During the course of our work on the Roles and Missions Panel, we became more and more aware that there are aspects of our current national security system that should change to help us better prepare for our uncertain strategic future. But that system is complex and the range of potential challenges enormous, and therefore the exact nature of the required changes is often unclear. These short essays highlight only a very few of the areas that may need reform, and offer possible solutions for consideration. These are by no means the only areas, nor are the solutions proposed the only ones feasible. In offering them, we simply mean to challenge our fellow citizens to think about what they expect our national security system to provide, and the trade-offs they are willing to make. As individual members of the Panel, we do not each agree with every view included here, but we all believe that these essays pose questions worth considering. Additionally, we hope to inspire the reader to think beyond the small set of ideas offered here, and to share their ideas with us as we proceed with our task. As members of the House Armed Services Committee, we will continue to expand on this beginning to ensure our government can provide the capabilities the American people need for their national security.
INTRODUCTION

“All predominant power seems for a time invincible, but in fact, it is transient.”
– British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Address to Joint Session of Congress, 2003

When you are the world’s only superpower, how do you stay Number One? That is the simple question this Report tries to answer. We do not attempt to define the wisest foreign or military policies, but to start probing some of the U.S. institutional weaknesses in the implementation of any security policy. American strength requires that we are able to achieve our policy goals.

The Pentagon’s traditional way of thinking of restructuring is termed “Roles and Missions,” an innocuous-sounding phrase with breathtaking reach. Normally confined to the Pentagon, the recent need for nation-building has broadened security thinking to agencies outside the Department of Defense. The task of our “Panel on Roles and Missions” is to examine the roles of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Coast Guard, as well as the particular missions of the Armed Services, Intelligence Agencies, State Department, the National Security Council and other agencies, in protecting American security. It is hard to imagine a broader or more daunting task.

We have divided the task into three levels:

- Inter-agency problems of coordination on nation-building, Africom, and use of American soft power.
- Pentagon-wide problems of procurement, management and strategic vision.
- Inter-service rivalry over which branch of the military controls drones, airlift, or even the infantry;
This Panel’s Report does not attempt to give full answers – and certainly not legislative ones – to these categories of problems, but to begin examining several ideas for removing or reducing a number of policy impediments. Many of these ideas will be unpopular with the Pentagon, White House, or within Congress, just as the now-famous Goldwater-Nichols reforms faced strong opposition before 1986. Some of these ideas in this Report deserve strong opposition. But the job of the Panel was to break some ground and plant a few seeds. By your reaction, you can help decide which ones deserve to grow, and offer new ones that should have been planted.

The timing of this Report is not a criticism, explicit or implicit, of the way the Wars in Iraq or Afghanistan are being conducted. The major reorganization of the U.S. military happened in 1947, just after the overwhelming Allied victories in World War II. The Goldwater-Nichols reorganization occurred in 1986, during the Reagan defense build-up and just prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Every twenty or thirty years, we seem to realize that our national security institutions are driven not by our country’s strategic needs but by petty organizational interests, political expediency, or plain inertia. In World War II, we were surprised that our military services did not know how to fight jointly. In Vietnam, we discovered that asymmetric warfare was a greater threat than we knew. On September 11th, we began to take terrorism more seriously.

But now, terrorism dominates our attention because terrorists are both a real threat, and successful in magnifying the fear that is naturally created by individual atrocities. In most years, according to Ohio State professor John Mueller, the total number of people worldwide who die at the hands of international terrorists is roughly the same as the number who drown in bathtubs in the United States. The first rule of war is to understand the nature of the enemy; today that would include Al Qaeda's intent to spread fear and our tendency to exaggerate the actual danger. The native resiliency of America may have been diminished by the enormous sums of money that we could have spent on other, more effective ways, of undercutting Al Qaeda's support in the Arab world. Only by thinking deeply about the world and our national security can we ensure we are getting ready for the challenges we will face in the coming years.
America has always overcome its challenges, but we should not make it any harder than it has to be, particularly for our service members. It’s hard enough to find the enemy; they should not have to fight the bureaucracy too. We must rethink what we expect of our national security apparatus and how we expect it to work. The 9/11 Commission Report helped us begin to understand our failure of imagination.

In this volume, my colleagues and I want to challenge our colleagues and fellow citizens to join us in rethinking national security. We have included a range of very short essays to address some of the many problems we see. They are designed to prompt a reaction, and a stronger America.

Jim Cooper, Tennessee
Chairman
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We believe this product is a small first step in serious consideration of the roles and missions of not just our military services but our entire national security organization. We also recognize we are not the only ones thinking about these issues and want to invite the public into the debate.

We would like to thank the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Congressman Ike Skelton. He was key in the last major reorganization of our Defense Department as a junior member of Congress and is once again demonstrating his leadership skills at the highest levels. We also want to thank our Ranking Member, Duncan Hunter, who made this issue part of the Committee Defense Review he initiated in the 109th Congress.

Many other people helped prepare this volume and deserve our thanks as well. Erin Conaton leads the HASC staff and provides valuable help to the members. Her key staffers for the Roles and Missions Panel, Mark Lewis, Tom Hawley, Andrew Hunter, and Andrew Hyde, have aided our efforts.

And we need to thank our own military legislative assistants who played such an important role; Russell Rumbaugh, David Sours, Aaron Moburg-Jones, Louis Lauter, Dan Adelstein, Ben Rosenbaum, Bryan Winter, Kenan Carraway, Juliet Chelkowski, and Pat Rigney.
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REFORM IS HARD

The Pentagon is always a favorite target for reformers. If we still have security problems in the world with a half-trillion dollar budget, the Pentagon must need reforming. And usually, it does. But actual reform is hard. There are a lot of reasons for why the Pentagon is how it is—some of them legitimately based on other priorities and many of them based on parochial interests. Sorting out which is which and making sure everyone agrees is not an easy task. Even the National Security Act of 1947 and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986—the two landmark reform efforts since World War II—show that restructuring has been slow and clumsy.

If history is our guide, then the Pentagon only changes: a) after a string of serious but preventable military failures, b) when a four-star general decides to break ranks by advocating change, c) the opposition of at least two, and sometimes all, uniformed services is overcome, and d) Congress votes in favor of new statutes, which are sometimes honored in the breach. This entire process, from initial top-officer complaint to presidential signature takes at least four years. If measured from the date of the first tragic military failures, it can take decades. Today’s enemies may not allow us the luxury of so much time.

Making matters worse, meeting this threat posed by today’s enemies might require reform of more than just the Pentagon. Even

The miracle of Goldwater-Nichols is that it happened at all.
if our military were everything we could want it to be, it might still not be enough. In today’s complex and uncertain world, problems can not be solved with military means alone. Diplomacy must set the stage. Intelligence must be understood. And all elements of national power must be brought to bear to solve the problem.

It is time to reform our national security institutions. Not to score political points but because the world has changed and continues to change. The institutions that served us well in the Cold War are still too focused on that conflict and not enough on the uncertain world we actually face. With an honest need for reform, we must look at what has gone before to understand what reform will require and remind ourselves of the hard work still ahead.

The 1947 National Security Act

It took more than Pearl Harbor to instigate the 1947 National Security Act. Problems with the split MacArthur / Nimitz command in the Pacific Theater in World War II, President Roosevelt’s perceived favoritism to the Navy, and the consensus-driven decisions of the powerful Joint Chiefs of Staff combined to create the conditions for serious overhaul of our military establishment. The old arrangements often led to confusion and mismanagement, even challenging the fundamental Constitutional principle of civilian control of the military.

Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall first proposed unifying the command structure of the Pentagon in 1943, the same year the famous five-sided building was completed. It is difficult to imagine now, but before Marshall’s bold initiative, an Army
Secretary and a Navy Secretary independently represented their Services to the President with no coordinating authority and no central planning. In spite of this glaring friction in American defense policy, Marshall’s reform ideas languished until after Roosevelt’s death in 1945, when they were championed by President Harry Truman. Truman was perceived as an Army partisan, however, due to his service in World War I in the Missouri National Guard, which inflamed the Navy’s and Marine Corps’ opposition to his preference for centralized command authority, which they considered to be too similar to the Army’s structure.

The subsequent two-year legislative struggle that produced the National Security Act of 1947 was really a four-year fight because clarifying amendments in 1949 were necessary to give coherence to the political compromise that was salvaged in 1947. Although the 1947 Act created a separate Air Force (a 38-year reform struggle that Brigadier General Billy Mitchell had advocated since 1919), a National Security Council, and a Central Intelligence Agency, and consolidated the separate Departments of War and Navy, critics already knew that it did not go far enough. General Eisenhower pointed out how weak the Secretary of Defense was under this new act, writing, “The entire structure… was little more than a weak confederation of sovereign military units.” He advocated going further still by mandating a single uniform for all services and a requirement that West Point and Annapolis cadets spend a year at the other institution in order to graduate.

Truman recognized these flaws but had to overcome the military opposition to the new system. His strategy to deal with the Service opposition was to select the main opponent of reform, Navy Secretary James V. Forrestal, to be the first Secretary of Defense so that he could experience first-hand the powerlessness of the position. After Forrestal attempted at Key West in 1948 to reconcile the roles and missions of the service chiefs, and, even more difficult, to get the services to live under a single $14.4 billion budget in 1949, Forrestal resigned as Secretary in despair. Later in 1949, after Forrestal’s suicide, Congress amended the National Security Act to give the Secretary of Defense the staff and budget authority that Forrestal had needed, and to create a non-voting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to slowly begin the process of unifying command of the services.
Naval opposition to reform remained strong, however, even after the 1947 and 1949 laws were passed. When Forrestal’s replacement, Louis Johnson, forced the Navy to work within the budget set by the new Republican-controlled Congress and cancelled an aircraft carrier after the keel had been laid, both the Secretary of Navy and Chief of Naval Operations resigned in what was called “The Revolt of the Admirals.” Political repercussions extended beyond the Eisenhower Administration, creating a fear in Congress that, if Ike could not control the military in what he called “the military-industrial complex,” no one could. As a result, the next major reform effort would wait almost forty years.

The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act

The impetus for 1980s reform stemmed from the combined failures of the Vietnam War, the Pueblo incident, Desert One, and even the limited conflict in Grenada. From today’s perspective, the Mayaguez incident, the Beirut barracks bombing, and the Achille Lauro hijacking, showed increasing threats from both state- and non-state actors. Terrorism, whether from North Korea, Cambodia, Iran, or the Middle East, was beginning to show its hand.

The miracle of Goldwater-Nichols is that it happened at all. The top general who championed reform, David Jones, did so very late in his career and very reluctantly. Lacking even a college degree, Jones had served eight years on the Joint Chiefs and was completing his second and final two-year term as Chairman when he testified informally in a closed hearing of the House Armed Services Committee on February 3, 1982. The hearing was not on strategy or organization, but on the Pentagon budget. The preceding witness, the new Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, privately derided Jones as a “holdover” from the Carter Administration who had only five months left before retirement. When Jones began speaking, only one junior member of the HASC, Ike Skelton, seemed to realize the significance of Jones’ understated testimony:

“I look forward to testifying on these budget issues, however, there is one subject I would like to mention briefly here. It is not sufficient to have just resources, dollars and weapons systems; we must also have an organization which will allow us to develop the proper strategy, necessary planning, and the full war-fighting capability. We do not have an adequate organizational
structure today… at least in my judgment.”

When Skelton’s time for questioning came, he said, “This seems rather a courageous thing for you to do. I think it is something that should get the utmost attention from this committee and from Congress.” And the reform effort began.

The entire Pentagon and the Reagan Administration opposed reform. Every uniformed service saw a simplified chain of command from the President, through the Secretary of Defense, down to a CINC with command of cross-trained services as a threat to their traditional prerogatives. Jointness, the term the defense world uses to describe military training and operations conducted by multiple branches, was anathema to services that took great pride in their individual history and culture. Weinberger thought that even raising the possibility of Pentagon disjointedness reduced the chance of funding the Reagan defense buildup.

The critics of Goldwater-Nichols have turned out to be largely incorrect. The fear that the services would lose their core competencies if forced to coordinate or that an Army General could not command Air Force assets never materialized. If anything, the years since 1986 have seen the Services improve upon their core competencies such as tank warfare and sea lane control. The air campaign in Kosovo saw an Army General exclusively use air power to achieve his strategic objectives. However, even Goldwater-Nichols does not achieve the level of jointness that Eisenhower called for as early as 1945.

The Next Step in Reform

Today, our national security institutions are struggling to adapt to a new world. Our intelligence community is wrestling with
changes forced on it after painful failures. Our State Department is scrambling to shift from a world of genteel diplomacy to demanding volunteers for Provincial Reconstruction Teams. The rest of the government is unprepared to use their expertise overseas. And our military is stressed trying to fill-in for civilian agencies.

Hopefully, we have suffered enough to prompt reform and don’t have to wait for even more grievous failures. The first legislative language is in the passed Defense Authorization Act of 2008. But so far, no visible military champion of change has emerged. There should be vociferous support from inside the Services since the military has been left carrying the burden of the failures of our national security institutions. Instead, our military has resisted change just as they have past efforts at reform. The Air Force and Navy are reemphasizing more traditional threats and downplaying the unexpected threats we face today. The other two services, the Army and Marines, try to tinker at the margins of their mission even as they suffer most from the current overstretch.

Overcoming that resistance is the next step in reform. As reasonable options are tabled, hopefully, a senior military advocate will step forward to support the changes. Then, with time, Congress can legislate the change that is so necessary.

We are at the earliest stages of reform. It is a long, hard task ahead of us. But armed with the knowledge of what it has taken to achieve reform before, we can persevere. To secure our nation’s future, we have no choice.
We in Congress have already started taking action to ensure the Department of Defense (DOD) is ready to meet the threats of the 21st century. In the National Defense Authorization Act for 2008, we enacted a requirement for a thorough review of the military services’ roles and missions.

The missions of the Department of Defense must be clearly defined. As important as the missions of the Department are, and how they are organized and distributed, are what are not the missions of the Department of Defense. In recent years, the shortcomings of the interagency process have led the Department to assume missions that are not core military responsibilities. A review of roles and missions is needed to allow the Department a chance to correct excesses. The military services bring certain core competencies to the execution of DOD's missions. By defining these core competencies, the Department can evaluate where the military services are engaged in missions for which they are not ideally organized, trained, and equipped. And it will highlight areas where core competencies are lacking.

To clarify the Department’s current state, we have directed the Secretary of Defense to review the armed forces roles and missions and the ability of the Department to conduct them. We have tasked the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to first conduct an independent military assessment and provide his recommendations to the Secretary. Armed with the Chairman’s recommendations, the Secretary will identify the core mission areas of the armed forces, the core competencies and capabilities needed for those areas, and
who in the Department of Defense is responsible for each competency and capability. He is also to note either gaps between or duplication of tasks and devise a plan for resolving each of those gaps or overlaps. He will then report to us his conclusions before we consider the next year’s military budget.

We have also taken steps to ensure the report’s conclusions help shape our military forces. The council responsible for determining what our military needs, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), will conduct its own reviews of joint military requirements according to the core mission areas the Secretary establishes. To enable the services to best accomplish their core competencies and capabilities, the JROC must provide the military services with clear guidance on the priority assigned to each requirement and on the expected resources allocated to fulfill such a requirement. Accordingly, we have added the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the Director of the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation as advisors to the JROC to help the council provide this guidance. By incorporating clear priorities and budget guidance into the JROC process, we ensure that decisions made in the requirements, acquisitions, and budget areas are truly joint, and are not driven primarily by the military departments’ budget considerations.

In addition to these changes, we have also amended the law so the Department of Defense reports its budget not just by major program but also by the core mission areas established by the Secretary’s report.

Finally, to ensure the core competencies and capabilities are regularly updated, we have required a review of the roles and missions of the Department of Defense be performed every four years. The Chairman will also complete his independent military assessment and provide recommendations before each report.

With this legislation, we have provided the tools for the Department of Defense to clarify what it must do and how it will do it. Using this clarity, the Department will be better prepared for the threats of the future.

The spirit behind this legislation is well-intentioned, but it will likely achieve the opposite of the original intentions. By demanding the Department go through a detailed study of core competencies and roles and missions, it will put in motion a great tidal wave of service uniqueness and exceptionalism. There is understandable rivalry among the Military Services. That rivalry is basically healthy. But at times it becomes a negative force. By launching a major analytic drive to force the services to define core competencies and unique roles and missions, forces that make it harder to get jointness are unleashed.

The key problem in the department is not core competencies. The services manage their core competencies very, very well. No one in the world is as good at night time flight operations from an aircraft carrier than is the United States Navy. No one does amphibious assault operations as well as the United States Marine Corps. The United States Air Force is unparalleled in air superiority. Combined maneuver of battle formations is the Army’s unchallenged expertise. Core competencies are not the problem in the Department.

There are two much larger problems. The first is the efficient preparation for and management of joint operations, and second, the operations and activities that are critical, but which the Military Departments do not consider to be
core missions. The great debate going on in the Army today is whether post-conflict reconstruction is a core mission. Before Iraq, the Army felt that was not a core mission. They are now working hard to develop expertise.

This legislation that forces the Defense Department to undertake core-competency and roles-and-mission reviews will only reinforce the things that the services do well and keep it from focusing on the things that it does not do as well.

The goal of the legislation may be to reduce unnecessary redundancy and provide better stewardship of taxpayer dollars. And both of these goals are laudable, but they are better achieved through improvements to the Secretary of Defense’s toolkit for making the right long-term joint investments. A welcome addition to that toolkit would be a capable advocate for the future joint warfighter who is engaged in major decision forums. Second, we need to strengthen Office of the Secretary of Defense’s ability to undertake mission area analyses, now often referred to as capability portfolio assessments. The Department does not systematically and comprehensively assess the linkage between the future-years defense program and the missions needed to support the defense strategy. It did this in an earlier day. It needs to be brought back.
If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.

— Sun Tzu, The Art of War
WHAT RUSSIANS THINK AND WANT


When the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, expectations were high that Russia, rid of communism, would take a firm pro-Western course… But after more than a decade, these expectations have not been realized. Since ex-KGB colonel Vladimir Putin took over as president in 2000, Russia's democratic institutions have been muzzled, its civil rights restricted, and its cooperation with the international community far from assured.

What accounts for these unwelcome trends? ...There is a good deal of evidence that the anti-democratic, antilibertarian actions of the current administration are not being inflicted on the Russian people but are actually supported by them.

DEJÀ VU

...Despite its reputation for unpredictability, Russia is a remarkably conservative nation whose mentality and behavior change slowly, if at all, over time, regardless of the regime in power.

...In a predominantly rural society, the kind of social cohesion that Westerners took for granted in their own countries was very weakly developed in Russia’s past: Russia was not so much a society as an agglomeration of tens of thousands of separate rural settlements. National feelings, therefore, were also poorly developed, except at times of foreign invasions...Private property and public justice were similarly underdeveloped, arriving in the country relatively late and in an imperfect form...

These factors—the absence of social and national cohesion, the ignorance of civil rights, the lack
of any real notion of private property, and an ineffective judiciary—prompted Russians to desire strong tsarist rule. With few lateral social ties, they relied on the state to protect them from each other. They wanted their rulers to be both strong and harsh...Experience has taught Russians to associate weak government—and democracy is seen as weak—with anarchy and lawlessness.

Such is Russia's cultural inheritance, the net effect of which is to make Russians, even in modern times, the least socialized or politicized people on the European continent. Twice in one century—1917 and 1991—their governments collapsed almost overnight, with people seemingly indifferent to their fate...

REJECTING RIGHTS

[Polling sources] suggest that modern Russians, like their ancestors, feel estranged from both the state and society at large. Their allegiance is to family and friends...and they feel little affinity with any larger community...Comparing citizens' attitudes toward their government in Russia [with other countries], Validata surveys concluded that Americans and Swedes display the highest trust in the state, whereas Russians "don't trust the state at all".  

Democracy is widely viewed as a fraud...Asked in a poll whether multiparty elections do more harm than good, 52 percent of respondents answered "more harm" and a mere 15 percent said "more good."  

"When asked to choose between "freedom" and "order," 88 percent of respondents in Voronezh Province expressed preference for order...Twenty-nine percent were quite prepared to give up their freedoms of speech, press, or movement for nothing in return, because they attached no value to them.  

Such opinions led Alexander Yakovlev, a principal architect of Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika, to bemoan his compatriots' penchant for authoritarian rule. In an interview with the "Financial Times," he observed that none of the winning parties in the December 2003 Duma elections "had even once mentioned the word 'freedom' [...] all the slogans were about banning, locking up and punishing..."  

PEOPLE'S MAN

In aggregate, the conclusions from surveys of Russian opinion are far from encouraging. Western commentators watch with dismay as Putin slowly and deliberately transforms Russia into a one-party state. But they fail to recognize,
even more ominously, that Russians by sizable majorities actually approve of his actions. Putin's victory in the 2004 presidential elections is certainly due in part to his stifling of the opposition. But he is popular precisely because he has re-instated Russia's traditional model of government: an authoritarian state in which citizens are relieved of responsibility for politics and in which imaginary foreign enemies are invoked to forge an artificial unity.

1 Validata, "Nations as Brands" (Moscow, 2003); p. 20
2 Vestnik Moskovskoi Shkoly Politecheskikh Issledovanii, no. 13 (1999), p. 91
Let’s say you were born in China. You’re an only child. You have two parents and four grandparents doting on you. Sometimes they even call you a spoiled little emperor.

They instill in you the legacy of Confucianism, especially the values of hierarchy and hard work. They send you off to school. You learn that it takes phenomenal feats of memorization to learn the Chinese characters. You become shaped by China’s intense human capital policies.

You quickly understand what a visitor understands after dozens of conversations: that today’s China is a society obsessed with talent, and that the Chinese ruling elite recruits talent the way the N.B.A. does — rigorously, ruthlessly, in a completely elitist manner.

As you rise in school, you see that to get into an elite university, you need to ace the exams given at the end of your senior year. Chinese students have been taking exams like this for more than 1,000 years.

The exams don’t reward all mental skills. They reward the ability to work hard and memorize things. Your adolescence is oriented around those exams — the cram seminars, the hours of preparation.

Roughly nine million students take the tests each year. The top 1 percent will go to the elite universities. Some of the others will go to second-tier schools, at best. These unfortunates will find that, while their career prospects aren’t permanently foreclosed, the odds of great success are diminished. Suicide rates at these schools are high, as students come to feel they...
have failed their parents.

But you succeed. You ace the exams and get into Peking University. You treat your professors like gods and know that if you earn good grades you can join the Communist Party. Westerners think the Communist Party still has something to do with political ideology. You know there is no political philosophy in China except prosperity. The Communist Party is basically a gigantic Skull and Bones. It is one of the social networks its members use to build wealth together.

You are truly a golden child, because you succeed in university as well. You have a number of opportunities. You could get a job at an American multinational, learn capitalist skills and then come back and become an entrepreneur. But you decide to enter government service, which is less risky and gives you chances to get rich (under the table) and serve the nation.

In one sense, your choice doesn’t matter. Whether you are in business or government, you will be members of the same corporacy. In the West, there are tensions between government and business elites. In China, these elites are part of the same social web, cooperating for mutual enrichment.

Your life is governed by the rules of the corporacy. Teamwork is highly valued. There are no real ideological rivalries, but different social networks compete
for power and wealth. And the system does reward talent. The wonderfully named Organization Department selects people who have proven their administrative competence. You work hard. You help administer provinces. You serve as an executive at state-owned enterprises in steel and communications. You rise quickly.

When you talk to Americans, you find that they have all these weird notions about Chinese communism. You try to tell them that China isn’t a communist country anymore. It’s got a different system: meritocratic paternalism. You joke: Imagine the Ivy League taking over the shell of the Communist Party and deciding not to change the name. Imagine the Harvard Alumni Association with an army.

This is a government of talents, you tell your American friends. It rules society the way a wise father rules the family. There is some consultation with citizens, but mostly members of the guardian class decide for themselves what will serve the greater good.

The meritocratic corpocracy absorbs rival power bases. Once it seemed that economic growth would create an independent middle class, but now it is clear that the affluent parts of society have been assimilated into the state/enterprise establishment. Once there were students lobbying for democracy, but now they are content with economic freedom and opportunity.

The corpocracy doesn’t stand still. Its members are quick to admit China’s weaknesses and quick to embrace modernizing reforms (so long as the reforms never challenge the political order).

Most of all, you believe, educated paternalism has delivered the goods. China is booming. Hundreds of millions rise out of poverty. There are malls in Shanghai richer than any American counterpart. Office towers shoot up, and the Audis clog the roads.

You feel pride in what the corpocracy has achieved and now expect it to lead China’s next stage of modernization — the transition from a manufacturing economy to a service economy. But in the back of your mind you wonder: Perhaps it’s simply impossible for a top-down memorization-based elite to organize a flexible, innovative information economy, no matter how brilliant its members are.

That’s a thought you don’t like to dwell on in the middle of the night.
THE TEHRAN-CARACAS AXIS


With Iranian nuclear aspirations gaining notice, it's worth directing attention to the growing relationship between Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez. The Reagan administration repulsed Soviet efforts to set up camp in Central America. Iranian designs on Venezuela perhaps deserve similar U.S. attention.

The warmth and moral support between Ahmadinejad and Chávez is very public. The two tyrants are a lot more than just pen pals. Venezuela has made it clear that it backs Iran's nuclear ambitions and embraces the mullahs' hateful anti-Semitism. What remains more speculative is just how far along Iran is in putting down roots in Venezuela.

In September, when the International Atomic Energy Agency offered a resolution condemning Iran for its "many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply" with its treaty commitments, Venezuela was the only country that voted "no." Ahmadinejad congratulated the Venezuelan government, calling the vote "brave and judicious."

Three months later, in a Christmas Eve TV broadcast, Chávez declared that "minorities, the descendants of those who crucified Christ, have taken over the riches of the world." That ugly anti-Semitic swipe was of a piece with an insidious assault over the past several years on the country's Jewish community. In 2004, heavily armed Chávez commandos raided a Caracas Jewish school, terrifying children and parents. The government's claim that it had reason to believe that the school was storing arms was never sup-
ported. A more reasonable explanation is that the raid was part of the Chávez political strategy of fomenting class hatred--an agenda that finds a vulnerable target in the country's Jewish minority--and as a way to show Tehran that Venezuela is on board. Ahmadinejad rivals Hitler in his hatred for the Jewish people.

It's tough to tell whether Chávez is a committed bigot or whether his anti-Semitism and embrace of the mullahs are simply a part of his calculated efforts to annoy the Yanquis. But it doesn't make much difference. The end result is that the Iranian connection introduces a new element of instability into Latin America.

In his efforts to provoke the U.S., the Venezuelan no doubt hopes that saber rattling against imperialismo can stir up nationalist sentiment and save his floundering regime. That view argues that the U.S. would do best to ignore him, but it's not easy to ignore a Latin leader who seems intent on forging stronger ties with two of the worst enemies of the U.S., Ahmadinejad and Fidel Castro.

That Chávez is making a hash of the Venezuelan economy while he courts international notoriety is no secret. There are shortages of foodstuffs that are abundant even in other poor countries. Milk, flour for the national delight known as arepas, and sugar are in short supply. Coffee is scarce because roasters say government controls have set the price below costs, forcing them to eat losses. The Chávez response last week was a threat to nationalize the industry.

Property rights are being abolished. Last week, authorities invaded numerous "unoccupied" apartments in Caracas to hand them over to party faithful, part of a wider scheme to "equalize" life for Venezuelans.

A bridge collapse earlier this month on the main artery linking Caracas to the country's largest airport, seaport and an enormous bedroom community is seen as a microcosm of the country's failing infrastructure. Aside from the damage to commerce, it has caused great difficulties for the estimated 100,000 commuters who live on the coast, Robert Bottome, editor of the newsletter Veneconomy, told me from Caracas on Wednesday. The collapse diverted all this traffic to an old two-lane road with hairpin turns and more than 300 curves. It is now handling car traffic during the day and commercial traffic at night, with predictable backups.
With Venezuelan oil fields experiencing an annual depletion rate on the order of 25% and little government reinvestment in the sector, similar infrastructure problems are looming in oil. In November, Goldman Sachs emerging markets research commented on a fire at a "major refinery complex" in which 20 workers were injured: "In recent months there has been a string of accidents and other disruptions [of] oil infrastructure, which oil experts attribute to inadequate investment in maintenance and lack of technical expertise to run complex oil refining and exploration operations."

Chávez is notably nonchalant about all this, as if the health of the economy is the last thing on his mind. His foreign affiliations are more important to him. The Iranian news agency MEHR said last year that the two countries have signed contracts valued at more than $1 billion. In sum, Iranians, presiding over an economy that is itself crumbling into disrepair, are going to build Venezuela 10,000 residential units and a batch of manufacturing plants, if MEHR can be believed. Chávez reportedly says these deals—presumably financed with revenues that might be better employed repairing the vital bridge—include the transfer of "technology" from Iran and the importation of Iranian "professionals" to support the efforts.

Details on the Iranian "factories"—beyond a high-profile tractor producer and a widely publicized cement factory—remain sketchy. But what is clear is that the importation of state agents from Hugo-friendly dictatorships hasn't been a positive experience for Venezuelans. Imported Cubans are now applying their "skills" in intelligence and state security networks to the detriment of Venezuelan liberty. It is doubtful that the growing presence of Iranians in "factories" across Venezuela is about boosting plastic widget output. The U.S. intelligence agencies would do well to make a greater effort to find out exactly what projects the Chávez-Ahmadinejad duo really have in mind. Almost certainly, they are up to no good.
Is Pakistan Pivotal?

Reprinted from “Politics & Economics: Is Pakistan Pivotal for al Qaeda? - - - Islamist Group's Losses Elsewhere Raise Its Stake in South Asian Strife”
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The current chaos in Pakistan could turn into a defining moment in the fight against Islamist extremism.

Al Qaeda-linked groups have been surging across the country, feeding fears in Washington of a prolonged offensive against Islamabad's secular establishment. At the same time, the U.S. and its allies have notched a string of wins against militant groups in Southeast Asia and the Middle East.

This conflicting dynamic leads many U.S. strategists to argue that what happens in Pakistan this year could be pivotal: If al Qaeda and other militant Islamist groups gain a greater toehold, the terrorist network will have its strongest base of operations since the Taliban ruled Afghanistan in the late 1990s. But having been backed into a corner in other parts of the world, losses in Pakistan could be a major blow, these officials say.

In Iraq, the Pentagon, working with Sunni tribes, has largely forced the group al Qaeda in Iraq - - which has declared itself to be a unit of al Qaeda-- out of its one-time stronghold in western Anbar province. American allies, often with U.S. assistance, have significantly weakened terrorist groups operating in countries such as Indonesia, the Philippines, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia. Just a few years ago, terrorism experts were predicting al Qaeda's ideology could solidify major bases in these countries.

The U.S. has "had a number of significant tactical successes, but in the aggregate, they haven't yet affected the strategic balance," said Bruce Hoffman, a counterter-
rorism expert at Georgetown University in Washington. He said that as al Qaeda has suffered losses in Iraq, it has shifted "the center of gravity" of its struggle to South Asia.

Last week, Pakistan's government accused al Qaeda of overseeing the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto on Dec. 27. Intelligence officials in Washington and London are still scrutinizing this charge, with some weighing the possible involvement of Islamabad's own intelligence service or some purely homegrown Pakistani militant groups. But U.S. intelligence analysts are increasingly concentrating their attention on a Pakistani militant with ties to al Qaeda, Baitullah Mehsud, according to a U.S. counterterrorism official.

U.S. officials have been watching with growing alarm what they say is the spread of the Taliban and other Islamist groups linked to al Qaeda across Pakistan. They note that a few years ago, these organizations were largely confined to the remote tribal regions along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. But now they're pushing east and building support in major Pakistani cities.

The fear now is that al Qaeda and its allies will expand their influence as the country faces instability fueled by Ms. Bhutto's death. Counterterrorism experts say they expect more attacks on secular Pakistani politicians and military leaders as militants seek to expand the power vacuum. Experts note that al Qaeda's No. 2 commander, Ayman al-Zawahiri, has repeatedly exhorted Pakistanis in recent months to overthrow President Pervez Musharraf's military government.

"In order for Pakistan to marginalize the extremists, you need to have a compelling leadership who can marshal the forces," said Robert Grenier, the Central Intelligence Agency's Islamabad station chief from 1999 to 2002. "Musharraf can no longer do it."

Pakistan's deteriorating situation has fueled calls for radical solutions. One theory among some counterterrorism officials says U.S. forces should now directly engage al Qaeda and Taliban militants operating inside Pakistan. Previously, policy makers worried such a move would undermine Mr. Musharraf; his weakened state diminishes such fears. Most Pakistani experts believe this would only further radicalize the country's population.

U.S. counterterrorism officials, conversely, are seeking to
learn from successes Washington has achieved in other places. In Iraq, the Pentagon succeeded in wooing tribal leaders away from al Qaeda by offering economic and political incentives, and by exploiting ideological differences.

In Saudi Arabia, U.S. officials are lauding a government strategy that has directly targeted senior al Qaeda leaders while also working to rehabilitate lower-ranking members of militant groups. The Saudi government recently released hundreds of onetime fighters from prison who had gone through the program. U.S. officials believe it has significantly reduced the threat of terrorism inside Saudi Arabia, though they still worry it is being exported into countries such as Iraq.

"The Saudi program is about the best program in existence today," said Dell Dailey, the State Department's coordinator for counterterrorism.

In Lebanon, too, U.S. allies weakened the Fatah al Islam militia that led a mutiny in a northern Palestinian refugee camp. The Lebanese army fought the militia with light arms and logistical support provided by the Pentagon and Arab allies.

Washington and Islamabad have arrested hundreds of top al Qaeda figures in Pakistan since the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist strikes, but have failed to damp a broader growth of radical Islamist ideology among the local population, according to current and former U.S. officials. This campaign has been undercut by a failure by the U.S. to develop effective allies in the tribal regions, say former counterterrorism officials who have worked in the region.

In the coming months, these officials say, the U.S. needs to find common cause with tribal leaders who could prove willing to break with al Qaeda, as they have in Iraq. These tribal chiefs could also assist Washington in dispensing $750 million that the State Department has earmarked for economic development in the tribal areas.

"The way for the central government and for the U.S. to deal with it is to figure out a way to co-opt these guys," said Frank Anderson, who was the CIA's Near East Division chief from 1991 to 1994.
But there were times in 2003 when the complete absence of coordination among the Defense Department, the State Department and the Treasury—to say nothing of the Commerce Department, the trade representative, the U.S. Agency for International Development and the host of institutions now notionally concerned with “homeland security”—recalled the worst “polycracy” of Wilhelmine Germany.

— Niall Ferguson, Colossus
Since the attacks of 9/11, Congress is the only part of our national security system that has not been overhauled. All the other parts of our defense establishment have been reformed. The Department of Homeland Security was created, combining 26 formerly separate domestic security agencies. The intelligence community went through its biggest reorganization since 1947 subordinating all of the intelligence agencies to the new Director of National Intelligence. Even the Department of Defense has increased its budget by more than 50 percent, grown its special operations forces, and added a new chief of defense intelligence. Although Congress forced many of the changes in the executive branch, it has done nothing to reorganize itself.

Today there are literally dozens of committees that share responsibility for intelligence oversight. The Secretary of Homeland Security could be called before 86 different committees and subcommittees of Congress. Each
house has an intelligence committee but they have authorizing and legislating power only over the Director of National Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Foreign Intelligence Program.

Oversight over intelligence is spread across every committee with oversight of an executive agency that has some role in intelligence. The Judiciary Committee oversees the FBI, the Armed Services Committee oversees the Defense Department and all of its subordinates, the Committee on Foreign Affairs oversees the State Department, the Homeland Security Committee oversees Homeland Security and on and on. And both the Senate and House have their own versions of these committees.

Intelligence may be the most blatant example but most areas of our national security suffer from the same lack of coordination. For example, the Defense Department is unable to share some of its funds with the State Department even though in Iraq our commanders argue it is political improvements that are needed not military ones. But the State Department’s money is given by the Foreign Affairs committees and the Defense Department’s by the Armed Services committees and allowing transfers between the departments would weaken the influence of both committees.

Several proposals have been offered to remodel Congress for the uncertain future we face.

The 9/11 Commission attacks recommended more centralized Congressional oversight—especially of intelligence and homeland security issues. The commission made two specific proposals; creating a joint committee on intelligence that would combine the Senate and House’s committees into one and giving that committee enhanced status and power. At the very least we need to ease transfer of funds across committee jurisdictions. Congress needs to create ways to move appropriate funds in emergency situations between executive agencies without Congressional permission. In 2005, the defense bill did include a way to move $100 million between Defense and State—the executive departments had their own problems actually doing it.

Overlapping oversight aids Congress’s responsibility to check the President’s and the executive agencies’ power but those overlaps are currently just obstacles.
We in Congress recognize the need to look at how we do business. As change spreads across the government, we need to change too. Now is the time to wrestle with these hard questions and make our nation safer.

President Bush articulated his idea of a Civilian Reserve Corps in his January 2007 State of the Union address, but the concept is not entirely new. The Bush administration proposed the idea in its National Security Strategy in 2002.

As envisioned by Bush, a volunteer Civilian Reserve Corps “would function much like our military reserve. It would ease the burden on the Armed Forces by allowing us to hire civilians with critical skills to serve on missions abroad when America needs them.” In many ways, this is the epitome of what so many of our Presidents have encouraged — Americans using their God-given talents to come to the aid of their country during times of need.

While the Civilian Reserve Corps would lead to a new kind of professional volunteerism, it is itself the derivative of generations of calls by American Commanders in Chief for Americans to serve causes bigger than themselves.

Charged with a vast array of responsibilities, the Civilian Reserve Corps would function as a post conflict reconstruction unit — essentially a nation-building corps — participating in stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) activities while laying the foundation for the advancement of democratic principles. In doing so, the Corps would allow the military to focus strictly on military tasks, and the State Department to focus on diplomacy.

The concept is indeed the acknowledgement that American foreign policy must be more than a matter of war and negotiation. It is an acknowledgement that a reconstruction mission run exclu-
sively by the military — even if undertaken with the best intentions — can take the appearance of an occupation while detracting from the military’s ability to perform its own mission. However, in order for a Civilian Reserve Corps to operate effectively, its mission and strategy must be mapped in conjunction with military planning.

Future analysis of operations in the Global War on Terror will undoubtedly show that American Armed Forces very quickly dominated the enemy, only to be challenged increasingly as the mission turned from one of armed conflict to one centered on S&R. Inter-agency coordination and joint military/civilian planning will ensure a seamless transition once the enemy has been routed and S&R operations begin.

It will further be imperative for those participating in the Civilian Reserve Corps to have an understanding not only of how we perceive our enemies, but of how we are perceived by our enemies. Indeed, the default position for most Americans is that the United States cannot be perceived as anything but pure hearted and well-intentioned; the enemy cannot be anything but evil and cowardly. Enemies often become caricatures for entire cultures, cultures whose civilians possess values which we must learn to understand if we are ever to be victorious.

Often, we hear a phrase such as “Islamic extremists” or “Islamic fundamentalists.” While these terms capture the extreme and perverted nature of the enemy, they can also have the unintended consequence of impugning the greater majority of the Islamic faith who do not support those who use their faith as a destructive force and justification for terror. Making this distinction is critical because we must not allow our words—even if unintentionally—to paint so broad a stroke can have the effect of alienating those who might otherwise join with us in combating those who commit acts of terror. Americans have had to overcome the presence of extremist hate groups domestically. While many of these groups tried to exploit the Christian faith to push their agenda of hate, the vast majority of Christians would never want to have their faith affiliated with these groups.

Unfortunately, the United States currently lacks the ability to tap a wide array of cultural experts. This deficit may necessitate the presence of religious professionals on some civilian units. Additionally, linguists, election specialists, law enforcement per-
As of 2004, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization in the State Department is charged with developing a “whole-of-government” approach to stabilization and reconstruction, in conjunction with military operations. Logically, their charge also includes building the capacity to staff those efforts. In order to capitalize on the civilian skills residing both inside and outside of the government, a three-tiered approach has been devised. Two of the approaches rely on civilians within the government and are already in progress, while the third approach — the Civilian Reserve Corps — has yet to be authorized by Congress or included in the State Department’s budget request.

It is an especially pertinent time to study the formation of a Civilian Reserve Corps, when Provincial Reconstruction Teams — interdisciplinary teams operating in Iraq and Afghanistan to extend the reach of the fledgling central governments to remote areas — have faced critical organizational and staffing challenges. Civilian positions have at times been filled by our brave men and women in uniform, leading many to question whether adequate incentives have been offered to encourage civilians to fill these critical roles.

How these civilian units would be organized and the specifics of their terms of service must be further refined. For now, however, Congress should earnestly examine the benefit of civilian units — especially as the international equation evolves — and therefore consider authorizing the creation of the Civilian Reserve Corps.
THE DEPARTMENT OF NATION-BUILDING

We are doing nation-building right now, regardless of what it’s called. We are deeply involved in helping create stable governments in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Bosnia. We have been doing nation-building since at least 1898 with William Taft serving as Governor-General of the Philippines before he became our own President. In the past we have done it on an ad hoc basis—usually by the military.

But now the job is even more important. If the best way we can defeat terrorism is to encourage stability and security in failing states, shouldn’t we reform our national security system to be prepared for nation-building rather than improvise every time?

Then, who in the U.S. government should do nation-building?

Since our military has usually been given the task, maybe it should be the Defense Department. It certainly has the resources and scale. And it has the experience and logistics to deploy overseas to very rough places.
But the Defense Department doesn’t currently own much of the necessary expertise including establishing law and order despite the Military Police and Civil Affairs. Let alone how to improve a country’s agriculture. Maybe more importantly, the military’s culture is better at destroying things than building them. It’s not clear a single organization can be good at both.

Of our current departments, the other obvious contender is the State Department. The State Department’s culture is better matched for finding political solutions. But it doesn’t have the needed expertise resident either—its job is diplomacy, not establishing governments. And it doesn’t have the resources or scale. Although spread all over the world, the State Department manages small shops usually built on the local economy and doesn’t have its own logistics system.

Others argue we just need stronger coordination and integration across our existing agencies. Somewhere in the U.S. government, better expertise and resources reside. If we just had a centralized strategic planning process or a centrally allocated national security budget, the United States could do nation-building well. But we already have a single President who puts

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Maybe then the answer is no existing organization can take on nation-building and we need to create a new organization whose sole purpose is nation-building. A new agency could create and manage an armed force that does law and order rather than warfare. A new agency could specialize in building a legal system rather than adjudicating cases. A new agency could focus on creating infrastructure from scratch rather than providing development aid. But if an office’s job is to build countries, won’t they look for more and more countries to build? When does nation-building become imperialism?
Our current system doesn’t plan for nation-building but in today’s uncertain world we cannot continue depending on ad hoc efforts. Now is the time to face the hard questions. No solution is perfect but we must weigh the positives and negatives and decide which solution best answers our glaring need for nation-building.  

The purpose of this essay is to propose two congressional strategies that will significantly improve national security organization and personnel programs in support of interagency operations. These strategies are relevant to the role of Department of Defense (DOD) in interagency operations. They envision a DOD role vis-à-vis other agencies that will vary based upon the situation.

Strategy to Enhance National Security Organization

The national security system is incapable of timely, effective integration of diverse departmental capabilities required to protect the United States, its interests and its citizens. Policy formulation and execution have suffered, sometimes catastrophically. Correcting this deficiency will require radical reforms in the executive and legislative branches.

A National Security Act is needed to reform not only DOD but the entire spectrum of interagency operations to speed reaction to the spectrum of threats America faces. The goal should be to codify an adaptive approach that flattens, simplifies, and integrates the agencies’ related processes.

The National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC) is a stellar example of a flat, adaptive and proactive inter-agency team that has integrated every federal agency involved in counter-terror activities. It is staffed by members of DOD, Department of Homeland Security, the Department of the Treasury and federal and state law enforcement agencies, among others.

Suggested Legislative Outcomes-
I. Mandate reform by passing a
National Security Act that replaces provisions of the National Security Act of 1947 that are no longer relevant, and flattens and realigns the interagency process to improve the ability of federal agencies to gain synergy.

II. Pass resolutions encouraging the President to implement changes to the process and organizations affiliated with national security that do not require prescription in law. These could include presidential directives such as personnel policies and the formation of interim organizations in the vein of the NCTC.

III. Mandate changes in the committee structure of Congress to provide a streamlined process and organization for effective oversight of interagency reform. At a minimum, Mr. Jim Locher, who drafted the original Goldwater-Nichols defense reforms, has suggested these include an interim Select Committee on Interagency Operations and Activities.

IV. Define and implement a national information strategy to effectively communicate to key constituencies based upon their world views, values, cultures, languages and goals. Perhaps an interagency working group composed of Department of State, DOD and United States Information Agency personnel could develop key message themes and then localize them to target regions, cultures and groups in a way that is more effective than current practices. We have ceded the information struggle to many of our adversaries who have been adept at shifting the operational center of gravity to local groups and the strategic center of gravity to the American people.

Strategy to Enhance National Security Personnel Programs

Our armed forces are about half of what they were at the height of the Cold War, with a greatly increased operations tempo. The State Department’s Foreign Service is small and designed for a conventional Cold War operating model rather than the demands of interagency efforts and support of field operations. Agencies like the Departments of Treasury, Agriculture, and Justice are not directed, budgeted or staffed to support effective interagency conflict avoidance, conflict management or post conflict stability and reconstruction efforts.
Suggested Legislative Outcomes-

I. Mandate the increase of the Army by 100,000 soldiers and the U.S. Marine Corps by 20,000 over five years while emphasizing the professional specialties required for peace keeping and post conflict stability operations while integrating military professional development strategies with those of other key agencies in the national security process. The military must also continue its internal transformation to a more agile force and increase language and cultural training.

II. Mandate that personnel policies of all agencies be altered to reflect the new demands. This includes establishing professional development requirements that support interagency operations and increasing the number of deployable professionals from each non-DOD agency. Require longer tours thereby permitting key staff to build long term relationships with key influencers in specific regions around the globe.

III. Mandate that rewards, compensation, promotion and retention are based on participation in interagency assign-
ments and in long term operational deployments to critical areas. Financial and career incentives should be provided for inter-agency professionals who are willing to extend or stay in critical areas and thereby maintain the strong relational ties that support the long term interests of the nation. The USG should also implement a pay for skills system to reward professionals in all agencies who acquire critical language and technical skills or who accept additional postings to critical regions. For this incentive to be given, participants would have to accept posting to assignments where these skills could be applied and enhanced.

The United States has a need for nation-building. Right now, an effort in the Horn of Africa is providing an example of how we might do it more formally while also showing the obstacles still ahead.

Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), whose area of responsibility stretches from Sudan down to Kenya, has evolved into something so much more than the terrorist hunting task force it started as: an experiment in combining defense, diplomacy, and development -- the so-called three-D approach so clearly lacking in America's recent postwar reconstruction efforts elsewhere. Because the task force didn't own the sovereign space it was operating in, as U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq did, the Marines were forced to work under and through the American ambassadors, their State Department country teams, and the attached U.S. Agency for International Development missions. If little of that cooperation was occurring in Kabul and Baghdad, then maybe Africa would be better suited.

The Horn of Africa was supposed to be Washington's bureaucratic mea culpa for the Green Zone, a proving ground for the next generation of interagency cooperation that fuels America's eventual victory in what Abizaid once dubbed the "long war" against radical Islam. But as its first great test in the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia demonstrated, the three D's are still a long way from being synchronized, and as the Pentagon sets up its new Africa Command in the summer of 2008, the time for sloppy off-Broadway tryouts is running out.
America is going to replace CJTF-HOA with the new Africa Command for the same reason people buy real estate -- it's a good investment.

Africa Command promises to be everything Central Command has failed to become. It will be interagency from the ground up. It will be based on interactions with locals first and leaders second. It will engage in preemptive nation-building instead of preemptive regime change. It will "reduce the future battlespace" that America has neither intention nor desire to own.

It'll be Iraq done right.

With CJTF-HOA, the regular military is trying to reassume its historical role in the everything else that accompanies the trigger-pulling: the civil-affairs work, the humanitarian stuff, the community projects designed to win hearts and minds.

There's nothing in the traditional military system that demands, recognizes, rewards, or basically gives a flying f--- about making friends with local populations. But still, soldiers like Army Captain Steve McKnight do it.

In his work, he has the bearing of a Peace Corps volunteer, not an Army officer. "It's the little things that make the difference," he says. "It's not the big-picture project stuff, it's remembering to bring that fourth grader in Kiunga the English books that we promised her. It's remembering to bring the chief a new stainless-steel coffee thermos. And it's not just the material stuff, it's doing the interaction. It's humanizing the relationship. You know, this business of just giving stuff, it's dehumanized us and it's dehumanized them."

Kinetics is what the military does. Iraq is a quagmire because kinetics is all we planned for. But in this new time, on this continent, the military also builds latrines for girls. That simple act might someday keep trigger pullers out of this village.

Which is why America has come to Africa militarily and isn't leaving anytime soon. To work, a lot of preconceptions about what an American military presence is really good for in underdeveloped countries will have to change. What we've not learned in Iraq -- or taken far too long to learn -- will have to be somehow acquired, soldier by soldier and tour by tour, on the ground in Africa.
Who is in charge of defending our country against a rogue nuclear attack? After the reforms from the 9/11 attacks, that question has a fairly simple answer; The Department of Homeland Security is responsible for the government-wide effort and U.S. Northern Command is responsible for the efforts of the Defense Department. But does that simple answer really answer the question?

Both the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) emphasize their responsibility for unified action. DHS’s mission statement starts with, “We will lead the unified national effort to secure America.” Within the Department of Defense, “NORTHCOM consolidates under a single unified command existing missions that were previously executed by other DOD organizations. This provides unity of command, which is critical to mission accomplishment.” But does asserting our efforts are unified really coordinate all the parts necessary to succeed?
Creating DHS was the largest government reorganization since 1947 and has been dogged by criticism ever since. Many critics do acknowledge how difficult the task facing the department is and even applaud many of its efforts so far. But a common worry is DHS is preoccupied in preventing another incident like the 9/11 attacks and neglects potentially more likely or more catastrophic threats—like a rogue nuclear attack.

Defending against such an attack is so complicated it requires greater focus than just saying we have unified efforts. It means coordinating the efforts of all 22 agencies reporting to DHS from customs controls to disaster response. It means coordinating action with all of the state and local agencies including the police departments that still serve as the primary detectors within the United States. It means coordinating at the federal level with at least three major departments that do not report to DHS; the Director of National Intelligence, the Department of Energy, and the Department of Defense. And those agencies are just the ones responsible for prevention. Even more at every level are responsible for response and mitigation.

Looking within the Department of Defense, we can see how much broader the problem is than just appointing a unified lead. NORTHCOM is in charge of operations within the United States. But it does not own its own troops—those come from the National Guard or active duty units. It does not determine what vehicles and tools those troops are armed with—the military services do that with other missions in mind. And it is not in charge of operations outside of the United States—the preferred place to stop an attack.

Defending a nuclear attack requires many different pieces to work smoothly together. An organizational answer can not solve all the problems. Maybe most important is oversight that continually asks how good our plans, tools, and coordination is. Only with constant vigilance and unflinching focus can we know the organizations responsible for defending us are thinking, preparing, and practicing for one of the more horrible events that could occur within the United States.

But does asserting our efforts are unified really coordinate all the parts necessary to succeed?
If we should perish, the ruthlessness of the foe would only be the secondary cause of the disaster. The primary cause would be that the strength of a giant nation was directed by eyes too blind to see all the hazards of the struggle.

– Reinhold Niebuhr, The Irony of American History
The President announced the creation of Africa Command in February 2007 to take charge of U.S. military operations throughout Africa. Called AFRICOM, the new command has been billed as the new look of our military. Its mission is not supposed to be the traditional military role of preparing for full-scale war. Instead, AFRICOM is supposed to strengthen stability and security in the region by working with African countries and organizations and supporting other U.S. agencies, like the State Department or USAID, with their work in Africa.

Is AFRICOM the model for how we should use our military in the world from now on? It addresses many of the doubts about our current defense posture. AFRICOM represents more and earlier engagement hopefully preventing crises rather than just responding to them. Instead of waiting for the Taliban to bring order to Afghanistan by imposing a fundamentalist regime, we will now work with countries to groom stable and democratic governments.

AFRICOM represents better interagency coordination. No longer will the Defense Department try to solve problems with military means alone. AFRICOM

Former child-soldiers: Will AFRICOM help prevent conflict in Africa or just encourage U.S. military intervention?

US Agency for International Development
will instead work with the State Department and other organizations to solve developing countries’ problems holistically.

But it’s easier to say AFRICOM will be different than it is to make it different. AFRICOM doesn’t actually become fully operational until next October. And so far, it looks a lot like our existing military commands.

But it’s easier to say AFRICOM will be different than it is to make it different.

AFRICOM’s precursor is already working in Kenya but its biggest job so far was sending special operations forces to help the Ethiopians invade Somalia and kill terrorists. And the Ethiopians ended up feeling like the United States claimed credit for the heavy lifting they did. Although using special operations forces isn’t as disruptive as conventional invasions, it is still using military force to solve all problems.

Some problems do require military solutions and AFRICOM is responsible for planning the U.S. military response if called upon. What if we undertake another mission in Somalia or we decide to intervene in the next Rwanda? Africa has plenty of opportunities for military intervention like the Sudan right now. To manage that planning, AFRICOM already argues it needs the same staff as our traditional military commands. It needs the planners, logisticians, and intelligence people the others have.

If AFRICOM does end up looking like the other military commands, what does that mean for interagency coordination? The State Department and others are already worried about how a four-star general will impact the bureaucratic battles of who does what in Africa. An unpleasant precedent is the constant sparring between the general in charge of Central Command and the ambassadors to Iraq and Afghanistan over how to rebuild those countries.

The rhetoric about AFRICOM is right. We have long needed to engage in the world earlier. We have long needed to better support our partners in the world. We have long needed to integrate U.S. government efforts better. Although it is great we now recognize those needs, we also must change what we do. We must not only say AFRICOM is different we must create structures that will be different.
Providing the Tools Our Elected Leaders Need

The Air Force has been engaged in combat continuously for seventeen years. The Army has suffered 71 percent of the casualties in Iraq. The Navy has almost half of its ships away from their home port. The Marines are fighting a sustained, land-based war for the first time since Vietnam. The United States has used its military to aid six Muslim countries in the last twenty years. Clearly our military bears a heavy burden. Yet the Department of Defense remains unable to ease the burden on our military by focusing our services only on the kind of military forces our future elected leaders will need in the future. The result is our military is overstretched despite increasing defense budgets. Instead, the makeup of the defense budget remains stagnant; in the last 30 years, each service’s share of the defense budget has changed by less than two percent. Any discussion of roles and missions has to address this continuing gap between what our services prepare to do and what our military forces are actually asked to do.

There are possible solutions out there. Here we will sketch out four proposed approaches that create earlier input to the services on what capabilities our future

The Defense budget is still growing but without better focus it won’t ever be enough to do everything.
elected leaders will want and our future warfighters will need.

The first proposed solution is to give our current warfighters—our combatant commanders—a bigger role in the budgeting process believing they are the best proxy for future warfighters. Two major studies in recent years have argued the combatant commanders need to have more involvement in determining where resources should go. However, current combatant commanders are responsible for today’s problems. One of the key authors of the last major defense reorganization believes because the combatant commanders are necessarily focused on planning for what might happen now, they can not provide input relevant to the future.

A second proposal is to further strengthen the board created twenty years ago to provide a joint perspective to defense resourcing—the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). We in the House Armed Services Committee added language to the defense authorization act last spring to “…clarify the necessity for the JROC to provide the military services with clear guidance on the priority assigned to each requirement and on the expected resources allocated to fulfill such a requirement.” But a former Deputy Secretary of Defense has pointed out that the JROC is composed of senior members of each service who represent each service’s view well but for that reason can not be expected to provide objective joint guidance on what our warfighters will need in the future.

The third proposed solution takes the criticisms of the first two proposals and argues only a new advocate could provide input without being biased by other responsibilities. In the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Pentagon said it was considering “designating a single lead advocate for the future joint warfighter in order to improve the Department’s long-range, joint perspective on the requirements, acquisition and resource allocation processes.” But an advocate is still just one among many and the proposal does not address how an office designated as advocate can maintain a unique,
unbiased perspective.

Finally, the fourth proposed approach makes it our elected leaders’ responsibility to say what the nations future needs will be. The defense budget is currently built by combining each service’s plan for its share of the budget with some minor adjustments by the Secretary of Defense. If instead, the Secretary of Defense as the one responsible for both the operations and resources of the Defense Department designed the budget himself and then directed the services to execute it, we would have a much tighter linkage between expected future missions and current budgets. But this approach also has some obvious drawbacks including the need for a much larger staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense to handle the many details currently handled by the service staffs. Additionally, this approach was already tried in the 1960s until reversed in the Nixon administration.

All four of these approaches have advantages and disadvantages and there other possibilities out there as well. But they demonstrate there are adjustments we can make to the Department of Defense to relieve some of the burden on our military services. Only when our services have clear direction on what military forces our warfighters will need in the future can they efficiently prepare today. When considering roles and missions, we must think about how to provide that direction.

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NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE RETHUGHT

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peration Iraqi Freedom and the greater War on Terror have dramatically altered America’s current military needs, and placed the most pressure on our Reserve Components – both the National Guard and Reserve Forces - since the Vietnam era. The size of our active duty forces have steadily declined over the last fifteen years (from 2.1 million in 1989 to 1.4 million in 2005), thereby increasing our reliance on Reserve Components in order to carry out military operations.

The role of the Reserve Forces should not change. However, the disparity in benefits, and unpredictability of deployments and dwell time should be addressed to improve recruitment and retention.

The role of the National Guard, however, is the larger question. The appeals made by State governments to maintain adequate numbers of National Guard to address natural disasters and increased terrorist threats at home have emphasized the diverse responsibilities of the Guard. Therefore, I will focus mainly on the mission changes that need be applied to the National Guard in order to address their dual missions at home and abroad.

Roles, Missions & Capabilities:

Perhaps the best method to address the needs of the States and improve recruitment would be to provide National Guard recruits with a non-binding choice to serve in the traditional homeland protection role or as part of a force available for deployment worldwide. All recruits would receive the same training so they would be prepared for all of the Guard’s missions. These non deployable
roles would support state missions within the United States. Assignment to the billets would be for defined lengths of time allowing for future deployment taskings for all personnel but also provide an opportunity to support stateside only missions. The development of these stateside only missions would be at the discretion of the National Guard.

Operation Iraqi Freedom has demonstrated the importance of the stability operations skill set. Today’s operational realities dictate that National Guard troops be trained in this skill set and Guard units, whose members commonly have well honed civic skills, have proven to be particularly adept at peacekeeping/rebuilding missions. The National Guard could provide the U.S. with a peacekeeping force that will be critical to future missions. Maintaining a strong American peacekeeping force would also help diversify our military capabilities and provide our leaders with an American force capable of performing these stability missions that are critical to American national security so as not to defer responsibility to an outside international force.

By creating a non-binding framework whereby recruits can specify preferences in mission, we can increase interest in the Guard. Allowing recruits to choose between the traditional roles of homeland defense, with a purely stateside mission under the command of the governor, or federal missions, under the command of the President with the possibility of overseas peacekeeping, stability operations or combat tours, will give the Guard flexibility without endangering our ability to execute operational missions.

In addition to redefining the role...
of the National Guard, the military overall would benefit from streamlining the mobilization process for our National Guard. In some cases, it can take almost three months to certify a Guardsman for active duty. This process is based on current funding levels and the unit’s position in the deployment/employment phase of contingency support. That process could be sped up substantially by maintaining them in an active state of readiness as is done with the Reserve Forces. This would have the added benefit of increasing our ability to react to national crises, but would increase the need for additional funding to provide the personnel and training assets required to achieve and maintain this state of readiness.

Recruitment and Retention:

The current strains placed on our Reserve Components will have an effect on our future success. By providing parity of benefits for the Guard and Reserve we could improve morale and retention of these forces. Some recommendations include:

1. Educational benefits are a great recruitment tool and contribute to the overall quality and strength of our forces. Educational benefits for the reserve components should be consolidated under the Veterans Administration with comparable reimbursement rates as the active forces. Those reimbursement benefits should be reviewed and updated to reflect rising costs of education including tuition, fees, room and board.

2. Reserve Components that do not live near designated TRICARE facilities should have access to TRICARE Prime Remote to ensure access to quality healthcare and full reimbursements for healthcare services.

3. The issue of dwell time is critical not only to the citizen soldiers, but their families as well. Given current military needs, 100% predictability in activation may never be truly achieved, but ensuring that our National Guard and Reserve receive the dwell time recommended by our military leaders will guarantee that we have high-operational performance, and ease the burden on Guard and Reserve families.

Conclusion:

Taking into account the many challenges our Military is facing in a post-9/11 world, reforming
the roles and mission of our Reserve Components can strengthen our ability to respond to and execute the current and future missions of the United States. Allowing members of the National Guard to choose between the dual Constitutional missions of domestic response and the federal mission of national defense, whether in a stability operations role or combat role, will improve our national response and provide the military with a highly-trained peacekeeping force. Recognizing and correcting the disparities in the benefits for our Reserve Components will strengthen retention and recruitment and ensure we have the forces necessary to successfully accomplish current and future challenges.
The United States is currently using a combination of military and civilian personnel in stability and reconstruction activities in Iraq and Afghanistan. These efforts have been developed somewhat on the fly, but have proven to be successful to the extent that greater attention must be given to properly developing a comprehensive strategy. I believe that the concept is valuable and that the capacity should be available to our decision makers in dealing with future conflicts beyond the current fights in Iraq and Afghanistan. We currently refer to these organizations as Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT).

The missions of PRTs in any specific conflict will be determined by the circumstances of that conflict, therefore the plans for the concept of PRTs must be broad enough to allow for the necessary flexibility to address the needs of each conflict. We are currently using PRTs in such areas as developing local governance capacity and economic development activities across a broad front from improving infrastructure to business opportunities.

The work of a PRT will in most instances start before peace and security in an area are completely secured. Therefore, plans must be developed to transition the mission and the makeup of a team between operations conducted while peace and security are being established to the operations conducted when peace and security is established.

PRTs will take on the nature of a military team in that ideally they could be deployed rapidly and to anywhere in the world. Obviously a PRT manned solely by military personnel would fit the
deployable requirement but the missions of PRTs will generally require skill sets that are beyond those found typically in our military personnel. Therefore, we should explore the idea of federal government career opportunities for service on a deployable PRT with all the expected difficulties of being deployed offset by compensation and incentives.

Today we cobble together personnel and resources from a variety of government agencies including DOD, State, Treasury, Agriculture and others. While a necessity today, the ideal structure would not require such cooperation and would be much more nimble and quicker. This will be complicated in that a standing capacity to field a PRT at a moments notice is not practicable unless we foresee continuous future situations that will require this capacity to be fielded.

The work currently being done by PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan is evidence that this capacity is necessary and valuable. There is a wide variety in the leadership and makeup of these teams. Their missions and level of peace and security in which the missions are conducted are also varied. The development of plans for maintaining PRT capacity and how that capacity will be utilized in the future will benefit from our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan.
TYRANNY OF OPTIMISM IN ACQUISITION

In what appears to be an escalating spiral, the Department of Defense (DOD) has continued to experience significant cost growth and schedule delays on key acquisition programs in each service. Key programs slated to deliver advanced warfighting capability—such as the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), Future Combat System, Coast Guard Deepwater, and the F-22 aircraft—have become acquisition challenges, with spiraling costs and poor acquisition performance. In what seems a self-fulfilling prophecy, the services appear to under-budget as programs are presented to Congress for approval, only to overrun those budgets during program execution. For example, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) continually warns that the Navy’s future shipbuilding funding needs are significantly understated, citing a long history of critical analysis that points to budgetary needs far in excess of those stated in the 30 year shipbuilding plan.

The DOD acquisition process requires overhaul. Lead times for weapons systems are longer than ever and costs continue to escalate. Services are also paying increasing costs to develop and produce unique weapons systems for the same or similar mission, for example, the Patriot vs. Standard Missile-3 (SM3) missile defense systems. Acquisition officials appear to change stated and approved acquisition plans without much discipline, thereby increasing costs, such as for LCS, the

It is time to impose a strategic pause in DOD acquisition ...
new carrier CVN-78, Ground / Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR), and SBINet. It is time to impose a strategic pause—or, at least, a review—in DOD acquisition so that the DOD can overhaul the process to ensure taxpayers receive a fair value for their dollar, and warfighters receive capable systems on time and within budgets. The Undersecretary for Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics must reevaluate not only what we buy, but how we buy it.

The House Armed Services Oversight and Investigation Subcommittee should conduct a comprehensive review of the DOD acquisition process, enlisting all the resources available to Congress, including—but not limited to—the GAO as well as the Congressional Research Service. This review should produce a record of programs that are performing well, and programs such as Advanced Integrated Electronic Warfare System (AIEWS) and Advanced Seal Delivery System (ASDS) that completely failed and were terminated before delivering fieldable capability. Furthermore, the lessons learned from successful programs should be captured and used to develop new acquisition guidelines that are implemented DOD-wide.

This effort is needed not only to ensure a more cost-effective proficient military as Congress appropriates funding, but will also serve to ensure the credibility of both the Defense Department and contractors that presently seem to present their costing under a “tyranny of optimism” that rarely proves true.
A FAILURE IN GENERALSHIP*

For the second time in a generation, the United States faces the prospect of defeat at the hands of an insurgency. In April 1975, the U.S. fled the Republic of Vietnam, abandoning our allies to their fate at the hands of North Vietnamese communists. In 2007, Iraq’s grave and deteriorating condition offers diminishing hope for an American victory and portends risk of an even wider and more destructive regional war.

These debacles are not attributable to individual failures, but rather to a crisis in an entire institution: America’s general officer corps. America’s generals have failed to prepare our armed forces for war and advise civilian authorities on the application of force to achieve the aims of policy.

America’s defeat in Vietnam is the most egregious failure in the history of American arms. America’s general officer corps refused to prepare the Army to fight unconventional wars, despite ample indications that such preparations were in order. Having failed to prepare for such wars, America’s generals sent our forces into battle without a coherent plan for vic-

* This article was originally published before events on the ground transpired and does not account for the results produced by the 2007 troop surge.
tory. Unprepared for war and lacking a coherent strategy, America lost the war and the lives of more than 58,000 service members.

America’s generals not only failed to develop a strategy for victory in Vietnam, but also remained largely silent while the strategy developed by civilian politicians led to defeat. Having participated in the deception of the American people during the war, the Army chose after the war to deceive itself. A faculty member of the U.S. Army War College argued that the Army had erred by not focusing enough on conventional warfare in Vietnam, a lesson the Army was happy to hear. Despite having been recently defeated by an insurgency, the Army slashed training and resources devoted to counterinsurgency.

America’s generals have repeated the mistakes of Vietnam in Iraq. Despite paying lip service to “transformation” throughout the 1990s, America’s armed forces failed to change in significant ways. The armed forces fought the global war on terrorism for the first five years with a counterinsurgency doctrine last revised in the Reagan administration. At the dawn of the 21st century, the U.S. is fighting brutal, adaptive insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, while our armed forces have spent the preceding decade having done little to prepare for such conflicts.

America’s generals then miscalculated both the means and ways necessary to succeed in Iraq. The most fundamental military miscalculation in Iraq has been the failure to commit sufficient forces to provide security to Iraq’s population. Inept planning for postwar Iraq took the crisis caused by a lack of troops and quickly transformed it into a debacle. And after failing to visualize the conditions of combat in Iraq, America’s generals failed to adapt to the demands of counterinsurgency. Maybe worst, America’s general officer corps did not accurately portray the intensity of the insurgency to the American public.

The intellectual and moral failures common to America’s general officer corps in Vietnam and Iraq constitute a crisis in American generalship. Any explanation that fixes culpability on

While the physical courage of America’s generals is not in doubt, there is less certainty regarding their moral courage.
individuals is insufficient. No one leader, civilian or military, caused failure in Vietnam or Iraq.

The need for intelligent, creative and courageous general officers is self-evident. While the physical courage of America’s generals is not in doubt, there is less certainty regarding their moral courage. In almost surreal language, professional military men blame their recent lack of candor on the intimidating management style of their civilian masters. Now that the public is immediately concerned with the crisis in Iraq, some of our generals are finding their voices. They may have waited too long.

If America desires creative intelligence and moral courage in its general officer corps, it must create a system that rewards these qualities. Neither the executive branch nor the services themselves are likely to remedy the shortcomings in America’s general officer corps. Instead, Congress must act.

It should require the armed services to implement 360-degree evaluations for field-grade and flag officers to include the insights of the junior officers and sergeants who served under them and are often the first to adapt to new ways of war.

The Senate should examine the education and professional writing of nominees for three- and four-star billets as part of the confirmation process. The Senate would never confirm to the Supreme Court a nominee who had neither been to law school nor written legal opinions. However, it routinely confirms four-star generals who possess neither graduate education in the social sciences or humanities nor the capability to speak a foreign language.

Finally, Congress must enhance accountability by exercising its little-used authority to confirm the retired rank of general officers. By law, Congress must confirm an officer who retires at three- or four-star rank. A general who fails to provide Congress with an accurate and candid assessment of strategic probabilities ought to be retired at a lower rank than one who serves with distinction. As matters stand now, a private who loses a rifle suffers far greater consequences than a general who loses a war.

The Iraq debacle, however humiliating, will not in itself signal national disaster. The hour is late, but not too late to prepare for the challenges of the Long War. We still have time to select as our generals those who possess the
intelligence to visualize future conflicts and the moral courage to advise civilian policymakers on the preparations needed for our security. The power and the responsibility to identify such generals lie with the U.S. Congress.
There shall be the maximum practicable integration of the policies and procedures of the departments and agencies of the National Military Establishment.

—Key West Agreement, 1948
Ever since the 1948 Key West meeting by the Department of Defense on Roles and Missions, follow-on studies have focused on differentiating the core competencies of the Services within their respective domains of land, sea, and the air. But what is needed today is a focus upon what is the one “common” domain among the Services, whose dominance is essential to winning—or dissuading—any future conflict or crisis.

Knowing well the respective roles and missions of the Services—and that there would be only marginal gain in efficiency by studying them further—the greatest improvement in warfare capability would be to affect a transformational change that would ensure the U.S. warrior of the future always has the “knowledge” to act before his adversary as a result of our dominance of cyberspace. To “know with assurance”—whether before a planned strike (such as Iraq attacking Kuwait) or for the assured identification of a foe during the fog of battle—is the new dimension of warfare that can ensure U.S. military dominance in the future, from the Global War on Terror to regional conflicts. But key to this future warfighting capability is the joint procurement of the network-centric systems needed to provide this “knowledge” to the U.S. military in order for it to act more swiftly than an adversary.

Presently, the Services address the domain of cyberspace To “know with assurance” is the new dimension of warfare
primarily as a means to help win within their own core competency. And while there are joint requirements for the procurement of network-centric systems so Service systems can operate together, the reality is that when each Service’s limited budget topline has competing joint and Service requirements, the Services default to procuring the “Service-unit” of prowess—ships, planes, troops, and their attendant equipment—rather than funding the joint capability for network-centric warfare.

A truly transformed military—one that is a “capability-based” force, rather than one measured by “capacity” or numbers—needs to be built upon a “knowledge-intensive,” network-centric foundation. But without a change in how the Defense Department acquires these systems that must work together seamlessly in the joint domain of cyberspace, the Services will not adequately fund them when confronted with fiscal constraints that force competition for funding with their parochial Service requirements. The “roles and missions” modification needed to affect this needed change is to place the funding for all network-centric systems within the Joint Staff, recognizing that the Pentagon is motivated by three primary incentives:

- Patriotism (a given);
- Promotion (which is why Congress—determined to have a more joint operational force—mandated in the Goldwater-Nichols Act that officers were not to be promoted unless they had done joint tours and education); and
- “Who owns the money” — which applies in this case (the Services should retain control of funding for their core competencies; but unless the “joint world” assumes responsibility for the funding of network-centric systems, the reality of a transformed knowledge-based military will not occur, either effectively or efficiently).

The enhanced warfighting capability of a military that is network-centric based is enormous as compared to one that is not. However—much as Goldwater-Nichols was needed to effect jointness in the operations of the U.S. military—it is a similar “Goldwater-Nichols II” that is needed to affect the joint acquisition (whose effectiveness is determined by assured funding) of network-centric systems. Much as the “incentive” of promotion helped turn the Services toward joint operations, so
too, is the “placement” of the responsible funds for network-centric systems within the Joint Staff the needed incentive to affect the joint procurement necessary for the transformed military required for the future.
The Future of Electronic Warfare

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are forcing our services to adapt to new asymmetric threats in new urban environments that require a higher level of jointness and inter-service cooperation. In these new environments the use of the electromagnetic spectrum, or more importantly the ability to obtain dominance of that spectrum, has quickly emerged as an essential tactical capability.

Dominating the spectrum through Electronic Warfare (EW) in recent years has been centered on the EA-6B Prowler squadrons of the Navy and Marine Corps (and soon to be Navy Growler Squadrons), and our military’s primary communications jamming aircraft, the Air Force EC-130H Compass Call. The Prowler’s ability to engage in electronic attack, electronic support, and electronic protection in support of our strike packages has earned the Prowler the status of a Go-No-Go asset. If a Prowler isn’t with an air squadron, the squadron doesn’t go. Additionally, both Prowlers and the Compass Call platform have stepped out of their traditional responsibilities to play key supporting roles in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).

Through the heroic work of these EW communities in OIF and OEF it has become apparent that the need for EW capability has grown beyond the air and on to the ground as we have faced new threats such as Improvised Explosive Devices (IED). This need has reinforced the importance of developing and maintaining joint EW capability, forced other services to step up to the plate, and raised serious questions about the sustainability and endurance of the EW community in the future.
**Joint EW Capability:**

In the new environment EW has emerged as a key capability that has both saved lives and defeated the enemy. However, in order to succeed the EW community had to rapidly adapt new tactics and operate outside of its standard mission areas. This adaptation primarily occurred at the operational level where the military quickly realized that successful EW operations and tactics required an ability to climb out of traditional missions and to break traditional service stovepipes.

*It is essential that EW is seen at all levels as a core mission area of the Department of Defense that will continue to be important in the future.*

It is essential that EW is seen at all levels as a core mission area of the Department of Defense that will continue to be important in the future. The recent lessons learned in combat theaters must be extended from the operational level to the policy and programming level at the Pentagon. As commanders on the ground adapt their EW capabilities to the threat, the planners at the Pentagon still do not seem to understand the value of joint EW, or maintaining capabilities across this entire mission area. As services such as the Army begin to ramp up core EW capability again, there is little assurance that EW will remain a core, sustained capability supported jointly by the services.

**Other Services:**

It has been the Navy and Marine Corps, and within those services primarily their Prowler communities, that have stepped up to the plate to identify new capabilities and to train the Army in Iraq and Afghanistan. While this has put significant strain on the EW community, the Army is doing its part by initiating its own EW core competency effort.

A target date of March 2008 has been set by the Army to replace Navy Electronic Warfare Officers in Iraq and Afghanistan and assume the primary ground EW mission. This represents a reacquiring of EW capability within the Army that had previously atrophied, reminding us of the importance of maintaining a balanced mix of complementary capabilities and skill sets across the services.
Sustaining EW Capability:

While the commanders on the ground in OEF and OIF quickly realized the value of sustaining joint capabilities in the EW mission area, serious questions remain about the Pentagon’s commitment at the policy and planning level.

The short history of the Air Force’s B-52 Stand-Off Jammer program provides a case study on how important mission areas that cut across the services are often not well coordinated. In 2002, the Department of Defense published an Analysis of Alternatives for Airborne Electronic Attack. It identified a mix of capabilities necessary to meet the Department’s airborne EW needs after 2009 when the Department’s Prowler fleet begins to retire. The Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force signed a Memorandum of Agreement outlining their respective contributions to fulfilling this mission, and in November 2003, the Air Force formally embraced a return to the EW mission when Air Combat Command issued a concept of operations for Airborne Electronic Attack defining the Air Force role. In October 2004, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council approved an Initial Capabilities Document, “Denying Enemy Awareness Through Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA),” defining requirements for an Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) System of Systems.

To fulfill its role, the Air Force designed a program to add a jamming capability to the venerable B-52 bomber, and initiated a B-52 Stand-off Jammer (SOJ) program beginning with FY05. The original plan was to take an existing jamming pod and integrate it onto the B-52’s airframe, however, the Air Force soon discovered that this arrangement would not provide the power required to satisfy many requirements incorporated into the program. Costs ballooned well in excess of the Air Force’s programmed budget, reportedly by as much as $6 billion. The program was terminated in the FY07 budget and a new study initiated. The Air Force is currently pursuing a concept for a Core Component Jammer (CCJ) capability on an as yet unidentified platform. The cost of this program is reportedly expected to be about $3 billion,

*Increased focus within DOD on the joint EW mission area is needed to avoid these situations.*
but has yet to become a program of record.

Because of these setbacks, the earliest we can expect to see an operational CCJ platform is 2015-2017. This creates a capability gap beginning in 2012, when the Air Force had committed to begin performing part of the airborne EW missions under the memorandum of agreement signed with the other services.

The Air Force must also address emerging shortfalls and readiness concerns in the Compass Call program. The aircraft has the highest utilization rate of any C-130 aircraft and it is approaching 20,000 hours of service in OIF and OEF alone. The 14 Compass Call aircraft in the fleet are aging and rely on decades-old technology that is rapidly becoming obsolete. While it achieved initial operational capability in 1983, the airframe is 35 years old and much of the technology dates back to the 1960s. If the Compass Call is expected to play an important role in joint EW for the next 10-15 years, it is important that the Air Force dedicate necessary funding to sustain the airframe and upgrading its mission and operating systems.

Increased focus within DOD on the joint EW mission area is needed to avoid these situations. The Air Force needs to step up with its role and commit to an AEA solution, but more oversight from Pentagon planners is required to support and enforce joint requirements in critical mission areas. The Pentagon needs to create a joint structure capable of ensuring that we don’t end up, once again, in a situation where EW expertise is in demand but the expertise is largely confined to one community.
Ownership Matters

Unmanned aerial vehicles are quickly becoming a classic case of bickering (i.e. “failed jointness”) between our military services.

Each military service is inventing new ways to use unmanned aerial vehicles. Responding to experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan and fueled by increasing defense budgets, the Army and Marine Corps are discovering how effectively and cheaply unmanned drones can provide real-time reconnaissance while keeping the ground forces safely hidden. And those ground forces are closer to relying on unmanned drones to provide fire support from the air. The Air Force is gaining confidence in operating unmanned drones and thinking more strongly about replacing manned aircraft for some of its more dangerous missions.

Even as each service develops different drones they come out looking the same and doing roughly the same thing. Yet because they were developed separately, they are different.
enough to be incompatible. Which creates unnecessary obstacles where we need the smoothest coordination—the battlefield.

Avoiding those obstacles requires choices as each drone is developed. But how to choose depends on how they are to be used. For example, to fly its drones the Air Force uses “rated” pilots—people who have gone through flight training and qualified by flying an actual aircraft. The Air Force insists on using pilots because it expects its unmanned aircraft to be like its current aircraft, which are highly sophisticated but few in number. Since each aircraft is expensive the cost of qualifying a pilot seems worth it. In contrast, the Army would prefer lots of simpler unmanned aircraft and so it uses enlisted technicians to fly the drones, lowering costs.

Each service not only sees a different way to use unmanned drones but sees a threat to their traditional mission if another service controlled them. The Army is confronted with the same dilemma they faced in 1947; if the Air Force owns all high-flying vehicles the mission of supporting ground troops will always be a low-priority. In contrast, the Air Force fears the Army would not properly weigh the long-range strike mission and might undermine manned fighters like the F-22. And the Marines and Navy ponder the recurring question of whether airpower transcends the ancient military divide between sea and land.

The services find little reason to work together because of these fears and so capitalize on their own operational reasons to pursue their own programs.

The Department of Defense has had some success achieving jointness. The Army and Marine Corps are using common ground control stations to fly their drones and are collaborating on some versions together. But not the Air Force. The Department of Defense has so far prevented any one service from dominating. The Air Force had proposed that it own all unmanned drones flying above 3,500 feet. Instead, the Deputy Secretary denied this request and set up a task force with more clout than the joint center of excellence that already exists. But without a stronger push to force jointness, parochial views will dominate.

Our increasing defense budget allows each service to pursue its own program. But when resources become scarce, we will have multiple programs each based on a different strategic goal. Our
elected leaders will either have to pick one program and hope it matches our strategic needs or underfund all of the programs. Only by making the hard strategic and budgetary choices now can we optimize unmanned drones for the future. Allowing service rivalry to determine the answer creates flawed answers.

“Hunter UAV kills two enemy fighters during historic flight”, Multi-National Corps—Iraq RELEASE No. 20070908-01, September 8, 2007
Megan Scully, “Pentagon rejects Air Force bid to control UAV programs,” CongressDaily, September 14, 2007
The first cyber war may have already begun. The Pentagon’s computers are attacked 35,000 times a day, with Secretary of Defense Gates email becoming a particular target. The country of Estonia came under sustained cyber attack in the spring of 2007, threatening to shut down the nation’s banking system and cutting off internet access to the world.

Never has the U.S. military been more dependent on computers for war-fighting or logistics, but the services show signs of slowness in adapting to the demands of computer culture. Two key problems have already emerged. Are we able to recruit the best minds in computer science? And are today’s troops computer-savvy enough to foil cyber-attacks?

How do you attract the best minds in hardware and software to the uniformed services? Many of these students have tattoos and body piercing. They resist strict hierarchical organizations like the military. Military contractors are able to hire some of them in order to interface with active duty troops without violating military culture.

But greater Pentagon involvement may be necessary in order to get the benefit of the new generation’s talent. Perhaps buildings near the
campuses of MIT, Berkeley, or other top schools could ease recruiting and enhance U.S. capabilities.

Given our current dependence on computers for almost every facet of national defense, computer hygiene has never been more important. Although some top generals are still slow to utilize the latest technology, those that do may find that tiny mistakes can do major harm to the U.S. defense establishment. Allowing a child to place a screensaver on a secure computer, access a popular music download site, or carry a Blackberry into a secure location could compromise security in a significant way. These innocent-seeming acts can have grave consequences.

It is interesting that the Uniform Code of Military Justice can punish a general for committing adultery, but not for compromising the SIPRNET. Adjusting our standards and, even more important, our attitudes can be vital in protecting U.S. secrets. We have a head start in many areas of computer sciences but it can disappear in a nano-second. There is no reason for the military to not fight as hard to keep our advantage in this area as it does to fight enemy insurgents on the ground.

It is hard for many older soldiers to even visualize the threat. It is possible that they simply will not be able to, and to respond appropriately. If every networked laptop in the hands of a private around the globe can become a backdoor into the Pentagon, then we will need to police our system much more vigilantly. Are today’s soldiers able and willing to do that? They may be good at video games, but computer security is a much more difficult, and deadly, enterprise.

At the extreme, it may take a new concept in our military to succeed in the cyber fight. A new military specialty, or even corps, may be necessary in order to instill and maintain the values that computers demand. These recruits would speak the language of computers (e.g. C++), be able to make limited repairs, and, most important, preserve their integrity, even from well-intentioned generals.

One mischievous suggestion has been that these recruits should start at the rank of general, but be gradually demoted as their knowl-
edge of the latest technology fades. Of course, this approach is impossible, but it illustrates the upside-down world of computer science to the lay military observer.
ACRONYMS

AEA.........................................................Airborne Electronic Attack
AFRICOM.................................................................Africa Command
AIEWS ...........................Advanced Integrated Electronic Warfare System
ASDS......................................Advanced Seal Delivery System
CCJ .................................................................Core Component Jammer
CJTF-HOA ............Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa
DHS...............................................................Department of Homeland Security
DOD .................................................................Department of Defense
DOS.................................................................Department of State
EW.................................................................Electronic Warfare
G/ATOR ................................................Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar
IED ..............................................................Improvised Explosive Device
JROC ................................................Joint Requirements Oversight Council
LCS .................................................................Littoral Combat Ship
NCTC ...........................................................National Counterterrorism Center
NORTHCOM ...................................................Northern Command
OEF ............................................................Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF ..............................................................Operation Iraqi Freedom
PRT .................................................................Provincial Reconstruction Team
S&R .............................................................Stabilization and Reconstruction
SIPRNET ...................................................Secret Internet Protocol Router Network
SM-3 ..........................................................Standard Missile 3
SOJ ...............................................................Stand-Off Jammer
USIA..............................................................United States Information Agency