Duties and Responsibilities

Presidential memorandum of December 18, 2018, directed the establishment of a United States Space Command (USSPACECOM) as a Unified Combatant Command, with responsibility for Joint Force space operations. Space Policy Directive (SPD)-4, dated February 19, 2019, specified, “[t]his command will have all of the responsibilities of a Unified Combatant Command in addition to the space-related responsibilities previously assigned to United States Strategic Command. . . . The Commander of this command will lead space warfighting through global space operations that may occur in the space domain, the terrestrial domains, or through the electromagnetic spectrum. . . . [T]he United States Space Command shall ensure unfettered access to, and freedom to operate in, space and provide vital effects and capabilities to joint and coalition forces during peacetime and across the spectrum of conflict.”

What is your understanding of the duties and responsibilities of the Commander, USSPACECOM as a Combatant Command in the Department of Defense?
The USSPACECOM Commander ensures the successful execution of the missions assigned in the Unified Command Plan. In particular, the Commander deters threats to US/Allied interests and, if deterrence fails, defeats those threats. In addition, the Commander ensures delivery of combat-relevant space capabilities that preserve and expand the space-enabled combat edge of US/Allied forces, while developing space forces to advance U.S. and Allied interests in, through, and from space.

In light of these duties and responsibilities, what background, expertise, and experience do you possess that qualify you to serve as Commander, USSPACECOM?
My 35 years of service have been focused almost entirely on planning, integrating, executing, and transforming national security space operations at every level from squadron commander to space wing commander, to the Joint Force Space Component Command, and an Air Force major command focused on organizing, training, and equipping space forces. I have been privileged to serve on multiple joint, multi-national and inter-agency teams. I believe the work ahead of us to evolve our national security space posture and protect our vital interests in space is essential and will be a team sport. If confirmed, I am committed to building a strong team of joint, inter-agency and multi-national partners and ensuring the effective and efficient accomplishment of US Space Command’s assigned missions.

Do you believe there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties and responsibilities of the Commander, USSPACECOM?
Yes. I trust and have confidence in the current approach to improve our national security space posture and ensure USSPACECOM has the necessary authorities and resources to carry out all assigned tasks and missions and ensure preparedness to respond to crises and contingencies.
If confirmed, I intend to maintain a laser-focus on the “no fail” space missions upon which the nation and the joint force depends. I also intend to conduct an assessment to ensure the current approach to standing up USSPACECOM remains consistent with U.S. strategic guidance and that the command is on track to secure the people, resources, and authorities necessary to execute the assigned missions. In order to execute these missions, I am committed to developing a strong relationship with my fellow Combatant Commanders, our joint and service component commands, our inter-agency partners, the Intelligence Community, as well as our allied partners. Finally, if confirmed, I look forward to working closely with this committee as we progress towards Full Operational Capability.

Establishing and achieving full operational capability of the U.S. Space Command, while serving as Commander, Air Force Space Command will be a significant undertaking.

What is your experience as a “change management” agent and how do you believe that your experience has prepared you for the task ahead, if confirmed? Please explain your answer.
Throughout my years of service, I have had the opportunity to revolutionize and transform our approaches to national security operations. Specifically, while serving in OSD's Office of Force Transformation in 2003, I had the opportunity to lead rapid satellite development across military, civil, and commercial applications. As the Director of Strategic Plans and Programs at USSSTRATCOM, I led efforts to revitalize and revamp our global campaign planning construct with a focus on global integration. In my current positions as Commander of Joint Force Space Component Command and the Commander of Air Force Space Command, I have worked across the department with inter-agency and international partners, to shift our view of space to a warfighting domain just like air, land, and sea. If confirmed, I plan to build on these efforts to rapidly synchronize and operationalize US and Allied efforts to protect our vital interests in space and ensure freedom of action.

**Major Challenges and Opportunities**

**What do you consider to be the most significant challenges you will face if confirmed as the Commander, USSPACECOM?**
At establishment, USSPACECOM will execute its mission from dispersed locations while building towards a fully functioning combatant command, integrated with the other combatant commands. During the build up, USSPACECOM will need to continue to address the following top challenges: (1) threats to U.S. space capabilities, (2) threats from adversary space capabilities to U.S. military forces, and (3) maintaining and growing our national security space programs, combat-relevant space capabilities, and joint space warfighters.

**What plans do you have for addressing each of these challenges, if confirmed?**
Space is a warfighting domain just like air, land, and sea, and we must normalize our warfighting posture as we do in the other domains. If confirmed, I will work closely
with the other Combatant Commanders to synchronize our efforts, integrate planning, and capitalize on one another's capabilities. I will continue to work closely with the military services and the intelligence community to leverage and build upon the great relationships we have today. We must ensure we're deploying the right capabilities and systems to ensure we can deter aggression and maintain freedom of action in space for ourselves, our allies, and our partners.

**Given the major challenges you identified above, what other priorities would you set for your term as Commander, USSPACECOM?**

If confirmed, I will work closely with my chain of command to shape the command’s priorities. Initial priorities will be to build the new Combatant Command focused on the space domain and remain consistent with the priorities of the department. We must enhance the readiness and lethality of our space capabilities to effectively operate in today’s warfighting domain. We also must develop the strong global partnerships with the intelligence community, our allies and commercial industry. Finally, we must develop warfighter essential requirements and business models to move fast and stay ahead of the growing threat. These priorities highlight the importance of elevating the responsibility for space to a warfighting combatant command with singularity of focus to compete, deter, and win in the space domain.

**If confirmed, what actions would you take to focus your Command’s and Department of Defense efforts on each of these priorities?**

If confirmed, I will work closely with the other Combatant Commanders to better integrate space capabilities into their deliberate planning efforts, synchronized with global operations. In my current role as Joint Force Space Component Commander, we have begun deploying Integrated Planning Elements within USINDOPACOM, USEUCOM, and USSTRATCOM as pathfinders to establish full-time, permanent teams at each of the Combatant Command staffs. I will also work closely with the military Services and the Intelligence Community to ensure our warfighting requirements are synchronized across the national security space enterprise.

**Chain of Command**

In accordance with title 10, U.S. Code, the President and Secretary of Defense exercise authority, direction, and control of the Armed Forces through two distinct branches of the chain of command. One branch runs from the President, through the Secretary of Defense, to the Combatant Commanders—for missions and forces assigned to their commands. For purposes other than the operational direction of the Combatant Commands, the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the Military Departments, and, as prescribed by the Secretaries, to the commanders of Military Service forces. Because you will be dual hatted as the Commander, USSPACECOM and the Commander, Air Force Space Command, you will report via both chains of command to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Air Force respectively.
What are your views of the feasibility, advisability, and suitability of the dual-hatting of the positions of Commander, USSPACECOM and Commander, Air Force Space Command?

At the outset, given the need for a rapid and synchronized approach to transforming our strategic operating concepts, warfighting doctrines, campaign plans, as well as force structure and posture, I see the dual-hatting as a strength and a significant opportunity for synergies between the “joint warfighting hat” of USSPACECOM and the “organize, train and equip” hat of Air Force Space Command, particularly given the limitations on staffing and the near-term review of authorities. If confirmed, once the combatant command has reached a conditions-based and combat-credible operating capacity, I think it will be best to split the two hats providing singularity of focus to both the warfighting and organize, train, and equip missions.

If confirmed as the Commander, USSPACECOM and Air Force Space Command, how would you envision and execute your roles in both the operational and “man, train, and equip” chains of command?

To some extent, the dual-hatting is not new, as I have been serving as both the Joint Force Space Component Commander and as Commander, Air Force Space Command since 2017. Although the two commands will be close partners, they have two separate staffs. There are functional synergies in operational missions and warfighting strategy that shapes requirements, as well as joint force design and development. If confirmed, I will focus the two headquarters on their assigned missions and on executing their assigned tasks while leveraging opportunities for synergy and speed while the Combatant Command evolves.

In your view, do these dual chains of command enhance or degrade civilian control of the military?

Civilian control of the military is established by the Constitution of the United States, the National Security Act of 1947, and Title 10 U.S. Code. The dual chains of command enhance civilian control of the military, providing a single Commander with accountability to civilian leaders for space matters. If confirmed, I will be accountable to my chain of command and will work closely with this committee for proper oversight.

Are there circumstances in which you believe it is appropriate for U.S. military forces to be under the operational command or control of an authority other than the chain of command established under title 10, U.S. Code?

The only circumstance in which it is appropriate for U.S. military forces to be under the operational command of an authority other than the chain of command is when directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. For example, during multinational operations, nations typically retain a National Command Element to exercise national Operational Control (OPCON) over their forces to ensure national caveats, such as differing Rules of Engagement, are complied with. There may be circumstances where it is appropriate for U.S. forces to operate under tactical control (TACON) of allied/coalition Command and Control (C2), but not without careful
consideration and coordination. However, OPCON of U.S. forces should not be relinquished outside of the chain of command established under U.S. law.

**Use of Military Force**

*In your view, what factors should be considered in making recommendations to the President on the use of military force?*

The Combatant Commander has the authority to give direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out the missions of the command, in particular the missions assigned to the command in the UCP. It is part of the commander’s role to ensure that military force is applied only within the bounds of the laws of armed conflict and domestic laws. Similarly, it is the commander’s role to carry out military operations subject to constraints outlined in the Standing Rules for the Use of Force (SRUF) and Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE). If a Combatant Commander needs additional authorities to carry out the assigned UCP missions, it is that commander’s responsibility to request and advocate for additional authority from the appropriate level in the Chain of Command.

*Are there other factors that, in your view, should be considered in making recommendations on the use of military force in space operations, whether conducted in the terrestrial or space domains, or through the electromagnetic spectrum?*

Any use of force must comply with domestic law, international law, the UN Charter, and applicable treaties, regardless of the domain in which the use of force originates, transits, or terminates. If confirmed, any recommendation on the use of force will comply with the above guidelines, and will be executed consistent with the process used by other Combatant Commanders.

*In your view, what is the appropriate role of a Combatant Commander in establishing policies for the use of military force and rules of engagement?*

If confirmed, my role is to use all available intelligence and situational awareness to make recommendations to the President. This includes, but is not limited to, the severity and imminence of the threat, the impact of the threat to global and regional military operations, and the broader strategic and geopolitical context. Any recommendation on the use of force will comply with domestic and international law, the UN Charter, and applicable treaties, and will be executed consistent with the process used by other Combatant Commanders.

*Should a Combatant Commander’s role in this regard differ, in your view, when establishing policies for the use of military force and the rules of engagement for space operations?*

No. Space is a warfighting domain just like air, land, and sea. Any use of force must comply with domestic law, international law, the UN Charter, and applicable treaties, regardless of the domain in which the use of force originates, transits, or terminates. If confirmed, the role of the USSPACECOM commander will be consistent with that of the other Combatant Commanders.
National Defense Strategy

The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) moved beyond the “two-war construct” that has guided defense strategy, capability development, and investment for the past three decades, and refocused DOD on “great power competition and conflict” with China and Russia, while directing a “more resource sustainable” approach to counterterrorism.

In your view, does the 2018 NDS accurately assess the strategic environment as it pertains to the domain of space? In your view, what will “great power competition” look like in space? Are there other nation-states or other actors operating in space that you perceive as a risk to the United States or as cause for concern? If so, why?
The 2018 NDS accurately assesses the challenges presented by an increasingly complex and volatile security environment marked by a return to great power competition, and the impacts to space are significant. Potential adversaries seek to undermine our competitive advantage, constrain our ability to project power and meet our alliance commitments. Moreover, they are developing capabilities to disrupt, degrade and destroy US national security space assets while deploying their own space capabilities to detect, track and attempt to defeat US/Allied forces.
Competition and deterrence in space are grounded in the tenets of our National Security Strategy and our National Defense Strategy and those apply across all domains and depend on tailored contributions from all elements of national power. Space is a vital national interest and freedom of action must be preserved. No one wants a conflict in space and deterrence is a top priority…however, if deterrence fails, we must be prepared to fight and win.

Does the 2018 NDS properly focus the United States on preparing to compete, deter, and win against the range of threats in the domain of space? Please explain your answer.
The NDS and the 2018 National Strategy for Space provide strong strategic direction to the Department and National Security Space enterprise. If confirmed, I plan to focus on developing the relationships and the globally integrated plans and operating concepts to strengthen our approach to strategic competition, deterrence, and warfighting moving forward.

What is your understanding of U.S. strategic objectives in space and what role do you believe USSPACECOM and Air Force Space Command should play in supporting these objectives? What does successful implementation of the 2018 NDS “look like” in the domain of space?
Space is a vital interest as spelled out in our National Security Strategy. Preserving U.S. freedom of action in space and, if necessary, denying adversaries the hostile use of space are essential to joint force operations. As the combatant command charged with ensuring space superiority, USSPACECOM will lead space campaign planning and employment. As the US Air Force’s major command focused on organizing, training, and equipping space forces, Air Force Space Command builds the force
structure for the combatant commands to fight with. In order to implement the NDS, these two commands must work together, and partner across the inter-agency, and alongside allies and partners to transform strategy and operating concepts, force structure and posture, and organizational approaches to compete, deter and win in an era of expanding threats to US interests.

**Given your current knowledge of space programs, does the 2018 NDS specify the correct set of capabilities by which the United States can achieve its objectives in space, in the face of ongoing competition and potential conflict with China and Russia? What do you perceive as the areas of highest risk?**

The 2018 NDS identifies strategic priorities necessary to compete with, and deter potential adversaries like Russia and China and provides a template for modifications to joint force design as the security environment evolves. Today, our space forces are the best in the world. However, the scope, scale and complexity of adversary counterspace capabilities are concerning and eroding our operational advantage. We need to expand and improve our space capabilities at a faster pace to stay ahead of the growing threat.

**Given your current knowledge of space programs, are extant U.S. policies, programs, and authorities applicable to space appropriate to ensure the United States can compete, deter, and win in great power competition in space? What do you perceive as the areas of highest risk? If confirmed, what additional measures would you consider and recommend?**

We are better postured now than we ever have been, but there is certainly work to do. Existing U.S. policies, programs and authorities related to space are moving in the right direction to ensure the U.S. prevails in a future great power competition in space. As directed by Space Policy Directive 4, the highest levels of the U.S. government to include the National Security Council, National Space Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and this Congress are all actively engaged on these issues. If confirmed, I am committed to being an active participant in this dialogue and a passionate advocate to ensure our policies, authorities, strategic plans, and joint force development are optimized and aligned to outpace the threat.

**If confirmed, what changes or adjustments would you advise the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to make in DOD’s implementation of the 2018 NDS as regards the domain of space?**

We have acknowledged that Space is a warfighting domain similar to air, land, and sea. Now we must organize and develop the joint force to posture for space superiority across the continuum of conflict—and that work is ongoing. As a co-equal Combatant Command, USSPACECOM will be the Department’s point of contact on military space operational matters. Accordingly, if confirmed, I will partner with the other Combatant Commands, and across the inter-agency, and alongside allies and partners to transform strategy and operating concepts, force structure and posture, and organizational approaches to compete, deter, and win in an era of expanding threats to US interests.
In your view, how should USSPACECOM and the Air Force Space Command be sized, structured, and resourced to implement the 2018 NDS and execute U.S. strategic objectives in the space domain?

USSPACECOM detailed planning efforts are under way. The department is working through manpower assessments as well as numerous senior leader reviews and exercises to refine the size, structure and resourcing requirements of USSPACECOM. The ultimate size of the command is still in work, but at establishment, we plan to transfer approximately 640 manpower authorizations from USSTRATCOM to USSPACECOM to form the initial cadre. These numbers include personnel from the USSTRATCOM headquarters staff, the entire Joint Force Space Component Command staff, as well as the manpower authorizations distributed across the five 24/7 space mission operations centers (e.g. missile warning, navigation warfare, space defense, etc.) which will transfer to the new USSPACECOM.

Manpower estimates to achieve Full Operational Capability will be completed in the coming months, but we expect the USSPACECOM headquarters to be sized consistent with other combatant commands. We are transforming our strategy and operating concepts, improving our force structure and posture, and strengthening our organizational approaches to compete, deter and win in the 21st Century Security Environment. If confirmed, I will work with the chain of command and this committee to ensure we have the resources required to accomplish the assigned missions.

In your view, what metrics or conditions would be indicative of U.S. success in the “great power competition” in space?

The principal condition we need to remain focused on is protecting our vital interests in space and ensuring US freedom of action. The nation and the joint force depend on our ability to project and sustain power globally and that cannot happen without space superiority. Hence our four lines of effort: to deter adversaries, defend US interests, deliver a space-enabled combat edge to the joint force, and develop space forces for warfighting. If confirmed, this is the lens through which I will assess effectiveness as we stand up USSPACECOM.

**DOD Readiness in Space**

How would you assess the current readiness of the DOD and the U.S. Government as a whole—across the domains of materiel and equipment, personnel, and training—to implement the 2018 NDS and U.S. strategic objectives as they relate to the domain of space?

The United States is the best in the world in space and enjoys both a qualitative and quantitative advantage over any potential adversary. Additionally, our world class space professionals provide us significant advantage. However, as noted in the recent DIA report: Challenges to Security in Space,” potential adversaries have taken note of our military operations over the years and are seeking to close the gap and reduce U.S. and allied military effectiveness. Specifically, nations like Russia and China are rapidly developing capability to deny and destroy U.S. space capabilities, while investing heavily in space capability designed to monitor, track, and target U.S. and
allied forces. Accordingly, the U.S. is taking concrete steps to advance our national interests and ensure we maintain freedom of action in, through, and from the space domain.

If confirmed, what actions would you take to move DOD and, as appropriate, other U.S. Government organizations toward full spectrum readiness to execute global space operations and missions, and under what timelines?
Historically, we have measured our space readiness against a benign domain. In my current role, we are shifting our efforts to measure against a contested warfighting domain. Re-establishing USSPACECOM is a significant step toward enabling the DoD to increase focus on joint readiness. DoD will now have a CCMD singularly focused on space operations, mission areas, and readiness. Much of our readiness in the space domain will be based on our ability to develop joint space warfighters to counter future threats. There are a number of processes in place for Combatant Commands to advocate for resources that impact their Areas of Responsibility. USSPACECOM's interaction with other U.S. Government organizations can help bring a unified effort across all space agencies. By actively executing the existing processes, working with partner organizations, and ensuring that the space AOR is properly represented, we will be able to move towards full spectrum readiness.

If confirmed, how would you oversee compliance with your timelines to ensure that readiness goals are met?
If confirmed, I will work with the military services, space agencies and this committee to develop, implement, and oversee compliance with readiness standards. I will utilize existing processes for readiness reporting and oversight. Prioritization of resources must be a part of any solution to ensure readiness goals are met.

**Alliances and Partnerships**

Mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships are crucial to U.S. success in competition and conflict against a great power. To this end, the 2018 NDS stresses the importance of strengthening existing U.S. alliances and partnerships, building or enhancing new ones, and promoting “mutual respect, responsibility, priorities, and accountability” in these relationships. If confirmed as Commander, USSPACECOM, you would serve as the single point of contact for military space operational matters to U.S. Government agencies, U.S. commercial entities, and international agencies for matters related to military space operations.

If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to strengthen existing U.S. alliances and partnerships, build new partnerships, and exploit opportunities for cooperation in space operations activities and missions?
In my current role, I have worked tirelessly to develop and mature needed partnerships. These partnerships provide us great strength. If confirmed, I would continue this critical work. Each ally and partner has unique strengths that can support the goal of deterring or otherwise discouraging potential adversaries from extending conflict into space. In my current role as the USSTRATCOM Joint Force...
Space Component Commander, we expanded Operation OLYMPIC DEFENDER (OOD) to the first officially-designated multi-national effort. The next step is to work with each partner nation to highlight the unique capabilities they would provide to the multi-national force (MNF). I am confident this work will deliver capabilities that strengthen our combined ability to ensure freedom of action in space.

**How would you characterize your familiarity with the leaders of other nations’ military space operations enterprises, international consultative forums regarding space operations, and processes for enhancing space-related interoperability between allies and partners?**

I am very familiar with all of our allied and partner space leadership, forums, and processes through my previous assignments, notably my past USSTRATCOM roles and my current position as the Commander of Air Force Space Command. We cannot afford to secure space unilaterally. In my prior and current positions, I have advocated for increased international engagement in various wargames and exercises to integrate efforts with our allies and partners—the Schriever Wargame series, Global Lightning, Global Thunder, Global Sentinel, and in future Space Flag warfighter exercises. Additionally, we have expanded coalition professional development opportunities. If confirmed as Commander of USSPACECOM, I am committed to expanding our international partnerships through direct engagement with like-minded nations.

**How would you characterize your familiarity with the leaders of the private sector commercial space operations community and how would you engage with them if confirmed as Commander, USSPACECOM?**

Throughout my career I have been afforded many opportunities to engage with the commercial space sector, and have established strong partnerships with them as a community of safe and responsible space organizations. As a nation we rely on a vibrant commercial space sector and, if confirmed, I would build upon and exercise those relationships to advance national security objectives that serve the military, civil, and commercial space community. We must continue to work together to advance our national interests in space through fostering U.S. space leadership in the international arena, promoting the responsible use of space, and collaborating on shared space situational awareness.

**What is your assessment of the risks and benefits associated with building partnerships with private industry to accomplish certain USSPACECOM and Air Force Space Command missions and activities? How would you mitigate any risks you identify?**

The commercial space industry will continue expanding and we are continually pursuing opportunities to take advantage of this explosive growth, which is critical to advancing our national interests in space. We are already leveraging mechanisms such as the Commercial Integration Cell—a formalized partnership with commercial satellite companies represented on the operations floor of the Combined Space Operations Center (CSpOC) at Vandenberg AFB, California. We have DOD-Commercial SSA Sharing Agreements and service-level agreements with several
industry partners. The benefits of partnering with private industry far outweigh the risks, and the best mitigation is continued cooperative engagement.

If confirmed, what steps will you take to improve information-sharing, integration, coordination, and collaboration between USSPACECOM, other DOD commands and organizations, the Intelligence Community, and other governmental agencies?

The global space domain requires global partnerships and close relationships with other Combatant Commanders, the Intelligence Community, and inter-agency organizations. Our partnerships have never been better, but we must continue to strengthen them. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the other Combatant Commanders to fully integrate planning across all domains, and the Intelligence Community to identify key areas of information sharing to strengthen our partnerships across the interagency, allies, and partners. Two ongoing efforts of note initiated under my Joint Force Space Component Command responsibility are Integrated Planning Elements at EUCOM, INDO PACOM and USSTRATCOM designed to better synchronize space planning in geographic Combatant Commands, and the Joint Space Warfighting Forum (JSWF)—a quarterly AFSPC/CC and NRO Director forum that was essential to the creation of the National Space Defense Center.

Relationships

The law, the Unified Command Plan, and traditional practice establish important relationships between the Commander, USSPACECOM/Commander, Air Force Space Command, and the Secretary of Defense, the Intelligence Community, and other senior officials and organizations of the DOD and the U.S. Government. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, USSPACECOM/Commander, Air Force Space Command to each of the following:

The Secretary of Defense
Pursuant to Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 164, subject to the direction of the President, the Commander, USSPACECOM performs duties under the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense and is directly responsible to the Secretary for the preparedness of the command to carry out assigned missions. Commander, USSPACECOM, will exercise Combatant Command authority over Air Force Space Command, its service component. Concurrently, Commander, Air Force Space Command, via the administrative chain of command, is responsible to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, who reports to the Secretary of the Air Force, who, in turn is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the organizing, training and equipping of space forces and capabilities.

The Director of National Intelligence
The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) has overall responsibility for intelligence support to the President and the day-to-day management of the Intelligence Community. USSPACECOM will integrate DNI capabilities, as well as those of
military service, combat support agency (CSA), and its own in-house intelligence assets to coordinate intelligence planning, collection management, and analysis to provide a coordinated, timely, all-source intelligence picture. If confirmed as the Commander USSPACECOM, I look forward to working with the DNI as well as the other intelligence agencies as appropriate, and will ensure the USSPACECOM JIOC has the appropriate connections and relationships to DNI representatives both directly and via the Joint Staff.

The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency reports to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). The CIA’s primary areas of expertise are in HUMINT collection, all source analysis, and the production of political, economic, and biographic intelligence. If confirmed as the Commander USSPACECOM, I look forward to working with the Director to ensure the USSPACECOM JIOC has the appropriate connections to CIA representatives both directly and via the Joint Staff.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
The Under Secretary for Intelligence is the advisor and Principal Staff Assistant (PSA) to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for all intelligence, counterintelligence, security, sensitive activities, and other intelligence-related matters. Intelligence assessments and products related to the global environment will be extremely important to USSPACECOM. If confirmed as the Commander USSPACECOM, I look forward to working with the Under Secretary, through or in coordination with, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to ensure the USSPACECOM JIOC is closely aligned and integrated with Under Secretary for Intelligence representatives.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment
As the Principal Staff Advisor (PSA), the Under Secretary for Acquisition and Sustainment makes recommendations to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for DOD acquisition; research and development; modeling and simulation; logistics; installation management; military construction; procurement; environment; and services. If confirmed as Commander USSPACECOM, I look forward to working with the Under Secretary, through or in coordination with, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to sustain current, and advocate for future, space capabilities.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
As the Principal Staff Advisor (PSA), the Under Secretary for Research and Engineering makes recommendations to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for DoD research and development; modeling and simulation; systems integration; installation management; military construction; and procurement. If confirmed as Commander USSPACECOM, and, as Commander, Air Force Space Command, I look forward to working with the Under Secretary, through or in coordination with, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to advocate, develop, and field future space capabilities.
The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
As the Principal Staff Assistant (PSA) and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary for Policy formulates national security and defense policy, integrates DOD policy and plans and performs oversight of defense policy goals to achieve national security objectives. These policies guide USSPACECOM strategic planning and operations. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Under Secretary, through or in coordination with, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to ensure USSPACECOM planning and operations are synchronized with national policy.

The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Per Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 151, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council and the Secretary of Defense. Per Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 163, the Chairman transmits communications between the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the USSPACECOM Commander as directed by the Secretary of Defense. As the principal military advisor to the President and Secretary of Defense, the Chairman is a key conduit between the Combatant Commander, Interagency, and the Service Chiefs. These officers are not in the chain of command. If confirmed, I will keep Chairman, or Vice Chairman in his absence, and the Secretary of Defense informed without delay on matters for which I am personally accountable as Commander, USSPACECOM.

The Secretary of the Air Force
Per Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 9013, the Secretary of the Air Force is responsible for, and has the authority necessary to conduct all affairs of the Department of the Air Force, including the functions of organizing, training, and equipping of Air Force forces. Additionally, under Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 165 the Secretary of the Air Force is responsible for administration and support of Air Force forces that are assigned to unified Combatant Commands. While Combatant Command authority is clear regarding assigned forces, close coordination with each Service secretary is necessary to ensure roles and responsibilities are lawfully executed. Close coordination with the Secretary of the Air Force is critical to successful execution of the USSPACECOM and Air Force Space Command missions, and if confirmed, I look forward to reinforcing a strong and productive relationship with the Secretary of the Air Force.

The Chief of Staff of the Air Force
Per Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 9033, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force advises the Secretary of the Air Force on plans and recommendations for the Air Force and carries those plans into effect. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force is responsible for the organization, training and equipping of Air Force forces to be employed by Combatant Commanders. The Commander of Air Force Space Command will be responsible via the administrative chain of command to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, who reports to the Secretary of the Air Force for the organizing, training and
equipping of space forces and capabilities. Close coordination with the Chief of Staff of the Air Force is critical to successful execution of the USSPACECOM and Air Force Space Command missions, and if confirmed, I look forward to reinforcing a strong and productive relationship with the Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

The Under Secretary of the Air Force
Per Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 9015, the Under Secretary of the Air Force shall perform such duties and exercise such powers as the Secretary of the Air Force may prescribe. Likewise, under Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 165, subject to the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense, and subject to the authority of the Combatant Commanders under Section 164, the Secretary of the Air Force is responsible for administration and support of Air Force forces that are assigned to unified Combatant Commands. The authority exercised by a Combatant Commander over assigned forces is clear, but requires close coordination with each Service Secretary to ensure there is no infringement upon those lawful responsibilities that a Secretary alone may discharge. If confirmed, I look forward to building a strong and productive relationship with the Under Secretary of the Air Force, in both my capacity as Commander, USSPACECOM and Air Force Space Command.

The Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force
Under Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 9016, the Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force shall perform such duties and exercise such powers as the Secretary of the Air Force may prescribe. There are four such assistant secretaries whose responsibilities cover manpower and reserve affairs; financial management (including comptroller functions); acquisition, technology, and logistics; and installations, environment, and energy. Under Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 165, subject to the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense, and subject to the authority of the Combatant Commanders, the Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible for administration and support of forces that are assigned to unified and specified commands. The authority exercised by a Combatant Commander over assigned forces is clear, but requires close coordination with each Secretary to ensure there is no infringement upon those lawful responsibilities that a Secretary alone may discharge. If confirmed, I look forward to building a strong and productive relationship with the Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force, in both my capacity as Commander, USSPACECOM and Air Force Space Command.

The Secretaries of the other Military Departments and Chiefs of the other Military Services
Under Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 165, subject to the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense, and subject to the authority of the Combatant Commanders under Section 164, the Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible for administration and support of forces that are assigned to unified Combatant Commands. The authority exercised by a Combatant Commander over assigned forces is clear, but requires close coordination with each Secretary to ensure there is no infringement upon those lawful responsibilities that a Secretary alone may discharge. If confirmed, I look forward to building a strong and productive
Likewise, the Service Chiefs perform their duties under the authority, direction, and control of the respective Service Secretaries and are responsible to their respective Secretaries to provide organized, trained, and equipped forces assigned to, and employed by, Combatant Commanders. While Service Chiefs no longer serve in the operational chain of command, they are members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and have a lawful obligation to provide military advice. If confirmed as Commander, USSPACECOM, I will confer closely and often with the Service Chiefs as they are individually and collectively a tremendous source of experience and judgment.

The Director, Space Development Agency
The Space Development Agency is one of several organizations focused on transitioning requirements into space capabilities to build a more lethal force and reform the department for greater performance and affordability. If confirmed, as Commander, USSPACECOM, I look forward to building a strong relationship with the Director of the Space Development Agency. I will help ensure proper coordination continues with organizations such as Space and Missile Systems Center and the Space Rapid Capabilities Office to meet the warfighting requirements of USSPACECOM.

The Director, Space Rapid Capabilities Office
The Space Rapid Capabilities Office is one of several organizations focused on transitioning requirements into space capabilities to build a more lethal force and reform the department for greater performance and affordability. Per the 2019 NDAA, the Director of the SpRCO is under my current authority as the Commander of Air Force Space Command. If confirmed, as Commander, USSPACECOM, I look forward to building a strong relationship with the Director of the SpRCO in the new role where I would establish and validate capability requirements and recommend priorities. I will help ensure proper coordination continues with organizations such as Space and Missile Systems Center and the Space Development Agency to meet the warfighting requirements of USSPACECOM.

The Commander, Space and Missile Systems Center
The Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) is one of several organizations focused on transitioning requirements into space capabilities to build a more lethal force and reform the department for greater performance and affordability. SMC is the Air Force’s product center for the development and acquisition of space and missile systems. SMC is under my current authority and I maintain a very close relationship with the SMC Commander and his PEO leadership through the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition. If confirmed as Commander, USSPACECOM, I will continue this strong relationship and will ensure proper coordination on mission essential warfighter requirements continues with organizations such as Space Rapid Capabilities Office and the Space Development Agency to meet the warfighting requirements of USSPACECOM.
The Commander, U.S. Strategic Command
The USSTRATCOM Commander provided the foundation of USSPACECOM through the establishment of the Joint Force Space Component Command (JFSCC). With delegated operational control of assigned space forces, the JFSCC staff and those organizations currently subordinate to JFSCC will comprise the initial USSPACECOM cadre. The smooth and seamless transfer of the space mission from USSTRATCOM to this new Combatant Command is vital. As such, the Commander USSTRATCOM directed a draft Memorandum of Understanding between USSTRATCOM and USSPACECOM be developed which will ensure the space domain is supported throughout the USSPACECOM establishment process until full operational capability (FOC) is declared. Further, USSPACECOM will provide vital space resources and capabilities to USSTRATCOM in support of its strategic deterrence mission. If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with Commander, USSTRATCOM throughout this process and will maintain this working relationship through FOC and beyond.

The Commander, U.S. Cyber Command
U.S. Cyber Command is responsible for the planning and execution of global cyberspace operations as directed, which includes directing Department of Defense information networks security, operations, and defense. The relationship between the space and cyber domains is critical to the success of both. If confirmed, as Commander, USSPACECOM, I will establish a close relationship with Commander, U.S. Cyber Command to support military operations in and through cyberspace, ensure effective cyber support to operations in the space domain, and ensure our policies and practices are consistent with U.S. Cyber Command guidance regarding the security and protection of USSPACECOM networks and systems.

The other Combatant Commanders
If confirmed as Commander, USSPACECOM, and following the establishment of USSPACECOM, I will work to establish close relationships with the other Combatant Commanders as such relationships and coordination are critical to the execution of the National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy and respective theater strategies. Effective cross Combatant Command relationships are characterized by mutual support, frequent contact, and productive exchanges of information and ideas. The importance of globally synchronized combatant commands has never been more important as the threats we face are becoming increasingly trans-regional in nature.

The Chief, National Guard Bureau
The Chief of the National Guard Bureau, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, serves as a military Advisor to the President, Secretary of Defense, and National Security Council. Further, the Guard Bureau Chief is the Department of Defense’s official channel of communication to the Governors and State Adjutants General on all matter pertaining to the National Guard. Success in the space domain, like air, land, and sea, requires a total force effort. If confirmed as Commander, USSPACECOM, I will coordinate and work with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau on all Guard issues related to USSPACECOM.
The Commander, U.S. Space Forces (when established)
When U.S. Space Force is established, it will be headed by a Chief of Staff similar in authority to the other Services. Service Chiefs of Staff are responsible to their respective Service Secretaries to provide organized, trained, and equipped forces for operations under Combatant Commanders in accomplishing their assigned missions. If confirmed as Commander, USSPACECOM, I look forward to working with whoever is nominated and confirmed to lead the U.S. Space Force.

The Director, National Security Agency (NSA)
The Director of the NSA is responsible for global monitoring, collection, and processing of information and data for foreign and domestic intelligence and counterintelligence purposes, specializing in signals intelligence (SIGINT). If confirmed as the Commander, USSPACECOM, I look forward to working with the Director to ensure the USSPACECOM JIOC has the appropriate connections to NSA representatives and to meet the other warfighting requirements of USSPACECOM.

The Director, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
The Director, NRO, reports to both the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense. The NRO is responsible for research and development, acquisition, launch, deployment, and operation of overhead systems and related data-processing facilities to collect intelligence and information to support national, Intelligence Community, and Department of Defense missions. If confirmed as Commander of USSPACECOM, I will continue the already-close relationship and build upon the successes we have achieved with the Director of the NRO on space mission area requirements—to include the National Space Defense Center (NSDC). The benefits of this teamwork over the last few years demonstrate the importance of bringing shared interests together to successfully address truly complex national security challenges.

The Director, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)
The Director, NGA, serves as the functional manager for Geospatial Intelligence Information (GEOINT) and is the principal GEOINT advisor to the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combatant Commanders. NGA receives guidance and oversight from the Department of Defense, the Director of National Intelligence, and Congress. If confirmed as Commander, USSPACECOM, I look forward to working with the Director to ensure the USSPACECOM Joint Intelligence Operations Center has the appropriate connections to NGA representatives and to meet the warfighting requirements of USSPACECOM.

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency advises the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commanders, and other senior leaders, on matters concerning military and military-related intelligence. Also, the DIA Director coordinates intelligence support to meet Combatant Command
requirements. As Defense Collection Manager, the DIA Director serves as the conduit for collection coordination with the joint intelligence operation centers (JIOCs). The Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence (J-2) is both a major component of DIA and a fully integrated element of the Joint Staff. If confirmed as the Commander, USSPACECOM, I look forward to working with the Director to ensure the USSPACECOM JIOC has the appropriate connections to DIA representatives via the Joint Staff and to meet the other warfighting requirements of USSPACECOM.

**USSPACECOM Establishment**

In your view, what are the first tasks you must undertake to establish USSPACECOM, particularly as relates to the separation from U.S. Strategic Command? What are the most challenging tasks you expect to undertake, if confirmed, in the context of standing up USSPACECOM?

If confirmed, my first priority will be to ensure the seamless transition of the command and control of critical space capabilities that the nation and the joint force depend on each-and-every day. Simultaneously we need to ensure we take steps to strengthen readiness and lethality as we complete our shift from a permissive environment to a posture for warfighting. The challenges in standing up a new Combatant Command are substantial, but can be binned in three broad categories: structural, operational, and cultural. Structurally, we need to sustain our partnership with USSTRATCOM while we stand up new, independent organizations, task-organized around space warfighting on a scale that has never been done before. Operationally, we must strengthen our capability and capacity to plan and employ space forces as part of a globally-integrated team. That will require expanding partnerships across the Department and in the other Combatant Commands, as well as internationally and across the inter-agency. Culturally, we need to solidify our shift in the development of the Joint Force to realize the potential of multi-domain operations. If confirmed, I am committed to tackling these challenges head on, in order to ensure we protect our vital interests in space and ensure U.S. freedom of action.

If confirmed as Commander, USSPACECOM, how would you structure the command and its subordinate components to unify the command and control of operational forces in the space operations domain?

The establishment of USSPACECOM will be focused on core organizing concepts to strengthen our ability to deter attack on the U.S. and our allies, defend U.S./Allied interests, deliver a space-enabled combat edge to the Joint Force, and develop space forces for warfighting. As we review the missions, authorities, and force structure required to execute assigned tasks, we see great promise in addressing the structural, operational, and cultural challenges of standing up USSPACECOM by leveraging subordinate components optimized to: deliver integrated space capabilities to the joint force, synchronize the command and control and defense of National Security Space capabilities, and forward-deploy space experts to improve globally-integrated planning and employment of space capabilities with reach back to USSPACECOM. The exact size and makeup of these components is still being refined, as are the
military service component relationships to USSPACECOM. If confirmed, optimizing USSPACECOM task organization for assigned missions will be a top priority.

If confirmed, what first steps would you take to integrate space operation and activity planning and execution across all combatant commanders’ campaign and contingency plans?
Through our current efforts in Joint Force Space Component Command, we have already made significant progress in integrating space operations planning and execution with key Combatant Commands through space Integrated Planning Elements (IPE) embedded in those commands. If confirmed, I will continue that effort in establishing these forward elements of USSPACECOM in each of the Combatant Commands to assist in the globally integrated planning and employment of space capabilities in each Combatant Command.

General John Hyten, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, has assured this Committee that U.S. Strategic Command will continue to perform essential space functions until USSPACECOM is established and operational.

On what timeline do you expect USSPACECOM to reach Initial Operating Capability? Full Operating Capability?
The milestones of USSPACECOM are Establishment, IOC, and FOC, and each are conditions-based and the milestones are dependent on meeting specific criteria. Establishment criteria center on Combatant Commander confirmation; Unified Command Plan designation of USSPACECOM missions and responsibilities, and the assignment of space operations forces to the CDRUSSPACECOM. Initial Operating Capability declaration will be based on the commander’s assessment that the command is appropriately resourced to execute basic combatant command functions. In short, the Commander, USSPACECOM will assess whether the command can accomplish independent intelligence, indications and warning (I&W), operations, Command and Control (C2), and campaign planning functions required of a combatant command; and evaluate whether USSPACECOM is postured with the appropriate forces, resources and authorities to execute assigned UCP missions and responsibilities. Full Operational Capability declaration will also be conditions-based and those criteria will be determined by the Commander after Establishment. Major milestones for consideration will be the termination of USSTRATCOM support and an assessment of USSPACECOM and subordinate components as fully mission capable with the necessary force structure, resources, and authorities required.

What missions, functions, and tasks will transfer from U.S. Strategic Command to USSPACECOM?
The recently signed UCP assigns the following responsibilities from U.S. Strategic Command to U.S. Space Command: Conducting offensive and defensive space operations; Protecting and defending U.S. and, as directed, allied, partner, and commercial space operational capabilities; Advocating for space operations capabilities; Serving as DOD manager for human space flight operations; Providing
warning and assessment of attacks on space assets, defending on orbit assets and associated data links, and coordinating with other Combatant Commands for defense of USSPACECOM terrestrial assets; Serving as the single point of contact for military space operational matters; space situational awareness for U.S. Government agencies; Planning and executing space situational awareness for the DoD and coordinating with U.S. Government agencies; and Providing space capabilities (e.g. satellite communications, missile warning, nuclear detonation detection, environmental monitoring, military intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance, etc.) to Combatant Commands, allies, etc.

How many people, including military and civilian personnel, do you expect to transfer from U.S. Strategic Command to establish and ramp up USSPACECOM? In what Military Service branches, specialties, areas of concentration, and occupational groups and series do you expect these transferred personnel will serve?

Approximately 642 personnel will transfer from USSTRATCOM to form the Establishment initial cadre. These include space-related positions from USSTRATCOM Headquarters, and all personnel from Joint Force Space Component Command and its distributed space mission operations centers. These personnel are from each branch of the military service and will serve in every Combatant Command functional area.

**USSPACECOM Operational Missions and Tasks**

The Commander, USSPACECOM is responsible for the planning and execution of global space operations missions and activities, providing space-related support to other combatant commands and their operational plans, and the defense of space assets.

**Please explain your views on the “pros” and “cons” of unity of command as compared to unity of effort in space?**

Today we effectively execute Unity of Command of our joint space forces and Unity of Effort among DoD and NRO forces. The relationship between DoD and the NRO has never been better. We share a protect and defend strategy, concept of operations, programs and organizations. We have built a strong “unity of effort” construct at the NSDC, which serves us very well in day-to-day space operations. Space Policy Directive 4 directs the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence to create and enhance mechanisms for collaboration. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing to strengthen this relationship further.

**In your view, in a time of conflict in space, is unity of command, unity of effort, or some other approach the most effective in ensuring the protection and defense of U.S. Government and allied space assets? Please explain your answer.**

As stated above, unity of effort has produced tangible gains in planning, coordination, and cooperation. That said, I can see a time when we will need to re-evaluate the formal command relationship depending on assigned missions. If desired, I can share the specific examples in a closed session with either members of Congress or cleared
If confirmed, what would be your approach to executing each of following responsibilities of the Commander, USSPACECOM:

**Conducting offensive and defensive space operations.**
Using proven Joint and Combined warfighting doctrine inherent in the Combatant Command structure, USSPACECOM will build on the relationships developed with the other Combatant Commands to integrate Campaign Planning and Operations. Embedding Integrated Planning Elements (IPE) at each Combatant Command to synchronize the use of space capabilities across all AORs ensures synergy of effects in multi-domain operations.

**Protecting and defending U.S., and as directed, allied and partner space operational capabilities.**
USSPACECOM’s organizational construct with a subordinate command responsible for Protecting and Defending in the Space AOR will provide deterrence, and should deterrence fail, the capability to fight through, from, and in space to protect and defend U.S. and Allied interests.

**Advocating for space operations capabilities.**
If confirmed, I will advocate for, and set priorities for space operations capabilities through the Combatant Command’s Integrated Priority List, in coordination with DoD, IC, and the military services to identify seams in our current capabilities, establish requirements and develop future space capabilities to enhance our combat power and ensure space superiority.

**Serving as DOD manager for human space flight operations.**
USSPACECOM will continue to build upon the already established relationships USSTRATCOM fostered with the Human Space Flight community and will coordinate with commercial, civil and international partners to provide safe and reliable human space flight operations.

**Providing warning and assessment of attacks on space assets, defending on-orbit space assets and associated data links, and coordinating with other Combatant Commands for defense of USSPACECOM terrestrial assets.**
USSPACECOM will integrate its Command and Control into the existing National Military Command System to enable timely sharing of critical data to military and civilian leadership, provide shared awareness with the IC in the National Space Defense Center, and coordinate with other Combatant Commands for defense of key terrestrial assets.
Serving as the single point of contact for military space operational matters to U.S. Government agencies, U.S. commercial entities, and international agencies for matters related to military space operations. If confirmed, my role as Commander, US Space Command will streamline my interaction with the commercial, civil and international entities to provide a single voice enabling seamless operations in the best interests of the US and Allied security and foster Joint, Combined, and Interagency partnerships that form the foundation of our nation’s space superiority.

Planning and executing space situational awareness operations for the DOD, and for assets used for national and homeland security purposes; Coordinating with U.S. Government agencies; and, as appropriate, commercial and force space entities. If confirmed, I will transition the SSA operations for DOD and other organizations that currently reside in USSTRATCOM to USSPACECOM and ensure that Joint, Combined, and Interagency cooperation and coordination increases to protect all US vital interest in space.

Providing space capabilities such as satellite communications; missile warning; nuclear detonation detection; environmental monitoring; military intelligence surveillance, and reconnaissance; and positioning, navigation, and timing information to combatant commands, allies, and other entities. USSPACECOM will provide these critical capabilities through the Service Components that will be assigned to the Combatant Command. If confirmed, I will work with the services to set priorities and ensure the capabilities are provided at the right time and the right place, to compete, deter and win in an era of expanding threats to US interests.

Planning, executing, and assessing security cooperation activities that support space operations, in coordination with geographic combatant commands and the Intelligence Community. If confirmed, I will continue to bolster the unity of effort between the DOD and IC that currently includes the Joint Space Warfighting Forum (JSWF) and the partnership in the National Space Defense Center. As a Combatant Command, USSPACECOM will increase the focus on security cooperation activities with a Commander singularly focused on the Space Domain.

Do you believe that in the event of a conflict in space, reliance on a single operational commander would benefit or detract from U.S. success? A single operational commander will be a benefit. Space capabilities today are so complex, equities are so varied, and importance of cooperation so vital, that success in the space domain will, in fact, depend on our ability to align properly under a single unified combatant commander. Moreover, the subsequent integration of space across U.S. warfighting commands and the resulting direct combatant commander input on the space components of the DOD’s Planning, Programming, and Budget Execution process, will enable the U.S. to maintain its superiority in the space
domain. This will, in turn, ensure space operations receive full and equal consideration for DoD resources, and it will consolidate responsibilities for training and globally managing the joint space operations force under one single authority.

**Should there be a conflict—whether in space or another domain—what are your views on the importance of unity of command and/or unity of effort between DOD and Intelligence Community assets, both in space on the ground?**

Space is a contested domain with determined adversaries dedicated to neutralizing the advantage the U.S. has held, and continues to hold in space. Given the integral nature of our civilian and military space systems to our way of life, and our way of waging war, it is absolutely essential to have unity of command and unity of effort where required to maximize delivery of effects and optimized efficient use of space capabilities.

The tasking of on-orbit assets must be conducted, and the data they collect made available in a timeframe relevant to the warfighter to ensure mission accomplishment. Given the current allocation of authorities and responsibilities across DOD and the Intelligence Community, how can these processes be accelerated to increase mission impact, in your view?

USSPACECOM will create a single DoD focal point for interaction with the IC in utilization of both DoD and IC space assets. The relationship has worked well in the past, and will continue. With a clear vision and unity of purpose between national security entities, the appropriate space authorities can be delegated to the lowest level in a single organization, enabling a more agile response to tasking requests through all levels of conflict.

**Given the growth of both the space enterprise and threats to space assets, how will you ensure the mission resiliency and survivability of USSPACECOM assets?**

The DoD has a solid strategy in place to address the full spectrum of space threats, from reversible jamming, to directed energy, on-orbit activities and kinetic destruction from the ground. With strong budget support, improvements are underway in both offensive and defensive space capabilities. We are developing new counterspace systems while new and legacy space systems are incorporating defensive measures and tactics. We’ll need to effectively integrate those capabilities across all domains, and ensure requisite tactics and authorities are in place.

**DOD military operations against peer competitors and rogue nation threats require constant monitoring and tracking of critical mobile targets, close integration between space and airborne intelligence systems, and tight coupling with strike planning and execution systems.**

If confirmed, how would you propose to satisfy these warfighting requirements? What are the implications of these tactical military requirements for constellation planning, processing agility, speed of dissemination, and coordination with the Military Services and commanders?
The differences between today's strategic environment and that of the timeframe of the original US Space Command are vast. The requirement for, and logic of a new unified warfighting command demands a warfighting mindset in operation of these capabilities. Such a mindset and focus are critical for the effectiveness of deterrence. If confirmed, among my foremost priorities will be to instill the cultural changes necessary to instill that warfighting mindset. The result of that mindset will in turn influence today's already outstanding processes for constellation planning, processing agility, speed of dissemination, and coordination with military services and commanders. As the new unified command normalizes its relationships as a Supported COCOM, as well as a Supporting COCOM, the necessary warfighting culture and focus will influence those existing processes.

**Tasking and control between overhead satellites has grown and evolved significantly. If confirmed, what would you do to ensure unity of effort and deconfliction of taskings in the space warfighting domain across DOD and the Intelligence Community?**

Defined roles and responsibilities in the context of supporting vs. supported Combatant Commands is key. A similar relationship will exist between USSPACECOM and the IC. As long as we're mutually focused on the ultimate objective of U.S. national security, we'll be able to enact processes to ensure the cooperation between the two entities when tasking limited assets. USSPACECOM will create a single DoD focal point for interaction with the IC in utilization of both DoD and IC space assets. The relationship has worked well in the past, and will continue. With a clear vision and unity of purpose between national security entities, the appropriate space authorities can be delegated to the lowest level in a single organization enabling a more agile response to tasking requests through all levels of conflict.

**In your view, would there be operational advantages if NSA and NGA overhead tasking organizations fully integrated their operations? Please explain your answer.**

While there could be minimal advantages, the disadvantages in operations execution would outweigh the value of such an integration. These intelligence organizations have specialties and functional management responsibilities that address a larger customer base than DoD. It is more important to address the synchronization, optimization, and tipping and queuing that arises from synchronized SIGINT and GEOINT collection. Current tasking processes are sufficient for the individual INTS, but greater focus should be placed on these linkages.

**In your view, would operational advantages accrue to our military forces if operations tasking NRO satellites were closely integrated with DoD airborne intelligence collection and targeting operations? Please explain your answer.**

Cooperation, more than integration here is key. We don't see enough operational advantage to make such a change. Previously, the Joint Functional Component Command-ISR was tasked with examining that process. Tasking for the GEOINT aspect of the NRO architecture is handled through the functional manager for
GEOINT, NGA. The functional manager for GEOINT allocates overhead and available airborne assets for ISR tasking, and integrating (or increasing) those platforms’ tasking expands the number of apertures available to satisfy all of the requirements.

The NRO is the only defense intelligence agency that is not designated as a combat support agency (CSA) as defined in the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986. Historically, the NRO has asserted that it should not be designated as a CSA because it does not make operational decisions regarding the satellites that it builds and controls. In NRO’s view, others, principally its Intelligence Community mission partners—NSA and NGA—both of which are designated as CSAs, are responsible for determining the requirements that guide NRO satellite designs and the operational tasking of deployed satellites. Now, however, there exists a class of operational decisions for which the NRO Director is responsible. In situations in which U.S. satellites are under attack or threatened with same, the NRO Director has the authority to make operational decisions regarding space control.

In your view, what should be the relationship between the Commander, USSPACECOM and the Director of the NRO when responding to hostile acts or evidence of hostile intent that threaten or could threaten DOD and NRO space assets?

We effectively execute “unity of command” to great effect within the DOD today. The relationship between our DoD space organizations and the NRO has never been better and, if confirmed, I look forward to continuing to strengthen this relationship further. We have built a strong “unity of effort” construct with the NRO at the NSDC, which serves us very well in day-to-day space operations. Consistent with Space Policy Directive 4, I would support continued discussions with the NRO to increase cooperation in space operations and evolve our current understanding of “unity of effort.”

Might the designation of NRO as a CSA with respect to space control matters prove helpful to ordering the relationship between the Commander, USSPACECOM and the Director, NRO in these situations?

The relationships between any combatant command and CSAs are defined by individual agency authorities and capabilities required by the command, and codified in individual MOAs. These MOAs are currently being updated for all participating intelligence agencies, including the NRO, based on the standup of USSPACECOM. Rather than designation as a CSA, it is more important to ensure that the proper relationship is defined and codified in a written agreement to ensure we institutionalize the relationship.

The satellites that the NRO builds and operates are tasked by small organizations that are subordinate to the Directors of NSA (for SIGINT) and NGA (for IMINT). The Director of NGA and DIA, and the national intelligence elements of the Military Services, report through separate chains to both the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence. Even though NSA and NGA are CSAs, as yet there exists no formal
operational relationship between the Commander, USSPACECOM and these organizations, notwithstanding the fact that battlefield commanders rely on these satellites for vital intelligence support and their operations must be tightly coordinated with other DOD intelligence systems, command and control networks, and strike systems.

Would it be advisable, in your view, for the Commander, USSPACECOM to be in the chain of command for the tasking of NRO satellites in conflict situations, as a means of rationalizing space command and control in support of U.S. military forces?
We continue to work with the NRO to explore options for closely integrating and synchronizing operations within USSPACECOM for the protect and defend mission. This includes ensuring that the authority to execute protect and defend actions can be performed on operationally relevant timeframes, and with appropriate personnel. The mechanisms and recommendations for those actions are being worked and will be presented in the 180-day study as directed by SPD-4.

In your view would it be feasible and advisable to apply the current model pursuant to which the Commander, U.S. Cyber Command serves also as the Director of NSA and reports to the DNI on national intelligence operations, to grant authority to the Commander, USSPACECOM to control the tasking of national intelligence space assets in support of military forces in combat?
While on the surface it may look comparable, the USCYBERCOM model does not apply in this case because the responsibility for national level intelligence collection lies with multiple agencies (NRO, NSA, NGA), and is not currently within the scope of what USSPACECOM will be assigned. I do not believe that, if confirmed, I need to be in the IC mission space of tasking intelligence satellite collection. We continue to work with the NRO to explore options for closely integrating and synchronizing operations within USSPACECOM for the protect and defend mission. This includes ensuring that the authority to execute protect and defend actions can be performed on operationally relevant timeframes, and with appropriate personnel. The mechanisms and recommendations for those actions are being worked and will be presented in the 180-day study as directed by SPD-4.

**Space Operations Joint Force Provider**

If confirmed as Commander, USSPACECOM, you will be charged with providing trained and ready joint space operations forces to other Combatant Commands.
Yes.

If confirmed, what would be your approach to executing each of following responsibilities:

Identifying and recommending global joint sourcing solutions to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in coordination with the Military Services and other Combatant Commands.
If confirmed, I will follow the existing Global Force Management Process. USSPACECOM will work with supported Combatant Commands to identify risks, trade-offs, and opportunities for the employment of space forces and capabilities. USSPACECOM must identify priorities and weight of effort for provision of space services. I will work with the military services and supported Combatant Commands to determine risks, trade-offs, and opportunities for terrestrial forces in support of space objectives.

**Inculcating in space operations forces across all Military Services and in the active and reserve components a warfighting culture and ethos.**
Establishing USSPACECOM as a geographic Combatant Command with a Commander who has a singular focus on the space domain is foundational to a strong warfighting culture and ethos. If confirmed as Commander, USSPACECOM, I will make active use of ongoing efforts by the military services to create this warfighting culture across our space cadre. USSPACECOM will be a home for emergent warfighting concepts and capabilities, and I will focus on building esprit de corps and culture across the command.

**Embedding at each Combatant Command staff to comprise a space planning cell, consistent with USSPACECOM’s overall responsibilities under the Unified Command Plan.**
Under my current position as Joint Force Space Component Commander, I have begun implementing an initial capability for space Integrated Planning Element (IPE) teams at USINDOPACOM, USEUCOM and USSTRATCOM. This concept was exercised and validated within recent command-level exercises. If confirmed, it will be my intent to embed these teams at each supported Combatant Command.

**Establishing enterprise-wide standards for the training and readiness of space operations forces across all Military Services and in the active and reserve components.**
Multi-domain, integrated global operations require warfighters who deeply understand space in all military services. Leaders at all levels must be as comfortable fighting in space as they are on land, at sea, and in the air. We must develop joint-smart space warfighters who are experts in their domain and passionate about integrating space into global joint combined arms across all Combatant Commands. We also need space-smart joint warfighters across all the military services who understand the importance of space to their combat edge, and their role in helping support and enable space superiority. If confirmed, I will advocate for the training necessary to ensure the Joint Force understands how space works, how to plan with it, and how to fight for it when required.

**Validating that space operations forces are fully trained and interoperable with other forces.**
If confirmed, I will ensure USSPACECOM provides the most robust training to supplement military service space operations training requirements and achieve
the objectives noted in the preceding section. As the operating environment changes, so too will the training and education needs, and we will be flexible to the needs of the Joint Force.

**Conducting and supporting joint exercises, experiments, and war games.**
If confirmed, I will ensure USSPACECOM participates in Joint Exercises to train and validate the command's ability to carry out its assigned missions and global capabilities while simultaneously supporting the space training objectives of the other Combatant Commanders. I will conduct experiments to provide technical demonstrations of emerging capabilities and analysis of tactics, techniques, and procedures to address emerging threats. Finally, I would pursue Wargaming opportunities to provide an analytic operational environment promoting the collaboration and coordination required to inform decisions across all event horizons and mission sets.

**Developing recommendations to the Chairman regarding strategy; doctrine; concepts of operation; tactics; and tactics, techniques, and procedures for the joint employment of space operations forces and space capabilities.**
If confirmed, I will employ the doctrinal planning process, integrating with the Joint Staff’s Global Integrated Plans according to the JSCP. USSPACECOM will continue to explore innovative strategic concepts, concepts of operation, doctrine, and other warfighting concepts, and will update those publications as required.

**Equipping Space Operations Forces and Providing Space Operations Capabilities**

SPD-4 directed DOD to submit a legislative proposal to Congress that would establish a Space Force to “organize, train, and equip to provide for freedom of operation in, from, and to the space domain; to provide independent military options for national leadership; and to enhance the lethality and effectiveness of the Joint Force.” The legislative proposal DOD presented to Congress intentionally omitted a primary role for the NRO and other Intelligence Community organizations, to the concern of many Members of Congress and their staffs. In recent confirmation hearing testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence the nominee to be the Director of the NRO expressed his views on the potential affiliation between U.S. Space Force and NRO, stating, “[k]eeping the NRO and the Space Force separate is the correct way to go.”

**Do you agree with maintaining separation between the NRO and any U.S. Space Force that may be established?**
I am comfortable with the current organizational arrangements, and the partnership between the DoD and NRO has never been better—we have a shared strategy, concept of operations, programs, and work together at the National Space Defense Center conducting operations. The NRO provides a vital service to the Nation and the Department of Defense. I support the establishment of the U.S. Space Force per SPD-4, and look forward to the conversation between DoD leadership and NRO leadership on how to improve our relationship, organizational constructs, and integrated support to global joint combined arms operations.
Are there any conditions or circumstances, in your view, in which NRO and space operations forces should be integrated, going forward?
We effectively execute “unity of command” to great effect within the DoD today. The relationship between our DoD space organizations and the NRO has never been better and, if confirmed, I look forward to continuing to strengthen this relationship further. We have built a strong “unity of effort” construct with the NRO at the NSDC, which serves us very well in day to day space operations. Consistent with Space Policy Directive 4, I would support continued discussions with the NRO to increase cooperation in space operations and evolve our current understanding of “unity of effort.”

Part and parcel of DOD’s enhanced approach to the domain of space, the Department has established the Space Development Agency. In testimony before this Committee, DOD officials reinforced that first and most important task assigned to the Space Development Agency is to develop, in cooperation with the space industry, a highly distributed and resilient space layer to support military targeting operations. While this Committee was deliberating on the administration’s Space Force proposal, NRO published a document stating:

“NRO provides the nation’s unified space-based ISR overhead architecture, addressing the needs of both national and tactical users. The nation does not need a competing and duplicative set of capabilities from what is currently being provided and developed to address these needs. Setting up a competing, tactically-focused ISR overhead architecture will cause budgetary and congressional issues for both DOD and IC, and should be avoided. Splitting the national overhead architecture into capabilities that focus on IC customers vs. DOD customers will create a seam where a seam does not exist today—all will lose in this proposed end-state. The nation is better off with a national agency chartered to develop intelligence capabilities that are operated/orchestrated as an architecture to support both IC and DOD missions.”

Do you share the view that neither the DOD Space Development Agency nor the Space Rapid Capabilities Office should be engaged in acquiring and fielding satellites that provide tactical support to military operations?
If confirmed as Commander, USSPACECOM, one of my primary focus areas will be to ensure space capabilities are integrated and synchronized with global military operations at all levels, from tactical to strategic. The satellites currently operated by the DoD have provided tactical support to military operations since the inception of the military space program. USSPACECOM must drive requirements and help ensure that efforts across the various DoD and military service acquisition organizations—including, but not limited to, the Air Force Space Rapid Capabilities Office and DoD Space Development Agency—are supporting tactical to strategic warfighting requirements with minimal duplication of effort. I look forward to continuing the dialogue with DoD leadership and the members of this Committee on
how to best ensure tactical warfighter needs are met within operationally-relevant timelines.

**Should NRO be the only organization in the U.S. Government with the mission of acquiring satellites capable of collecting intelligence from space? Please explain your answer.**

The NRO is not currently the only organization in the U.S. Government with the mission of acquiring satellites capable of collecting intelligence from space. Other organizations, with differing intelligence missions, acquire their own capabilities much like ISR platforms in the air, maritime, and ground domains. For example, the Air Force Space Command acquires and operates the Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program—a constellation of satellites designed to conduct surveillance of the geosynchronous orbit to maintain custody and awareness of activities within that orbital regime. Each military service has its own intelligence organization, and each has its own acquisition programs to support tailored platforms in other domains for their specific mission needs. This diversity of concepts, tailored to the needs of the operational customer and leveraging common requirements where possible, should be enabled and expected. If confirmed as Commander, USSPACECOM, I will work to ensure close integration with the intelligence community to ensure minimal duplication of effort and maximum delivery of capability to warfighters.

**In your view is there any appropriate role for the Space Development Agency in providing a highly distributed and resilient space layer to support military targeting operational requirements?**

The standup of USSPACECOM provides the DoD a commander singularly focused on space. If confirmed, I will work with the other Combatant Commands, the military services, and inter-agency partners to carefully consider the full range of new warfighting capabilities enabled by space. I look forward to identifying requirements, advocating for customer needs, and helping determine priorities for capabilities we must pursue to maintain our combat edge. I look forward to working with the Space Development Agency in developing new architectures for resiliency.

**Do you perceive any disadvantages to establishing the Space Development Agency as the defense organization charged to focus on tactical space capability speed to market by leveraging commercial technologies and products?**

Leaders across the DoD have been focused on the goal of achieving more rapid and agile delivery of space capabilities to the warfighter. The Space Development Agency, the Space Rapid Capabilities Office, the Defense Advance Research Project Agency, the Defense Innovation Unit, the Space and Missile Systems Center, and various other interagency partners all represent important lines of effort toward that goal. Competition of ideas and concepts within DoD is as critical as in the commercial market, and smartly leveraging the innovation and advancements available through the commercial sector is a key to future success. As with most complex decisions, there will be advantages and disadvantages for each path forward and each potential technical path. If confirmed as Commander, USSPACECOM, I
will work with the other Combatant Commands, military services, and inter-agency partners to carefully consider the full range of new warfighting capabilities and effects we might deliver from space and be an advocate for the priorities.

**In addition to sharing technology, how could the capabilities vested in the NRO and the Space Development Agency be employed to rationalize and harmonize the efforts of both organizations?**  
In order to stay ahead of the threat and maintain our warfighting advantage in all domains, close collaboration will be required. The partnership between the DoD and the NRO has never been better, and any improvements to organizational constructs must ensure this relationship remains strong, and on a path towards continued excellence. The National Space Defense Center remains a crucial nexus of NRO and DoD partnership, and its mission of experimentation contributes to the development of capabilities beneficial to both organizations. If confirmed, I am committed to deepening this relationship, and look forward to the continued dialogue within DoD and across the interagency about how to better integrate and synchronize our efforts to ensure we maintain our warfighting advantage across the Joint Force.

**As regards the Space Development Agency’s role in equipping space operations forces and providing innovative capabilities and capacity for space operations, how would you propose to solve—in short order—the longstanding problems associated with overly bureaucratic and late-to-need systems and processes for identifying requirements for, and developing, procuring, and fielding space warfighting capabilities?**  
The establishment of the SDA is expected to improve DoD’s efforts to rapidly build, deploy, operate, and innovate at low cost. While focusing on experimentation, prototyping, and accelerated fielding, the SDA will be a lean organization with similar style and intent as the DoD Strategic Capabilities Office, DARPA, the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office, and the Space Rapid Capabilities Office. If confirmed, I look forward to working with DoD leadership, the military services, and this Committee to continue to improve the rapid delivery of warfighter capabilities while minimizing duplication of effort.

**Where should the Space Development Agency reside, in your view?**  
The legislative proposal presented to Congress by the Department initially establishes SDA under the authority, direction and control of the Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, with it ultimately transitioning to the U.S. Space Force. If confirmed, I look forward to continued discussions about the role of USSPACECOM, the SDA, and the U.S. Space Force.

### Science, Technology, and Innovation

U.S. superiority in key areas of innovation is decreasing or has disappeared, while our competitors are engaging in aggressive military modernization and advanced weaponry development. DOD has identified ten key areas—space among them—in which
investment to develop next generation operational capabilities is imperative. Much of the innovation in these technologies that could prove suitable for national defense purposes is occurring outside of the traditional defense industry.

What do you see as the most significant challenges (e.g., technical, organizational, or cultural) to U.S. development of technologies key to dominance in space?

The DoD and military services have several agencies and organizations that tackle technical challenges in space, namely: NRO, DARPA, MDA, AFRL, SMC, Service Research Labs, etc. We must ensure these agencies/organizations are communicating and integrating technical challenges and synchronizing efforts to capitalize and synchronize the investments for U.S. space dominance.

In your view, has DOD properly integrated and synchronized investments in technologies key to space across all its Components?

The proposed organizational changes to create a USSPACECOM and U.S. Space Force are meant to synchronize our efforts across the domain from warfighting requirements and organize/train/equip roles respectively. These organizations will help to identify key technologies to build space forces able to compete, deter, and win in a warfighting environment. Progress is being made to increase integration of organizational investments, but there are still improvements to be made to ensure transparency and full synchronization.

How has DOD prioritized limited R&D funding across key areas of space-related technology? Specifically, where is the DOD either increasing or decreasing focus and funding?

The DoD prioritized use of limited research and development funding to defeat adversary technology advances which threaten U.S. space advantages. Focus and funding were on implementation of resilient ground and space architectures that can operate in a contested environment and on fielding smaller satellites that are developed faster and use commercial technology.

How is the Department balancing space-related revolutionary capability advancements as compared to “quick win” incremental improvements that can be rapidly fielded?

Near term adversary threats require the DoD to first address quick-win capabilities by focusing on speed and rapid implementation of commercial capabilities and technologies that require a minimum level of research and development. Pursuit of revolutionary capabilities requires a more deliberate requirements approach and higher levels of research and development.

Commercial technology often surpasses the innovative edge once held by the military and the Intelligence Community in the domain of space. Industry is rapidly moving into space in ways not seen before, and may eclipse the capabilities of our national security satellites in both technology and ability to reconstitute in space.
Do you believe it wise for DOD to take advantage of these commercial developments? Why or why not? Absolutely. DoD must take advantage of rapid commercial development, streamlined operational testing processes, and innovative technology advancements to deliver immediate and revolutionary space capabilities.

What efforts is the DOD making to identify space-relevant new technologies developed commercially and apply them to military and national security purposes? The DoD identifies new commercial space technologies primarily through direct engagement with industry and academia. As DoD investments in new space technologies increase and the culture of the DoD space enterprise changes to more readily accept mature commercial space capabilities for government use, the application of commercial technology for national security purposes will increase.

If confirmed, how will you ensure that commercial technology is appropriately incorporated into USSPACECOM mission execution at acceptable risk levels? What are the challenges that you perceive to increasing collaboration between the private sector and DoD? If confirmed, I will rely on the military services to provide technology (including commercial) to my warfighting command, and encourage collaboration with private industry where appropriate. A predictable, multi-year budget and proper risk management controls will assist in increasing collaboration between the private sector and DoD.

In your view, what steps must DOD take to protect and strengthen our National Security Innovation Base both to promote space-related innovation and to ensure that critical information is protected? In order to strengthen the innovation base, DoD must motivate industry to invest in pioneering national security technologies, while properly protecting critical sources of sensitive national capability from adversary attempts to acquire the technology. An iterative and agile method of requirements, acquisitions, and budgetary processes that support a faster development and operational fielding timeline must be implemented in order to outpace our adversaries.

The national security space community has begun to blend the use of traditional spacecraft and new flexible smallsats to provide improved mission support to users. In your view, how can USSPACECOM exploit commercial launch and other less expensive launch options to allow for more rapid replenishment and on-orbit employment of vital warfighting systems, while minimizing the risk of mission failure? USSPACECOM will rely on the military services to provide launch capability for the warfighting command. The use of commercial launch services are essential to drive down costs to below $100 million per launch and make replenishment of critical national security payloads affordable. Commercial ranges and smaller launch
vehicles are key enablers to attain higher smallsat launch rates and to improve on-orbit resilience of DoD space capabilities.

**One of the main objectives of the defense research enterprise is to develop advanced technologies that will be of benefit to the warfighter. In this regard, it is critical that advancements quickly transition from the development phase into testing and evaluation and ultimately into a program of record for the deployment of capability to the warfighter.**

**What are the challenges you perceive to effectively transitioning technologies from research programs into programs of record?**
The new organizational structure of SDA will help overcome the challenges of transitioning technology. Commercial and government research and development programs generally take a new technology to a mid-level technical maturation level and finish with a preliminary design. DoD acquisitions processes have traditionally been slow to integrate new technology into program of record activities due either to funding limitations or concerns with mission assurance. Establishment and funding of a rapid prototyping and development organization like the Space Development Agency to expedite new technology into DoD space operations is critical in order to go faster.

**If confirmed, what specific steps will you take to ensure that the DOD space enterprise is benefitting more quickly and directly from research being performed across the defense research enterprise?**
If confirmed, I will cooperate with our DoD and National space agencies to synchronize Research and Development to deliver capabilities to stay ahead of our adversaries’ capabilities. I will partner with the ASD R&E to ensure that new organizational structures such as SDA that are meant to move new technology into our architectures quickly, are a success.

**Technical Workforce**

**USSPACECOM and the Air Force Space Command must be comprised of, and supported by an exceedingly capable workforce of highly-technical and qualified military and civilian space professionals across all relevant specialties, including operations, intelligence, engineering, science, acquisition, and cyber.**

Given the constant competition for talent across the technical community, specifically what would you do ensure that DOD sustains and enhances its ability to recruit, develop, sustain and retain the cadre of qualified technical experts it needs to perform its current and future missions in the domain of space?
If confirmed, I will make a concerted push across the respective services in the appropriate occupational career codes to promote the current and anticipated requirements of emerging space missions. The appeal of space-related national defense missions is wide and we will be able to recruit fully qualified individuals into the military to help us execute this vital mission. We will also recruit and retain a
talented DoD Civilian workforce with competitive compensation and benefit programs.

In your view, do USSPACECOM and the Air Force need any additional hiring, talent management, and workforce shaping tools to recruit, develop career tracks for, sustain, and retain highly skilled military and civilian space professionals with specialties in operations, intelligence, engineering, science, acquisition, and cyber? Maintaining Direct Hire Authority for STEM and cyber-related positions is critical to attract and retain the skills we will need. Encouraging the military services to promote to requirement may also help with sustainability. For the DoD Civilian space workforce, primarily supported by U.S. Air Force civilians, expedited hiring authorities for critical career fields are helpful.

China

What is your assessment of the strategic objectives of China in space? Beijing has the goal of building China into a space power in all respects, seeing it as a great power competition. China is developing space capabilities that will allow them to operate with the same advantages that we enjoy, while supporting civil and military interests, science and technology, and military modernization.

In what ways, if any, do China’s strategic objectives in space conflict with U.S. strategic objectives? China is developing a full spectrum of capabilities to deny us the use and benefits of space while assuring its own use of space. China officially advocates for peaceful use of space, but continues to improve its counterspace weapons capabilities and military reforms to better integrate space into joint military operations.

To what extent do you view China's activities related to the space domain as a threat or challenge to U.S. national security interests? China is making considerable gains and our operational advantage is shrinking. The PLA views space superiority, the ability to control the information sphere, and denying adversaries the same, as key components of information warfare. Space and counterspace operations will form integral components of PLA campaigns.

Which Chinese initiatives and capabilities poses the greatest risk to U.S. space-related capabilities and assets? Please explain your answer? China is pursuing a full spectrum of threats to our space capabilities, including reversible jamming, directed energy weapons, cyber threats, orbital threats, and kinetic energy threats from ground-based missiles. China proved its kinetic capability in 2007, and the risk to U.S. space capabilities will increase if they pursue additional weapons capable of destroying satellites up to Geo-synchronous orbit.

Are U.S. policies and the associated authorities—as applicable to space operations and assets—sufficient to counter China's activities and influence, or
are there additional measures we should be considering? What role should USSPACECOM play in this regard?
U.S. space policies and associated authorities are moving in the right direction - a pivot to a warfighting focus, given the near-peer competitor threat. Space Policy Directive-4 directs the Secretary of Defense to present relevant authority changes to the National Space Council and the National Security Council. In my current role, we have identified additional relevant authorities and I will be happy to discuss these in a closed hearing. USSPACECOM will play a key role in the identification and advocacy for these additional authorities.

Which additional capabilities will be most important to maintaining the U.S. advantage over China in space, in your view?
We’ll need systems to counter the full spectrum of space threats, from reversible jamming, to directed energy, on-orbit activities, and kinetic destruction from the ground. We must improve our ability to protect space capabilities to include their vulnerable ground infrastructure. We must exploit commercial capabilities such as advanced computing, big data analytics, and artificial intelligence to make sense of the voluminous amount of classified and unclassified data we collect to out-maneuver our adversaries through superior battlespace awareness and command and control. With strong budget support, improvements are underway in the development of new space capabilities.

Russia

What is your assessment of the strategic objectives of Russia in space?
Russia recognizes that U.S. and allied combat power is enabled with space capabilities. Their objective is to blunt our ability to maintain space superiority, and to neutralize our space capabilities. Russia is aggressively modernizing its military to gain an advantage over the United States and NATO. In space, Russian systems are intended to disrupt, degrade, and damage U.S. satellites in orbit. There is no question: Russia treats space as a warfighting domain to gain military advantage over the United States. Moscow has already fielded ground-based directed energy laser weapons and is developing air-based systems and additional counterspace capabilities to target space-based sensors. Russia now has the third largest collection of operational satellites in the world, behind the United States and China.

In what ways, if any, do Russia’s strategic objectives conflict with U.S. strategic objectives?
Russian military doctrine and authoritative writings articulate Russia’s views regarding the achievement of supremacy in space as a decisive factor in winning future conflicts. Russia views space as a key enabler to U.S. precision strike and force projection, and they are pursuing counterspace systems to neutralize or deny U.S. space based-services and offset a perceived U.S. military advantage. The United States views space as a vital national interest. USSPACECOM will protect and defend our interests in space.
To what extent do you view Russia's activities related to the space domain as a threat or challenge to U.S. national security interests?

Russia's activities in space directly challenge U.S. and allied space superiority. However, there still exist areas of alignment in space exploration and scientific research. These areas offer possible avenues for communication and cooperation to counter Russia aggression. Russia is making considerable gains, and our operational advantage is shrinking. Russia is pursuing a broad spectrum of threats to our space capabilities. These include on-orbit activities, directed energy, jamming, and kinetic destruction from the ground.

Which Russian initiatives and capabilities poses the greatest risk to U.S. space-related capabilities and assets? Please explain your answer?

Russia is developing a full range of counterspace capabilities to include electronic warfare, directed energy, cyber threats, sophisticated on-orbit threats, and direct ascent missiles. Russia's pursuit of counterspace systems to neutralize or deny U.S. space-based capabilities is an attempt to offset conventional U.S. military advantages.

Are U.S. policies and the associated authorities—as applicable to space operations and assets—sufficient to counter Russia's activities and influence, or are there additional measures we should be considering? What role should USSPACECOM play in this regard?

U.S. space policies and associated authorities are moving in the right direction - a pivot to a warfighting focus, given the near-peer competitor threat. Space Policy Directive-4 directs the Secretary of Defense to present relevant authority changes to the National Space Council and the National Security Council. In my current role, we have identified additional relevant authorities and I will be happy to discuss these in a closed hearing. USSPACECOM will play a key role in the identification and advocacy for these additional authorities.

In your view, what types of activities are most important to deterring Russian aggression in space and mitigating any threat it may present?

Establishing a Combatant Command for space in recognition of space as a warfighting domain is an important first step. Development and deployment of capabilities necessary to provide strategic deterrence and advantage is also important. Foundational to these activities is strengthening strategic partnerships and alliances. Events such as Schriever Wargames engage our allies and partners in defining dangerous actions and reinforcing responsible actions in space. We must work with the international space community to understand the risk of unintended consequences, establish norms of behavior, define dangerous actions, and reinforce responsible activities in space.

Sexual Assault Prevention and Response in USSPACECOM

In your view, are the policies, programs, and training that DOD and the Military Services have put in place to prevent sexual assault and respond to sexual assault when it does occur, adequate and effective?
While we have seen some periods of progress over the past 10 years, there is much more to do: my understanding is that the 2018 survey of the force found that the occurrence of sexual assault increased for our youngest active duty women in all four Services. If confirmed, I intend to support the Acting Secretary of Defense’s May 2019 directions to improve and expand existing prevention and response programs, including: implementing the Sexual Assault Accountability Investigation Task Force (SAAITF) recommendations, developing new climate assessment tools, launching the Catch a Serial Offender (CATCH) Program, enhancing efforts to select recruits of the highest character, preparing new leaders and first-line supervisors for applied leadership challenges, and executing the DoD Sexual Assault Prevention Plan of Action. The Acting Secretary of Defense is committed to doing more for the women and men who serve this country; I whole-heartedly agree with these directed actions.

**What will be your approach to sexual assault prevention and response in USSPACECOM and in Air Force Space Command, given that, if confirmed, you will lead a diverse workforce of service members and civilians?**

If confirmed, I will establish a command climate that promotes an environment of dignity and respect, free from unlawful sexual harassment and sexual assault. I will support implementation of the six major actions as directed by the Acting Secretary of Defense, which include recommendations of the Sexual Assault Accountability Investigation Task Force (SAAITF). I will also ensure my command has a robust Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) program, and foster an environment where sexual harassment and sexual assault are not condoned, tolerated or ignored.

**What is your view of the necessity of affording a victim both restricted and unrestricted options to report a sexual assault?**

Sexual assault victims should be afforded every option available to report a sexual assault. Restricted and unrestricted reports offer victims a personal choice and greater voice, ensuring victim safety and support while also ensuring the chain of command is aware of a crime.

**What is your assessment of the potential impact, if any, of proposals to remove from military commanders, case disposition authority over felony violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, including sexual assaults?**

Commanders are responsible for maintaining good order and discipline in their command. The legal authority to dispose of misconduct is vital to maintaining good order and discipline, and effectively exercising command responsibilities. Removing the responsibility and authority to dispose of felony Uniform Code of Military Justice violations runs counter to the expectations our government and nation place on our commanders and potentially disrupts a commander’s ability to enforce good order and discipline. Commanders, advised by trained and qualified legal advisors, ensure their disposition decisions are both fair and just, and they are in the best position to take action appropriate for both offenders and victims of crime.
What is your assessment of DOD’s implementation of protections against retaliation (including reprisal; social ostracism; and acts of cruelty, oppression, and maltreatment) for reporting sexual assault?
The Joint Force is resolute in protecting service members from retaliation for reporting sexual assault. The Department of Defense and Military Services continue to develop policies and procedures that implement the retaliation-related notification, training, and reporting requirements prescribed by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, 2017 and 2018 to protect those who report sexual assault. The DoD issued the Defense Retaliation Prevention and Response Strategy to provide support to individuals who experience retaliation after reporting sexual assault or sexual harassment. I fully support the subsequent Retaliation Implementation Plan and, if confirmed, will execute tasks as indicated in the identified issue areas and support the comprehensive and consistent approach to retaliation prevention and response across the Department. These documents are publicly available at www.sapr.mil.

What is your understanding of the “continuum of harm” in the context of sexual harassment and sexual assault and their effects on the readiness of military units?
The "continuum of harm" is a spectrum of behaviors that can escalate and create an environment conducive to sexual violence, ranging from inappropriate behavior to sexual harassment, and finally, sexual assault. These behaviors are fundamentally incongruent with our values and erode combat readiness of military units to deploy, fight and win. Sexual harassment and sexual assault are unacceptable. Sexual harassment and sexual assault have no place in the military, and destroy the climate of trust, teamwork, and cohesion necessary for effective units and organizations.

What is your view of the role of the chain of command in maintaining a command climate in which sexual harassment and sexual assault are not tolerated?
In my experience, units led by strong, disciplined, and engaged commanders have less military discipline issues. Commanders at all levels are expected to promote an environment of dignity and respect; free from unlawful discrimination, sexual harassment, and sexual assault. The chain of command plays a vital role in all aspects of command climate and maintenance of good order and discipline.

How will you ensure that military and civilian leaders in USSPACECOM and in the Air Force Space Command, have the training, authorities, and resources needed to hold subordinate commanders and supervisors accountable for the prevention of and response to sexual harassment and sexual assault?
If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring good order and discipline in the command climate in Air Force Space Command and USSPACECOM, and to ensuring dignity and respect is fundamental to daily interactions between our service members. If confirmed, I will ensure that my military and civilian leaders have the required training, authorities, and resources to hold subordinates, commanders and supervisors accountable. Key to this will be implementing the actions directed by the Acting
Secretary of Defense, which include the Sexual Assault Accountability and Investigation Task Force (SAAITF) Report recommendations, Prevention Plan of Action, and CATCH a Serial Offender Program.

Quality-of-Life Challenges in USSPACECOM

What unique quality-of-life challenges do you foresee could affect service members and civilians assigned to USSPACECOM and/or the Air Force Space Command, and their families?
Quality of life challenges in the local area of the host base for USSPACECOM Headquarters (yet to be determined by the Air Force’s Strategic Basing Process) could include capacity for child care, spousal employment opportunities/certificate & licensure portability, housing availability and affordability, and school availability and proximity.

If confirmed, how would you address these challenges to help improve the quality-of-life and retention of these personnel and their families?
If confirmed, and following a basing decision, I will work with our host installation to assess capacity in these areas and advocate within the local community for any needed increases in the previously mentioned areas. Supporting the Services and their installations in efforts to engage with the applicable state lawmakers, I will ensure we comprehensively address attracting and retaining entire families in our operational locations. Also, I will develop a robust communication plan to keep our families educated on the organization's mission and informed on relevant topics.

Mental and Behavioral Health Care

How will you ensure that adequate and appropriate services are available in USSPACECOM and in Air Force Space Command to address the mental and behavioral health needs of the service members and civilians assigned to these organizations, and their families?
I will work with Service components and advocate within DoD to ensure that every member has access to a Military Treatment Facility with a behavioral health clinic that is proportionally staffed based on its patient population needs. I believe there is value in working to reduce barriers to care by incorporating and promoting alternative sources of care (like Military Family Life Consultants, Military OneSource, embedded behavioral health personnel where appropriate, virtual mental health visits, and leveraging the Chaplain Corps). I will seek feedback to determine if and where mental health needs are falling short so that I can address those shortfalls.

Although the Department has made great strides in reducing the stigma associated with help-seeking behaviors, many service members remain concerned that their military careers will be adversely affected should their chain of command become aware that they are seeking mental or behavioral health care. At the same time, the military chain of command has a legitimate need to be aware of physical and mental health conditions that may affect the readiness of the service members under their command.
Do you have any views on how to reduce the stigma, real or perceived, for seeking mental or behavioral health care?
The stigma around seeking help for mental health issues is largely based on misinformation: that it will adversely affect their career or that it is a sign of weakness. While data indicates that the millennial generation appears to attach less stigma to care-seeking, my focus will be to work diligently to promote the dissemination of good information: the vast majority (97% for Air Force) of members who voluntarily seek mental health care suffer no career impact and seeking care is a sign of strength. If confirmed, I will promote DoD's efforts to minimize barriers to seeking help, and promote the range of services available to our members. The Services have focused on mental, physical, social, and spiritual resilience that affect personal attitudes. If confirmed, I will support this focus on resiliency.

As regards the provision of mental and behavioral health care to service members assigned to USSPACECOM and Air Force Space Command, how does DOD bridge the gap between a service member’s desire for confidentiality and the chain of command’s legitimate need to know about matters that may affect the readiness of individual service members and the unit?
DoD has policies in place to protect privacy, while balancing the need to provide the commander with information necessary to complete the mission. Department instructions implement measures to control use and disclosure of Protected Health Information (PHI) that comply with federal privacy laws and delineate when relevant aspects of a service member’s mental health care may be disclosed to a commander. The instructions create a presumption not to notify a Service member’s commander unless it meets specific criteria.

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive timely testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch.

Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Yes

Do you agree, if confirmed, and when asked before this committee, its subcommittees, or other appropriate committees of Congress to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the position of the Administration?
Yes

Do you agree, if confirmed, to provide this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses
and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so in a timely manner?
Yes

Do you agree, if confirmed, to consult with this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you?
Yes

Do you agree, if confirmed, to keep this committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided?
Yes

Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request?
Yes

Do you agree, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this committee?
Yes

Do you agree, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress?
Yes