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THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF

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Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. It is a pleasure to join Kenneth Myers, Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), to discuss inspections associated with the New START Treaty, and the continuing work of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. My remarks will provide a policy perspective, and Mr. Myers will address implementation, for which DTRA plays a leading role.

### **New START Inspections**

On-site inspections are a linchpin of the New START Treaty's verification framework. The Treaty allows each Party to conduct up to 18 short-notice on-site inspections each year, with up to ten Type One inspections conducted at operating bases for ICBMs, strategic nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), and nuclear-capable heavy bombers, and up to eight Type Two inspections conducted at places such as storage sites, test ranges, formerly declared facilities, and conversion or elimination facilities.

On-site inspections work synergistically with other elements of the Treaty, including extensive data exchanges on the technical characteristics, locations, and dispositions of ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers, and unique identifiers associated with each ballistic missile and heavy bomber. Any changes in the status of strategic systems must be reported through timely notifications and, twice annually, the sides must provide a comprehensive snapshot of their strategic offensive forces. By enabling the

United States to directly observe Russia's strategic nuclear forces and related facilities, inspections help confirm the accuracy of declared data on deployed and non-deployed strategic offensive arms, and the conversion or elimination of these systems. Inspections also can confirm that facilities which previously supported strategic offensive arms are not being used for purposes inconsistent with the Treaty. In short, inspections will help the United States verify that Russia is reporting the status of its strategic forces accurately and complying with the provisions of the New START Treaty.

Inspections will not be shots in the dark. Using information provided by required data exchanges, notifications, past inspections, and national technical means (NTM), we can choose to inspect those facilities of greatest interest to us. Then, through short-notice on-site inspections, our inspectors can verify that what the Russians are reporting accurately reflects reality.

Inspections under New START will provide a deterrent to cheating. Because the Treaty provides for an annual quota of up to eighteen inspections at sites selected by the inspecting party, each side knows that the other will have a significant capability to uncover any discrepancies between what is reported and what is actually happening. If the United States has concerns or sees ambiguities in reported data, we will be able to raise them with the Russians in the Bilateral Consultative Commission and pursue them further at higher levels, if necessary.

In addition to helping to monitor compliance and deter cheating, on-site inspections, coupled with compulsory exhibitions of any new types of strategic systems, will help the

United States better understand the disposition, operating and support patterns, and characteristics of Russia's strategic offensive forces. This level of detailed information on Russian strategic forces could simply not be accumulated in the absence of a treaty verification regime. By allowing both sides to base assessments on the direct monitoring of each other's strategic offensive forces, New START will, if ratified, promote transparency and help avoid worst-case assumptions and planning.

### **Conversion and Elimination**

The conversion and elimination provisions of the New START Treaty are designed to allow both the United States and Russia to convert or eliminate strategic offensive arms in a transparent, simplified, and less costly manner than was the case under START. These processes will ensure that the systems are rendered incapable of performing their original purposes. Under New START, the United States will be able to remove from accountability 96 former SLBM launchers on four Ohio-class SSBNs converted to SSGNs, and over 60 B-1B bombers converted to a conventional-only role. We will also be able to convert additional B-52H bombers to a conventional-only role and employ simplified procedures to eliminate 100 currently empty ICBM silos and more than 70 B-52 and B-1B heavy bombers.

## **Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program**

For almost twenty years, the Nunn-Lugar CTR program has worked with Russia, other states of the former Soviet Union, and increasingly, new partners around the world to advance U.S. nonproliferation objectives by providing support for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and associated delivery systems. As part of this mission, the program has played a critical role in the elimination of the strategic systems of the former Soviet Union. As of June 21, 2010, the CTR program has supported the elimination of 672 ICBM launchers and 783 ICBMs, 476 SLBM launchers and 651 SLBMs, and 155 heavy bombers and 906 air-to-surface missiles. It has also supported the deactivation of 7,545 nuclear warheads.

CTR assistance has incentivized Russia to draw down its Soviet-legacy nuclear forces, and reduced opportunities for their proliferation or use. Past eliminations have been completed in accordance with applicable START provisions, including the START Conversion or Elimination Protocol. CTR will complement New START, while continuing to operate under its own authorities. Consistent with longstanding practice, the United States will continue to make payment for the work funded by Nunn-Lugar CTR only after it is confirmed as completed by a U.S. Government CTR official or U.S. Government-authorized CTR contractor personnel. Such practices will provide additional transparency into the elimination of Russian strategic systems that builds on the verification provisions of the New START Treaty.

I would also like to highlight that other Nunn-Lugar CTR projects in Russia complement New START Treaty objectives. DoD, in cooperation with the Department of Energy, has upgraded and modernized the security systems of sites in the Russian Federation where strategic and non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons are stored. This has included instituting an enhanced personnel reliability system and provision of an automated inventory control system to allow the Russian Ministry of Defense to keep better track of the location and status of its nuclear warheads destined for dismantlement. We are sustaining enhanced security systems at 24 nuclear weapons storage sites in Russia previously upgraded by DoD. Further, CTR's nuclear weapons transportation security program is enhancing the security, safety, and control of nuclear weapons during shipment between operational sites, secure storage sites, and dismantlement facilities. Such nuclear weapons shipments average four per month and will continue through 2012. These programs play an important proliferation prevention role and support the President's initiative to lockdown all vulnerable nuclear sites around the world.

In sum, the CTR program has made a tremendous contribution to U.S. national security and will continue to do so under the New START Treaty.

### **Continuing Biological Threat**

The Committee asked that Mr. Myers and I address the administration's efforts to prevent and respond to biological threats, which is a top priority for the Obama Administration. To guide the U.S. government approach to this problem, in November 2009, the

President signed a National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats which seeks to reduce the risks presented by the deliberate or accidental release of a biological agent.

DoD, along with its interagency partners, is developing a comprehensive plan to implement the national strategy and ensure that all U.S. government efforts in this critical area are aligned with the strategy. For the Department of Defense, a large portion of the overall support to this plan comes directly from the CTR program. In fact, biological threat reduction activities are an increasingly important aspect of the overall CTR program and now reflect almost 40 percent of the CTR budget. Today, the Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP) is assisting eight countries, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan, with plans to expand further into Afghanistan and several other regions.

Building on these and other successes of the Nunn-Lugar CTR program, we are working to expand the scope of our threat reduction efforts to new regions and in response to new challenges and opportunities. Four key principles – integration, responsiveness, stewardship, and cooperation – will guide the Nunn-Lugar CTR program as we undertake these new missions around the world. We are grateful for the continued support of Congress, including this committee. This support has enabled the Nunn-Lugar CTR program to address emerging WMD threats and to achieve long-standing nonproliferation goals more effectively and comprehensively.

## **Conclusion**

The New START Treaty's provisions for on-site inspections provide the cornerstone of the Treaty's verification regime. On-site inspections and exhibitions will provide us with the ability to put our trained inspectors in some of Russia's most sensitive facilities to confirm that the data they declare about their strategic offensive arms is valid. This, in turn, will establish a strong disincentive to Russian cheating. More broadly, these inspections and exhibitions will give us a detailed picture of Russia's strategic nuclear forces that we simply could not obtain otherwise. The Nunn-Lugar CTR program plays a critical role in encouraging further eliminations of Russia's strategic delivery systems and associated infrastructure. Together, these activities form a central part of our effort to reduce nuclear dangers in a verifiable and stabilizing manner. The expansion of the CTR program's biological threat reduction program will further reduce risks to the United States.

Thank you. I am ready to answer your questions.