

Advance Questions for Ashton Carter, Nominee to be Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics

1. Defense Reforms

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

I worked in the Pentagon both before and after the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and I have seen its benefits in terms of jointness, provision of military advice to the President, and streamlined acquisition management. Some of the Act's principles are also being applied to interagency coordination. At this time I see no specific changes in the Act that I would recommend. If confirmed, I would have the opportunity to assess whether changes were needed, and if so consult with this Committee.

If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

Acquisition reform must be a central priority, and if confirmed I will be assessing proposals for reform, including ones that might touch on aspects of Goldwater-Nichols. I will consult with this Committee if such a proposal arises and appears to have merit.

2. Duties

Twenty years ago, Congress established the position of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition in response to the recommendations of the Packard Commission. The Packard Commission report stated: "This new Under Secretary . . . should be the Defense Acquisition Executive. As such, he should supervise the performance of the entire acquisition system and set overall policy for R&D, procurement, logistics, and testing. He should have the responsibility to determine that new programs are thoroughly researched, that military requirements are verified, and that realistic cost estimates are made before the start of full-scale development. (In general, we believe, cost estimates should include the cost of operating and maintaining a system through its life.) He should assure that an appropriate type of procurement is employed, and that adequate operational testing is done before the start of high-rate production. He also should be responsible for determining the continuing adequacy of the defense industrial base."

Do you believe that the position of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(ATL)) has the duties and authorities necessary to carry out the recommendations of the Packard Commission?

Yes

Do you see the need for modifications in the duties and authorities of the USD(ATL)?

No.

Do you believe that the Department of Defense has effectively implemented a streamlined chain of command for acquisition programs, as envisioned by the Packard Commission?

I believe that the Department has implemented acquisition chains of command that provide a good management structure to meet current acquisition requirements and outcomes. If confirmed, I will continue to examine these acquisition structures and oversight chains.

Do you see the need for modifications in that chain of command, or in the duties and authorities of any of the officials in that chain of command?

Not at this time. I believe the statutory reporting chain which provides USD (AT&L) directive authority for Service acquisition programs via the Service Secretaries is a critical authority which must be maintained. If confirmed, I will evaluate the current chains of command and recommend adjustments, if needed.

Section 133 of title 10, United States Code, describes the duties and responsibilities of the USD(ATL).

Assuming you are confirmed, what additional duties do you expect that the Secretary of Defense will prescribe for you?

If confirmed, I expect the Secretary to assign me duties and functions commensurate with the USD(AT&L) position, and any others he may deem appropriate.

Do you recommend any changes to the provisions of section 133 of Title 10, United States Code, with respect to the duties of the USD(ATL)?

No, I do not.

3. Qualifications

If confirmed, you will be responsible for managing an acquisition system pursuant to which the Department of Defense spends almost \$400 billion each year. Section 133 of title 10, United States Code, provides for the Under Secretary to be appointed

from among persons who have an extensive management background in the public or private sector.

What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?

I have had 25 years of experience working with and for the Department of Defense and its supporting defense industry and laboratories on major weapons systems and command and control systems. I first worked in DOD for Secretary Caspar Weinberger on space programs, nuclear weapons systems, command and control systems, and strategic defense in the 1980s. In the 1990s I was privileged to serve as Assistant Secretary of Defense. In between government service I have been a consultant and advisor to defense companies, to defense laboratories and FFRDCs, and a member and consultant to the Defense Science Board and to DOD's Threat Reduction Advisory Council. I have participated in many panels and studies that have assessed the defense acquisition system going back to the 1980s and have written three books that address the subject. As a physicist, I am very familiar with developments in defense technology and therefore with the role the USD(AT&L) plays in overseeing the science and technology efforts of the Department. The USD(AT&L) also plays a key role in our nuclear deterrent and in other strategic issues. I have been deeply involved in technical aspects of nuclear weapons and missile defense since the 1980s.

What background or experience, if any, do you have in the acquisition of major weapon systems?

Acquiring weapons systems in a manner that that warfighter and taxpayer deserve has several dimensions, and I have background and experience in each. Secretary Gates and Deputy Secretary Lynn have stressed the need to ensure that the Department's acquisition program meets the needs of the 21st century, and I believe they expect the USD(AT&L) to contribute, with other senior managers, to that end. I have previously participated in many governmental and non-governmental reviews and analyses of U.S. military strategy, trends in the types of threats the U.S. will face in the future, and the spectrum of military and non-military responses to these threats. Once a need is identified and a materiel approach selected, it is important to know whether the technology is mature enough to permit an acquisition program to commence and then to proceed at every key milestone. I am a physicist with long involvement in the technical aspects of defense programs, and I therefore believe that if confirmed, I will be able to discharge the USD(AT&L)'s responsibility to assess technology readiness levels at each step of the acquisition process. Development, procurement, and sustainment of major weapons systems require experience with the Department of Defense and the defense industry, systems engineering at every stage, and iron discipline. I have had 25 years of experience working with and for the Defense Department and its supporting industry, laboratories, and FFRDCs. Finally, the acquisition system itself is widely regarded as having failed both the warfighter and the taxpayer, and reform of the system is an imperative. I have participated in numerous reform efforts dating to the 1980s and have

written three books that deal with the subject. I believe that, if confirmed, I can use this experience to help identify reforms that will avoid in the future some of the problems we are having with major defense programs today.

4. Major Challenges and Problems

In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the USD(ATL)?

A first major challenge is to ensure that AT&L is supporting the war effort through rapid acquisition of systems our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines need in Iraq, Afghanistan, and in the war on terror; ensuring that the logistics supply lines into and out of Iraq, and into Afghanistan, can support the forces and the required deployment timetables; and making sure the role of contractors on the battlefield is appropriate. A second major challenge is to get under control the many troubled acquisition programs that are supposed to be supporting our forces – both today and tomorrow. Too many of these programs are failing to meet their cost, schedule, and performance expectations, and some are failing even more fundamentally the test of whether they are needed for the future military challenges we are most likely to face. In addition to disciplining these programs, reform of the acquisition system is needed to ensure that we do not get ourselves in this position again in the future. A third challenge is to ensure that the Department has the strongest science and technology base supporting national security. A fourth challenge is to ensure, consistent with overall national policy, a safe and secure nuclear deterrent and technically effective missile defense programs.

Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

If confirmed, I would use the experience and knowledge I have of defense programs, technology, and the DOD to focus on these priorities, working with the acquisition team, other senior managers in the Department, the Congress, and industry leaders to produce real progress for the warfighter and taxpayer.

5. Acquisition Organization

Do you believe that the office of the USD(ATL) is appropriately structured to execute its management and oversight responsibilities?

I have not had the opportunity to familiarize myself with the AT&L office organization, so at this time, I am not aware of significant structural impediments to accomplishing its function.

Do you believe that any change is needed in the duties and responsibilities of the Deputy Under Secretaries of Defense serving under the USD(ATL)?

See previous answer.

Do you see the need for any changes in the relationship between the USD(ATL) and senior acquisition officials in the military departments?

Not at this time. If confirmed, I will be actively involved in setting acquisition policy. My expectation would be to ensure the senior acquisition officials in the Military Departments and Defense Agencies implement and follow those policies, and demonstrate effective execution

Do you see the need for any additional processes or mechanisms to ensure coordination between the budget, acquisition, and requirements systems of the Department of Defense and ensure that appropriate trade-offs are made between cost, schedule, and performance requirements early in the acquisition process?

I am not aware of a need for additional processes or mechanisms at this time. If confirmed, I will examine these issues and recommend appropriate changes. I do believe, however, that coordination among these functions is absolutely necessary to best serve the warfighter and taxpayer.

What do you believe should be the appropriate role of the service chiefs in the requirements, acquisition, and resource-allocation process?

The Service Chiefs have a key role to play in the development of capability needs and in the planning and allocation of resources consistent with those needs. Service chiefs do not play a formal role in the acquisition chain of command, but I would respect and encourage their advice on matters within their purview.

What do you believe should be the appropriate role of the combatant commanders in the requirements, acquisition, and resource-allocation processes?

Combatant Commanders have an important role in the development of capability needs and advising on priorities and allocation of resources consistent with those needs. I believe the acquisition system should be especially responsive to their urgent needs. If confirmed, I would respect and encourage their advice on matters within their purview.

Do you see the need for any changes in the structure or operations of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)?

JROC membership may be appropriate for the USD(AT&L). The USD(AT&L) must continue to at least participate in a full advisory role. Close coordination between requirements and acquisition is essential.

6. Major Weapon System Acquisition

The investment budget for weapon systems has grown substantially over the past few years to more than \$150 billion per year. An increasing share of this investment is being allocated to a few very large systems such as the Joint Strike Fighter, Future Combat Systems, and Missile Defense.

Do you believe that the current investment budget for major systems is affordable given increasing historic cost growth in major systems, costs of current operations, projected increases in end strength, and asset recapitalization?

I am concerned that it may not be. Moreover, I believe the investment budget will be under increasing pressure in the future. If confirmed, this is an area I will manage vigorously to ensure we have an affordable long term investment strategy.

If confirmed, how do you plan to address this issue?

If confirmed, I expect to acquaint myself as quickly as possible with the facts of this situation and assist the Secretary and Deputy Secretary in addressing it.

What would be the impact of a decision by the Department to reduce purchases of major systems because of affordability issues?

If confirmed, I will carefully assess the impact of any proposal to reduce purchases of major systems because of affordability, including the impact on national security risk, industrial capability, as well as international implications.

Nearly half of DOD's 95 largest acquisition programs have exceeded the so-called "Nunn-McCurdy" cost growth standards established in section 2433 of title 10, United States Code, to identify seriously troubled programs. The cost overruns on these major defense acquisition programs now total \$295 billion over the original program estimates, even though the Department has cut unit quantities and reduced performance expectations on many programs in an effort to hold costs down.

What steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to address the out-of-control cost growth on DOD's major defense acquisition programs?

We cannot change history. But it is important to assess whether programs that have already experienced cost growth are still out of control and whether they can still be afforded. Looking forward I intend to ensure programs start out right with an appropriate degree of practical realism in terms of technical, performance and cost expectations. If confirmed, I intend to emphasize realistic overall cost estimates and time phased funding profiles. If confirmed, I will also work to devise and enforce current and possible new

policies to discipline the system so that program requirements are well understood when programs start, and are stabilized as much as possible over the long term to guard against unreasonable future growth in costs.

What steps if any do you believe that the Department should consider taking in the case of major defense acquisition programs that exceed the critical cost growth thresholds established in the “Nunn-McCurdy” provision?

I believe the current statutory provision provides the authority to take appropriate measures, including major restructuring or termination.

Do you believe that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, as currently structured, has the organization and resources necessary to effectively oversee the management of these major defense acquisition programs? If not, how would you address this problem?

If confirmed, this is an area I would examine carefully and make appropriate recommendations.

Do you believe that the Department of Defense has the systems engineering and developmental testing organizations, resources, and capabilities needed to ensure that there is a sound basis for key requirements, acquisition, and budget decisions on major defense acquisition programs? If not, how would you address this problem?

I believe sound systems engineering and developmental testing is a fundamental basis for acquisition decisions, and I am concerned about the adequacy of the organizational and human capital dimensions of systems engineering in the Department. If confirmed, I will review and assess the organizations and capabilities in this area and make appropriate recommendations.

Do you see the need for any changes to the Nunn-McCurdy provision?

Not at this time, but this is an issue I would intend to review if confirmed

What principles will guide your thinking on whether to recommend terminating a program that has experienced “critical” cost growth under Nunn-McCurdy?

The certification criteria in the statute provide a set of principles, namely, whether a program is still a high priority to National Defense, has sound management, the costs are well understood moving forward, and that there are no other more cost effective alternatives.

In the Budget Blueprint that supports the FY2010 Presidential Budget Request, the Administration committed to “setting realistic requirements, sticking to them and

incorporating ‘best practices’ by not allowing programs to proceed from one stage of the acquisition cycle to the next until they have achieved the maturity to clearly lower the risk of cost growth and schedule slippage.”

If confirmed, how would you help ensure that the Department makes good on this commitment?

If confirmed, I intend to enforce policies that discipline the system so that program requirements are well understood when programs start, and are stabilized as much as possible over the long term to guard against unreasonable future growth in costs for whatever reason.

7. Technological Maturity

Over the last several years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has prepared a series of reports for this Committee comparing the DOD approach to the acquisition of major systems with the approach taken by best performers in the private sector. GAO concluded that private sector programs are more successful because they consistently require a high level of maturity for new technologies before such technologies are incorporated into product development programs. The Department has responded to these findings by adopting technological maturity goals in its acquisition policies.

How important is it, in your view, for the Department to mature its technologies with research and development funds before these technologies are incorporated into product development programs?

Launching into a product development program with immature technology presents a high risk with respect to cost, schedule, and performance. Ideally, technology maturation is accomplished through private sector investments, and the Department is able to harvest the results of commercial investments in its acquisition programs. However, when certain critical technologies are required for achieving mission success, and private sector investment is unlikely to be forthcoming or adequate, the Department should invest research and development funds to mature those technologies.

What steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that the key components and technologies to be incorporated into major acquisition programs meet the Department’s technological maturity goals?

Since 2006, the Department has required that all critical technologies for major acquisition programs must be rated as Technology Readiness Level 6 or better at Milestone B, and TRL 7 or better at Milestone C. I believe this policy is extremely beneficial, and has resulted in numerous cases where acquisition programs have devoted much more attention to ensuring technology readiness at key milestones. I am in favor of

developing policy and approaches that will shine a spotlight on technology readiness even earlier in the acquisition cycle to ensure that maturation occurs in a timely way.

Do you believe that the Department should make greater use of prototypes, including competitive prototypes, to ensure that acquisition programs reach an appropriate level of technological maturity, design maturity, and manufacturing readiness before receiving Milestone approval?

Yes. When judiciously applied, competitive prototyping can substantially reduce development risk in acquisition programs. I say judiciously because it is not practical to force every program to prototype full systems in every case. If confirmed I will include competitive prototyping in acquisition strategy decisions informed by technology readiness, systems engineering and integration evaluations, and other management factors.

Section 2366a of title 10, U.S. Code, requires the Milestone Decision Authority for an MDAP to certify that critical technologies have reached an appropriate level of maturity before Milestone B approval.

What steps if any will you take, if confirmed, to make sure that the Department of Defense complies with the requirements of section 2366a?

If confirmed, as chair of the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) and Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) for Acquisition Authority (ACAT) 1 programs, I will use technology readiness assessments submitted to ensure compliance with section 2366a.

What steps if any will you take to ensure that the Director of Defense Research and Engineering is adequately staffed and resourced to support decisions makers in complying with the requirements of section 2366a?

If confirmed, I expect to work with DDR&E and DUSD(S&T) and other members of the OSD staff to evaluate the adequacy of resources available to meet the challenges of complying with the requirements of section 2366a.

Are you satisfied that technology readiness assessments adequately address systems integration and engineering issues which are the cause of many cost overruns and schedule delays in acquisition programs?

On the basis of the information currently available to me, I am not. If confirmed, I will direct the appropriate USD(AT&L) offices to ensure that systems integration, systems engineering, and technology maturity issues are properly addressed and coordinated

Do you plan to follow the recommendation of the Defense Science Board Task Force on the Manufacturing Technology Program and require program managers to make use of the Manufacturing Readiness Level tool on all programs?

I believe strongly in the importance of manufacturing technology as a type of technology deserving DoD fostering just as DoD fosters the technologies embedded in the manufactured weapons themselves. I also agree that manufacturing readiness should be assessed more rigorously before programs pass into production. If confirmed, I intend to review the specific recommendations of the DSB report and to take actions that reflect the importance of this subject.

Beyond addressing technological maturity issues in acquisition programs, what other steps should the Department take to increase accountability and discipline in the acquisition process?

There are a great number of factors that contribute to the pervasive failure of programs to meet their schedule, cost and performance goals. As Secretary Gates has said, there is no “silver bullet” that will address all of the factors. They involve all steps of the process, from unrealistic requirements and technology immaturity at the front end of the process to instability and inefficient production runs at the back end, to insufficient systems engineering throughout the process, to many other factors. If confirmed, I will be committed to addressing all these factors and, where necessary, reforming the system to minimize the frequency of these pervasive problems.

8. Fixed Price-Type Contracts

Recent Congressional and DOD initiatives attempt to reduce technical and performance risks associated with developing and producing major defense acquisition programs so as to minimize the use of cost-reimbursable contracts.

Do you think that the Department should move towards more fixed price-type contracting in developing or procuring major defense acquisition programs? Why or why not?

I do think that the Department should whenever possible consider moving towards the more frequent use of fixed price type contracts in developing or procuring major defense acquisition programs. Whether a program should have a fixed price or cost type contract depends upon several key factors: 1) the stability of the requirement; 2) the maturity of the technology employed; 3) the ability to estimate accurately the cost of the system to be procured; and 4) stable funding. If these key factors are met, then it is appropriate to utilize a fixed price type contract for developing and producing major defense systems.

9. Technology Transition

The Department continues to struggle with the transition of new technologies into existing programs of record and major weapons systems and platforms. Further, the Department also has struggled with moving technologies from DOD programs or other sources rapidly into the hands of operational users.

What impediments to technology transition do you see within the Department?

There are several impediments to technology transition. One is the gap between the results of R&D sponsored in DOD laboratories and the engineering and production processes in industry. Another is having a rapid enough acquisition system that the technologies it embeds in the systems it produces are not out of date by the time they are fielded. Another is the gap that sometimes develops between the commercial (and largely globalized) technology base and the defense technology base.

What steps if any will you take, if confirmed, to enhance the effectiveness of technology transition efforts?

As a technologist myself, overcoming these impediments will be a priority for me and for the Director, Defense Research and Engineering (DDRE). If confirmed, I intend, with that individual's help, to devise and implement further measures to overcome these impediments.

What can be done from a budget, policy, and organizational standpoint to facilitate the transition of technologies from science and technology programs and other sources, including small businesses, venture capital funded companies, and other non-traditional defense contractors, into acquisition programs?

It is very important that defense tap into these sources, which are some of the most innovative in the world, for technology that can be applied to weapons systems. R&D and acquisition processes must make it easier for such entities to contribute to defense.

Do you believe that the Department's science and technology organizations have the ability and the resources to carry technologies to higher levels of maturity before handing them off to acquisition programs?

The S&T organizations can take technologies to levels appropriate to their mission, but going beyond that (e.g., to demonstrations in operational environments) would require resources not generally resident in S&T organizations.

What steps if any do you believe the Department should take to ensure that research programs are sufficiently funded to reduce technical risk in programs so that technological maturity can be demonstrated at the appropriate time?

To enable research programs to reduce technical risk in acquisition programs more effectively, they must have current, detailed understanding of the technical approaches in those programs. Visibility into acquisition program technical approaches by the research enterprise may need to be improved.

What role do you believe Technology Readiness Levels and Manufacturing Readiness Levels should play in the Department's efforts to enhance effective technology transition and reduce cost and risk in acquisition programs?

Together with others, TRLs and MRLs can serve as management tools to gauge the maturity of technologies that might be adopted by acquisition programs and to estimate the effort required to achieve acceptable production capabilities.

Section 2359a(c) of title 10, United States Code, requires the USD(ATL) to designate a senior official of the Department to support the development of policies to facilitate the rapid transition of technologies from science and technology programs into acquisition programs of the Department of Defense.

If confirmed, would you expect to appoint a single technology transition advocate who would be responsible for promoting technology transition throughout the Department?

If confirmed, I would expect the DDRE to be responsible for promoting technology transition.

If appointed, where should this official be positioned within the Office of the USD(ATL) to most effectively and seamlessly transition technologies to acquisition programs from science and technology programs and other sources and best reflect the needs of both the user and technology development communities?

See above

10. Unrealistic Cost, Schedule and Performance Expectations

Many acquisition experts attribute the failure of DOD acquisition programs to a cultural bias that routinely produces overly optimistic cost and schedule estimates and unrealistic performance expectations. As Senator Levin explained at a June 2008 hearing, "contractors and program offices have every reason to produce optimistic cost estimates and unrealistic performance expectations, because programs that promise revolutionary change and project lower costs are more likely to be approved and funded by senior Administration officials and by Congress."

Do you agree with the assessment that overly optimistic cost and schedule estimates and unrealistic performance expectations contribute to the failure of major defense acquisition programs?

Yes. I believe there are real cultural issues at play in this regard. For example, each program is so difficult to start and “sell” within the enterprise and Congress that multiple stakeholders are needed, and the tendency is to settle on satisfying everyone’s wishes. Since few of the parties at this stage face any real penalty for making the program do “a little bit more”, this drives to overly ambitious programs with exquisite capabilities. Ultimately this results in overpromising and under delivering.

What steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that the Department’s cost, schedule and performance estimates are realistic?

There is no one step that will ensure that cost, schedule and performance estimates are realistic. But, if confirmed, I will insist on technology maturity and the solicitation and heeding of independent cost estimates.

Do you believe that early communication between the acquisition, budget and requirements communities in the Department of Defense can help ensure more realistic cost, schedule and performance expectations?

Yes, and if confirmed, I will work hard to break down any barriers between these three processes.

If so, what steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to ensure such communication?

The key is leadership that is committed in all three processes working together. I believe that Secretary Gates and Deputy Secretary Lynn expect those who lead the requirements, acquisition and budgeting functions to work as a team. If confirmed, that is my intention.

What is your view of the need for an independent office of cost estimating within the Department of Defense?

The function of independent cost estimation is critical. My first Pentagon job in the 1980s was in PA&E, and I am well familiar with the capabilities of the CAIG. If confirmed, I will take a careful look at the cost estimation capabilities, and more importantly whether their results figure in decision making.

The Department of Defense has increasingly turned to incremental acquisition and spiral development approaches in an effort to make cost, schedule and performance expectations more realistic and achievable.

Do you believe that incremental acquisition and spiral development can help improve the performance of the Department’s major acquisition programs?

Yes I do, in selected instances. Like other useful acquisition concepts, spiral development is not a “silver bullet” but should be in the acquisition system’s toolkit.

In your view, has the Department’s approach to incremental acquisition and spiral development been successful? Why or why not?

I think the answer is mixed. My impression is that some of the more successful implementations of evolutionary approaches have come recently as a result of rapid fielding necessitated by operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. But if not used wisely, the result can be added complexity to systems.

What steps if any do you believe are needed to ensure that the requirements process, budget process, and testing regime can accommodate incremental acquisition and spiral development approaches?

Each of these requirements, budget and testing processes must be flexible enough to accommodate the possibility, where appropriate, of applying these acquisition concepts. If confirmed, I will seek to ensure this flexibility.

How should the Department ensure that the incremental acquisition and spiral development programs have appropriate baselines against which to measure performance?

I see this as no different than any other program. If confirmed I would insist that each increment or evolution of capability have a baseline for assessing execution performance.

11. Funding and Requirements Stability

The poor performance of major defense acquisition programs has also been attributed to instability in funding and requirements. In the past, the Department of Defense has attempted to provide greater funding stability through the use of multi-year contracts. More recently, the Department has sought greater requirements stability by instituting Configuration Steering Boards to exercise control over any changes to requirements that would increase program costs.

Do you support the use of Configuration Steering Boards to increase requirements stability on major defense acquisition programs?

Yes, I support activities such as Configuration Steering Boards that prevent unnecessary changes to program requirements or system configuration that could have an adverse impact on program cost and/or schedule. In addition, I am aware that Configuration Steering Boards are required by Section 814 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 and are included within the recent update to DoD Instruction 5000.02. If confirmed, I will review the Department's implementation of Configuration Steering Boards to ensure they are contributing to requirements stability as intended.

What are your views on multiyear procurements? Under what circumstances do you believe they should be used?

In general, I favor multiyear procurement strategies if they provide savings. Frequently, multiyear procurements can offer substantial savings through improved economies in production processes, better use of industrial facilities, and a reduction in the administrative burden in the placement and administration of contracts. There are a number of criteria to be considered in deciding whether a program should be considered for multiyear procurement. Among them are: savings when compared to the annual contracting methods; validity and stability of the mission need; stability of the funding; stability of the configuration; associated technical risks; degree of confidence in estimates of both contract costs and anticipated savings; and promotion of national security.

What is your opinion on the level of cost savings that constitute “substantial savings” for purposes of the defense multiyear procurement statute, 10 U.S.C. § 2306b?

There has been much debate over the threshold on the level of cost savings that constitutes “substantial savings.” It has been suggested that the Department needs to “raise the bar” with regard to the amount of savings that are achieved through the use of multiyear contracts. I agree that we need to ensure that the savings achieved are substantial not only in terms of dollars but also substantial in terms of the relative difference in price that we would otherwise pay for an annual procurement.

But I also understand that placing an absolute minimum threshold on “substantial savings” could unnecessarily limit the contracting options available and should be evaluated based upon the circumstances of each particular proposed program being proffered for multiyear procurement.

Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe that a multiyear contract should be used for procuring weapons systems that have unsatisfactory program histories, e.g., displaying poor cost, scheduling, or performance outcomes but which might otherwise comply with the requirements of the defense multiyear procurement statute, 10 U.S.C. § 2306b?

Additional analysis and careful review of all information should be completed when a multi year contract is being considered for use in procuring weapon systems that have unsatisfactory program histories but which otherwise comply with the statutory requirements. The Department would need to examine very carefully all risk factors to determine if a multiyear procurement would be appropriate.

How would you analyze and evaluate proposals for multiyear procurement for such programs?

The Department would need to examine all risk factors in conjunction with the potential for cost savings to determine if multiyear procurement would be appropriate for a program with an unsatisfactory history. If confirmed, I will analyze and evaluate proposals for multiyear procurements in accordance with all statutory and regulatory requirements and I will ensure that we fully understand the benefit to the warfighter and taxpayer to proceed with a multiyear procurement for a program with a checkered history.

If confirmed, what criteria would you apply in determining whether procuring such a system under a multiyear contract, is appropriate and should be proposed to Congress?

If confirmed, I will ensure that all of the regulatory and statutory requirements are met before proceeding with any multiyear procurement.

Under what circumstances, if any, should DOD ever break a multiyear procurement?

If the Department has done its job properly, the cancellation of a multiyear contract should be a rare event. However, there are circumstances under when it could occur. One such event would be the failure to fund a program year. Another would be the failure of the contractor to perform, which ultimately would lead to a decision to terminate for default.

What other steps if any would you recommend taking to increase the funding and requirements stability of major defense acquisition programs?

I understand the Department has implemented numerous initiatives focused on improving funding and requirements stability. These include; 1) greater up front planning implicit in the new Material Development Decision; 2) the use of Configuration Steering Boards; 3) Program Management Agreements to limit requirements changes; and 4) competitive prototyping to inform the Department on the realism of requirements. I believe these and other Department initiatives are sound and I support them. It will take time to show the impact of these policies, but lasting change starts with good common-sense policies that are measurable, enforceable, and widely accepted as good policy. If confirmed, I plan to closely monitor the execution of these policies and look for other opportunities to improve funding and requirements stability.

12. Multi-Year Contracts

The statement of managers accompanying Section 811 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 addresses the requirements for buying major defense systems under multiyear contracts as follows: “The conferees agree that ‘substantial savings’ under section 2306b(a)(1) of title 10, United States Code, means savings that exceed 10 percent of the total costs of carrying out the program through annual contracts, except that multiyear contracts for major systems providing savings estimated at less than 10 percent should only be considered if the Department presents an exceptionally strong case that the proposal meets the other requirements of section 2306b(a), as amended. The conferees agree with a Government Accountability Office finding that any major system that is at the end of its production line is unlikely to meet these standards and therefore would be a poor candidate for a multiyear procurement contract

If confirmed, under what circumstances, if any, do you anticipate that you would support a multiyear contract with expected savings of less than 10 percent?

Multiyear contracting can provide cost savings, and therefore it should be considered as an option to serve the warfighter and taxpayer. There has been much debate over the threshold on the level of cost savings that constitutes “substantial savings.” That cost saving can be measured in dollar terms and in price the Department would otherwise pay for an annual procurement. If confirmed, I would value the flexibility to consider both metrics of cost savings

If confirmed, under what circumstances, if any, would you support a multiyear contract for a major system at the end of its production line?

It may be appropriate to consider a program for multiyear procurement when it is nearing the end of production. It depends upon the circumstances of the particular procurement. Analysis and careful review of all information as well as should be completed when a multi year contract is being considered.

13. Continuing Competition and Organizational Conflicts of Interest

The Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Industrial Structure for Transformation recommended last summer that “DOD must increase its use of creative competitive acquisition strategies, within limited budgets, in order to ensure long-term innovation and cost savings, at both prime and critical sub-tier elements. Competition would not be required beyond the competitive prototype phase, as long as the current producer continuously improves performance and lowers cost – but other contractors should always represent a credible option if costs rise or performance is unacceptable.”

Do you agree with this recommendation? Do you believe that continuing competition is a viable option on major defense acquisition programs?

Yes, I believe that DOD must increase its use of creative competitive acquisition strategies to ensure long-term innovation and cost savings. Harnessing the power of competition in some form should be a goal on all MDAPs.

Do you support the use of competitive prototypes for major defense acquisition programs?

Yes, I support competitive prototyping in our major defense acquisition programs.

In your view, has the consolidation of the defense industrial base gone too far and undermined competition for defense contracts?

I understand it is the Department's policy to oppose transactions that reduce or eliminate competition and I would implement that policy where necessary. Yes, I am concerned about the loss of competition caused by consolidation over the last few decades.

If so, what steps if any can and should the Department of Defense take to address this issue?

The Department continues to discourage mergers and acquisitions among defense materiel suppliers that are anti-competitive or injurious to national security. If confirmed, I will work to adjust DOD transaction evaluation procedures/criteria as appropriate.

What steps if any do you believe the Department of Defense should take to address organizational conflicts of interest in major defense acquisition programs?

Even the perception of an Organizational Conflict of Interest (OCI) may taint the integrity of the competitive procurement process. I support the requirement in the Federal Acquisition Regulation to avoid, neutralize, or mitigate significant potential conflicts before contract award.

What are your views on the lead system integrator approach to managing the acquisition of major weapon systems?

I do not support the use of lead systems integrators unless adequate steps have been taken to ensure that there is no potential for conflict of interest. In general, the Department should select development contractors to perform substantive development work, rather than to perform acquisition functions closely associated with inherently governmental functions

What are your views on the use of system engineering and technical assistance contractors that are affiliated with major defense contractors to provide

“independent” advice to the Department on the acquisition of major weapon systems?

Systems Engineering and Technical Assistance (SETA) support contractors are currently a critical component of the Department’s Acquisition workforce. They provide engineering and analysis services in a consulting capacity. However, they must be properly utilized and not used to perform any inherently governmental functions. If confirmed I will continue the efforts to increase government and FFRDC staff support to reduce the reliance on SETA contractors

What lines do you believe the Department should draw between those acquisition responsibilities that are inherently governmental and those that may be performed by contractors?

For acquisition responsibilities, I believe a clear line must be drawn such that only government personnel may make value judgments that obligate funds and commit the Government contractually. However, I recognize a number of other important functions within the Defense acquisition community must be retained for government-only performance. Given the current workforce mix and the level of contracted support to acquisition functions, I believe a careful review is needed to assess whether the Department has become too dependent on contractors in this area. I understand the Congress has recently codified a definition of inherently governmental functions and required a review by the Department. I believe this review provides a mechanism to address this important question.

If confirmed, what steps if any would you take to ensure that defense contractors do not misuse their access to sensitive and proprietary information of the Department of Defense and other defense contractors?

It is my understanding that USD(AT&L) has issued guidance to information assurance and acquisition personnel to ensure strong measures are in place at the individual contract level. Because this issue is potentially so serious, I intend to review it if confirmed.

If confirmed, what steps if any would you take to ensure that defense contractors do not unnecessarily limit competition for subcontracts in a manner that would disadvantage the government or potential competitors in the private sector?

This is an unacceptable practice, and if confirmed, I will review the department’s safeguards against it.

14. Defense Acquisition Transformation Report

In February 2007, the Secretary of Defense submitted a report to Congress entitled “Defense Acquisition Transformation Report to Congress”.

If confirmed, to what extent would you support and continue implementation of the defense acquisition reform initiatives set forth in that report?

Acquisition reform will be a priority for me if I am confirmed. In general, I support the majority of the acquisition reform initiatives identified in the Report. If confirmed, I will support the implementation activities which are already underway and evaluate additional ways and means to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the system.

In particular, please discuss your views regarding the following aspects of transformation:

- **Portfolio Management**

In general, I support the Capability Portfolio Management Initiative which is intended to provide an enterprise-level, horizontal (cross-component) view of the Department to better balance and harmonize joint warfighter capability needs with capability development efforts. If confirmed, I will review the CPM construct to ensure it enables better-integrated and balanced advice across the full spectrum of capability needs to DOD senior leadership.

- **Tri-Chair Concept Decision**

In general, I strongly support efforts that harmonize the major Department processes for requirements, resources and acquisition and, if confirmed, will pursue management mechanisms that ensure harmonization.

- **Time-Defined Acquisitions**

Time should be a critical element in DOD acquisition decision-making since in many programs “time is money”, and emphasizing time forces consideration of material alternatives and technologies that can be fielded consistent with user need.

- **Investment Balance Reviews**

The Department should take a holistic approach, assessing the opportunities and threats across all the Services, to determine where to best focus investment and energy. Investment Balance Reviews (IBRs) provide the Defense Acquisition Executive with the opportunity to make course corrections during the life cycle of the portfolio of capabilities, systems and programs. If confirmed, I will review this initiative for any additional support or direction needed.

- **Risk-Based Source Selection**

The Risk-Based Source Selection concept is intended to identify and quantify risk, inform requirements development and cost estimation, and improve available information to assess contractor proposals. Risk-Based Source Selection techniques enhance the quality of requests for proposal by improving technical criteria and making DOD a

"smarter" buyer. It is my understanding that the department has implemented a series of policy initiatives including: 1) the issuance of policy describing the proper use of award fees; 2) the establishment of competitive prototyping as the underlying strategy for demonstrating the technical maturity of key technologies; 3) the requirement to do Preliminary Design Reviews before MS B when consistent with the Technology Development Strategy; 4) the requirement to conduct peer reviews of source selections to ensure requirements traceability and effective source selections; 5) the requirement for offerors to substantiate claims of technology maturity as part of their proposals for Engineering and Manufacturing Development [EMD] contracts.; and 6) a new MDA decision point titled the Post Critical Design Review Assessment [PCDRA] to assess design maturity. If confirmed I will review these efforts to ascertain whether they can be further strengthened

- **Acquisition of Services Policy**

It is my understanding that the Department has recently issued new policy guidance regarding the Acquisition of Services. It is my understanding that this new policy imposes significant changes in the way the Department manages and reviews the performance of service contracts. If confirmed, I intend to assess such initiatives and related policy and make any adjustments necessary to implement the President's direction to carry out robust and thorough management and oversight of contracts.

- **Systems Engineering Excellence**

Systems engineering is a practice that is critical throughout the lifetime of a program and especially in its early stages, as recent testimony before this committee has attested. If confirmed, I will continue to strengthen early and informed systems engineering in both new and current acquisition programs as a clearly demonstrated best practice, augmented with a revitalized systems engineering workforce to strengthen program management organizations.

- **Award Fee and Incentive Policy**

I support the efforts currently underway to link award fee and incentive payments to acquisition outcomes such as cost, schedule, and technical performance. If confirmed, I intend to assess such initiatives and related policy and make any adjustments necessary to ensure that their intended purposes are being met.

- **Open, Transparent and Common Shared Data Resources with Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval (DAMIR)**

DAMIR currently provides enterprise visibility to acquisition program information. If confirmed, I intend to evaluate current initiatives focusing on implementation of open, transparent and common shared data resources.

- **Restructured Defense Acquisition Executive Summary Reviews**

The DAES reviews provide a forum for OSD to work with the Services and Agencies to evaluate progress in program execution. In general, I support this initiative which is

designed to improve decision making, communication and trust between OSD, the Joint Staff and the Services. If confirmed, I will review this initiative for any additional support or direction.

- **Policy on Excessive Pass-Through Charges**

I support the full implementation of Section 852 to ensure that pass-through charges on contracts or subcontracts that are entered into for or on behalf of DoD are not excessive in relation to the cost of work performed by the relevant contractor or subcontractor.

Are there other initiatives or tools discussed in the Defense Acquisition Transformation Report that you view as particularly likely, or unlikely, to be productive in achieving acquisition reform?

I am aware that the final Defense Acquisition Transformation Report was recently submitted. The Report has identified numerous initiatives. If confirmed, I will study all of the report's acquisition reform initiatives to determine additional ways and means to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the system.

15. Operation of the Defense Acquisition System

On December 2, 2008, the Department promulgated a new version of DOD Instruction 5000.02, the key guidance on the Department's acquisition of major weapon systems. . The revised instruction restructured the management framework for translating capability needs and technology opportunities into stable, affordable, and well-managed defense acquisition programs.

What is your assessment of the new version of this instruction and the extent of its implementation to date?

The new instruction is a constructive step, and if confirmed I will ensure that it is effectively implemented and seek to improve upon it.

If confirmed, what steps would you take to continue implementation of the new version of DOD Instruction 5000.2 and improve upon it?

If confirmed, I intend to monitor the implementation and effectiveness of the new policies. If necessary, I will alter these or introduce additional policies to ensure that our programs achieve cost, schedule and performance objectives.

16. Contracting for Services

Over the past eight years, DOD's spending on contract services has more than doubled, with the estimated number of contractor employees working for the Department increasing from an estimated 730,000 in Fiscal Year 2000 to an estimated 1,550,000 in Fiscal Year 2007. As a result, the Department now spends

more for the purchase of services than it does for products (including major weapon systems).

Do you believe that the Department of Defense can continue to support this rate of growth in its spending on contract services?

I am very concerned about this trend. If confirmed, I intend to work with Secretary Gates and the Department's senior leadership to address the underlying question about whether the Defense Department is adequately staffed, quantitatively and qualitatively, to carry out its responsibilities. If the Department continues to utilize contracted service providers to such a large extent, it is absolutely essential we have a sufficient amount of qualified Government civilian or military personnel dedicated to perform meaningful oversight of contractor activities.

Do you believe that the current balance between government employees (military and civilian) and contractor employees is in the best interests of the Department of Defense?

DoD requires some mix of federal employees and contractors to carry out its mission effectively, but that mix might be out of balance. If confirmed, I would support efforts to help ensure the appropriate balance.

What steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to control the Department's spending on contract services?

If confirmed, I intend to work with Secretary Gates and the Department's senior leadership to assess the amount of spending on contracted services, consistent with President Obama's March 4, 2009 memorandum on Government Contracting which emphasizes the need to ensure best value for the taxpayers.

At the request of the Committee, the GAO has compared DOD's practices for the management of services contracts to the practices of best performers in the private sector. GAO concluded that leading companies have achieved significant savings by insisting upon greater visibility and management over their services contracts and by conducting so-called "spend" analyses to find more efficient ways to manage their service contractors. Section 801 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 required DOD to move in this direction. Sections 807 and 808 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 built on this provision by requiring inventories and management reviews of contracts for services.

Do you believe the Department is providing appropriate stewardship over service contracts?

I am concerned that in some instances it might not be. I understand the Department has recently instituted policy and processes, such as peer reviews of significant service

acquisitions, to ensure taxpayer funds are spent wisely when acquiring contracted services. If confirmed, I intend to assess these policies and procedures and make any necessary adjustments

Do you believe that the Department has appropriate management structures in place to oversee the expenditure of more than \$150 billion a year for contract services?

I have not had an opportunity to assess the current management structures that are in place, but if confirmed, I will make the necessary adjustments to implement President Obama's direction to carry out robust and thorough management and oversight of contracts.

Do you believe that the Department should conduct a comprehensive analysis of its spending on contract services, as recommended by GAO?

Although I am not familiar with the specific GAO recommendations regarding a comprehensive spend analysis, I agree with its intent. It is also my understanding that the office of the Director of Defense Procurement and Strategic Sourcing has completed an extensive spend analysis of the Department's spending on services. If confirmed, I intend to review this analysis to ensure that the Department is effectively implementing cost saving strategies in the procurement of services.

Do you support the use of management reviews, or peer reviews, of major service contracts to identify "best practices" and develop lessons learned?

I fully support the use of management reviews and peer reviews of major service contracts to identify "best practices" and develop lessons learned. If confirmed, I will work with the Department's senior leadership to further institutionalize this practice and make any necessary adjustments.

If confirmed, will you fully comply with the requirement of section 807 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, to develop an inventory of services performed by contractors comparable to the inventories of services performed by federal employees that are already prepared pursuant to the Federal Acquisition Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act?

If confirmed, I will be committed to actively pursuing the continued implementation of Section 807 as this legislation establishes a solid post-award review process and increased transparency of services contracts to Congress, the public, and internally within the Department.

What additional steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to improve the Department's management of its contracts for services?

If confirmed, I will take steps to ensure leaders at all levels of the Department understand and appreciate the vital role they must play in diligently managing service contracts in a way that maximizes the benefit to the warfighter and the taxpayer.

17. Contractor Performance of Critical Governmental Functions

Over the last decade, the Department has become progressively more reliant upon contractors to perform functions that were once performed exclusively by government employees. As a result, contractors now play an integral role in areas as diverse as the management and oversight of weapons programs, the development of personnel policies, and the collection and analysis of intelligence. In many cases, contractor employees work in the same offices, serve on the same projects and task forces, and perform many of the same functions as DOD employees.

In your view, has DOD become too reliant on contractors to support the basic functions of the Department?

I am concerned that it may be.

Do you believe that the current extensive use of personal services contracts is in the best interest of the Department of Defense?

While I am not specifically aware of the use of personal services contracts within the Department, I do know that there are statutory restrictions that govern the use of personal services contracts. If confirmed, I will ensure that if personal services contracts are being used in a manner that is inappropriate, that practice is ended immediately.

What is your view of the appropriate applicability of personal conflict of interest standards and other ethics requirements to contractor employees who perform functions similar to those performed by government employees?

I believe that contractor employees who directly support Government employees, and may have access to similar business sensitive or source selection sensitive information, should be subject to similar ethical standards as the Government employees they support, and should not be allowed to profit personally from the information that may be available to them because of their performance under a DOD contract.

U.S. military operations in Iraq have relied on contractor support to a greater degree than any previous U.S. military operations. According to widely published reports, the number of U.S. contractor employees in Iraq exceeds the number of U.S. military deployed in that country.

Do you believe that the Department of Defense has become too dependent on contractor support for military operations?

Secretary Gates has tasked the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to oversee a Department-wide review of contractor roles and missions. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary and Chairman Mullen in this review and implement recommendations where appropriate and, if necessary, work with the Congress to institutionalize reforms.

What risks do you see in the Department's reliance on such contractor support?

I see two risks: 1. Fraud, waste or abuse if there is insufficient oversight and 2. The possibility that contractors could choose to leave the mission because it became dangerous or for some other reason.

What steps do you believe the Department should take to mitigate such risk?

The first step is to have a thorough understanding of any risks we have with the current workforce mix of military, civilian and contractors. As mentioned earlier, the study being led by the Joint Staff will provide insight into this important issue. Next would be the development of a robust capability to provide oversight and management of contractor performance and restrictions.

Do you believe the Department is appropriately organized and staffed to effectively manage contractors on the battlefield?

It is my understanding that there have been shortcomings in recent years, and if confirmed I intend to learn more about them.

What steps if any do you believe the Department should take to improve its management of contractors on the battlefield?

If confirmed, I intend to review this subject and recommend steps to ensure that shortcomings are not repeated.

18. Private Security Contractors

The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) recently reported that federal agencies including the Department of Defense have spent more than \$5 billion for private security contractors in Iraq since 2003. Over this period, there have been numerous reports of abuses by private security contractors, including allegations of contractors shooting recklessly at civilians as they have driven down the streets of Baghdad and other Iraqi cities. In September 2007, employees of Blackwater allegedly opened fire on Iraqis at Nisour Square in downtown Baghdad, killing more than a dozen Iraqis and wounding many more.

Do you believe the Department of Defense and other federal agencies should rely upon contractors to perform security functions that may reasonably be expected to

require the use of deadly force in highly hazardous public areas in an area of combat operations?

I cannot directly comment on the Blackwater incident as I have not had access to information about this case, and in any event I understand that it is a State Department issue, presently in the federal courts. But I believe that the use of private security contractors, and more generally the use of contractors in wartime, deserves careful review.

As a practical matter, the Department of Defense must use the total force (military forces, Department civilians, and contractors) to resource the full spectrum of requirements. DoD's recent ongoing efforts to perform more detailed contractor support planning for all operational plans can ensure that the use of Private Security Contractors (PSCs) is based upon careful planning and assessment and not simply on general assumptions and, if confirmed, I will review these plans. If contractor personnel cannot be used appropriately, there will be force structure implications which will require consideration by Congress.

In your view, has the U.S. reliance upon private security contractors to perform such functions risked undermining our defense and foreign policy objectives in Iraq?

I have not had an opportunity to acquaint myself with the facts of this situation, nor to discuss it with DoD leadership, military commanders or diplomatic observers. But it is clear that appropriate conduct of Americans in the theater, including contractors, is important to overall progress in achieving our aims.

What steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that any private security contractors who may continue to operate in an area of combat operations act in a responsible manner, consistent with U.S. defense and foreign policy objectives?

We have learned two important lessons from the current operations: First, the use of private security contractors in any area of combat operations must be fully coordinated. There must be unified and consistent procedures for all such contractors, regardless of which U.S. agency hires them. Our commanders on the ground must have authority to restrict or redirect their operations as the situation requires. Second, there must be assured legal accountability for the actions of private security contractors. If confirmed, I will review further steps that can be taken.

How do you believe the ongoing operations of private security contractors in Iraq are likely to be affected by the new Status of Forces Agreement between the United States and Iraq?

I have not had the opportunity to acquaint myself with all the facts bearing on this situation, but if confirmed, I would intend to do so. I do understand that since January 1st of this year, U.S. government contractors no longer have immunity from host nation law.

If confirmed, I would seek to ensure that the loss of contractor immunity in Iraq does not diminish the effectiveness of operations.

Do you support the extension of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act to private security contractors of all federal agencies?

I have not had the opportunity to acquaint myself with the practical and legal dimensions of the issue. It is my understanding that DoD has consistently supported unambiguous application of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act to all U.S. government private security contractors operating in contingency areas.

What is your view of the appropriate application of the Uniform Code of Military Justice to employees of private security contractors operating in an area of combat operations?

I have not had the opportunity to acquaint myself with all the practical and legal dimensions of this issue. There must be assured legal accountability for the actions of all contractors deployed to an area of combat operations. The application of the Uniform Code of Military Justice is one tool to do this.

OMB Circular A-76 defines “inherently governmental functions” to include “discretionary functions” that could “significantly affect the life, liberty, or property of private persons”

In your view, is the performance of security functions that may reasonably be expected to require the use of deadly force in highly hazardous public areas in an area of combat operations an inherently governmental function?

My understanding is that DoD’s decision to use private security contractors (including subcontractors) is in compliance with current U.S. government policy and regulations. It clearly raises issues of appropriateness, and if confirmed I would intend to participate in shaping policies regarding the appropriate use of contractors.

In your view, is the interrogation of enemy prisoners of war and other detainees during and in the aftermath of hostilities an inherently governmental function?

The role of DoD contractors raises issues of appropriateness, and if confirmed I would intend to participate in shaping policies regarding the appropriate use of contractors.

Do you see a need for a comprehensive reevaluation of these issues now?

I do, and I understand that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJSC), as directed by the Secretary of Defense, is already conducting a thorough examination of the use of DoD contractors in support of current military operations as well as a review of the range and depth of contractor capabilities necessary to support the Joint Force of the future.

In October 2008, the Department of Defense announced a plan to award contracts in excess of \$300 million to U.S. contractors to conduct “information operations” through the Iraqi media.

In your view, is DOD’s use of private contractors to conduct information operations through the Iraqi media appropriate?

I have not had the opportunity to have access to information regarding this matter.

19. Government Contracting Reform

In a memorandum to the heads of all federal agencies, the President on March 4, 2009, directed a government-wide review of contracting procedures and stating that “executive agencies shall not engage in noncompetitive contracts, except in those circumstances where their use can be fully justified and where appropriate safeguards have been put in place to protect the taxpayer.”

If confirmed, how would you determine whether the use of noncompetitive contracts could be fully justified?

If confirmed, I will continue to emphasize the importance of competition and review the Department’s competition practices. At present, it is my understanding that DOD Competition Advocates participate in acquisition strategy sessions and are engaged in the review of noncompetitive contracts. All noncompetitive contracts must be supported by a justification and determination and approved by the procuring activity Competition Advocate if over \$550,000; the head of the procuring activity if over \$11.5 million; and the senior procurement executive of the agency if over \$78.5 million. The DOD Competition Advocate submits an annual report on the Department’s competition achievements to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. If confirmed, I intend to review these practices to ascertain if adjustments are needed pursuant to the President’s guidance.

In your opinion, how would the direction in this memo affect the use of single-award and multiple-award Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity contracts?

I support the direction in the memo emphasizing competition and appropriate use of various contract types. An Indefinite-Delivery Indefinite-Quantity (IDIQ) contract is appropriate for use when the Government cannot predetermine the precise quantities of supplies or services it will require and it is inadvisable to commit the Government beyond the more than a minimum quantity. The Federal Acquisition Regulation establishes the

preference for multiple awards when an IDIQ contract is awarded and requires approval of the agency head for a single-award IDIQ contract estimated to exceed \$100 million. It is my understanding that the Department does not support the use of single-award IDIQ contracts unless they are absolutely necessary. If confirmed, I intend to review these practices pursuant to the President's guidance.

20. Contracting Methods

The Office of Federal Procurement Policy and the Department of Defense have long agreed that federal agencies could achieve significant savings and improved performance by moving to "performance-based services contracting" or "PBSC". Most recently, the Army Environmental Program informed the committee that it has achieved average savings of 27% over a period of several years as a result of moving to fixed-price, performance-based contracts for environmental remediation. Section 802 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, as amended, established performance goals for increasing the use of PBSC in DOD service contracts.

What is the status of the Department's efforts to increase the use of PBSC in its service contracts?

It is my understanding that the preferred approach to services contracting within the Department is already to utilize fixed price performance based contracts whenever it has well-defined statements of work that have clear performance objectives which can be measured objectively. The Department continues to emphasize the use of this type of contract whenever possible.

What additional steps if any do you believe the Department needs to take to increase the use of PBSC and meet the goals established in section 802?

If confirmed, I will ensure that a fundamental element of our strategic sourcing approach to services contracts will be the increased use of performance based fixed price contracts.

In recent years, the Department of Defense has relied heavily on time-and-materials contracts for the acquisition of services. Under such a contract, the Department pays a set rate per hour for contractor services, rather than paying for specific tasks to be performed. In some cases, contractors have substituted less expensive labor under time-and-materials contracts, while continuing to charge federal agencies the same hourly rates, resulting in effective contractor profits of 25 percent or more.

What is your view of the appropriate use of time-and-materials contracts by the Department of Defense?

T&M contracts, regardless of dollar value, are the least preferred contract type and should only be used if no other contract type is appropriate. They are a very costly and

ineffective method of contracting for services. If confirmed, I will ensure appropriate determinations are made to only use time-and-materials contracts when no other contract will satisfy the requirement.

What steps if any do you believe the Department should take to minimize the abuse of time-and-materials contracts?

I understand the Department has taken several steps to minimize the abuse of time-and-materials (T&M) contracts. The Panel on Contracting Integrity is reviewing the appropriate approval levels for determinations made by contracting officers for use of a T&M contract. Additionally, the OUSD (AT&L) requested the Military Departments and Other Defense Agencies review their use of T&M contracts for services and identify contracting activities that have executed more than 10% of their obligations using T&M. DPAP continues to monitor the inappropriate use of T&M contract types for services. If confirmed, I will review the various initiatives for any additional support or direction needed.

Section 852 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 requires the Department of Defense to promulgate regulations prohibiting excessive “pass-through” charges on DOD contracts. Pass-through charges are charges added by a contractor for overhead and profit on work performed by one of its subcontractors, to which the contractor provided no added value. In some cases, pass-through charges have more than doubled the cost of services provided to the Department of Defense.

What is your view of the regulations promulgated by the Department of Defense to implement the requirements of section 852?

It is my understanding that the Department issued an interim rule amending the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement to implement Section 852 to ensure that pass-through charges on contracts or subcontracts that are entered into for or on behalf of DOD are not excessive in relation to the cost of work performed by the relevant contractor or subcontractor. The rule provides a list of functions that are considered to be value-added. If the contractor does not perform the demonstrated functions or does not add value, the rule makes the excessive pass-through charges unallowable and provides for recoupment of the excessive pass-through charges consistent with the legislation. While I have not had the opportunity to analyze this matter sufficiently in order to form an opinion, if confirmed, I will be receptive to suggested refinements as the case makes its way through the federal rulemaking process.

What additional steps if any do you believe the Department should take to address the problem of excessive pass-through charges?

Beyond finalization of the DFARS rule and associated updates that should be made to Defense Acquisition University training curriculum, I understand the Department has

incorporated this issue as an element to be addressed in Peer Reviews in accordance with Section 808 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008.

21. Interagency Contracting

GAO recently placed interagency contracting – the use by one agency of contracts awarded by other agencies – on its list of high-risk programs and operations. While inter-agency contracts provide a much-needed simplified method for procuring commonly used goods and services, GAO has found that the dramatic growth of inter-agency contracts, the failure to clearly allocate responsibility between agencies, and the incentives created by fee-for-services arrangements, have combined to expose the Department of Defense and other federal agencies to the risk of significant abuse and mismanagement. The DOD Inspector General and the GSA Inspector General have identified a long series of problems with inter-agency contracts, including lack of acquisition planning, inadequate competition, excessive use of time and materials contracts, improper use of expired funds, inappropriate expenditures, and failure to monitor contractor performance. DOD, in conjunction with the General Services Administration and the Office of Management and Budget, is taking a number of actions to improve training and guidance on the use of this contract approach.

If confirmed, what steps if any will you take to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of the actions currently underway or planned regarding DOD’s use of other agencies’ contracts?

Interagency contracting is a necessity at times to achieve “whole of government” efforts to address complex contemporary security challenges, but it must be done in a way that gives best value to the taxpayer. If confirmed, I will review the efforts outlined in the January 2005 policy on the “Proper Use of Non-DoD Contracts” and subsequent policy updates. In addition, I understand that as part of the Department’s strategic spending analysis, DOD is collecting adequate data to know what non-DoD agencies are acquiring on behalf of DOD and which organizations they are supporting.

Do you believe additional authority or measures are needed to hold DOD or other agency personnel accountable for their use of inter-agency contracts?

If confirmed, I will review and evaluate these authorities.

Do you believe contractors have any responsibility for assuring that the work requested by DOD personnel is within the scope of their contract?

The primary responsibility for ensuring work is within the scope of the contract rests with the contracting officer. I believe that if a contractor is uncertain whether or not supplies or services ordered are within scope of their contract they should consult with the contracting officer.

Do you believe that DOD's continued heavy reliance on outside agencies to award and manage contracts on its behalf is a sign that the Department has failed to adequately staff its own acquisition system?

If confirmed I will examine whether or not the Department is adequately staffed to manage and execute these efforts. However, the Department should continue to utilize the expertise of non-DoD agencies operating under Congressional authority to acquire supplies and services in the most efficient and effective way possible.

22. Acquisition of Information Technology

Most of the Department's Major Automated Information System (MAIS) acquisitions are substantially over budget and behind schedule. In particular, the Department has run into unanticipated difficulties with virtually every new business system it has tried to field in the last ten years.

Do you believe that unique problems in the acquisition of business systems require different acquisition strategies or approaches?

Yes. The problems suggest the need to move away from large business information technology development projects to smaller, more incremental business systems developments, utilizing commercial applications whenever possible. Existing DoD hardware development processes do not always translate effectively in the software development world. Finally, DoD frequently needs to do business process re-engineering prior to software development so that new development is not imposed on legacy systems and processes.

What steps if any do you believe the Department of Defense should take to address these problems?

If confirmed, I would work with the Chief Information Officer and Chief Management Officer to create a set of processes that are used in industry to develop, test, and deploy software within DoD's regulatory and statutory framework. For example, I would use incremental development and limited deployments to get capability out to users as well as feedback from users to guide future increments of capability.

If confirmed, how would you work with the Chief Information Officer of the Department of Defense to take these steps?

I would partner with the Chief Information Officer and Chief Management Officer to develop best practices for DoD.

Problems with computer software have caused significant delays and cost overruns in a number of major defense programs. Section 804 of the National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 required DOD to establish a program to improve the software acquisition process.

What steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to address delays and cost overruns associated with problems in the development of software for major weapon systems?

If confirmed, I would consider three steps. First, I would consider directing that weapon systems use incremental software development to minimize risk. Second, I would insure that software embedded in weapon systems be mature before being integrated in platforms. Third, I would seek to use independent assessment teams of software experts to guide and advise weapon system program managers.

What role if any do you believe that the Chief Information Officer of the Department of Defense should play with regard to the acquisition of information technology that is embedded in weapon systems?

The Chief Information Officer would be a key advisor to me and the Department in assessing program risk and acquisition strategies for development and procurement of embedded information technology.

23. Acquisition Workforce

Over the last 15 years, DOD has reduced the size of its acquisition workforce by almost half, without undertaking any systematic planning or analysis to ensure that it would have the specific skills and competencies needed to meet DOD's current and future needs. Since September 11, 2001, moreover, the demands placed on that workforce have substantially increased. While DOD has started the process of planning its long-term workforce needs, the Department does not yet have a comprehensive strategic workforce plan needed to guide its efforts.

Do you believe that DOD's workforce is large enough and has the skills needed to perform the tasks assigned to it?

I don't believe it is. A number of studies and analyses, including by this Committee, have pointed in the direction of increasing the size of the DOD acquisition workforce and have identified certain skill sets that need to be built up.

In your view, what are the critical skills, capabilities, and tools that DOD's workforce needs for the future?

Program management, risk management and leadership are critical skills, as are systems engineering and financial management. Contracting officers need business acumen and understanding of how to formulate, negotiate and oversee contracts.

What steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that the workforce will, in fact, possess them?

We need to attract talented people to government service, specifically into the acquisition workforce, give them challenging work to do, retain the best of them, and be sure all of them are fully trained and qualified for the jobs we give them. If confirmed, I will want to ensure that the Department has the right infrastructure and resources in place to do all that and to improve where we should.

Do you agree that the Department needs a comprehensive human capital plan, including a gap analysis and specific recruiting, retention and training goals, to guide the development of its acquisition workforce?

Yes.

What steps if any do you think are necessary to ensure that the Department has the ability it needs to attract and retain qualified employees to the acquisition workforce?

Personally, I can think of nothing more inherently rewarding than serving one's country as the men and women of our armed forces and our civilian employees do. These are dynamic times and the approach we take now may be different from what we did in the past or may need to do in the future. I'm told that the largest numbers of people in the acquisition workforce are engineering, scientific and technical professionals, followed by business-oriented people, such as contracting officers. Also, they are largely civilians. They will have to be change oriented, because as national strategy evolves, what we buy and how we buy will change. To attract and retain them we need to provide challenging and rewarding work and a competitive rate of compensation. If confirmed, I will do all I can to ensure we have a properly sized, highly qualified, professional acquisition workforce.

What are your views regarding assertions that the acquisition workforce is losing its technical and management expertise and is beginning to rely too much on support contractors, FFRDCs, and, in some cases, prime contractors for this expertise?

A number of reports have pointed to this conclusion, and it is a disturbing trend. As a policy matter, it is vital that inherently governmental functions be performed by government, that is, in this instance, by civilian and military members of the DOD acquisition workforce. As a practical matter, program formulation, management, and contract oversight cannot be done effectively in the interests of both the warfighter and the taxpayer unless competent, trained, and dedicated government professionals do it. If we have let some of this slip away, say in areas like systems engineering and contracting, then it is time to reverse the trend, not to the point of eliminating all support contractors, but to achieve the proper balance. The first step is to understand how many support contractors we have, what they are doing, and at what cost. FFRDCs are in a different

category since they are specifically chartered to assist government professionals and in many cases have done so effectively for many years.

What is the appropriate tenure for program managers and program executive officers to ensure continuity in major programs?

Program managers and program executive officers need to be in their jobs long enough to be accountable for their decisions. These jobs are not training grounds or stepping stones to higher levels. Those who take them on must be fully qualified experts. I am aware that there are statutory tenure minima prescribed for these and other key leadership positions, which I support. I believe this may be more an issue of compliance than new policy, but it is something I would look at, if confirmed.

Section 852 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 established an Acquisition Workforce Development Fund to help the Department of Defense address shortcomings in its acquisition workforce. The fund would provide a minimum of \$3 billion over six years for this purpose.

Do you believe that the Acquisition Workforce Development Fund is needed to ensure that DOD has the right number of employees with the right skills to run its acquisition programs in the most cost effective manner for the taxpayers?

Yes, it provides necessary resources to recruit, train and retain the people we need in the acquisition workforce and the resources to increase the size of that workforce as appropriate.

If confirmed, what steps if any will you ensure that the money made available through the Acquisition Workforce Fund is spent in a manner that best meets the needs of the Department of Defense and its acquisition workforce?

First, I would review the processes in place to allocate that money to the highest needs and I would review the execution of funding that has been allocated so far. I cannot say at this point what, if any, systemic changes may be needed, but an initiative of this magnitude would certainly have my personal attention, and I would welcome a continuing dialog with this Committee on the matter if I am confirmed.

24. Procurement Fraud, Integrity and Contractor Responsibility Issues

Recent Air Force acquisition scandals have raised concerns about the adequacy of existing mechanisms to uphold procurement integrity and prevent contract fraud.

What is your view of the adequacy of the tools and authorities available to DOD to ensure that its contractors are responsible and have a satisfactory record of integrity and business ethics?

I believe that integrity in contracting is an absolute obligation to the taxpayer, and confidence in the integrity of DoD contracting must be re-established. If confirmed, I intend to assess the adequacy of the existing tools and authorities and make any necessary adjustments.

In your view, are current “revolving door” statutes effective?

I understand an interim rule was published in the Federal Register in January of this year to strengthen regulatory language regarding DOD personnel who accept positions with Defense contractors. It is important that the taxpayer have confidence in these practices. If confirmed, I will assess the effectiveness of the applicable statutes.

What tools other than law enforcement measures could we use to help prevent procurement fraud and ethical misconduct?

I understand the Office of the Inspector General and the Defense Acquisition University continue to offer additional training and awareness presentations on procurement fraud indicators. If confirmed, I would seek to identify further tools.

Are there sufficient enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance with laws and regulations?

Under existing laws and regulations, a contractor may be suspended or debarred for failure to timely disclose a known violation of Federal criminal law in connection with the award or performance of any Government contract performed by the contractor or a subcontract. If confirmed, I will assess the existing enforcement mechanisms to determine areas for improvement.

25. “Buy America”

“Buy America” issues have been the source of considerable controversy in recent years. As a result, there have been a number of legislative efforts to place restrictions on the purchase of defense products from foreign sources.

What benefits do you believe the Department obtains from international participation in the defense industrial base?

I believe international participation in the defense industrial base serves to promote the interoperability, standardization, and rationalization of the conventional defense equipment used by the armed forces of the United States and its allies and other friendly governments. It also helps to avoid or reduce duplication in research and development initiatives. These attributes can lead to savings in terms of the time and money needed to develop, produce, support, and sustain the materiel needed and used by our warfighters. It also helps the

Department to achieve the advantages of competition in contracting, which includes the ability to obtain world class, best value products for our warfighters. Further, international participation in the defense industrial base encourages development of mutually beneficial industrial linkages that enhance U.S. industry's access to global markets and exposes U.S. industry to international competition, helping to ensure that U.S. firms remain innovative and efficient.

Under what conditions, if any, would you support the imposition of domestic source restrictions for a particular product?

In certain instances involving national security or the preservation of a key defense technology or production capability, domestic source restrictions may be necessary. The Department has (and, I understand, has exercised) the authority to "self-impose" such domestic source restrictions.

Section 831 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 requires the Secretary of Defense to ensure that the United States firms and United States employment in the defense sector are not disadvantaged by unilateral procurement practices by foreign governments, such as the imposition of offset agreements in a manner that undermines the United States industrial base.

What steps if any do you believe the Department should take to implement this requirement?

Section 831 requires the Secretary of Defense to make every effort to ensure that the policies and practices of the Department reflect the goal of establishing an equitable trading relationship between the U.S. and its foreign defense trade partners. I understand an interagency team composed of the Departments of Defense, Labor, Commerce, and State and the U.S. Trade Representative was established to consult with other nations about limiting the adverse effects of offsets. If confirmed, I would decide on the need for any steps to be taken by the Department based on information the team provides.

The Defense Science Board Task Force on "Defense Industrial Structure for Transformation" found in July 2008 that U.S. policy regarding "Buy America" and the "Berry Amendment" inhibits the nation from gaining the security and economic benefits that could be realized from the global marketplace.

What is your opinion of "Buy America" legislation and the "Berry Amendment"?

Such restrictions may impede the Department's ability to procure world class products and capabilities on a "best value" basis for our warfighters, and they may impair effective defense cooperation with our allies and other friendly governments. For example, such restrictions can be inconsistent with supply chain management practices of commercial enterprises. This would impede efforts to promote civil-military integration and to achieve greater reliance on commercial solutions to the Department's requirements. It

would be a preferable alternative to allow the Department to rely on its ability, under existing law, to impose source restrictions when necessary. I understand that The Department also has authority to restrict procurements to domestic sources when it determines that a particular domestic industrial capability must be protected. This means the Department has the ability to sustain endangered industrial capabilities when necessary to protect national security interests and to remove the restrictions when no longer needed, thus returning to the benefits of competition.

26. The Defense Industrial Base

What is your view of the current state of the U.S. defense industry?

The defense industry is a vital partner to defense, since most defense products and services are provided by the private sector. Generally, my viewpoint is that our Nation's defense and technology industrial base remains the most innovative, reliable, and cost-effective in the world.

Do you support further consolidation of the U.S. defense industry?

I support the Department's overall policy to review each proposed merger, acquisition, and teaming arrangement on its particular merits in the context of the individual market and the changing dynamics of that market. I have some concern about the loss of competition caused by significant industry consolidation over the last decade. If confirmed, I would work with Department leadership to evaluate options to address continued consolidation and the flux of the competitive environment.

What is your position on foreign investment in the U.S. defense sector?

Generally, I support foreign investment in the defense sector. Foreign firms enhance competition which can lower costs of specific defense systems as well as provide for them leading edge technologies which were developed abroad. In addition, such investment in the long-run will increase interoperability between the U.S. and its allies. To be sure, we must ensure that foreign investment in the defense sector does not create risks to national security.

What steps if any do you believe the Department of Defense should take to ensure the continued health of the U.S. defense industry?

If confirmed, I would support the Department's strategy to rely on market forces to the maximum extent possible to create, shape, and sustain the industrial and technological capabilities needed to provide for the Nation's defense. However, I think it is also important to recognize that the Department (through its budget, acquisition, and logistics processes) can create market forces capable of harnessing the innovation potential in the industrial/technological base. In addition, when it becomes necessary to intervene in the marketplace, the Department has tools available which help to focus industry attention on

critical technology development, accelerate technology insertion into manufacturing processes, create or expand critical production facilities, and direct production capacity towards meeting the most urgent warfighter needs.

27. Manufacturing Issues

The recent Defense Science Board (DSB) study on the Manufacturing Technology Program made a number of findings and recommendations related to the role of manufacturing research and capabilities in the development and acquisition of defense systems.

Have you reviewed the findings of the DSB Task Force on the Manufacturing Technology Program?

Yes.

What recommendations from the Task Force do you plan to implement?

The overarching recommendation of the DSB report was to give “leadership emphasis” to manufacturing technology. I believe strongly in the importance of manufacturing technology as a type of technology deserving DoD fostering just as DoD fosters the technologies embedded in the manufactured weapons themselves. I also agree that manufacturing readiness should be assessed more rigorously before programs pass into production.

What incentives do you plan to use to enhance industry’s incorporation and utilization of advanced manufacturing processes developed under the manufacturing technology program?

The Department’s competitive solicitation process must adequately identify and reward proposers who plan to employ advanced manufacturing processes in response to DoD requests for proposals and where manufacturing processes are mature and do not present excessive risk.

28. Science and Technology

What, in your view, is the role and value of science and technology programs in meeting the Department’s transformation goals and in confronting irregular, catastrophic, traditional and disruptive threats?

I believe science and technology plays a large role in shaping the future direction of the Department of Defense as the Department takes on the challenge of accomplishing an expanded range of missions. The content of a science and technology program needed to address these future challenges is likely different than in the past. The threats to our

national security have expanded to cyberspace as well as physical space. Just as science and technology gave us the world's most capable military at the end of the Cold War, we need science and technology to provide answers for tomorrow's fight.

If confirmed, what direction will you provide regarding funding targets and priorities for the Department's long term research efforts?

I am aware that Secretary Gates has made, in particular, basic research a priority—increasing funding by about \$300 million in Fiscal Year 2009. If confirmed, I will carefully review all funding portfolios; then assess the relative merits and targets.

What specific metrics would you use, if confirmed, to assess whether the Department is making adequate investments in its basic research programs?

There are a number of metrics to assess whether the Department is making an adequate investment in basic research. None of these provide a binary yes or no answer. By definition, basic research is long-term, and not measureable credibly with short-term metrics. The department needs to assess a number of factors, to include growth or decline in real dollars of the basic research program; change in number of projects; proportion of DoD-funded researchers in key science disciplines; and number of students supported by the basic research program investments. While these metrics offer insight, if confirmed, I will need to work closely with the Director, Defense Research and Engineering before defining specific metrics.

Do you feel that there is sufficient coordination between and among the science and technology programs of the military services and defense agencies?

I am aware that there are coordination mechanisms in place for the Department's S&T program. If confirmed, I would look at this issue more closely to determine if current coordination is adequate.

What is the Department's role and responsibility in addressing national issues related to science, technology, engineering, and mathematics education and workforce development?

The Department must take a pro-active role in ensuring that the Nation has an adequate Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) workforce. In addition to encouraging STEM workforce development through its research investments and education outreach efforts, I believe the Department of Defense needs to work closely with the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the National Science Foundation, and other federal components involved in national security, to generate a "whole of government" approach to workforce development.

What steps if any would you take to support efforts to ensure that the nation has the scientific and technical workforce needed for its national security technological and industrial base?

I am aware of several activities within the DoD, such as the National Defense Education Program and the National Security Science and Engineering Fellows program, that aim to expand the pool of scientists and engineers able to contribute to the national security technological and industrial base. If confirmed, one of the first steps I would take would be to direct the DDR&E to determine how well these programs and others like them meet the Department's science and technical workforce needs.

How would you use science and technology programs to better reduce technical risk and therefore potentially reduce costs and schedule problems that accrue in large acquisition programs?

Science and technology programs, particularly in Budget Activities 2 (Applied Research) and 3 (Advanced Development) can have substantial impact on improving technology readiness, and thereby reduce technical risk. I believe there is an opportunity to expand the ties from BA2 and BA3 programs to large acquisition programs, particularly between Milestones A and B.

Do you feel that the science and technology programs of the Department of Defense are too near-term focus and have over emphasized technology transition efforts over investing in revolutionary and innovative research programs?

If confirmed, I will look at the balance of near and far-term innovative research. The DoD S&T program should be balanced so there are opportunities for both capabilities pull, responding to the warfighter's needs, and technology push, responding to the promise of new technology. The Under Secretary for AT&L has the responsibility of helping to shape and focus the portfolio, and if confirmed, I will rely on the DDR&E to advise me on how to discharge this responsibility.

Are you satisfied that the Department has a well articulated and actionable science and technology strategic plan?

I know the Department has a recent Research and Engineering Strategic Plan, published in 2007, and that each of the Military Services and Agencies that conduct research publish strategic plans that are harmonized with the DDR&E plan. If confirmed, I will ensure the plans have clear and actionable guidance.

Do you see a need for changes in areas such as hiring authority, personnel systems, financial disclosure and ethics requirements, to ensure that the Department can recruit and retain the highest quality scientific and technical workforce possible?

I believe any modern enterprise needs effective tools, to shape the workforce and attract the most capable people. This principle holds true for the Department. Various recent studies indicate that the Department has difficulty competing with the private sector for technically capable staff. I will take all possible steps to ensure the Department is competitive.

The Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) has been designated as the Chief Technology Officer of the Department of Defense.

In your view, what is the appropriate role of the Chief Technology Officer of the Department of Defense?

The role of the Chief Technology Officer of the Department is defined in the DDRE charter. The charter defines the role of the DDR&E as the Principal Staff Assistant to the Under Secretary (AT&L) and the Secretary on all technical matters. The DDR&E should provide guidance to shape the DoD S&T program and develop technology options for the Department. The CTO should also contribute significantly to ensuring that major acquisition programs are conducted with acceptable technological risk

What authority should the DDR&E have over the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)?

As the Department's primary corporate research activity, DARPA reports to DDR&E. The DDR&E should have all authorities necessary to ensure DARPA is effective in meeting its mission, including budgetary authority and authority over selection of agency leadership.

What authority should the DDR&E have over other Service and Agency science and technology efforts?

The DDR&E should provide oversight responsibilities of the Service and Agency programs, consistent with the DDR&E charter.

Do you see the need for any changes in organizational structure, workforce, or availability of resources to improve the effectiveness of the Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering?

I believe science and technology is critical to maintaining military superiority across a broad range of crises and military operations. Ensuring the technological superiority of our Armed forces will require a strong DDR&E. If confirmed, I will take any steps I determine necessary for a strong DDR&E.

29. Defense Laboratories

What is your view on the quality of the DOD laboratories as compared to the DOE national laboratories, federal laboratories, academic laboratories and other peer institutions?

The DoD laboratories employ a talented and mission-oriented workforce, and constitute an important Departmental resource for the Nation's national security. That said, I am certain they can be improved. If confirmed, I will place priority in examining the capabilities and long-term requirements of the DoD laboratories, and develop, with the Services, a plan to address the role of the DoD laboratories.

What metrics will you use, if confirmed, to evaluate the effectiveness, competitiveness, and scientific vitality of the DOD laboratories?

The effectiveness, competitiveness, and scientific vitality of the DoD laboratories are gauged by a combination of factors, including external review of their research programs and the Service parent organizations' assessment of their effectiveness in meeting Service requirements and other needs. These in turn are influenced by the ability to attract and retain a talented workforce, and the adequacy and robustness of their physical infrastructure. I believe collaboration with universities, industry, and other laboratories also constitute an important contributor and measure of our laboratories' effectiveness in fostering and recognizing world class research and development.

What steps if any will you take, if confirmed, to increase the mission effectiveness and productivity of the DOD laboratories?

If confirmed, I will work with the DDR&E to ensure that DoD Labs operate at maximum effectiveness and productivity.

Do you see value in enhancing the level of technical collaboration between the DOD laboratories and academic, other federal and industrial scientific organizations?

Yes. The effectiveness and competitiveness of our laboratories can only be helped by enhanced technical collaboration with other research and development organizations.

Do you feel that past investments in research equipment; sustainment, repair and modernization; and facility construction at the DOD laboratories have been sufficient to maintain their mission effectiveness and their standing as world class science and engineering institutions?

I believe that in some science and technology areas that are key to defense, DoD laboratories are at the cutting edge. If confirmed, I will assess what they need to retain this standing.

30. DARPA

What is the relationship between the DARPA and the DDR&E?

DDR&E is the Department's Chief Technology Officer responsible for ensuring the technological strength that undergirds our defense and overseeing all of the department's technical activities. DARPA is the Department's primary corporate research agency, fulfilling a crucial role complementary with the Military Services' and Agencies' research efforts. The DARPA director reports to the DDR&E.

Has DARPA struck an appropriate balance between investments in near-term technology programs that are tied to current battlefield needs and investments in longer term, higher risk, and revolutionary capability development?

Since its inception in the late 1950's, DARPA has led the Department and this Nation in long-term, high-risk/high-payoff research, resulting in numerous revolutionary force-multiplier advantages for our Warfighters. I am strongly committed to ensuring that DARPA maintains and enhances the leadership role it has established over decades, and that it strikes the right balance between near-term and far-term efforts.

Do you feel that DARPA has adequately invested in the academic research community?

Many, if not most, of the revolutionary science and technology advances of the future will likely arise from academic research conducted in America's outstanding universities, and from the spin-off companies that universities often foster. It is important for DoD's entire science and technology enterprise, including DARPA, to nurture and encourage academic research.

What are the major issues related to DARPA investments, management, and research outcomes that you will seek to address?

I believe that it is important for DARPA to pursue a portfolio of research investments that offer promise of future revolutionary war-fighting advantage. DARPA must hire the most technologically advanced, creative, and innovative staff that our Nation can offer. DARPA must empower its workforce to think "out-of-the-box," to engage energetically with the brightest minds in the US and abroad, regardless of nationality.

31. Test and Evaluation

The Department has, on occasion, been criticized for failing to adequately test its major weapon systems before these systems are put into production.

What are your views about the degree of independence needed by the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation in ensuring the success of the Department's acquisition programs?

In general, I believe an independent Director of Operational Test and Evaluation provides a valuable perspective on whether the Department's weapon systems are operationally effective and suitable. The Operational Evaluation, a validation of the developed system's ability to improve the warfighter's capability, is an essential input to any decisions on investing in the full production of new systems. It is however often too late in the acquisition cycle to influence design and development. That's the role of the systems engineers and developmental testers. Developmental testing is the verification half of systems engineering. If confirmed I also intend to examine the independence and resourcing of developmental testing.

Are you concerned with the level of test and evaluation conducted by the contractors who are developing the systems to be tested?

In general, I believe contractors are an important and integral part of the test and evaluation process during system development. In the past era of acquisition reform the Department may have delegated too much of the early developmental test and evaluations to the contractors without adequate government participation or oversight. If confirmed, my emphasis will be on integrating contractor and government test efforts.

What is the impact of rapid fielding requirements on the standard testing process?

Rapid fielding requirements require rapid performance from the entire acquisition team, including the test and evaluation community. With a rapid fielding requirement, it is necessary to adjust the scope and amount of testing to address the key issues and risks that affect the system's use in combat and gain early insights into the capabilities and limitations of the system being acquired. In rapid fielding, particularly of commercial items, the focus needs to be on understanding what we're buying, not whether the system meets a set of rigid requirements. If confirmed, I will work with all stakeholders to ensure testing processes support rapid fielding without delaying our response to these urgent requirements.

If confirmed, how will you work to ensure that all equipment and technology that is deployed to warfighters is subject to appropriate operational testing?

All equipment and technology acquired by the Department should be subject to robust Systems Engineering, comprehensive Developmental Test and Evaluation, and realistic Operational Test and Evaluation. If confirmed I would enforce existing acquisition policies regarding these processes and where necessary amend them.

Do you believe that the developmental testing organizations in DOD and the military services are adequate to ensure an appropriate level of developmental testing, and testing oversight, on major defense acquisition programs?

I believe the Department needs to improve the adequacy of the developmental testing organizations in DoD and the Services. If confirmed, I will look at the entire acquisition

organization, including Developmental Test and Evaluation and make changes as necessary to best accomplish the mission.

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2003 included several provisions to improve the management of DOD test and evaluation facilities.

Are you satisfied with the manner in which these provisions have been implemented?

Yes. The language in the FY03 NDAA led to the establishment of the Defense Test Resource Management Center (TRMC). The TRMC's mission is to plan for and assess the adequacy of the Major Range and Test Facility Base (MRTFB). Two key provisions of that legislation included the TRMC's requirement to develop the Department's Strategic Plan for T&E Resources and to certify the adequacy of Service and Agency Test and Evaluation budgets. If confirmed, I will review the adequacy of the Department's responses to these mandates.

Do you believe that the Department should take any additional steps to improve the management of its test and evaluation facilities?

If confirmed, I will review this matter and make changes where necessary and in consultation with Congress.

As systems grow more sophisticated, networked, and software-intensive, DOD's ability to test and evaluate them becomes more difficult. Some systems-of-systems cannot be tested as a whole until they are already bought and fielded.

Are you concerned with DOD's ability to test these new types of systems?

Absolutely, testing and developing software-intensive programs in a net-centric, systems-of-systems (SoS) environment is indeed a challenge.

32. Ballistic Missile Defense

When it was created in 2002, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) was exempted from normal acquisition rules and processes in order to field an initial set of missile defense capabilities on an expedited basis. That fielding has now taken place, although numerous upgrades and corrections are being implemented. Each of the elements of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) would normally meet the criteria for a Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP), but none of them has been managed as an MDAP. Furthermore, for most of MDA's existence, all its programs were funded with Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) funds, even for non-RDT&E activities.

What management and acquisition changes or improvements if any do you believe are warranted for the ballistic missile defense programs?

I expect missile defense to be addressed as part of the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review as well as the Congressionally-mandated Ballistic Missile Defense Policy and Strategy review. In concert with those policy reviews and if confirmed, I will review existing DoD acquisition policies and procedures related to developing and fielding ballistic missile defense capabilities to ensure appropriate acquisition processes are in place.

Do you believe that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics should have the same responsibilities relative to the ballistic missile defense acquisition programs as for all other MDAPs?

I believe that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, as the Department's senior acquisition executive, should have the same responsibilities, within the current departmental guidance, for all MDAPs, regardless of the capability being acquired.

If confirmed, what steps if any would you plan to take to ensure that the ballistic missile defense programs of the Department of Defense follow sound acquisition and management practices and processes?

I understand that the Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB) has been the forum for the last two years for senior Departmental review of Missile Defense Agency activity. If confirmed, I would review within the MDEB, efforts to maintain regular oversight of the MDA acquisition and management practices.

For many years the Department of Defense and Congress have agreed on the principle that major weapon systems should be operationally effective, suitable, survivable, cost-effective, affordable, and should address a credible threat.

Do you agree that any ballistic missile defense systems that we deploy operationally must be operationally effective, suitable, survivable, cost-effective, affordable, and should address a credible threat?

Yes

If confirmed, what steps if any would you take to ensure that the BMDS and each of its elements meet these criteria?

Rigorous and realistic testing of missile defenses is imperative. I understand that the Missile Defense Agency presently is executing a plan which includes the use of a Development/Operational Testing approach that allows the U.S. Strategic Command warfighter community (which includes all Combatant Commanders) and all the Service

Operational Test Agencies to be integral parts of the test program. If confirmed, I would need to review these plans and the proposed test activities to determine whether additional steps or other emphases are necessary or appropriate.

Today, there are many hundreds of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles that can reach forward-deployed U.S. military forces, allies, and other friendly nations. A Joint Staff study, the Joint Capabilities Mix study, has repeatedly concluded that the United States needs about twice as many Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptors just to achieve the minimum inventory needs of regional combatant commanders to defend against such threats.

Do you agree that U.S. missile defense efforts should be prioritized on providing effective defenses against existing ballistic missile threats, especially the many hundreds of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles that are currently within range of our forward-based forces, allies, and other friendly nations?

If confirmed, I will review the balance among the elements of the ballistic missile defense program.

What do you believe should be the appropriate role of the combatant commanders and the military in determining requirements, force structure, and inventory levels for ballistic missile defense forces?

Combatant Commanders are the ultimate employers of the capabilities that the acquisition community delivers. As such, they should have a voice in determining their priorities for requirements, force structure, and necessary inventory levels. Title X provides for the Military Departments to have responsibility to organize, train, and equip the forces employed by the COCOMs. MDA serves as the materiel developer for ballistic missile defenses and as such has a role in determining what capabilities are achievable and what inventory quantities are feasible at what cost. These three roles are interdependent. If confirmed, I will review existing policies and procedures to ensure they are transparent and provide the capabilities required at the best value to the taxpayer.

For many years, Congress and the Department of Defense have agreed on the principle of “fly before you buy,” namely demonstrating that a weapon system will work in an operationally effective, suitable, and survivable manner before deciding to acquire and deploy such systems. This demonstration requires rigorous, operationally realistic testing, including independent Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E), to provide an accurate assessment of how weapon systems will perform in combat conditions. The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) has expressed concerns that the testing of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system has not been sufficient to provide confidence in its operational capability.

Do you agree that ballistic missile defense testing needs to be operationally realistic, and should include Operational Test and Evaluation, in order to assess operational capabilities and limitations of ballistic missile defense systems, prior to making decisions to deploy such systems?

I agree that operationally realistic testing is imperative, and if confirmed, I will review MDA's test plans and practices to ensure that they satisfy this imperative.

If confirmed, what steps if any would you take to ensure that the BMDS, and each of its elements, undergoes independent operational test and evaluation?

If confirmed, I will work with the Missile Defense Agency and the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E) to see what testing is planned and eliminate any shortcomings.

The Missile Defense Agency has developed ballistic missile defense systems and capabilities and procured the initial inventories of missile defense element weapon systems. However, the military departments are notionally intended to procure, operate, and sustain these missile defense systems.

What do you believe is the appropriate role for the military departments in the procurement, operation, and sustainment of ballistic missile defense systems, and at what point do you believe these systems should be transitioned and transferred to the military departments?

I understand the Missile Defense Agency and the Military Departments are in the process of preparing overarching and element-specific Memorandum of Agreements to define responsibilities and relationships in preparation for Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) operations and deployment. If confirmed, I will work with the Missile Defense Agency and the Military Departments to ensure processes and policies are in place to accomplish the transition and transfer in a timely manner and within budget.

33. Nuclear Weapons Council

If confirmed as USD(ATL), you will chair the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC).

In your view, what are, or should be, the highest priorities of the NWC?

If confirmed, I will carry out all of the Nuclear Weapons Council responsibilities listed under Section 179, title 10, U.S. Code. In my view, the highest priority of the NWC is to ensure the safety, security and reliability of our nuclear weapons stockpile.

What improvements, if any, do you believe should be made to the operations of the NWC?

If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, as well as members of the NWC, to identify improvements, if any, that would further the goals of the NWC. These may include recommendations from the recent Schlesinger Commission report.

What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in the development of the Nuclear Posture Review?

If confirmed I will be closely involved, along with the appropriate agencies and departments, in both the development and the review of the NPR.

34. Logistics and Readiness

If confirmed as USD(ATL), what steps if any would you take to ensure that life cycle maintenance requirements and sustainment support are considered in the acquisition process for new DOD systems?

Reliability, Availability and Maintainability must be designed in early-on in the acquisition process for our weapon systems to provide the best value to the Warfighter and taxpayer. DoD is pursuing several acquisition reforms to ensure the acquisition process maintains a life cycle management perspective, maximizes materiel availability for the Warfighter, and controls operations and support costs. If confirmed, I will review and if necessary adjust these reform measures.

Section 332 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 requires the Department of Defense to conduct life-cycle cost analysis for new capabilities including the fully burdened cost of fuel during the analysis and evaluation of alternatives in the acquisition program design trades.

Do you believe that the fully burdened cost of fuel is an appropriate factor for the Department to consider in the evaluation of acquisition alternatives?

Absolutely yes. The Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel serves as a means to address future systems energy demand within the Departments key business processes (force planning, requirements development and acquisition). By properly valuing the “burden” of fuel delivery in systems development, the Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel allows a more realistic examination of Departmental costs in terms of operational effectiveness, force structure and operating budget.

What steps if any will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that the Department of Defense complies with the requirements of section 332?

My understanding is that work associated with institutionalizing the Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel (FBCF) factor is underway within the Department. If confirmed, I will review this work and institute appropriate improvements.

With persistent combat operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and around the globe, combat service support units are constantly at risk when transporting supplies.

What role do you believe the USD(ATL) should play in developing strategies to reduce the logistical footprint of deployed units operating in hostile environments?

Logistics footprint is a multifaceted issue which is based on the mission, the force structure, the environment, the weapons systems deployed, and the capacity and security of our lines of communication. If confirmed, my office, in conjunction with US Transportation Command, the Defense Logistics Agency, the Joint Staff, and the Military Services should continue to focus on managing the logistics footprint required to sustain the force in any theater of operation. In the long-term, we must ensure the best possible sustainability, maintainability, reliability, and fuel efficiency of our weapon systems in the acquisition process as a way of lowering the footprint needed to maintain those systems.

Sections 333 and 334 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 direct the Department of Defense to conduct studies on renewable energy sources such as wind and solar power and on the reduction of life cycle emissions of alternative and synthetic fuels.

What is your view of the role that the USD(ATL) should play in developing and pursuing alternative energy sources for the Department of Defense?

Since Sections 333 and 334 of the National Defense Authorization Act of FY2009 direct the Department of Defense to conduct studies on renewable energy sources and the reduction of life cycle emissions on alternative and synthetic fuels, I believe it prudent to determine the status of those studies before formulating a specific approach. I do believe the goals and intents of energy efficiency and renewable sources of energy may be consistent with operational effectiveness. If so, and if confirmed, I will ensure we establish the right research, prototyping, acquisition and sustainment for a stable energy program.

What steps if any will you take, if confirmed, to makes sure that the Department of Defense complies with the requirements of sections 333 and 334?

If confirmed, I expect the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to comply with statutory requirements. I will investigate the process we have in place to track progress against all statutory requirements, to include Sections 333 and 334.

Do you foresee a significant role for the use of solar and wind energy systems with deployed units operating in remote environments?

I think it is too early to determine if renewable energy systems will play a significant role in meeting deployed unit requirements. What I am comfortable in committing to is within the roles and responsibilities of the office for which I am nominated, to reduce the risk to deployed American forces and systems. If solar and wind energy can help meet that goal, we will do what can to accelerate their fielding.

35. Base Realignments and Closures

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report in January 2009 regarding DOD's implementation of the decisions contained in the 2005 Defense Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round. In the report, GAO described several significant challenges which may impact the Department's ability to complete BRAC implementation by the statutory deadline of September 15, 2011.

If confirmed, will you be committed to meet the statutory goal for BRAC implementation?

Yes.

In your opinion, what measures will you need to undertake to assist the services to complete their BRAC actions on time?

The Department will need detailed business plans with cost and savings estimates to govern BRAC implementation and will need to apply the necessary resources to meet the statutory BRAC implementation deadline. If confirmed, I will do so to ensure that the statutory deadline can be met.

Regarding policies related to the disposal of property at closed installations, currently, the Department is encouraged to obtain fair market value for excess property not required by the Federal Government. Funds obtained for this property are used to augment appropriated funds for the environmental clean-up of other DOD property to be disposed. The Department of Defense is also authorized to convey property to local redevelopment agencies for little or no consideration in order to facilitate economic recovery and development.

In light of current economic conditions, do you see a need for the Department to reassess its policy on the need to seek fair market value in all cases? If so, what changes would you propose to this policy?

I understand that the Department has a broad range of authorities under which it may convey surplus property at closed installations, and I believe this flexibility is important. These authorities give the Department the flexibility to address the wide range of

circumstances encountered at communities that have hosted closing installations. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department properly considers all relevant factors when selecting the appropriate property disposal method.

In your opinion, does the current BRAC law authorize the Department to carry out property disposals for no consideration or consideration at less than fair market value? If not, what changes would you propose to the BRAC law?

Current BRAC law authorizes the Department to dispose of property using a variety of conveyance methods. Some of those conveyance methods involve payment of consideration, and some may be at no-cost. These conveyance authorities provide flexibility to address the wide range of circumstances encountered at communities that have hosted closing installations. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department properly considers all relevant factors when selecting the appropriate property disposal method.

Many communities around the country affected by significant increases in populations at military bases have asked for financial assistance from the federal government to fund improvements or construction of local schools, transportation, utilities, ports, and other infrastructure.

What is your opinion about using funds appropriated to the Department of Defense to pay for these types of projects in local communities?

Law and Executive Order direct the domestic Federal agencies to work with DoD and support a program of economic adjustment assistance for affected communities, workers, and businesses. If confirmed, I will review what can be done to ensure our cognizant Federal partners [U.S. Departments of Commerce (Economic Development Administration), Labor (Employment and Training Administration), Education, Transportation, and Agriculture (Rural Development Administration)] are supporting these efforts as intended. At the same time, I will review the status of these efforts, including the possible use of DoD appropriated funds beyond the state and local organizing and planning activities these funds have supported to date.

If confirmed, how would you propose working with local communities to address their concerns about adequate support for military members and their families?

Across the Department, numerous components have responsibilities for working with and assisting these areas, including the Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA). If confirmed, I would review these interfaces to ensure we are appropriately structured for assisting these needs and optimizing our resources. This effort would take OEA's efforts to date with these affected states, communities, installations, and service members into account. Additionally, I would work within the Administration to effectively implement the statutory and Executive Order direction for the cognizant Federal agencies to afford priority consideration to requests from Defense-affected communities for Federal technical assistance and financial resources.

36. Environmental Security

If confirmed, you will be responsible for environmental security for the Department of Defense.

What do you see as the most significant challenges facing the Department in the area of environmental security?

Environmental issues are an area of great importance to the Department. One of the Department's challenges is environmental sustainability, evident in the energy, environment, safety, and occupational health issues in its operations. The Department must also address these issues in a fiscally responsible manner.

Assuming you are confirmed, what plans if any do you have for addressing these challenges?

To address these challenges, if confirmed, I will ensure collaboration among DoD, State and local governments, non-governmental organizations, other federal agencies, industry, and academia to provide better tools and policies for life-cycle cost and sustainability analyses. I will promote decisions that are based on the best science available at the time, while recognizing that the Department must adapt to changing events, technology, and emerging requirements.

The Department of Justice recently concluded that the Department of Defense must comply with clean-up orders from the Environmental Protection Agency.

What steps if any do you plan to take, if confirmed, in response to this determination?

It is my understanding that the Department has responded that it will comply with these orders and EPA and DoD have agreed to finalize interagency agreements required under the main cleanup law, the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act, to replace these orders. If confirmed, I will ensure that DoD continues to keep its primary focus on the Department's responsibility to ensure cleanup actions are promptly and cost effectively taken to protect human health and the environment.

Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) remains a problem at many current and former DOD sites. Section 311 and 313 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 and section 313 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 required the Department of Defense to develop and implement plans for the remediation of UXO at such sites. However, the Department has yet to develop comprehensive plans and request adequate funding to comply with these requirements.

If confirmed, what steps if any would you take to address the UXO issue?

The Department has made significant efforts with all stakeholders to update the inventory of the Munitions Response Sites (MRSs), prioritize all the MRSs in the inventory with stakeholder input and measure progress through established performance goals and metrics. I will look into it further if I am confirmed.

What steps if any do you believe are needed to ensure that the UXO program receives adequate funding and makes meaningful progress in the detection and clearance of UXO?

The first step is to refine estimates for remediation of Munitions Response Sites (MRSs), including estimation of future costs and activities. This will be the key for both planning and execution for MRS remediation and will enable the Department to implement the predictable funding levels required for effective program execution in a fiscally responsible manner.

37. Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the USD(ATL)?

Yes.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes.

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes.