, headquartered at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, after 37 years of service. He retired with over 31 years of full-time civil service employment with the Nebraska Army National Guard and has served in numerous positions at state headquarters, including Chief of Staff of the Nebraska Army National Guard, battalion commander, and Director of Personnel.
• **John M. Keane** – Commissioner Keane is Senior Managing Director and co-founder of Keane Advisors, a consulting and private equity firm. He is a director of MetLife, General Dynamics, and Allied Barton Security. He served as the 29th Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, retiring after 37 years of service. General Keane was a career paratrooper and a combat veteran, who was decorated for valor. He commanded the famed 101st Airborne Division and the legendary 18th Airborne Corps.

• **Patricia L. Lewis** – Commissioner Lewis served over 28 years with the federal government, including service with the Senate Armed Services Committee for Chairmen John Warner, Sam Nunn, and Scoop Jackson. Ms. Lewis began her federal career in 1975 with the Department of the Navy and has held positions in Naval Sea Systems Command, the Office of the Navy Comptroller, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. She is currently a partner with Monfort-Lewis, LLC.

• **Dan McKinnon** – Commissioner McKinnon was founder, Chairman, and CEO of North American Airlines. He undertook special projects for the Director of Central Intelligence and also served as Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, during which time he implemented airline deregulation. He has owned radio stations in San Diego. Early in his career, he spent four years in the United States Navy as an aviator where he set, and holds, the U.S. Navy helicopter peacetime air/sea record of 62 saves.

• **Wade Rowley** – Commissioner Rowley is currently a Military Border Infrastructure Construction Consultant with the Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection. He served over 23 years with the California Army National Guard and Army Reserves. His last military assignment was with the California Army National Guard, where he served as an Engineer Officer, Company Commander, and Facility Commander for the California National Guard Counterdrug Task Force in support of the U.S. Border Patrol.

• **James E. Sherrard III** – Commissioner Sherrard served as Chief of Air Force Reserve, Headquarters USAF, Washington, DC, and Commander, Air Force Reserve Command, Robins AFB, Georgia, from 1998 to 2004. He is a retired lieutenant general with more than 38 years of commissioned service in the United States Air Force. As Chief of Air Force Reserve and Commander, Air Force Reserve Command, he was responsible for organizing, training, and equipping more than 79,000 military and civil service personnel required to support operations and combat readiness training for 36 flying wings, 14 detached groups, 13 Air Force Reserve installations, three Numbered Air Forces, and the Air Reserve Personnel Center (ARPC). As Chief of Air Force Reserve, he directed and oversaw the mobilization of Air Force Reserve personnel in support of military operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. During his career, General Sherrard commanded an airlift group, two Air Force Reserve installations, two wings, and two Numbered Air Forces.
• **Donald L. Stockton** – Commissioner Stockton owns and has operated for over 32 years the Marshfield Drayage Company, a regional trucking company in southwest Missouri. He retired as a lieutenant colonel from the U.S. Air Force Reserves, where he served nearly 30 years. For almost 25 years he commanded various flights and squadrons, was deputy commander for resources, and subsequently was deputy commander for support of the 943rd Airlift Wing at March Air Force Base in California. His last command was with the 934th Maintenance Squadron, a subordinate unit of the 934th Airlift Wing, Air Force Reserve, in Minneapolis, where he was responsible for the unit’s C-130E aircraft and for the training of some 175 reservists. For the Reserve Officers Association of the United States (ROA), he is immediate past national Air Force vice president, a past president, and currently national councilman for the Missouri Department.

• **E. Gordon Stump** – Commissioner Stump retired in January 2003 from his position of Adjutant General and the Director of Military and Veterans Affairs in Michigan after serving for 12 years. He commanded and directed a total of 157 Army and Air National Guard units, two Veterans Nursing Homes, and 12 Veterans Service Organizations. His prior assignments included Squadron Commander 107th TFS and Commander and Deputy Commander of the Headquarters Michigan Air National Guard. He flew 241 combat missions over North and South Vietnam. He also deployed to South Korea during the Pueblo crisis. He served as President of the National Guard Association of the United States and as a member of the Reserve Forces Policy Board. Prior to his assignment as Adjutant General, he was Vice President of Automotive Engineering for Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. He is currently President of Strategic Defense Associates, LLC.

• **J. Stanton Thompson** – Commissioner Thompson is currently an Executive Director for the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Farm Service Agency. He is a retired naval rear admiral with over 35 years of military service. He is the former Special Assistant for Reserve Matters to the Commander, U.S. NORTHCOM and North American Aerospace Command. He also served as a principal adviser to the commander for maritime homeland defense. During his recall to active duty, he provided active duty support to Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm.
PUBLIC HEARING PANELS TO DATE

HEARINGS ON PRINCIPLES AND PRIORITIES, ROLES AND MISSIONS
Room 2216, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC

March 8, 2006

9:30 AM (IN ORDER OF APPEARANCE)
• Senator Mark Pryor, Co-Chair, Senate Reserve Caucus
• Senator Lindsey Graham, Chairman, Personnel Subcommittee, Senate Armed Services Committee
• Rep. Duncan Hunter, Chairman, House Armed Services Committee
• Senator Kit Bond, Co-Chair, Senate National Guard Caucus
• Senator Patrick Leahy, Co-Chair, Senate National Guard Caucus
• Rep. John McHugh, Chairman, Military Personnel Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee
• Senator Ben Nelson, Ranking Member, Personnel Subcommittee, Senate Armed Services Committee
• Senator John Warner, Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee
• Rep. Ike Skelton, Ranking Member, House Armed Services Committee
• Rep. Gene Taylor, Co-Chair, House Guard and Reserve Components Caucus
• Rep. Steve Buyer, Co-Chair, House Guard and Reserve Components Caucus

1:00 PM
• Dr. David Chu, Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness
• Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno, Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

March 9, 2006

9:30 AM
• General Richard Cody, Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army
• Admiral Robert Willard, Vice Chief of Naval Operations
• General Robert Magnus, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps
• General John D. W. Corley, Vice Chief of Staff of the U. S. Air Force
2:00 PM
- Michèle Flournoy, Senior Adviser in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Dr. Andrew Krepinevich, Executive Director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

HEARINGS ON HOMELAND DEFENSE/HOMELAND SECURITY
National Transportation Safety Board Conference Center
429 L’Enfant Plaza, SW, Washington, DC

May 3, 2006

9:30 AM
- Secretary George W. Foresman, Under Secretary for Preparedness, Department of Homeland Security
- Secretary Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, Department of Defense
- Admiral Timothy J. Keating, USN, Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command, and Commander, U.S. Northern Command

1:30 PM
- Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, USA, Chief, National Guard Bureau
- Major General Roger P. Lempke, ANG, President, Adjutants General Association of the United States, and Adjutant General, State of Nebraska
- Rear Admiral Kenneth T. Venuto, U. S. Coast Guard, Assistant Commandant for Human Resources

May 4, 2006

9:30 AM
- Honorable John O. Marsh, Jr., Distinguished Professor of Law, George Mason University
- Frank J. Cilluffo, Associate Vice President for Homeland Security, and Director, Homeland Security Policy Institute, The George Washington University
- Dr. James J. Carafano, Senior Research Fellow, Defense and Homeland Security, The Heritage Foundation
APPENDIX 4

CONCURRENT STUDIES

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves is tracking major studies that address issues we are tasked to assess. Readers who know of relevant studies not listed here are urged to contact the Commission at 703-699-2800 to share that information with our research staff.

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs
The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (Resources) is conducting an ongoing study for resourcing an operational reserve based on the Army Force Generation Model. The Commission has received briefs on the preliminary findings. Booz Allen Hamilton is conducting an Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)–funded follow-up study.

Center for Strategic and International Studies
The center is completing its three-part effort, *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols*. It describes the third phase as “continu[ing] its analysis of military command structures and the defense acquisition process, while primarily focusing on the future of the Guard and Reserve components of the Total Force. Clark Murdock leads the investigative study with significant contributions from Kurt Campbell, Michèle Flournoy, Pierre Chao, Christine Wormuth, and other members of the ISP [International Security Program] staff.”

Congressional Budget Office
The Congressional Budget Office’s assessment of relevant proposed legislation and policy initiatives will be utilized. CBO has agreed to assist in determining potential resource impacts of the Commission’s recommendations.

Congressional Defense Review
The House Armed Services Committee is engaging in a comprehensive dialogue with security experts from the intelligence, academic, and think tank communities to examine which U.S. military tools can best protect our interests at home and abroad. The goal of this process is to produce a focused, well-researched report that reflects the committee’s bipartisan view of the military capabilities we need for the future.
Defense Advisory Committee on Military Compensation
Committee chartered by the Secretary of Defense to identify approaches to balance military pay and benefits in sustaining recruitment and retention of high-quality people, as well as a cost-effective and ready military force. The Committee’s findings and recommendations, including a framework of principles with which to evaluate changes to the military compensation system, are being analyzed by the 10th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation.

Defense Science Board
Section 540 of the FY06 National Defense Authorization Act tasks the Defense Science Board with conducting a study on the “Deployment of Members of the National Guard and Reserve in the Global War on Terrorism.”

Government Accountability Office
The Government Accountability Office is conducting numerous studies and audits that cover topics of interest to the Commission. The Commission has met with the Comptroller General, and all work groups have already benefited greatly from the cooperation and support of the GAO Defense Capabilities and Management Team.

10th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation
The 10th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC) will begin a review of military compensation on April 1; its research efforts will be informed by the recommendations of the Defense Advisory Committee on Military Compensation.

Quadrennial Defense Review Execution Road Maps
A January 2006 memo from Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England established eight QDR Execution Roadmaps. The eight groups, each focusing on a different topic, are tasked with guiding DoD’s six-year plan for investment and organization from fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2013.

Rand Corporation
Rand Corporation has a number of projects currently under way. Their topics include active/reserve force mix, military health care, effects of activation on earnings, family support to the National Guard and Reserves, reserve component joint officer management, medical readiness in the reserves, reserve recruiting, and retirement reform.
APPENDIX 5

PARTIAL LIST OF STAKEHOLDER ORGANIZATIONS CONTACTED

Adjutants General Association of the United States
Air Force Association
Air Force Lessons Learned
Air Force Sergeants Association
Air Force Women Officers Association
Air Force Reserve Policy Committee
American Enterprise Institute
American Ex-Prisoners of War
American Legion
American Logistics Association
America’s Health Insurance Plans
AMVETS
 analytic Services, Inc.
Army Aviation Association of America
Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee
Association of Military Surgeons of the United States
Association of the United States Army

Defense Advisory Committee on Military Compensation
Defense Business Board
Defense Policy Board
Defense Science Board
Democratic Governors Association
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Veterans’ Affairs
Disabled American Veterans

Employee Benefit Research Institute
Employer Support of the Guard and Reserves
Enlisted Association of the National Guard of the U.S.

Federal Emergency Management Agency
Fleet Reserve Association
Foreign Policy Research Institute

GlobalSecurity.org
Gold Star Wives of America, Inc.
Governors of the 50 states

Heritage Foundation
Hoover Institution
House Reserve Component Caucus

Industrial College of the Armed Forces
Institute for Defense Analysis
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis
International Association of Chiefs of Police
International Association of Fire Chiefs

Jewish War Veterans of the U.S.A.
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Joint Center for Operational Analysis
Lexington Institute
Logistics Management Institute

Paralyzed Veterans of America
Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies (SAIS – Johns Hopkins)
Police Executive Research Forum

Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned
Marine Corps League
Marine Corps Reserve Association
Marine Corps University
Military Officers Association of America
Military Order of the Purple Heart, The
MIT Security Studies Program
MITRE Corporation

RAND Corporation
Republican Governors Association
Reserve Enlisted Association
Reserve Officers Association
Retired Enlisted Association, The

National Academy of Sciences, The
National Association of Counties
National Association For Uniformed Services
National Coalition for Homeless Veterans
National Conference of State Legislatures
National Congress of American Indians
National Defense University
National Emergency Management Association
National Federation of Independent Business
National Governors Association
National Guard Association of the United States
National League of Cities
National Military Family Association
National Naval and Marine Corps Reserve Policy Board
National Order of Battlefield Commissions
National Security Council
Naval Enlisted Reserve Association
Naval Post Graduate School
Naval Reserve Association
Navy League of the United States
Navy Lessons Learned (NWDC Doctrines Dept)
Navy Nurse Corps Association
Non Commissioned Officers Association

Senate National Guard Caucus
Senate Reserve Caucus
Senior Army Reserve Commanders Association
Small Business Administration
Society of Medical Consultants to the Armed Forces
Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College

United Armed Forces Association
U.S. Air Force
U.S. Air Force Academy//Institute for National Security Studies
U.S. Army
U.S. Army Warrant Officers Association
U.S. Chamber of Commerce
U.S. Conference of Mayors
U.S. Department of Commerce
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
U.S. House of Representatives, leadership and certain committees
U.S. Joint Forces Command
U.S. Marine Corps
U.S. Naval Institute
U.S. Navy
U.S. Senate, leadership and certain committees
USCG Chief Petty Officers Association

Veterans of Foreign Wars
Veterans’ Widows International Network
Vietnam Veterans of America

Wounded Warrior Project