

Costly Requirements

The editorial by Adam Hebert was interesting if not very flawed and certainly biased [“*Too Many Bases, Not Enough Air Force*,” June, p. 4]. It was clear from the beginning that Hebert, almost line and verse, took Secretary of the Air Force Deborah Lee James’ position to arbitrarily support BRAC and close additional bases based simply on cost considerations. And it’s also evident that James and other leaders, including the members of Congress [from districts where] many of the identified Air Force bases are located appear to focus solely on either cost considerations (operating under budget constraints) or the economic impact those installations have on local economies. While both factors are extremely important, I believe those considerations take a back seat to even higher priorities such as those the Heritage Foundation identified back in 2011. Specifically, and as was stated in the Heritage Foundation report: “The US military force structure envisioned by the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review and the President’s

FY 2012 budget request is inadequate to protect vital US national interests. After the ‘procurement holiday’ during the 1990s and the wear and tear of the long war against terrorism’ in Iraq and Afghanistan, all military services urgently need to recapitalize and modernize their inventories. Over the long term, failure to invest the funds needed to rebuild the US military in the near term will increase not only the costs, but also the risks to the nation and endanger US allies and friends.”

Nothing has appreciably changed from the above policy statement made in 2011. Our defense budget is even more woefully inadequate today than it was five years ago! We’re still engaged in both Iraq and Afghanistan with no end in sight. But also now add Syria and other satellite Middle Eastern countries where terrorist extremists continue to operate freely. In addition, our USAF infrastructure and inventories ARE in worse shape today than at any time in the past (prior to World War II?). But yet, Secretary James and other leaders continue to call for a mass closing of US military installations to further shrink US military presence based solely on cost? That’s bad math at best, and totally irresponsible behavior at worst. Why? Because “requirements determine costs”—NOT the other way around. For far too long I’ve read article after article regarding how we don’t have the budget dollars to adequately man our military services, that Congress or the President hasn’t approved the necessary budget money to modernize our weapons systems or infrastructure, etc. etc., ad nauseam. [The articles did not show] much regard for nor an understanding of the priorities of our “national interests.” Americans are not only tired of hearing the same

old platitudes, more importantly, they’ll go to the polls in November angrier at their elected officials than at any point in modern US history for allowing this systematic decay of our forces’ ability to fly and fight.

And, as a reminder to those who may forgotten what our national priorities are (in all the rhetoric coming out of Washington nowadays): The Heritage Foundation report said, “Our US national interests have remained remarkably consistent since WWII, despite the changing threat environment. They include:

1. Safeguarding US national security
2. Preventing a major power threat to Europe, East Asia, or the Persian Gulf
3. Maintainin access to foreign trade
4. Protecting Americans against threats to their lives and well being; and
5. Maintaining access to resources.”

Lastly, as the foundation stated: “National security challenges drive force structure requirements: how many brigades, wings, carrier groups, and other military assets are needed; where they are deployed; and how they are used.”

And, we haven’t even factored in the possibility of a new President in

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November who does, in fact, recognize the urgent need for a strong US military (peace through strength). That "major" call for mobilization will require real estate, personnel, and equipment to successfully implement. That means more military installations, *not* fewer. Again, the requirements determine the costs, not the other way around.

MSgt. Randolph E. Whitmire,
USAF (Ret.)
Rochester Hills, Mich.

I saw the title of the June 2016 editorial in *Air Force Magazine* and was greatly hopeful—hopeful that your editorial would be a balanced

discussion of overcapacity and the need for a significantly increased size of the Air Force. However, the balance never showed. The article was, once again a plea to reduce the number of Air Force bases. I have a number of concerns about another reduction in our base infrastructure. First, given the increase in the number of nations with nuclear capability now versus 30 and 50-plus years ago, I would consider the dispersion of our air forces more critical today than those past decades. Since one nuke can destroy a base and all its assets, fewer bases in the future greatly increases the risk that an enemy can neutralize our capability



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to retaliate with fewer nukes. This, to me, significantly raises the specter of a larger number of enemy countries being able to cripple us. Second, I hope that the Air Force has not given up hope for a significant increase in our force structure size in the future. It seems to me that the Air Force as with the other services has more mission than we have assets to adequately cover them all. If this is true, and the Air Force prematurely reduces our infrastructure, then what would the cost be in the future to re-establish a base? After all, the historical tradition has been for the Air Force to place closed bases on the sales block rather than mothball them. If the Air Force chooses to close a base and quickly sell the assets, the cost of bringing a new base into fruition would be both costly and time-consuming. Finally, the quantity of major missions of the Air Force seems to have grown during the last three decades. Although we have fewer mission assets and fewer people, conglomerating missions at a single base may seem doable. However, during the decades since the end of WWII, many companies who increased their size through conglomeration of product centers at a single geographical area have found time and again that the anticipated economies of scale not only failed to occur, but product quantity and quality diminished because common core maintenance and support functions of greatly diverse facilities, equipment, and people skills at a central location often diminished the specializations needed in each of those resource areas which ultimately downgraded the output (quality and quantity). In my view, downsizing bases today incurs greater risk than [closures] done 10 through 20 years ago because excess capacity today reflects mission capability unexecutable in the future.

Lt. Col. John Bredfeldt,
USAF (Ret.)
Dawsonville, Ga.

Faint Praise for Stalin

In his essay "Operation Barbarossa Stalls Out," John T. Correll ably documented the war on the Eastern Front that became, as he noted, "Hitler's biggest military mistake" [June, p. 62]. Perhaps because of space limitations, a number of crucial aspects were omitted in what Stalin called the "Great Patriotic War" that made Soviet Russia an ally of the Western-led, warfighting United

Nations. It should be recalled that the war on the Eastern Front tied up nearly half of the German armed forces. These forces could have been deployed against the Allied invasion of Hitler's Festung Europa in spring 1944 when Operation Overlord was begun on D-Day.

A number of Russian historians together with various memoirists that include Stalin's top aide, Vyacheslav Molotov, and informed spies like Zoya Voskresenskaya, note that:

- Stalin was fully aware of the German threat of invasion. Indeed, in spring 1941, he sharply augmented defenses on the front facing the Wehrmacht's buildup (as Correll acknowledged) when his agents in Tokyo informed him that Japan would strike against other enemies in the Pacific, not its adversary, the USSR;

- Stalin erred tactically, not strategically, on the matter of the exact date of the expected invasion, which was, as he told aides, "inevitable." According to some sources, Molotov included, Stalin was bluffing in assuming a defensive posture toward Hitler in the preceding months before Barbarossa. Stalin had decided that the Soviet Union must not be perceived as the aggressor in this "world-historical" war, that the USSR should occupy the high moral ground of being the "victim of Fascist aggression." This would assure an alliance with the West as America loomed as the decisive factor in the defeat of the Axis (Lend-Lease Aid to Britain was already established by late winter 1941, aid that Stalin later urgently requested immediately after the German attack of June 22). Soviet counterintelligence worked overtime directly via agents in Washington (as we now know from decryptions of "Operation White") to instigate a diversionary war between the US and Japan and thus hasten US entry into the war;

- The date of the German attack had to be postponed several crucial weeks because of the Wehrmacht's operations against a pro-Nazi regime in Yugoslavia in spring 1941; this was an effort that ironically ran parallel to Britain's own effort to keep Yugoslavia on the Allied side; this delay meant that the Germans would find themselves bogged down in an unusually brutal Russian winter;

- Stalin, a cruel and hated dictator, should nevertheless be appraised as a leader who assured a Soviet victory in a war with Germany on the Eastern

Front and who brought Russia into a warfighting alliance with the West. Marshal Georgy Zhukov, no friend of Stalin's, notes in his memoirs that it was Stalin who had readied the USSR for war beginning in the early 1930s and who took a personal hand in the many-sided military and paramilitary buildup in the USSR; Stalin always kept diplomatic channels open to America.

- The biggest surprise—for Hitler—was how energetically and effectively the Soviet warfighting machine became a match for the combat-experienced Wehrmacht. As Correll writes: "Stalin and the Russians were not as clumsy or as dull-witted as they may have seemed earlier. To the utter surprise of the Germans and the rest of the world they managed an astounding recovery in a very short time. ... Stalin [had rebuilt the Red Army] in record time through redeployments and mobilization."

Albert L. Weeks
Sarasota, Fla.

Wait, Wait

I enjoyed the article "Remembering Those Who Served" [June, p. 44]. Having lived in the Capitol Region for several years, I visited the memorials on several occasions. Those who have not had the same opportunity were able to see what our nation has done to pay tribute to those who served, through your article. I was, however, disappointed when I came to the last page only to see [the logo] of the Air Force Memorial. I would have thought that when photographing the Pentagon Memorial, the photographers could have traveled the short distance up the hill and provided photos of the impressive Honor Guard Statue and the spires.

CMSgt. Stephen Talbot,
USAF (Ret.)
Hardeeville, S.C.

- *As mentioned in the article, we will be running extensive coverage of the Air Force Memorial in our October issue, in celebration of its 10th anniversary.—THE EDITORS*

I want to comment on your article "Remembering Those Who Served," which appears to have a misleading statement. The article states "list the names of 58,307 service members who were wounded in the Vietnam War between 1956 and 1975 and died of those wounds." I was under the impression that

number (58,307) was all deaths including illnesses, accidents, suicides, etc.

Regardless of cause of death, all names of those having died in the Vietnam War are most deserving to be inscribed on this memorial. Let us never forget their service during such a difficult war. Thank you for including a story of the war memorials in *Air Force Magazine*.

Harold Boone
Harrisburg, N.C.

Bubbles? Well, That's Perfect

The following comments are offered [*"Flashback: Where's Up, Pussycat?" June, p. 61*].

The cat's name was Bubbles and the owner was Dr. Siegfried J. Gerathewohl, a member of the USAF School of Aviation Medicine. The purpose of the weightless flight was to see how the cat's labyrinthine righting reflex would respond to the weightless environment and how the cat would right itself after being held upside down and then released. The animal was confused and panicky and tumbled or righted itself in the wrong direction. When the resultant of the forces involved (gravity and inertia) was zero, the otoliths were not simulated at all. This caused complete disorientation.

Lt. Col. Otto Vaughn,
USAF (Ret.)
Huntsville, Ala.

Oops

I'm sure it was just a typo, but we have to keep you guys on your toes. On p. 58 of the June issue, it was stated that the B-47 Stratojet had eight engines [*"The First Offset"*]. As any jet aircraft buff knows, the B-47 only had six engines. This fact is also verified by the photo of a B-47 on p. 60. The B-47 may have been confused with the B-52 which does indeed have eight engines.

I look forward to each issue of *Air Force Magazine*. It always contains many interesting and informative articles. Keep up the great work!!!

Charlie Friend
Alamogordo, N.M.

You write that the E-8C depicted on the back page of the June issue was "assigned to the 461st Air Control Wing" in 2004. This is wrong.

In 2004, I was wing historian of the 116th ACW. This was one of our jets and had been since 2002, when the 116th ACW was formed from the 116th Bomb Wing of the Georgia ANG with jets from the disbanded 93rd ACW at

Senior Staff Changes

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CONFIRMATIONS: To be General: Terrence J. **O'Shaughnessy**, Stephen W. "Seve" **Wilson**. **To be Lieutenant General:** Thomas W. **Bergeson**, Richard M. **Clark**, VeraLinn "Dash" **Jamieson**. **To be Major General:** Thomas W. **Geary**.

NOMINATIONS: To be Lieutenant General: Jerry D. **Harris Jr.**, Jerry P. **Martinez**, Steven M. **Shepro**.

CHANGES: Maj. Gen. (sel.) Steven L. **Basham**, from Dep. Dir., Rqmts., Jt. Staff, Pentagon, to Dir., LL, OSAF, Pentagon ... Lt. Gen. (sel.) Thomas W. **Bergeson**, from Dir., LL, OSAF, Pentagon, to Cmdr., 7th AF, PACAF, Osan AB, South Korea ... Maj. Gen. Thomas A. **Bussiere**, from Dep. Dir., Nuclear, Homeland Defense, & Current Ops., Jt. Staff, Pentagon, to Cmdr., 8th AF, AFGSC, Barksdale AFB, La. ... Lt. Gen. (sel.) Richard M. **Clark**, from Cmdr., 8th AF, AFGSC, Barksdale AFB, La., to Cmdr., 3rd AF, USAFE, Ramstein AB, Germany ... Maj. Gen. (sel.) James C. **Dawkins Jr.**, from Dir., Strat. Capabilities Policy, Natl. Security Council, Executive Office to the President, Washington, D.C., to Dep. Dir. for Nuclear, Homeland Defense and Current Ops., Jt. Staff, Pentagon ... Lt. Gen. John L. **Dolan**, from Cmdr., 5th AF, PACAF, Yokota AB, Japan, to Dir., Ops., Jt. Staff, Pentagon ... Maj. Gen. (sel.) Thomas W. **Geary**, from Dir., ISR, Strategy, Plans, Policy, & Force Dev., DCS, ISR, Pentagon, to Asst. DCS, ISR, DCS, ISR, USAF, Pentagon ... Brig. Gen. Gerald V. **Goodfellow**, from Cmdr., Squadron Officer School, AU, AETC, Maxwell AFB, Ala., to Dir., Nuclear Enterprise Spt. Directorate, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Fort Belvoir, Va. ... Brig. Gen. Gregory M. **Guillot**, from Dir., Strat. Plans, Rqmts., & Prgms., PACAF, JB Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii, to C/S, PACAF, JB Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii ... Maj. Gen. John P. **Horne**, from Dep. Dir., Defense Threat Reduction Agency, OSD, Fort Belvoir, Va., to Dir., DOD Spec. Access Prgm. Central Office, OSD, Pentagon ... Lt. Gen. (sel.) VeraLinn "Dash" **Jamieson**, from Dep. Cmdr., Jt. Functional Component Command, ISR, STRATCOM, JB Anacosta-Bolling, D.C., to DCS, ISR, USAF, Pentagon ... Brig. Gen. David A. **Krumm**, from Spec. Asst. to the C/S, USAF, Pentagon, to Dep. Dir., Rqmts., Jt. Staff, Pentagon ... Brig. Gen. (sel.) Richard G. **Moore Jr.**, from Chief, Prgm. Integration Div., Office of the Asst. SECDEF for Financial Mgmt. & Comptroller, OSAF, Pentagon, to Cmdr., 86th AW, USAFE, Ramstein AB, Germany ... Gen. (sel.) Terrence J. **O'Shaughnessy**, from Cmdr., 7th AF, PACAF, Osan AB, Korea, to Cmdr., PACAF, JB Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii ... Brig. Gen. Aaron M. **Prupas**, from Dep. Dir., Intel., US Forces-Afghanistan, Kabul, Afghanistan, to Dir., ISR Strategy, Plans, Policy, & Force Dev., DCS, ISR, USAF, Pentagon ... Maj. Gen. Kevin B. **Schneider**, from C/S, PACAF, JB Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii, to C/S, PACOM, Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii ... Maj. Gen. Thomas J. **Sharp**, from Dir., Strat. Plans, Rqmts., & Prgms., AMC, Scott AFB, Ill., to Vice Cmdr., AMC, Scott AFB, Ill. ... Lt. Gen. (sel.) Steven M. **Shepro**, from Vice Dir., Strat. Plans & Policy, Jt. Staff, Pentagon, to Dep. Chairman, NATO Mil. Committee, Brussels, Belgium ... Brig. Gen. (sel.) Robert S. **Spalding III**, from Chief, China, Taiwan, & Mongolia Div., Jt. Staff, Pentagon, to Defense Attaché, China, Defense Intel. Agency, US Embassy, China ... Maj. Gen. (sel.) Jon T. **Thomas**, from Cmdr., 86th AW, USAFE, Ramstein AB, Germany, to Dir., Strat. Plans, Rqmts. & Prgms., AMC, Scott AFB, Ill. ... Maj. Gen. Linda R. **Urrutia-Varhall**, from Asst. DCS, ISR, DCS, ISR, USAF, Pentagon, to Dir., Ops. & Mil. Dep., Natl. Geospatial-Intel. Agency, Springfield, Va. ... Brig. Gen. Craig D. **Wills**, from Exec. to the Cmdr., PACAF, JB Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii, to Dir., Strat. Plans, Rqmts., & Prgms., PACAF, JB Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii ... Gen. (sel.) Stephen W. "Seve" **Wilson**, from Dep. Cmdr., STRATCOM, Offutt AFB, Neb., to Vice C/S, USAF, Pentagon.

SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE CHANGES: Diana **Banks**, to Dep. Asst. SECDEF for Mil. Education, USD (Personnel & Readiness), Washington, D.C. ... Glenn A. **Fogg**, to Dep. Dir., Prototyping & Experimentation, USD (AT&L), Washington, D.C. ... Sylana A. **Tramble**, to Dep. Dir., Human Resources Directorate, Washington Headquarters Svcs., Arlington, Va. ... Daryl B. **Witherspoon**, to General Counsel, Defense Contract Audit Agency, Fort Belvoir, Va.

Robins AFB, Ga. The 116th was the first "blended wing" of Active Duty and ANG airmen, along with some US Army soldiers who were assigned (the Joint in Joint STARS). It remained thus until 2011, which is when the 461st ACW

was formed to serve alongside the now all-ANG 116th.

There was no 461st ACW in 2004.
MSgt. Bill Brockman,
ANG (Ret.)
Atlanta