

DOD News Briefing: Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces

Gen. Colin Powell, Chairman, JCS, and Lt. Gen. Edwin S. Leland, Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, Joint Staff

Friday, February 12, 1993 Noon

[Document File: [CJCS Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces](#)]

Powell: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. It's a pleasure to see you all again. Earlier this morning I submitted my Roles and Missions report to Secretary of Defense Les Aspin. As I think everybody in the room knows, the report is required at least once every three years by the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. This is the second report in this series. Admiral Crowe submitted the first report back in 1989, just before he left the office of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In this Roles and Missions report, the chairman is required to report on matters relating to the roles, missions, and functions of the armed forces of the United States—looking for unnecessary duplication, and finding areas for efficiencies and savings. It's all designed to make the force better.

The effort was a little bit different this time around, because over the last year, Congress has also asked us to look at rather specific programmatic issues, as well as theologic issues concerning roles and missions. So to some extent, we moved a little bit into the programming and budgeting process. This made the work a little more difficult to do, but I think it makes a better link between roles and missions as a doctrinal thing, and the actual business of findings savings and efficiencies in the Department.

The analysis was done during the last Administration, but the report wasn't finished in time to provide to Secretary Cheney.

The report, I should also point out, shouldn't be viewed in isolation as an indicator of all changes that are taking place within the Department, within the armed forces. Changes occur in many other ways, and especially during the regular programming and budgeting process.

The report also is not an end in itself. Because I have submitted this report today doesn't mean that we've stopped the clock on looking for duplication that is unnecessary or in finding additional changes to make to the roles, missions, and functions of the Department.

The report should be seen as a snapshot—a snapshot of a continuous process of self evaluation. We'll start again tomorrow, looking for other things that might improve the armed forces, that might lead to greater savings. A recent Congressional Research Service report by John Collins has given us some new ideas. We will be anxious to hear from think tanks, from outside experts. We certainly want to work with the new OSD staff, and we're always interested in hearing from reporters on ideas that we should examine for purposes of these sorts of analyses. (Laughter) And we don't need to wait another three years as these changes manifest themselves to put them into effect. Anything that comes along that makes sense, that makes the force better, that saves money, we're going to implement it tight away.

I don't think it is always fully appreciated how much change has taken place in the armed forces in recent years, especially during the three and a half years that I've been Chairman. We've cut the force roughly 25 percent, or it's certainly going to hit that 25 percent within the next year—500,000 active duty troops taken out of the force structure; 250,000 reservists eventually; some 250,000 Department of Defense civilians, A third of the active Army being taken out; 25 percent of the Navy and the Air Force, the Marine Corps. Over 70 percent of our nuclear weapons are on their way out of the force as a result of changes in our strategy, changes in our doctrine, and the breathtaking changes we've seen in our relationship with the Soviet Union which has led to these remarkable arms control agreements in recent months.

We have removed from the mission, the function and role of the Marine Corps and the Army, any requirement for nuclear weapons. If you ever need it in the future, another service, the United States Air Force, will provide that sort of support. We have removed tactical nuclear weapons from our ships at sea. We have undertaken a dramatic series of base closures—some 800 bases, large and small, huge bases with 5,000 people, small installations with perhaps just 100. A massive closure of bases. We have brought home half of the troops that were in Europe when I became Chairman three and a half years ago. Over 100 hardware programs have been cut. We've probably affected over one million jobs in the public economy as a result of our activities over the last several years.

The guidance that we have given to the Chiefs, the guidance that we have given to our commanders in the field, is that this is the time to divest, divest ourselves of Cold War thinking, divest ourselves of Cold War programs, divest ourselves of Cold War assumptions with respect to how we organize, train, and equip.

While going down, over the last several years, we have also fought major wars; we have dealt with crises; we have performed major relief efforts around the world and here at home—all the while maintaining our overseas commitments to our friends and neighbors. I suspect I must be the only Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in history who has ever testified before Congress on how to cut the force that was, at that moment, fighting a war 8,000 miles away.

We've brought a new sense of jointness to the armed forces. We emphasize that we're now fighting as a team. I think we have been very successful in recent years in breaking old patterns of service parochialism. Joint fighting is team fighting. Every member of the team supporting every other member of the team. We've gone through all this change, we've dealt with all of these crises in a way that I believe has succeeded in maintaining the quality of the force, maintaining the exquisite nature of the force of which Americans are so proud. This roles and missions and functions report builds on what we've done. It points in some new directions. It breaks some new ground. Some will find it much too modest. It does not go to revolutionary extremes such as eliminating the Marine Corps or pulling all of the aviation out of the Marine Corps or substituting a good part of the Air Force for some other Service. Others, I'm sure, will find some of the proposals too radical, and they will be objected to in various places. I believe the report will stand on its own merit.

I believe the ideas and suggestions in there will, over time, be seen as sensible and things we ought to do.

There are some ideas that we examined early on and during the course of this entire process that really didn't pan out, and some of you have noted that as you have gotten access to drafts. Things fell out of the second draft that were in the first draft. Frankly, we did a lot of brainstorming. We threw a lot of ideas out. And when we asked for comments back, some of our

original ideas didn't save money, didn't improve the force, and therefore, we discarded them. You should have seen some of the goofy ideas we had even before you got the first draft leaked, that no longer exist. And General Leland, when he presents the report in detail, will cover some of these ideas.

I and my Joint Chiefs of Staff colleagues stand behind this report, although I have to say to you, it is my report, it is not a consensus report. We didn't ask the Chiefs to vote on it, and there are differences of opinion amongst the Chiefs about various parts of the report. But in general, we're pleased with this piece of work we did for President Bush and for Secretary Cheney and the last Administration.

We are now part of President Clinton's Administration. We are now part of Secretary Aspin's Administration herein the Department of Defense and the Pentagon. And President Clinton and Secretary Aspin have given us new directions. The directions are rather simple, rather clear, rather direct—maintain our commitments around the world, continue performing the missions that we are doing now, maintain the quality of the force. The President has told this to me on at least three occasions. He wants to make sure that that quality remains high. Emphasize technical superiority, the advantage the American armed forces has always had. Adjust to the changing security ' environment—don't remain static, be flexible. And finally, make further reductions to our programs and to our force structures.

As you know, we are now going through an exercise to find 200,000 additional spaces to cut out of the active force, and to bring another 50,000 troops home from Europe, coming below our original planned level of 150,000. We are at work doing all of these things now, taking in the President and Secretary Aspin's guidance. In the near future, we will convert that into the defense component of President Clinton's FY94 budget submission."

You will also see when that budget submission becomes public, how parts of the Roles and Missions Report have already begun to drive the programming and budget process.

I'm going to turn the floor over in a minute to General Ed Leland, the Director for Strategic, Plans and Policy of the Joint Staff, who is the lead horse, working with the very, very fine young men and women on the Joint Staff and throughout the Services, to put this work together. Before doing so, I'd like to steal a little of General Leland's thunder and talk about a couple of the issues that am of particular interest to you and have been of such interest in public comment and in the newspapers or on television.

One of those great rhetorical questions is, "Why do we have four air forces, and do we need four air forces?" The premise underneath the question being: get rid of one of them or consolidate them into perhaps only two or only one. The answer is: the nation is well served by each one of our services having an aviation component in it. There is really only one United States Air Force—first and foremost, the best in the world. It dominates the skies and space over any battlefield that American troops may have to step foot on.

Within the Navy, within the Marine Corps, and within the Army, they have taken advantage of the potential of air by putting attack helicopters into the Army, by the Navy being able to project airpower from floating airfields—our carrier force—and by the Marines being absolute masters of using integrated air-ground operations to perform their missions.

So the real issue is not getting rid of any one of these. They serve America's interests well. Let me give you an example. In early August of 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait, I was very, very

pleased to know that in that early stage of the crisis the carrier Independence was moving into position and could have launched air mikes should that have been necessary. A few days later then, Air Force airpower started to arrive on scene. And even later, when the Army showed up, its attack helicopters made a major contribution to the ability of the Army to perform its mission. Throughout the entire crisis and through the war itself, Marine aviation demonstrated what it can do working closely with Marine ground power. I am glad that that basket of air capability was available to the President of the United States and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to General Schwarzkopf so that he could perform his mission. And I'm glad that the Congress over the years has supported this investment in airpower. The real issue now is not how do I get rid of one of those.

The real issue now is how do I make sure we have not over invested in any one of those? How do I make sure they are truly complimentary? How do I make sure that underneath the four aviation elements we are not wasting money in the ways in which they are trained, in the ways in which we maintain those aircraft, how we determine the number of aircraft that we need.

What you will see in this report is that's where we went to look for savings. That's where we went to see what could be done. And as General Leland will brief, we have tried to break out of the Cold War mentality that said every one of these four aviation elements has to keep growing. They're all going to get smaller. We're going to find other ways to mix their capabilities, to make them more complimentary. We're going to make major reductions in the depot maintenance structure underneath that is used to support all of these airplanes, and our other equipment that we use throughout the force.

So we're anxious to find not just nice, rhetorical fixes, but to find real savings and money by going after the infrastructure. You will also see a number of other areas where we have made savings with respect to airpower. We think we can cut down on the number of airplanes that are dedicated to continental air defense. We have a large number of planes that essentially are still positioned, waiting for Soviet bombers to come over the North Pole. We can make savings there. We can reduce the total number of attack aircraft because part of our bomber fleet can now be devoted to conventional purposes. We can make a better judgment as to what kind of investment we need in Navy deep strike aircraft compared to Air Force deep strike aircraft. Flight training can be consolidated inventory management consolidated in the sense that all services will now use the same methodology to determining how many aircraft they should have in their inventory. We can make some eliminations and consolidations with respect to our command and control aircraft.

We want to make significant reductions in our VIP aircraft fleet—the fleet we call operational support aircraft. One of the things I would ask Congress to do is stop giving us VIP airplanes. We don't ask for, we don't want, we don't need, but every year get given to us or presented to us as a gift by the Congress.

We can do more with respect to consolidating our helicopter air crew and maintenance training. We can do, I think, a lot better on initial skills training. Basic training, people call it, where one service can serve as the schoolhouse for other services for common skills training.

We can do a lot of other things. As you'll see here, letting the Army provide heavy artillery support, multiple launched rocket support to the Marine Corps at a potential savings of \$300 million because the Marine Corps needs the capability, but they will now count on their Army buddies to provide that capability to them.

So those are just a few of the things we've tried to do. I think it's a good report. I think it will stand up. But we're starting again, because this is a rapidly changing environment. We've got a new team on board. We're going to get new ideas from that new team. We look forward to working with them.

Now, let me turn it over to General Leland.

Leland: I'll talk to you about the highlights of the report, and then I'll also give you some background on kind of how we got to where we did, or how it turned out.

I'm going to talk a minute or two about process because the terms, roles, missions and functions, are commonly used and interchanged within the building, often as if they mean the same thing, and they don't. So there's some help in understanding what we did and why we concluded what we did by understanding the terminology.

Very simply, a role is a broad and enduring purpose, and it is provided to a service. So the Army, as an example, as you see on the left there, the role is to man, train, and equip forces for operations on land. The Navy does that on the sea. The Marine Corps for land operations essential to naval campaigns. Then you can see here for the Air Force, for offensive and defensive air campaigns. So that's a role. The roles are provided by the Congress to the Services. A function is something where the President or the Secretary of Defense tell a service to do something in particular. An example would be to provide forces. So an example of a function is the President says, "I want you, Army, to provide forces to do that role—operations on land."

Finally, missions are done by combatant commanders. Missions are not done by services. So services provide forces; combatant commanders do missions.

This other diagram just gives you the same information in a little bit different form. Congress gives the roles to the Services. The President and the Secretary of Defense assign specific functions. The Services then provide the forces and the forces must be capable of performing the functions that were given to them by the President and the Secretary of Defense. The commanders, the combatant commanders, when they have those forces, they get missions from the President and they conduct operations. The ones listed there are some you're very familiar with—Desert Storm, of course Southwest Asia; Just Cause, the operation in Panama; Restore Hope is the ongoing operation in Somalia.

This used to be very simple. If you go back before World War II, the Army did the stuff on land, and the role was to do land things. And the Army did missions. So if the President wanted a mission accomplished on land, he told the Army to go do it. The same thing for the Navy—on and from the sea. That was their role, and they did the mission.

The maturing of aircraft is what complicated all of this. So during World War II it got much more complex. Joint Chiefs of Staff were created. And we came out of World War II, and in 1947 and 1948, there was a lot done to restructure the military. So the military that you have today is largely a result of what we came out of World War II with, and the fact that we were getting ready for the Cold War almost from the time World War II ended.

So what this shows you a little bit is just how things have changed over time. Three major Acts there—one in '47, one in '58, one in '86. We created an Air Force, we created a Secretary of Defense, we created a National Security Council. In '58, we put the Secretary of Defense in the

chain of command and said he does missions, and he gives the missions to the combatant commanders, so we got the Semites out of the mission business. Then, of course, the Goldwater-Nichols Act in '86 is the one that strengthened the whole joint structure.

What this talks about is the report. The report is required by Goldwater-Nichols. What it says is that at least once every three years the Chairman has to report out to the Secretary of Defense. He has to consider at least three things. Changes in the threat, changes in technology, and unnecessary duplication. He makes his recommendation. So the Congress tells the Chairman to do that, the Chairman gives his recommendation to the Secretary of Defense.

In the Authorization Act for '93, the Congress said 30 days after it gets to the Secretary of Defense, we would like you, Secretary of Defense, to provide the report to us. So that's what this is.

Down here, what this shows is that the Services and the combatant commanders are big time players in this operation but, as the Chairman mentioned it is not a consensus document. In the end, it's his document. The next thing I'm going to dwell on is the changes. I'll just let you read this chart. What it tells you is that because the world has changed and because we have a different strategy, there are some opportunities to do things for less money.

The next series here talks about things we have already done. If you look at the report you'll notice that Chapter 2 addresses that. The key point we want to make, and I'm going to cover these things very quickly, but the military has not been asleep at the switch. There's a tremendous amount of change that has happened. In fact, the change in the military in the last three years is greater than in any other three year period since 1947.

Probably the biggest thing is what's in that first bullet which is the national military strategy. We had the same strategy since World War II until we changed it just a little over a year ago. It is a markedly different strategy. It talks about nuclear deterrence, crisis response, forward presence, reconstitution. It does away with the global threat. It does away with the preparation for World War III. It does away with the Cold War. It concentrates on regional conflicts—a big change.

The strategy not only says what we think the world's going to be like, but it says what military capabilities we think we're going to need down to including the peace parts. It tells you how many aircraft carriers, how many divisions, how many tactical fighter wings that we believe are required, and basically, how they're going to be used. What's going to be overseas, what's going to be in the United States. A major effort. In fact I thought it was the most difficult thing I'd ever done, or was associated with, until I got into roles and missions. So the base force is, obviously, the force structure that's part of that, also is the forward stationing.

I will not reiterate the things the Chairman said, but obviously, we've gotten a lot smaller overseas, I would emphasize, though, as the report does, that our continuing stationing of forces overseas is extremely important. It shows commitment. It reinforces alliances. It brings about stability, it helps crisis response. So although we're much smaller overseas in terms of stationing, we're still very substantial. Even if we are down at 100,000 in Europe, that's a big force, and that's very, very important.

But also, because we have less stationed overseas, how we do our periodic deployments is particularly important, which is what this next bullet's about, and it has changed a lot and we're just beginning with this. I think you all are very familiar with our naval deployments. We send carrier battle groups, amphibious groups, all over the world. We have them in the

Mediterranean, the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and you are generally familiar with how we do that. We're going to continue to do that, but in some cases we're going to do it differently. Rather than having it just be the Navy, it's going to be joint. It's a joint service thrust, to everything we do. That's what the strategy says, and that's what you'll see all the way through this report.

So on these deployments, for example, you need a maritime element, you need a land element and you need an air element. They just aren't always going to be Navy-Marine. Sometimes there may be no Marines and we'll do the land part by light infantry from the Army that's either in theater or that's on alert in the United States. Or sometimes we may do the air element from forward stationed aircraft, or again, bomber aircraft that are in the United States that are on alert.

How we configure them, whether it's big or small, how often we do the deployments, can vary a lot, depending on what the commander has in terms of resources in the theater, and kind of what's going on. If things are tense, maybe more often, bigger. If things are not so tense, less. A major change for us.

We have now got all of our strategic weapons under a single commander. That's a big change. For a long time the strategic nuclear forces, the Navy part was commanded by each of the two commanders of the fleet in the Atlantic and the Pacific. In the Air Force, SAC commanded the Air Force part. We put together the strategic commands, did away with SAC. One senior officer commands all our strategic nuclear forces. The Chairman talked to you about the Marines and the Army being out of the nuclear business.

The first bullet on the next chart is the same sort of thing except it's chemicals. We are out of the chemical business. We defend against them, but we don't ever deploy them. That affects the Services and the functions that go to the Services because they don't have to prepare aircraft and artillery pieces to deliver the weapons; and that affects the CINCs because as we give the missions to them, as the President does, he doesn't have to tell them to be prepared to have his forces employ those weapons.

This is something that is a significant switch. As everybody in here knows, the defense budget, almost anywhere you look—is coming down. There's one place it's going up. That's in strategic mobility. Again, that's related directly to the strategy. If you're going to have a lot smaller force and most of it's going to be in the United States, you have to have the capability to get the force from wherever it is to wherever you need it. The way you've got to do that, part of it anyway, is strategic mobility.

We're going to buy the C-17, and we're going to buy ships. We haven't bought transport type ships for the military in a long time. So we're going to buy 21 ships off the market. Those are existing ships. About half of them have already been contracted for. We're going to buy seven or eight container ships that are going to get turned to RORO ships. RORO's are the roll on roll off, like they use to carry cars around. And we're going to build ships. We're going to build 12 new ships in the United States to transport forces. That's unusual, but it's going to give us a much better capability to get forces where we need them quicker.

We've done a lot better in terms of the intelligence support. Again, I'm not going to dwell on this, but essentially it's a lot more joint, and we're a lot better coordinated here in Washington in terms of how we do support for commanders. And the Chairman mentioned about closing bases.

The first bullet on the next chart talks about counter narcotics or counter drug operations—narcotics, a tremendous problem in the United States. It is a new mission for our armed forces, and it is a big mission. We've got thousands of servicemen and lots of equipment overlarge areas working on this mission every day. It's something different.

The Chairman mentioned this one, the fact that we have reconfigured our supplies and reduced them. Again, it's related to the strategy. In the old strategy, we were getting ready to fight the Soviet Union—a very sophisticated enemy. War could have lasted along the. We bought lots of stuff. And most of it, or big chunks of it, was stationed overseas. New strategy, regional conflicts are probably going to be smaller, probably not going to last as long. How much we need and where we need it much different. Just in two years the Services have brought down the value of the inventory in stocks by \$34 billion. The Army estimates that the reduction of what they're going to go to from what they had will come down to half. So it's a big deal and a lot of money is tied up in this.

This is doctrine and training. I'm not going to dwell here, but doctrine, as you all know, is the book. It's the books that describe how it is we're supposed to do things. But combat is extremely complicated a little bit because of the equipment mostly because the environment changes. That changes the whole calculus, which is the reason you have to train. So we're doing a lot better in terms of writing the joint doctrine or the books that say how we fight, and we're doing a lot better in terms of the training that we do.

Having done all of that, it still became clear that there was a lot more that needed to be done. What we needed to be sure of is that what we were doing was consistent with the strategy. That's what that first bullet says.

Next, rather than taking a philosophical approach and sort of massaging each other's foreheads about what the Services ought to do, we said what are the tough questions? We listened to the Congress, we read the newspaper, we listened to ourselves. So we went into this saying, okay, what are the tough questions? When people are saying maybe we ought to consider doing something, we've got to have a good answer to that. Either we ought to say, yes, you're right, we ought to do it. Or, if we think it's a bad idea, we'd better be pretty articulate about saying why we think it's a bad idea. So that's the approach we took.

Maybe the most important thing I'll tell you in the whole pitch, and that General Powell emphasized, is, "what the heck's the criteria?" The criteria is, if you're going to make a change, it's got to make some capabilities that we need it's got to improve our capability, that needed capability, or it's got to save money. Or some combination of that. If it doesn't, don't change it.

So what: this says at the bottom, clearly, we don't want to mess up the force. We've got wonderful armed forces. So in the process of making the kinds of changes that we all know need to be made, one of the things we wanted to be extremely careful with was, that we didn't destroy the important parts. So we wanted to guard against that. And the other part is, we clearly don't want to do cosmetic things or changes for change sake.

One of the first things I'm going to talk to you about in the way of changes, had to do with the unified command plan, so you get a short course on the unified command plan—two charts The first chart, really all I need you to get off of here is that there are ten combatant commanders, 9 and they come in two types. There is the geographic type. They have a responsibility for a particular area of the world, and that's what I'm going to show you on the next chart. Then there is a functional type that has special operations or transportation or strategic as examples of that.

This shows you the areas of responsibility for the five geographic commanders. The things I want you to get off of this are, the blue on both sides is the Pacific Command. This in the middle here is the Atlantic Command, European Command, Central Command, Southern Command. Notice that there are certain parts of the world that don't have a command, a joint command. One of them is the United States, and that's going to relate to something I'm going to tell you next.

One of the key recommendations in the report is that we believe, the Chairman believes, that we need to have the forces in the United States under a joint command. The first two sub bullets in there basically say that what we want to do is we want to make things joint—joint activities, joint training—not an every now and then thing, but a way of life.

We have selected as our recommendation, the Atlantic Command, to be that command. So it would keep its current area of responsibility. It would keep its naval forces. And it would add to it the Army and the Air Force operational forces that are in the United States.

The other two things that it says on there is that this officer, the commander, who by the way, can come from any service, doesn't have to be Navy, would be the officer that would watch after our peacekeeping operations for the UN. Obviously, that is an area of particular interest and of greater activity.

The other bullet up there says that he'll have some responsibility for supervising disaster relief, like responding to Hurricane Andrew. Now obviously, all of those kinds of things in the United States are always done in response to what the President wants, and at the request of the Governor, and in coordination with the National Guard.

A key point in this also is, one of those commands I showed you, of the ten, on that list, was Forces Command, which commands all the Army forces in the United States, which is a combatant command. Under this arrangement, that command becomes a subordinate command of the Atlantic Command. So if we've got the math right, the number of combatant commands has been reduced now from ten to nine.

The second part here talks about space, and the strategic forces. Both extremely important. What it says is we're going to put those... at least we have a proposal that we are considering, of putting those two commands together. Space grew up out of World War II. We got into the rocket business, as you all know—all the Services did—German scientists after the war. The rocket business turned into the space business. So all the Services kind of grew in that area. They all have a role to play, still, but the vast preponderance of space is done by the Air Force.

So under this proposal, the Air Force would have primary responsibility for space. It would be a subordinate command of the Strategic Command. The Army and the Navy would still be very much involved but in a somewhat different way. So there's no intent here to divorce the Army and the Navy from space, since it's very important to them as well.

Again, this results in a reduction of a command, in terms of the combatant commands, and will save us some space. So now we have taken the combatant commands from ten to eight. General Powell mentioned the depot reorganization. It's important for a couple of reasons. One is, there's a lot of money involved in there. The other is because it's representative of a lot of things I'm going to tell you later. It is representative of an area where we have capacity that far exceeds the requirements under the current strategy. Built up after World War II, the Cold War, a huge organization—130,000 civilians; 2,000 military; 30 bases; lots of money.

As you can see here, the estimate is that we can reduce that by 25 to 50 percent. We think we can close either seven or eight of those 30 installations. The results of that will be a savings of somewhere between \$400 and \$600 million a year.

This last piece has to do with how we organize it. How we got these results, is the Chairman commissioned a study. Some retired officers, some representatives of industry, had them go out and look at this because we knew there was some potential there. They came back with these recommendations that I'm giving you here, and what we have in the report. They also said we need to take a look at how it's organized. We need central direction. There's about three ways we can do that. We can have a Service do it as an executive agent, we can have a defense agency, or we can have a joint command. That's an interesting proposal. Has some merit in terms of coordination with the other combatant commanders that this command would be there to support. There are some other combat support type defense agencies that that same sort of logic might apply to, and that's what the report says, we ought to take a look at that as well.

Where we go next is to aviation. The point here is sort of like the depot maintenance. It is an area in which we have more capacity than we have a requirement. This just emphasized the points that General Powell made, so I'm not going to go through those.

The first category where the recommendations are, had to talk about how many airplanes we have. General Powell mentioned this continental air defense. There are 180 airplanes, modern airplanes—F-15s, F-16s; 12 squadrons Air National Guard—great people, good units; 14 bases on 24 hour alert every day, seven days a week, for a threat that is largely gone away.

The recommendation is that that mission can be performed by other aviation units that are at 30 bases in the United States, just sort of general purpose units and training units. So that we can do away altogether with the dedicated force, or at least drastically reduce it.

The Chairman mentioned theater air interdiction. Interdiction is where we go back and try to mess up the enemy before he gets to the front line. You can do that lots of ways. You can do it with rockets, you can do it with airplanes, In this case what we're talking about is airplanes. The things that are different now is that we have a bomber fleet that was almost exclusively dedicated to things nuclear. The nuclear situation has changed a lot. Strategy has changed a lot. Those bombers, a lot of them, can now be used conventionally. They have some advantages—long range, big payload long endurance time. But fighters have advantages too. If they're in the area, they're quicker; you can turn them a lot faster, they're a lot more flexible. They can do air to air, air to ground so there are some real advantages to both.

But obviously, as we figure our total requirement for how much we need, we need to figure both of these capabilities, which are going to mean a requirement for less airplanes.

Similarly, stealth technology, tremendously important we believe. We need to invest in it. But when you do that, you get a more survivable aircraft. You probably need to buy less. Again, less airplanes. Close air support, I've been serving for 32 years. That has been a tough issue since I 11 was commissioned. It was a key point in Admiral Crowe's report. We think we've made a lot of progress on that one.

The key things that are in the report are that now all of the Services have the function of providing close air support. The change there is the Army has that function. The Army does that with attack helicopters. Now they can get close air support from the Air Force and the Navy as well.

But at the time all this stuff was worked out in Key West in 1947, there weren't any attack helicopters. So the assumption always was ~hat close air support, by definition, was fixed wing aircraft. Now that's no longer the case, or that's the recommendation anyway. Again, as you look at the total requirement for close air support, you should end up with fewer aircraft.

The other issues involved with this are in the book, in the doctrine, that says how the various services are supposed to work together. A lot of progress has been made in that area, and during the next few months we're finally going to get those issues resolved.

Airborne command and control. Both the Navy and the Air Force have aircraft that control the nuclear forces. The Navy has a Boeing 767 type aircraft, and it was initially configured to be able to communicate with our nuclear submarines. The Air Force has a 707 type aircraft. There are 16 of these Navy ones, and 11 of these Air Force ones. They were SAC aircraft, did the bomber-missile stuff that the Air Force did. The determination is we don't need both. We're going to keep the Navy aircraft. We're going to retire the Air Force aircraft. That's the recommendation. And we don't need any more. So we can get by with 16. That's less money.

Marine aviation, the Chairman emphasized a big success story. He talked about that, I won't belabor that. Two big changes there. The number of airframes they've got going from nine down to four. The other thing is the amount of time that their air wings spend on carriers is going to increase. What they're good at, obviously, is providing ground support from the sea. That's their specialty and that's what they train on. With the new strategy, the whole Navy's focus is mom on power projection and being able to project power ashore, and they need less of some kinds of aircraft on aircraft carriers than they needed before. Since they're not protecting sea lines of communications, the anti submarine situation is a lot different so the mix of aircraft on aircraft carriers will be different, and a lot more times the Marines will be there.

What that all can end up with, again, is a requirement for fewer air wings. The Chairman talked about this, so I'll just pass over it quickly. The difference there, there are different definitions in different services. It primarily has to do with how you buy spares, and what you assume for attrition. By standardizing those definitions, a lot less airplanes. It seems simple, but a big deal.. In flight training, closed two bases in the last year. Still have 12. Can close a lot of those. We're going to take the fixed wing training and make it all joint. We're going to have a common fixed wing aircraft. We're going to combine helicopter training if it makes sense. The only reason I put a little caveat on the last one, we do helicopter training now in only two places—Pensacola for the Navy, Marines, Coast Guard; the Army and the Air Force do it at Fort Rucker with the Army doing it. It isn't clear yet that we save any money by combining them. So we've still got a little bit of work to do as to whether that makes sense or not.

General support aircraft, you're talking about helicopters now, we've got lots of them, and they're in all the services. For those of you who have been comparing drafts, you know one of the initial proposals was that we take them all and put them in the Army. When we got more information on that, what we found out was it didn't meet the criteria. It didn't help us in terms of 12 improving our capability, and it didn't save us any money. So it didn't make sense, so we don't recommend it. However, not doing that, there's still a lot of things we can do in terms of maintenance and support, and that's what these recommendations are about.

The last one says that in some places in geographic areas, we can change the mission. An example of that is the helicopter support in the Washington, D. C. area is provided by several Services. Maybe it makes sense to only do that with one Service and we can save some money that way.

This is one of the most hotly debated subjects—theater air defense. The situation is in the United States armed forces that's done by both the Air Force and the Army. The Air Force does the aviation part; the Army does the ground missile part. Both do their pieces extraordinarily well.

As you look around the world at other armed forces, you can find about any combination you can imagine. Some do it like we do, some put it all in the Air Force, and other things in between.

As we got into this, what we determined, though, is that we kept running into a substance question that didn't have much to do with how we were organized. The first has to do with how much air defense do we need. We, those of us serving in uniform on active duty, have not experienced very much attack from the air. In part, because the Air Force has done an awful good job of having that not be a problem. So there's a real fundamental issue of how much air defense do we need.

Another issue is, we know we've got a missile threat. So do we have the balance right between our defense against missiles and our defense against airplanes?

Our intent in this is we need to concentrate on the substance of what's tight in those areas, which is what we're going to do, which is what this joint mission area analysis is all about. Once we get that done, we'll go back and look at roles and missions.

This is an Army-Marine issue. The allegation there, I think as everybody knows, is that if you take the expeditionary forces in the Marine Corps and the contingency forces in the Army, generally equated to light infantry, that we've got some duplication in there we don't need.

I guess the first point I would make is it's a little bit more complicated question than that in that contingency forces in the Army are the whole force structure. It's not just the light part. So the heavy part of the Army is very much a contingency force, and it's not just the force in the United States, but it's the forces deployed all over the world. As I tried to explain earlier about crisis response, and we take the forces from where they are to where they're needed. The first thing we did is we went through and we said okay, what do each of these Services bring to the table? What are the capabilities? We determined that they were quite different. In other words, the Marines' capability to project forces over the beach, to bring a lot of support with them when they come, the Marines are easy to get out once you put them in. Somalia is a good example of something that I think has been done very well, done well overall by the Marines, but they were them initially.

On the other hand, the Army, if you've got to get there faster, the Army's the only thing that will get you there with airborne and air delivered forces. So the airborne, air assault, light infantry, heavy forces of the Army, we need all of those capabilities in the same way that we need the Marines.

The issue is, how much is enough? That's a legitimate question. That's a part of the evolution of the force structure. Our answer to that, when we published the military strategy last January, was what's in there. That's what we believe.

Obviously, as times change, situations can change. But the key point is the functions, all of the capabilities that those forces bring, we need those. Every one of them.

This is an Army-Marine issue. Tanks and these multiple launched rocket systems that General Powell mentioned. The conclusion was the Marine Corps needs some tanks. Not very many. They just need enough to do amphibious operations and have the tanks on these maritime pre positioning ships. Because the teamwork that is required, in order to conduct those kinds of operations, is so great and they need attack capability, that if we put Army people in there, the Army would have to end up spending so much time with the Marine Corps, you might as well make them Marines in order to have the right skills. So it doesn't make any sense.

But if you have any requirement beyond that, the recommendation is that it be provided by the Army. In the way that a brigade was provided to the Marines during Desert Storm. A different answer for the rocket system. The Army has them, the Marine Corps currently does not. The Marine Corps intends to buy them. The recommendation is that they not. There's a little more cost analysis more that still needs to be done. But basically, it seemed to us that the Army could provide that support, they get some of that type of support from their close air support aircraft, and some naval gunfire.

This next one I'll just touch very briefly, because it's basically more of the same. I indicated to you a little bit about what had happened so far in intelligence. Everybody's kind of happy, almost happy, anyway, with the structure at the top. Nobody argues with the tactical structure, the corps and the fleet, the numbered air force level. The issue is the Service intelligence structure that's in between. The recommendation is that we can make some more reductions and consolidations.

This is a capacity issue and a coordination issue in terms of test, evaluation, and training. We have some wonderful facilities out in the southwestern part of the United States that most of you all are very familiar with, that happen to be very close together—China Lake, Fort Irwin for the Army, Nellis Air Force Base, Twenty-nine Palms. So the idea is that we should be able to coordinate our efforts out there in a way that we can do things jointly better while the Services still continue to do the things they're supposed to do, which is to train their forces in their basic skills.

Construction engineers. This is another one that changed between drafts. The proposal in an early draft was to put them all in the Army. And by the way, construction engineers build buildings, build roads, build airfields. They build things. They are not the combat type engineers that take out mines and accompany the infantry, and that sort of thing. So what they do in each of the four Services is quite similar.

What we found out here is all the Services need to reduce. The Air Force the most, I think, 39 percent, 34 percent for the Army, and on down from that—big reduction in all the Services. But we didn't gain anything by putting them all in the Army. Again, it didn't improve the capability, and it didn't save us any money. We ended up needing the same capabilities. So it's not recommended.

The Chairman mentioned this. This is just the fact that we've consolidated a lot of our training in terms of how we teach guys how to drive, operate radios, and that sort of stuff, and we need to do more of it and we're going to.

The last one here has to do with Reserve Components. The section in the report is pretty short. Not because it isn't a very important issue, but because the Rand Corporation just finished a major report on this subject which is the basis of a lot of work that's going on now in the Pentagon. We did comment in here, though, that we thought that the various headquarters

structures for the reserve component needed to get linked at to see if there wasn't some unnecessary duplication.

I'm going to go through these very quick. These are examples of things that we looked at and decided that there was no joy in doing any consolidation. Again, one that changed between drafts was C-130. There are over 700 of them—600 of them in the Air Force. They come in several different types, but basically they're transports and they're refuelers. The Marines have them, the Air Force has them, the Coast Guard has them.

When we went out and ran out all the numbers and kinked at the impact, there wasn't any benefit from bringing them together. We didn't save any money, and we lost some stuff in terms of responsiveness to the needs of the various services. So the recommendation is not do it.

These are jammer aircraft, the Navy aircraft, there are 133 of these; and 40 of those. They're quite different in terms of their capabilities. These fly off of earners; these don't. These do stand off jamming this is a much closer type of work. And there are lots of A 6 aircraft in the Navy, so there is some relationship in terms of maintenance and so forth for the Navy, with this being a derivative of the A 6. There are obviously bombers, F-111 bombers in the Air Force. And I guess the other thing is we need them all, we need the capability. So there was no advantage to coming down with one aircraft. We looked at it a whole bunch of different ways. They all cost money, give us less capability. No reason to do it.

Electronic surveillance. These are the guys who are the listeners. Fourteen and 12 of those, this is Air Force, this is Navy. Every one of them was in Desert Storm. Every single one. So there is no excess capacity. If we'd had to go do something else, we'd have had to short them in order to give them to somewhere else. So again, as we went through this, there's no advantage to bringing them together.

Attack helicopters, they're in the Army, two types—Apaches and Cobras; and in the Marine Corps with the Cobras. Again, they're an integral part of those forces. You need about the number you need now, so there wasn't any advantage. The idea would be you put them all in the Army, but there's no particular benefit to that, so we didn't recommend it.

It says we're going to, in the future, if we buy another helicopter, they're both going to buy the same one. That's the recommendation.

The last one on here talks about chaplains and lawyers. That's an attractive one kind of on the surface, but when you get into it there's nothing there. What you're interested in is not a chaplain that's in the Army, but an Army chaplain. You want a soldier who just happens to be a chaplain, or a sailor, or a marine, or an airman. There's a great cultural thing. And oh, by the way, if you combine them, that doesn't reduce the number you need. The number you need is the same. So there's very little savings. The only savings would be in the training, and very little there, and you lose a lot of the cultural association. The same with lawyers and a lot of other areas. So it's not recommended.

Two things not on the charts. One was rescuing downed pilots in a combat environment. In an earlier draft we thought about sort of combining that capability in the Air Force and in the Army, and then decided against it. The reason we decided against it was because as we got more into it, the problems weren't how it was organized; the problems were the fact that our forces can't operate together. We've got some radio netting problems, we've got some doctrinal problems, and we've got some training problems. If we fix those, that will take care of that.

The last one that I would mention to you is operating tempo. It has to do with readiness. A lot of people around say, new strategy, you need less money to be operationally ready. Less OpTempo. OpTempo or flying hours, steaming hours, mileage put on vehicles for ground units.

What we found is, first of all, when you've got a lot smaller force and you've got a regional strategy, and the assumption is you haven't got much time, and that's certainly been our recent experience. When we went to Panama, we didn't have much time to think about that. When we went to Desert Storm, we didn't have much time. And we don't think we're going to have much time for the next one. So the forces have got to be highly ready.

Also, this flexible joint deployment scheme that I explained to you that compensates in some ways for the reduction in forward stationing. That's going to take some operating tempo.

The Services have all done a great job in terms of simulations, which allows them to use their equipment less. But when you sort of balance that off against these other things that I mentioned, it comes out about the same. So the operating tempo, the recommendation is to stay about the same.

This is a summary chart. I'll just let you read that. This just emphasizes the points the Chairman made.

Powell: Thank you all very much. We're ready for some questions. Let me make one comment. When General Leland was talking about the Space Command and our thinking about that, we are very conscious that the commander of the Space Command at Colorado Springs is also commander of the North American Air Defense Command a US-Canadian command. If we made any changes there, we would certainly preserve that relationship with whatever the Air Force Space Command (inaudible) is in Colorado Springs. So I just want to make sure everybody understands this would not affect NORAD in any way.

Q: This may have gone by me faster than I could absorb it, but on the question of deep strike capability, is it your conclusion that the Navy needs to have that carrier based, and you need bomber, a land based bomber component? Or is it something that can evolve into an Air Force mission?

A: I think our conclusion is that with the contribution that bombers can now make, released from strategic responsibilities, the change in the strategy, and the contribution that stealth can make in our programming and budgeting work, we have to take a hard look at the investment mix with respect to deep strike aircraft coming off of carriers as opposed to what the Air Force can do. That's about as far as I want to go here. We are giving a thrust line, really, for the Navy and the Air Force, and the OSD staff to work. I think you will see some of the results of this as programming and budgeting decisions are made. But it goes a little bit beyond the charter of the Roles and Missions Report. You may recall that Congress has asked us to at least give this indication or direction so that the OSD staff, working with the Semites, can now go make program and budget choices accordingly.

Q: General Powell, going back to your initial statement that this is not a consensus report, but your report. As I hear General Leland, at one point he said fewer air wings.

A: I think he said fewer aircraft.

Q: Fewer aircraft. I think he also said air wings. I might be wrong, but anyway. The Navy might view that as needing fewer carriers. Also, is the Navy unhappy about the CINCLANT four star billet that perhaps they're going to lose that under your reorganization? And the last part of that question is, again, backed by your consensus, that's pretty munge language, very defensive language. The last bullet is not the opening shot of an insurrection. Why was that chosen? Is there some insurrection among the Joint Chiefs disagreeing with your position?

A: Which LANT post? I'll let General Leland answer that. (Laughter) There was a suggestion that somehow the Chiefs were all fighting amongst themselves so that there would be no change, and this was a grand scheme to take on the new Administration. That's just nonsense. They are difficult issues. We have wrestled with them. That's one of the reasons the report is late. We have struggled with them. There is no insurrection. I would submit to you that the Chiefs are getting along better than they have in many, many years in trying to wrestle with these things as a team.

Going back to your other question, the Navy is on board the CINCLANT concept. They see the merit in it. It's an exciting idea. We have to work through a lot of issues. It was one of the most controversial of all of the issues. We, frankly, have been looking at something like this for two and a half years, and we finally reached the point of maturity where we think we can go forward with it. But the Navy is on board that particular recommendation.

With respect to carrier wings and numbers of carriers, I'm going to let the Navy talk to that one as part of the budget submission that you're going to see coming up. I'll let them make a case, and they make a god case as to why they are recommending what they are recommending. But I'll let the Secretary and the Navy present that.

Obviously, we're going to have fewer airplanes, a lot fewer airplanes. Obviously, we have to be very sensitive to the mix of airplanes. Obviously, as we take further reductions, we're going to have to reduce the overall size of the force structure. The kinds of dollars that we have to generate to make our contribution to the President's program and the President's emphasis on the economy and the budget can't be dealt with just by roles and mission changes. We're going to take down some capability. We want to make sure we take down the right mix of capability. Aircraft will come down, other things will come down.

Specific numbers of wings, though, let me not totally duck the question, let me just tell you: You will see that in a couple of weeks.

Q: What is your estimate of the overall cost savings from these changes beyond the, I think, \$400 to \$600 million you mentioned?

A: I wish I had an answer to that question. We tried to get one over the last several days knowing it would be asked but we really have not yet reached budget level detail, because the 17 services really have to grind this out now. But I would say at the depot maintenance one, I'm fairly sure that if we can get those closures, we're talking about hundreds of millions of dollars a year, and thousands of spaces.

The MLRS one, Ed was a little more cautious than I was, but I think that's probably a cost avoidance in the neighborhood of \$300 million for the Marine Corps. The consolidation of training facilities, the merging of some of the things we're merging, will generate more. But I don't have a number that I would be comfortable giving you.

Q: A ball park?

A: No, ball parks always get me in trouble. I get picked off at first.

Q: Nevertheless, despite your pains to show that you're not out of sync with the Clinton Administration, that this is part of an ongoing process...

A: I am part of the Clinton Administration, yes.

Q: Out of sync with President Clinton. Nevertheless, some people will point to this report and say that these proposals, while they may be well founded, are quite modest and not in line with the kind of pledge that President Clinton made during the campaign in terms of reducing redundancies. What do you do to combat that?

A: I don't know that I have to. This was done during the previous Administration. We are in the third, fourth week, I guess, of the Clinton Administration. We're prepared to go right back to work and deal with this concern. We're not here posturing ourselves to resist. We're trying to finish off this piece of work so we can take new guidance from our leaders and respond to that new guidance, and go to work on it.

Q: Are you at odds with President Clinton about cuts to the military?

A: No. Obviously, I don't quite understand the question. We have gotten our guidance from the President. We are part of that Administration. We have been given our guidance by the Secretary of Defense. We had good meetings with the Secretary earlier this week on the proposals that we're going to be coming forward in the budget submission. And in due course, you will see how we're going to adjust to these reductions. I've had excellent conversations with the President. I know where he wants to go. I also know his commitment to the quality of the force. I look forward to seeing him in this regard.

Q: Some have suggested that something you alluded to earlier, the really big stuff like four air forces, like redundancy between the Army and the Marines, you, in effect, take a pass on that, and that this report is really much more nibbling around the edges than going after the really tough stuff.

A: The really tough stuff like... I've got to answer it this way. For the last three and a half years the capabilities inherent in Army, Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Air Force, have served the nation extremely well. I have faced one problem or crisis after another where I was awfully glad, awfully glad, that somebody had thought hard in previous years to protect the kind of force we have and the kind of capabilities we have. So I'm a great defender of what we have, and I believe we can shake it down.

But it always comes in well why isn't this more revolutionary. It's a new Monday, why don't you do something more revolutionary than the previous Monday? It may be nibbling on the edges to some, but to others, this is significant change. There are hundreds of millions of dollars to be saved here, there are spaces to be saved here, and there are new ways to do our business reflected here.

So I'm well aware of that criticism, and I am prepared to receive any suggestions about which Service we should "eliminate" or cut in half or let's go up and eliminate Marine aviation. But my mama did not raise a fool, and there are some issues that I know you're not going to take on

because it doesn't make sense to take on. It's not in the national interest to do some of the ideas that are suggested

So while I am trying to be responsive to the need for change, and I believe I am being responsive to the need for change, I've presided over more change in the last three and a half years than anyone of my predecessors except perhaps going back to the days of General Marshall and Omar Bradley and Eisenhower, right after the war. [Someone] recently characterized that period as going from the world's most powerful force to a force that was not demobilized, it simply disintegrated.

The President, President Clinton has charged me to make sure that that does not happen, and we come down in a sensible way. So I'll look at anything. But I am not going to apologize for the fact that we are trying to protect a broad range of capabilities to serve the nation's interests in the future.

Q: Speaking of looking at anything, I'd just like to focus in for a moment on the two helicopter flight training schools. Your report makes mention of the fact that there was a report that said this might not be cost effective, but there have been eight other reports, going back to 1970, that said it would save a lot of money, including reports last year by the DoD IG, and by the DMR. Why do you focus on the one that said it was questionable, and essentially ignore the eight that said it would save a lot of money?

A: Because there is one that says it is questionable. We were not able to resolve it. I think it is something that is doable. My recommendation to the Secretary is that we bore in on it now and make a decision once and for all. This is an issue that I first joined when I was a colonel about 17 years ago. There are strong arguments to do this.

I don't want to go any further, because the analysis has not been completed. But I think we should move in this direction and let's see if the numbers will support that. Through the process that we have, the BRAC process, it isn't enough just to make a statement. You have to do analysis that is sustainable. There will be jobs and communities affected by this, and we shouldn't do it lightly, just because two into one makes sense. We've tried to avoid the Aeroflot technique here, where centralization is good. The Soviets know how to do it. They give you an Aeroflot.

Q: You're doing it with fixed wing planes.

A: I'm not disagreeing with you. I'm saying we should... there have been lots of studies. Now as Chairman, for the first time, as a result of the authority I have under Goldwater-Nichols and with this report, I'm saying to the Secretary there is a presumption that we should be able to do this in one location, but I don't have the numbers for you.

So I recommend to you, the Chairman recommends to you that we do the numbers and if the numbers hold up, then let's stop debating this and let's do it. If the numbers don't hold up, then let's stop raising the issue.

Q: The DoD IG numbers aren't sufficient from last year?

A: If the Secretary examines the DoD IG numbers and he's satisfied with them, then I hope he will act on that. But I will not prejudge what the Secretary will do.

Q: ... demise of the Soviet Union, that one thing we should all be alert to are regional conflicts. We're now seeing that in the former Yugoslavia, in Bosnia. As you look at the roles, missions, and functions report that you've just completed, does it give you any concern about U.S. capability, of getting involved in Bosnia?

A: The force we have now and the force that we will be going to in which you will see when the budget is submitted, gives us sufficient capability to deal with the potential crises that I see on the horizon. The problem is that I'm not sure what's over the horizon. The problem is we are no longer dealing with all known threats. It was comfortable for 40 years, always to have your eye on a single, big, red ball. But now they come up like rainstorms.

You have to have a broad range of capabilities to deal with these as they come along. I'm not going to get into Bosnia, of course, at this session, but anything we might be called upon to do, I think we'd be able to do with the force structure we have now or the force structure we are going to.

Q: You mentioned in the report, and you mentioned it first thing, that was one of the things you mentioned, that you would not want to see the four... that the US does not have four air forces. And actually, President Clinton in his campaign in August had used that phrase, that America does have four air forces. Does that not put you at odds with Clinton during his campaign?

A: I don't think so. I really don't think so. I'm not saying that there are not four packages of air power in each Service. I'm just trying to make the distinction that they all serve a legitimate purpose. The President has made reference to them, Senator Nunn has made reference to them, a lot of people have made reference to them.

The answer to this issue, as I'm presenting it, is that you've got to remember the uniqueness of the United States Air Force, and you've got to remember why the other Services have air power within them. If you wish to call that air power a Navy air force, an Army air force, and a Marine air force, therefore four, that's fine. But that isn't where the real challenge is.

The real savings and the real improvement in capability is not in scratching out one of them. It's in downsizing them in an appropriate mix across all four of them. It's in getting at what is supporting them internal to each of the services.

Each Service developed its own system over time. Each Service was responding to Cold War requirements, World War III, global war, it will go on forever. That's gone. So if you really want to save money, it's not a matter of scratching out a few airplanes in the Marine Corps, it's getting into the infrastructure under all of those air forces, and that's where I believe we have made progress in this particular report.

But there is no doubt about it that the question will come up again, why do we have four air forces, I've tried to deal with that as best I know how.

Q: In your report, it singles out the MILSTAR as one of the four most noteworthy recent procurement activities. The Air Force earlier this week recommended cutting it. Which are you going to recommend to the Secretary of Defense? That he go with you or with the Air Force?

A: I'd prefer to make my recommendation to the Secretary of Defense before I make you aware of what my recommendation is. (Laughter) It will be dealt with in the normal budget issue process, and that's what we're going through now.

Q: What's the main obstacle to future changes? And secondly, your report doesn't address potential competition tasks between missiles and manned aircraft, or unmanned UAVs and manned reconnaissance aircraft.

A: With respect to the first question, there is no obstacle to further change. If we came across something this afternoon that made a great deal of sense and it met our test of improving the force in some way or saving money, I'd want to do it tomorrow morning. I'm not going to wait three years for...

Q. You couldn't necessarily do it. You've been trying to cut the reserves. You've been trying to cut bases...

A: Whether I'm allowed to do it is a different question. I can assure you, a lot of the suggestions out there are going to run into difficult sledding in various places. I'm an adviser. I don't command anything, and I don't make decisions. I provide advice. This is advice to my leadership.

So if your question is how will it happen, well, it's gone to the Secretary. I'm sure he will find some of this consistent with his views, other parts perhaps not. We'll see. But that isn't going to keep me from making recommendations whenever I come upon a good recommendation that I think would serve the interests of the nation, serve the interests of the Department.

With respect to your other question, we're working on that and constantly examining the tradeoffs between missiles, air breathing delivery systems, as well as unattended air vehicles, but it is not a particular feature of this report as roles and missions and functions of the armed forces of the United States.

Q: Questions on the new CONUS based Unified Command. One, I don't see what you're doing with TAC, Marine Corps, those people. They seem to be kind of left out in limbo. The other one is: is one of the functions of this new command going to be training peacekeepers for United Nations functions? That's something you folks have shied away from as a concept in the past. Do you see creating specified forces to do those kind of peacekeeping and domestic tranquility missions?

A: The first part, you hit a good question that we're still analyzing. There are Navy and Marine forces in the Continental United States that belong to the Pacific Command. So one thing we have to resolve is whether we just leave that relationship as it is, or do we form some kind of relationship between those West Coast units and the bulk of our forces here on the East Coast which would be under CINCLANT. So we have to resolve that issue. It is an issue.

With respect to UN operations, what we have in mind is that this new command, this CINC, would ensure that as joint training exercises are planned, and as we look at the overall training plans for our units, new emphasis is provided on the kinds of peacekeeping and humanitarian missions that we are being involved in more and more. It does not mean, necessarily, that this command or the units of this command are dedicated to an arrangement outside of US national control. That's another issue for another time.

It will give us a place to show that we understand our responsibilities in this new environment, and give us a place to ensure that we have somebody watching out for this kind of activity with emphasis on civil affairs, humanitarian support, how the UN works, the difference between Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 peacekeeping activities, and capture all the lessons we've learned in

recent months as a result of our operations in Somalia, Provide Comfort in eastern Turkey and northern Iraq, Desert Storm, and other United Nations activities that we have participated in.

Q: There's only one new start fixed wing aircraft on the books, that's the AFX. How should the Navy interpret what you've done here? Do they need that airplane, or do they not?

A: I would prefer to let that come out as a result of the Secretary's deliberative budget process that he's going through now with the Navy and the Air Force. Not to dodge, but you'll see that.

Q How about the mission then? Do you see the Navy as having a role 'o play in deep strike?

A: I think the Navy does have a role to play in deep strike. How much investment should be put in that role, and what the proper mix of aircraft should be is really a service function and role that I would not wish to get ahead of the Chief of Naval Operations on, or the Secretary of the Navy. We'll all be taking about it, and I will provide a joint perspective to those discussions. But I would not today wish to prejudge what the Navy might want to do.

Q: The only mission that the Clinton Administration has articulated yet for the military is a peacekeeping mission, a possible peacekeeping mission in Bosnia. Are US military people adequately trained, in your estimation, for that kind of work? Especially if that's the only kind of work they get in the next four or eight years?

A: I hope that's the only kind of work they get forever. But being ready for war, being trained in the warrior ethic, as well as understanding what peacekeeping operations are like and what's required of units performing peacekeeping operations I think makes the armed forces of the United States uniquely able to perform those kinds of activities.

I think Somalia was a perfect example. Most of the ground taken in Somalia was taken by Ambassador Oakley. But the reason Ambassador Oakley was so successful as our point man is that as people looked over his shoulder and they saw combat troops who were here to back up this diplomatic effort, they thought this must be a pretty good crowd to cooperate with. I do not think I wish to see what would happen if they got very, very mad, or if Ambassador Oakley went like this.

So that's the way we like to see an operation work. Minimum loss of life, stabilize the situation. You use warriors who also know how to be peacemakers and peacekeepers. This new command will make sure that we're training warriors, and we're training them jointly so they can go in, go in harm's way, and come home safely after accomplishing the mission. But also ensure that while they are trained that way, they also know how to do these kinds of humanitarian peacekeeping operations. And they have done some splendid ones in recent months. From Miami, south Dade County, to Somalia, to Provide Comfort.

Q: This is for General Leland. The Marines, for many years, have been, by law, required or tasked with developing doctrine, equipment, and tactics for amphibious warfare. Now that the Army has been made a charter member of the close air support community, which service, if any, has been similarly tasked to develop the doctrine, tactics, techniques, and equipment for close air support?

Leland: There are two parts to that.

Q: I know what the Marines are doing. I want to know what we're going to do under close air support.

A: I understand that. But the two parts have to do with where the direction, oversight, and approving is; and who's got the pencil in their hand. The direction, oversight, and approval is done by the Chairman. So in other words, it is joint doctrine, and one of the things that has firmly been established is that all service doctrine has to be consistent with joint doctrine. So the tough issues that I mentioned to you that are going to get resolved will be decided by the Chairman.

The United States Army is drafting a lot of the details, so the actual work, along with the Joint Staff, a lot of it is being done by the Army in coordination with all the other Services.

Q General Leland, even though, as General Powell pointed out, there's going to be continuing discussion and deliberations, based on what you said about how the Marines can come in over the beach and the Army can get there faster via airlift are you leaving somewhat unresolved for now the question over when you use Marines and when you use Army units for quick response contingencies?

A: I don't think I'm leaving it unresolved. The capabilities are different, so each varies depending on the situation that the United States faces, and also, geographically, where things are. If there's a Marine Amphibious Group that is close by, and if the problem is close to the water, that gives you one set of parameters to work with. I can give you an example, there was Operation Sharp Edge where we went into Liberia and evacuated the embassy and a lot of other people out of Liberia. I was in the European Command at that time, the Chief of Staff there. We end up doing that with the Marine Amphibious Group that was in the Mediterranean, but it took several days to get that force off the coast of Liberia. Once they got there, there were lots of advantages to using the Marines, because of sustainment, because they had helicopters with them, we could get the people out, put them on the ships, and that sort of thing. But had the problem developed quicker, there's no way the Marines could have gotten there, and the contingency plan was to bring Army forces from the United States. So we were going to do it both ways, and it just depended on how the situation worked out.

Q: General, as you're consolidating the military depots, do you envision bringing more of the maintenance and repair work in house, or do you want to compete for more of that?

A: That's not clear at this point. It's just part of it that's not resolved.

Powell: Let me take a shot at it. One of the things we really want to look at it is seeing how much of it can be contracted out in order to help sustain the industrial base, so that's one of the things that we hope this new Joint Depot Maintenance Command would put into their calculations.

Q: I'm also a little confused on your answer on deep strike. I know you don't want to talk about it too much, but you said before that you wanted to take a hard look at it. Did you mean that yourself or the Joint Staff was going to start studying the issue as a follow on to what you've said here today?

A: I think we will be studying it along with the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and his staff, as well as the Chief of Naval Operations, as we start to look at how to implement the additional reductions that we have to take.

Q: Do you have to keep an eye towards the recommendation in the FY94 budget? Or further down the road?

A: I think you will see some indication of our thinking in the FY94 budget. Maybe not the complete answer, but...

Q: I was just confused, because I thought Congress had ordered, if I'm correct, the staff to do a tactical aviation modernization study.

A: That's correct, and this feeds into it, but this is not the tactical aircraft modernization study.

Q: When will that study be completed?

A: I can't answer that. I think OSD has the con on that, and I think they needed our work... somehow 1 March comes to mind, but I don't want to speak definitively.

Q: With respect to the contingency forces, the relationship between the Marines and the light Army divisions. I notice you recommend, or suggest the possibility of further reductions of light divisions.

A: Yes.

Q Why did you opt for that rather than cutting back the Marines?

A: I'll tell you what, the Marines, boy have they demonstrated what they can do in the three and a half years that I've been Chairman. In fact all the Services are running a very, very high Op Tempo right now, meaning they really are finding themselves coming and going. But no Service is maintaining as high an OpTempo as the United States Marine Corps right now, in terms of what they have been doing. Somalia, or what they did in a variety of other places.

In the foreseeable future, as these contingencies keep coming, I don't see any advantage, or where it would be in our interest to make any further reductions in the size of the Marine Corps beyond what has already been planned And I think in the next year or so we may have to take a look at what some of those original out year cuts to the Marine Corps might mean. We have to get rid of some requirements or the Marines will not be able to continue performing all the missions there are now.

So as we looked at the overall structure, we thought we could make some additional savings, and I think the Chief of Staff of the Army agrees with this, some additional savings in our light infantry force structure in the Army without sacrificing that rapid contingency capability inherent in units like the 82nd Airborne and others. I think you will see that reflected in the budget.

Q: General Powell, throughout this presentation you've described this report as a work in progress, a snapshot, that work was done during the previous Administration. Given the position that President Clinton took last summer, seeking support, critique that Senator Nunn made, perhaps a more aggressive approach, was it your intent here to maybe not make the kind of radical or more radical types of changes that Senator Nunn had suggested in order to leave that to the new, incoming Administration? Let them put their mark on this and come forward with something a little bit less than what they talked about?

A: No, I can only work for one President and one Secretary of Defense at a time. Last year, as you recall, I was working for President Bush and I was working for Secretary Cheney, implementing the Bush budget, the Cheney budget and program. So that's the answer to that. I was not trying to game anyone, since I was not (inaudible) about how any election would turn out, and I don't care. I do my work based on what I think is right, what I think is correct for the armed forces, and working for the bosses that I have at that time.

Q: You've made certain revisions and taken some of them back after the election when you knew what...

A: It had absolutely nothing to do with the election. In fact, Senator Nunn has remarked on more than one occasion, that this is an ongoing process. Some of the questions that were posed were of a rhetorical nature. Look at these things. It didn't say do it, it said look at them. And some of them we looked at, and sorry, it just doesn't make sense to take a small fleet of airplanes from one service and a small fleet of airplanes from another service, which has larger families of similar airplanes in that service, and merge them together, breaking up a unique capability to put together some ad hoc capability just so I can be able to say I consolidated something. It may have a surface attractiveness, but it is fundamentally dumb.

Q: Going back to mission just for a moment, and given the planning. If you were called upon to go into an area, let's say, of the world, maybe east of the Adriatic where it's hilly or mountainous, what mix would you recommend, and how much of each?

A: I don't want to speculate on what I might do in a particular situation. You haven't told me what the mission is. So in the absence of knowing exactly what the mission is, I wouldn't want to speculate on what I might do.

Q: On the consolidation of the training, tests, and evaluation, I'm not sure where I see any money saving.

A: Really it's an efficiency more so than the money. We're not creating a huge new organization. But because of the investment we have out there, each service having made a huge investment in those facilities, we think we can leverage that investment by electronically and through simulations and computers, tying them together, so that what's happening at the National Training Center can be used by the Marines at Twenty-nine Palms, can be used up at Nellis, can be used at China Lake, and computers and new techniques of simulation allow us to get more of a out of the existing investment in those facilities.

Q: With fewer weapons coming on, you don't see a duplication, or a redundancy between China Lake and Eglin Air Force Base? The test and evaluation...

A: In fact, we have not dealt with that extensively in this report, but I think we need to take a hard look at how many R&D aviation test facilities we need. You may want to say some more about that. Leland: There are really two pieces to the recommendation. I, obviously, didn't make that clear enough. One, as you looked at the test and evaluation capacity, like the depot capacity and like a lot of other things, the assumption is that we have excess capacity.

So there's an effort to reduce and consolidate. A separate but related issue is the training and the test and evaluation on the West Coast. The point there was we think we can do a better job of joint training and of test and evaluation if we have an executive agent or somebody, some

central direction between those very valuable facilities that are in the West and are, fortunately, so close together.

END TEXT