

**Advance Questions for General Kevin P. Chilton, USAF  
Nominee for Commander, United States Strategic Command**

**Defense Reforms**

**The enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms brought about fundamental change in the manner in which the Department of Defense and the Services carry out the mission of national security.**

**Do you support full implementation of these defense reforms?**

*Yes.*

**What do you consider to be the most important aspects of these defense reforms?**

*The most positive aspect is the overall improvement in our joint military operations. The Goldwater-Nichols Act resulted in much needed improvements in joint doctrine, joint professional military education, and joint strategic planning. Another important element is clarity in the chain of command from the National Leadership to the Combatant Commanders and the unambiguous responsibility placed upon each combatant commander for execution of the mission and preparedness of assigned forces.*

**What is your view of the extent to which these defense reforms have been implemented?**

*I believe that the Department of Defense has vigorously and successfully pursued implementation of these reforms.*

**The goals of the Congress in enacting the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations defense reforms, as reflected in section 3 of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, can be summarized as strengthening civilian control over the military; improving military advice; placing clear responsibility on the Combatant Commanders for the accomplishment of their missions; ensuring the authority of the Combatant Commanders is commensurate with their responsibility; increasing attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning; providing for more efficient use of defense resources; enhancing the effectiveness of military operations; and improving the management and administration of the Department of Defense.**

**Do you agree with these goals?**

*Yes.*

**Do you foresee the need for additional modifications of Goldwater-Nichols in light of the changing environment and possible revisions to the national security strategy.**

*No. I do not believe changes to Goldwater-Nichols are necessary at this time. If confirmed, I will monitor any proposals and provide my best military advice.*

**Duties**

**What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, U. S. Strategic Command?**

*The Commander, USSTRATCOM maintains primary responsibility among the Combatant Commanders for strategic nuclear forces to support the national objective of strategic deterrence. Additional responsibilities assigned by the President include providing integrated global strike planning and command and control to deliver precision kinetic and non-kinetic effects; developing characteristics and capabilities, advocating, planning and conducting space operations; planning, integrating, and coordinating global missile defense support, operations, and desired characteristic and capability development; planning, integrating, and coordinating intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in support of strategic and global operations; integrating and coordinating Department of Defense (DoD) information operations efforts across geographic areas of responsibilities; planning, leading and coordinating DoD global network operations and defense; and serving as the lead Combatant Commander integrating DoD efforts combating weapons of mass destruction. Additionally, Commander, USSTRATCOM provides strategic military advice to the Secretary of Defense and exercises command over the organization and operation of all assigned forces and headquarters in accordance with public law and DoD regulations.*

**What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?**

*Over thirty one years of commissioned service in the United States military have prepared me for this position. My career includes diverse and challenging operational and staff assignments, within both the Air Force and Joint Service environments and NASA. I believe these assignments have prepared me for the specific duties of the Commander, USSTRATCOM. My assignment as Task Force 204 Commander (responsible for the readiness and generation of our nuclear bomber fleet) combined with my command of USSTRATCOM's Joint Functional Component Command for Space and Global Strike (responsible for integrated planning and command and control for space and global strike operations) have prepared me for the USSTRATCOM responsibilities for strategic nuclear forces, global strike and conducting space operations. Further, my experiences as the Commander of Air Force Space Command, coupled with those at NASA, to include work in launch, mission control, on orbit operations, program management and international negotiation, particularly with Russia, I believe will serve*

*me well if confirmed. In the cyber and information operations areas, my command of the Air Force Network Operations Command and oversight of the Air Force's information operations and intelligence wings as the 8<sup>th</sup> AF Commander will be helpful. In the mission area of ISR, I've had the opportunity to fly in the tactical and strategic mission areas in the RF-4 and command the 9<sup>th</sup> Reconnaissance Wing, our Air Force's U-2 and now Global Hawk wing. And again, as the 8<sup>th</sup> AF Commander, I had the opportunity to oversee all of our Air Force's manned reconnaissance platforms. In the missile defense area as the Commander of Air Force Space Command, I have had the opportunity to become very familiar with the contributions the Air Force makes to this capability in the form of space based and terrestrial early warning and tracking systems. Finally, my staff positions as the Air Force programmer and Joint Staff Deputy Director for Political Military Affairs for Asia, Pacific and the Middle East have given me a strategic perspective that I think will be of value if I am confirmed.*

**Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander, U. S. Strategic Command?**

*My military career has provided me an ongoing opportunity to expand leadership experiences, interact with new organizations and people, and to continue the learning process. If confirmed, I look forward to working with several of the organizations upon which USSTRATCOM depends for continued success and which I did not have an opportunity to work with while commanding USSTRATCOM's Joint Functional Component Command for Space and Global Strike. I will also need to increase my familiarity with these organizations (e.g. Department of Energy-National Nuclear Security Administration, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Nuclear Weapons Council, etc.) and the contributions they provide to mission success.*

**Relationships**

**Section 162(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, U. S. Strategic Command, to the following officials:**

**The Secretary of Defense**

*Pursuant to Title 10, U.S. Code, section 164, subject to the direction of the President, the Commander, USSTRATCOM performs duties under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense and is directly responsible to the Secretary for the preparedness of the command to carry out missions assigned to the command.*

## **The Deputy Secretary of Defense**

*In accordance with Title 10, U.S. Code, section 132, the Deputy Secretary of Defense will perform such duties and exercise powers prescribed by the Secretary of Defense. The Deputy Secretary of Defense will act for and exercise the powers of the Secretary of Defense when the Secretary is disabled or the office is vacant. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Deputy Secretary on matters of strategic importance.*

## **The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy**

*Title 10, U.S. Code and current DoD directives establish the Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and advisors to the Secretary of Defense regarding matters related to their respective functional areas. Within these areas, the Under Secretaries exercise policy and oversight functions, and in discharging their responsibilities the Under Secretaries may issue instructions and directive memoranda that implement policy approved by the Secretary. Communication between the Under Secretaries and Combatant Commanders is direct unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on all policy issues that affect USSTRATCOM operations.*

## **The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence**

*Title 10, U.S. Code and current DoD directives establish the Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and advisors to the Secretary of Defense regarding matters related to their respective functional areas. Within these areas, the Under Secretaries exercise policy and oversight functions, and in discharging their responsibilities the Under Secretaries may issue instructions and directive memoranda that implement policy approved by the Secretary. Communication between the Under Secretaries and Combatant Commanders is direct unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence on matters in the area of USSTRATCOM's assigned responsibilities pertaining to Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance.*

## **The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics**

*Title 10, U.S. Code and current Department of Defense directives establish the Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and advisors to the Secretary of Defense regarding matters related to their respective functional areas. Within these areas, the Under Secretaries exercise policy and oversight functions, and in discharging their responsibilities the Under Secretaries may issue instructions and directive memoranda that implement policy approved by the Secretary. Communication between the Under Secretaries and Combatant Commanders is direct unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics on Command issues pertaining to his departmental responsibilities.*

### **The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy**

*The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy serves under the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Any relationship the Commander, USSTRATCOM requires with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy would exist with and through the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.*

### **The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense**

*The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense executes responsibilities including overall supervision of the homeland defense activities of the Department of Defense while serving under the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Any relationship the Commander, USSTRATCOM requires with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security would exist with and through the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. If confirmed, I look forward to this relationship in concert with the Commander, U.S. Northern Command and Commander, U.S. Pacific Command on related national security issues.*

### **The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

*Title 10, U.S. Code clearly establishes the Chairman as the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. In this role he is the most senior ranking member of the armed forces but does not exercise command over any military forces or serve in the Chain of Command between the President and Secretary of Defense and Combatant Commanders, although the President may transmit communications through him. By law and as directed by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman consults with the Combatant Commanders, evaluates and assists in achieving their requirements and plans. He provides a vital linkage between the Combatant Commanders and other elements of the Department of Defense. If confirmed, I will assist the Chairman with my full and diligent efforts and advice. If confirmed, I will keep the Secretary of Defense informed on matters for which he may hold me personally accountable and work through the Chairman in the fulfillment of my duties, in keeping with all legal and departmental regulations.*

### **The Secretaries of the Military Departments**

*Under Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 165, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, and subject to the authority of the Combatant Commanders, the Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible for administration and support of forces that are assigned to unified and specified commands. The authority exercised by a Combatant Commander over Service components is quite clear but requires close coordination with each Secretary to ensure there is no infringement upon those lawful responsibilities which a Secretary alone may discharge. If confirmed, I look forward to building a strong and productive relationship with each of the Secretaries of the Military Departments.*

## **The Chiefs of Staff of the Services**

*As a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Service Chiefs no longer serve in the operational chain of command. They now serve to provide organized, trained, and equipped forces to be employed by Combatant Commanders in accomplishing their assigned missions. Additionally, these officers serve as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and as such have a lawful obligation to provide military advice. Individually and collectively, the Service Chiefs are a tremendous source of experience and judgment. If confirmed, I will work closely and confer regularly with the Service Chiefs.*

## **The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office**

*The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) is a DoD organization engaged in the research and development, acquisition, launch and operation of overhead reconnaissance systems necessary to meet the needs of the Intelligence Community and of the Department of Defense. According to the Unified Command Plan, USSTRATCOM is the responsible Combatant Commander for both space operations and for planning, integrating, and coordinating intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in support of strategic and global operations, as directed. In these capacities, the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command must maintain a close relationship with the Director of the NRO to coordinate and represent requirements in these mission areas. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Director of the NRO on matters of shared interest and importance.*

## **The Combatant Commanders, including Commander, U. S. Northern Command**

*The Commander, USSTRATCOM has both supported and supporting relationships with other Combatant Commanders, largely identified within the Unified Command Plan (UCP), the Forces for Unified Commands Memorandum, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, specific command arrangement agreements, OPLANs, and CONPLANs. In general, the Commander, USSTRATCOM is the supported Combatant Commander for the national strategic war plan, for planning and conducting DoD space operations, for planning, leading, and coordinating DoD global network operations and defense and, in general, is a supporting Combatant Commander for other UCP assigned missions. These additional functional missions and our current era of rapid global, technological, and threat changes create opportunities to further refine the supporting/supported command relationships between the combatant commands. If confirmed, I look forward to working with other Combatant Commanders to broaden and enhance the level and range of these relationships.*

## **The Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration**

*According to Title 50, U.S. Code, section 2402, the Department of Energy's Under Secretary for Nuclear Security serves as Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration. The Administrator is responsible for all Department of Energy programs and activities related to nuclear weapons, including the stockpile stewardship*

*program. Although the Administrator serves outside the Department of Defense's operational control, he does serve on the Nuclear Weapons Council and executes duties which closely concern USSTRATCOM. If confirmed, I will work closely and confer regularly with the Administrator.*

### **The Director of the Missile Defense Agency**

*The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) serves as the missile defense systems engineering and development organization for the Department of Defense. It provides the research, development, testing, and evaluation of the missile defense and associated systems that would be employed by Combatant Commanders. The current Unified Command Plan charges USSTRATCOM with responsibilities for planning, integrating, and coordinating global missile defense operations, including developing and advocating for missile defense characteristics and capabilities desired by Combatant Commanders. Given these closely aligned responsibilities, both the Commander, USSTRATCOM and its Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense must continue their close working relationship with MDA. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Director of MDA to ensure that Combatant Commanders' required ballistic missile defense and warning capabilities are appropriately and effectively represented to MDA.*

### **The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation**

*Title 10, U.S. Code, section 139, provides for a Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, who serves as the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics on operational test and evaluation in the Department of Defense and the principal operational test and evaluation official within the senior management of the Department of Defense. The Director, as allowed by law and departmental regulations, formulates policy, provides guidance, coordinates, reviews, monitors, and makes recommendations regarding test and evaluation matters under his purview. If confirmed, I will work closely with and seek the advice of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation in assessing the progress of command programs of interest.*

### **Major Challenges and Problems**

**In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next Commander, U.S. Strategic Command?**

*The rapidly transforming world has empowered our potential adversaries to leverage information and space technologies to asymmetrically threaten U.S. interests. Our civil, military, and commercial systems are increasingly dependent on access to cyberspace and space-based capabilities. These dependencies make securing these domains crucial to our national security. The largest challenge facing USSTRATCOM is managing the complexities of securing these domains while meeting the demands of the command's other mission areas.*

**Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?**

*First, ensure we have identified any/all capability gaps required to perform our assigned missions. Next, determine if we have the right command relations, organizations and tools in place to provide for rapid, integrated and collaborative planning and execution in our assigned mission areas and for the support we provide to the other Combatant Commanders.*

**What are your priorities for the U.S. Strategic Command?**

*Deliver space capabilities to support Joint operations around the globe. Provide the nation a global deterrent capability to prevent potential adversaries from acquiring and/or using weapons of mass destruction. Integrate and synchronize Department of Defense effects to combat adversary use and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Enable decisive global kinetic and non-kinetic combat effects through the application and advocacy of integrated Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, space, cyberspace, and global strike operations, information operations, integrated missile defense and robust command and control.*

**Strategic Threats**

**In your view, what are the most serious strategic threats facing the United States today?**

*I believe the most serious strategic threat to the U.S. today is the threat of non-state terrorist groups gaining control of and using weapons of mass destruction against the homeland. Attacks impacting our freedom to operate in space and cyberspace also pose serious strategic threats.*

**What future strategic threats should the United States prepare for?**

*We face four persistent and emerging global challenges: traditional adversaries (nation-states), unconventional non-state or state supported actors, catastrophic use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and disruptive capabilities to supplant our advantages in particular operational domains. Based on these challenges, and within USSTRATCOM's realm of responsibility, several significant threats present themselves: those that affect our cyber and space systems, weapons of mass destruction, and ballistic and cruise missiles. Cyberspace and space are "global commons", and as such, are vitally important to our daily way of life and the economic wellbeing of our nation and the world. We have all observed manifestations of threats to these domains in the recent past. WMD and ballistic missiles are threats with obviously devastating consequences.*



## **U. S. Strategic Command Missions**

**In an overarching sense, how do you define the U. S. Strategic Command mission?**

*I think the command's current mission statement captures it well: Provide the nation with global deterrence capabilities and synchronized Department of Defense effects to combat adversary weapons of mass destruction worldwide. Enable decisive global kinetic and non-kinetic combat effects through the application and advocacy of integrated Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, space and global strike operations, information operations, integrated missile defense and robust command and control.*

**U. S. Strategic Command has absorbed multiple new missions since its creation, with the most recent additions being cooperative threat reduction, information operations, and computer network security.**

**How successful has U. S. Strategic Command been at integrating these new missions and acquiring the expertise needed to perform them?**

*My current understanding is that Cooperative Threat Reduction is a Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) mission and that USSTRATCOM leverages DTRA through its Director, Dr. James Tegnalia, who is also dual-hatted as the Director, USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction. If confirmed, I will assess the scope of all mission areas, integration and expertise.*

**What organizational challenges remain at U. S. Strategic Command related to these new missions? Specifically, what additional work, if any, remains to be done and what expertise, if any, needs to be acquired for these new missions?**

*Challenges within all mission areas are a function of mission maturity, integration with mission partners, operational capabilities, and the environment in which operations take place. If confirmed, I will evaluate all mission areas and determine the need for additional prioritization and expertise. I will also examine the roles and missions between the USSTRATCOM staff and the Joint Functional Component Commanders.*

**If confirmed, would you recommend or support any changes in the missions currently assigned to U. S. Strategic Command? If so, what changes would you recommend?**

*Not at this time. As my understanding of the missions evolves and integration matures, I will assess command mission effectiveness and recommend changes as appropriate.*

**Are you aware of any additional new missions that are being contemplated for the Strategic Command?**

*No.*

### **Organization**

**General Cartwright, the previous Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command reorganized the Command to establish a series of joint functional component commands that correspond to the mission areas of the Strategic Command.**

**If confirmed, would you maintain or modify this structure?**

*I do not have any present plans to modify this structure. As my understanding of the missions evolves, and integration matures, I will assess command mission effectiveness and recommend changes as appropriate.*

### **Ballistic Missile Defense**

**How do you view the role of the Commander, U. S. Strategic Command, related to ballistic missile defense?**

*The Unified Command Plan directs USSTRATCOM to plan, integrate, coordinate global missile defense operations and support for missile defense, as well as to develop and advocate missile defense characteristics and capabilities for all combatant commands. If confirmed, this is an area that I will focus on to be sure I clearly understand the Command's authorities and responsibilities as well as those of the Regional Combatant Commanders and the Missile Defense Agency.*

**If confirmed, would you recommend or support any changes in the authorities of Commander, U. S. Strategic Command, as they relate to ballistic missile defense?**

*As of today I would not recommend any changes. If confirmed, I will continue the close working relationships with fellow Combatant Commanders and the Missile Defense Agency that have been established, and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense ensuring the appropriate authorities are in place to support the defense of our nation and our friends and allies.*

**If confirmed, what role would you anticipate playing in the assessment of the military utility of ballistic missile defenses against short-, medium-, and long-range ballistic missiles?**

*Department of Defense regulations require USSTRATCOM to direct, coordinate, and report the Military Utility Assessment of the Ballistic Missile Defense System*

*(BMDS). The latest version of this report was delivered to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 12 July 2007 and to the Secretary of Defense on 27 July 2007. I plan to continue submitting this report annually until such time as the BMDS architecture has matured and all elements have been transitioned to their respective services.*

**What are your views on the relationship between ballistic missile defenses and nuclear deterrence?**

*Ballistic missile defense represents an essential component of our active and passive defensive measures to support our National Military Strategy. Missile defense systems raise our adversaries' perceived costs associated with their continued development of ballistic missiles. In addition, our ballistic missile defenses enhance deterrence by helping to deny adversaries the benefits they might seek through ballistic missile attack. As a key component of the New Triad, ballistic missile defense enhances global deterrence by complementing strike assets and a responsive infrastructure.*

**From the perspective of the warfighter, do you believe that the spiral acquisition of ballistic missile defenses through concurrent fielding, development, testing, and operations is appropriate?**

*Yes. The capability-based spiral acquisition process with the unique authorities given to the MDA provide critical ballistic missile defense capabilities to the nation faster than the traditional processes.*

**Do you believe that the exploitation of the operational capabilities of the ballistic missile test bed provides a militarily useful capability and contributes to deterrence?**

*Yes. I believe this approach can contribute to deterrence of a limited long-range attack from North Korea.*

**In your view, at what stage in the deployment of missile defense capabilities should operationally realistic testing be conducted?**

*When conducting operational testing, whether before or after fielding, by definition the testing should be as operationally realistic as possible. How and when development testing shifts to operational testing and then follow on operational testing (classically done after fielding) varies from program to program. I am not informed enough at this point to have an opinion on at what stage in the deployment of particular missile defense capability that operationally realistic testing should be conducted. If confirmed, I will work closely with MDA to understand their plans and criteria for deployment of the various capabilities they are developing.*

**In your view, what is the threat scenario driving a decision to place interceptors in Eastern Europe, including both timing and location?**

*The threat scenario involves an Iran that threatens Europe and the U.S. Homeland with ballistic missiles. Iran has demonstrated ballistic missile capabilities which make the ballistic missile threat against Europe real today and, in the future, possible against the United States. Add that to Iran's President publicly threatening neighboring states, and Iran's developing nuclear program and I would conclude that this is a threat and scenario we should address sooner rather than later. If we choose to address this threat to our allies and ourselves with a missile defense system then the selection of the location for the deployment of this system becomes one dependent on the geometry of missile trajectories and desired reaction timelines. If confirmed, I will consult with MDA to better understand their considerations for recommending specific deployment locations.*

**In your view, what are the opportunities to work collaboratively with Russia to address emerging ballistic missile threats and the means to address such threats?**

*I think there are both technical and diplomatic opportunities to work with Russia for the benefit of mutual national security concerns over the ballistic missile threat. The recent Russian proposal to use one of their radar systems is worth exploring and encouraging.*

**Space**

**What is your view on the responsiveness of current space systems to meet warfighter needs and what are the opportunities for the Operationally Response Space program to meet military and other space requirements?**

*I think the current systems we have on orbit are very responsive to warfighter needs today. That said, we should continue to look for ways to make them even more responsive. We should also continue to explore the feasibility of rapidly deploying capabilities that can augment regional combatant commander emergent needs or replenish lost capabilities should our current systems come under attack. We should also look for ways to more rapidly deploy breakthrough technological developments into the space domain. Today, I believe these are the opportunities that the ORS program should explore.*

**What is your view of the ability of the DOD to develop and deploy space systems in a cost-effective and timely manner?**

*I believe we have this ability. It takes capable government and industry leadership in our program offices, requirement discipline, targeted technological investment to reduce technical risk prior to program start, and stable funding after program start.*

**What steps, if any, do you believe might be necessary to improve the responsiveness of current space systems?**

*We need to completely re-architect the way we do space surveillance and develop space situational awareness for our operational commanders. Today, we have a legacy Cold War architecture that is not responsive to today's needs let alone tomorrows.*

**In your view, what are the most important unmet requirements for space systems?**

*The need for adequate surveillance and reconnaissance of the space domain, the Regional Combatant Commander needs for surveillance and reconnaissance in their areas of responsibility and the need for increased global satcom bandwidth to support global military operations.*

**What do you believe should be done to meet those requirements, and what space programs should be accorded highest priority?**

*If confirmed, I will continue to be an advocate for the key enhancements required of our future space systems. I will also advocate through my Service components for investments in science and technology to maintain our pre-eminence well into the future. In the near term, programs supporting improved Space Situational Awareness capabilities, improved Surveillance and Reconnaissance, and increased bandwidth would be a high priority.*

**How important, in your view, is persistent surveillance? What programs do you believe are best able to provide this capability?**

*Persistent surveillance is paramount to developing a better understanding of adversary intentions and a key contributor to a credible strategic deterrent. It is also important to the successful conduct of combat operations at the operational and tactical level of warfare. Shorter revisit times provided by enhanced persistence can increase opportunities to operate inside an adversary's decision cycle. I believe we need to continue to work on ways to better integrate our airborne and space-based Surveillance, and Reconnaissance system so they can be employed in a complementary manner to increase the persistence our Combatant Commanders require.*

**In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Congress approved a national policy to support two space launch vehicles, or families of launch vehicles, capable of launching national security payloads into space. Recently the two launch vehicles were combined into one company to provide launch services to the U.S. Government.**

**What are your expectations with respect to efficiencies, and when would you expect these efficiencies to begin to be realized?**

*Last year, ULA projected annual savings on the order of \$150M per year starting in 2011. These numbers were developed as a snapshot in time based on expected launch rates. As we have seen in the past, these rates can both increase and decrease, however, in any case there should be efficiencies over the two company approach.*

**What, in your view, should the United States do in the future, and what steps would you take if confirmed, to ensure continued reliable access to space?**

*I would advocate for continued attention to and appropriate investment in the mission assurance programs the USAF has put in place today. I would also advocate for increased investment in the sustainment and modernization of our two key launch sites at Vandenberg and Cape Canaveral. And, I would support efforts to explore how we might better leverage other launch ranges such as Wallops, Kwajalein, White Sands, and Kodiak.*

**Do you believe that the nation should sustain redundant space launch capabilities?**

*For today, yes.*

**How important, in your view, is the Air Force Operationally Responsive Launch program?**

*If you are referring to the Operationally Responsive Space Office (ORS) as required by the National Defense Authorization Act of 2007, it is a joint effort vice an Air Force program. I believe it is important to explore the potential of this program to improve the responsiveness of current capabilities, to augment current capabilities, to replenish lost capabilities or accelerate deployment of breakthrough technologies.*

**In your view, what are the most significant challenges that the U.S. faces in military space programs and policy?**

*I believe the most significant challenge is getting a firm grasp on Space Situational Awareness, answering the "who, what, where, and why" of everything in orbit in a timely manner. We must also have adequate plans and capabilities in place to ensure the current space capabilities we provide to the Joint fight can be either defended or delivered by alternate means to deter our adversaries from attempting to deny our freedom to operate in space.*

**Training of U.S. military personnel to understand and to incorporate space assets into all aspects of operations is critically important to future success.**

**How would you address this challenge including ensuring that blue force training includes space operations?**

*This has been a major focus area for me in my current command. We are currently looking at the standards for how we assess, train and develop our Airmen in the space career fields and also how we as an Air Force deliver the right level of education for all Airmen at our basic, intermediate and advanced schools. If confirmed, I will advocate for increased support to the National Security Space Institute and ask for an examination of our course curriculum in our joint schools to see if we are conducting the right level of space education in those institutions. I will also advocate for the inclusion of space scenarios in our joint exercises to heighten awareness of the necessity to include consideration of this domain in future conflicts.*

**What role does the National Security Space Institute play in the training process, and how could their training programs be improved?**

*The National Security Space Institute is the Department of Defense's premier focal point for space education and training. It compliments existing space education programs provided by the services by teaching joint policy and doctrine, acquisition and integration, and preparing warfighters for joint military operations. While not a joint organization, it is operating in a joint manner. Continued efforts should be made to attract space cadre from all services and coalition partners, to establish firm community educational requirements and to provide stable funding to support these requirements.*

**What, in your view, are the priorities for improving space situational awareness?**

*We must be able to improve our ability to rapidly detect and track objects in orbit to evolve from cataloguing to understanding and anticipating the purpose of each object in orbit. While sustaining our current systems, we need to simultaneously improve our sensor coverage of the space domain with a mix of ground and space-based sensors while improving the data transmission architecture and equipment necessary to fuse the data we collect into useable information for the JSPOC Commander. At the same time, we need to invest in the appropriate command and control equipment to allow the JSPOC Commander to fulfill his mission of supporting USSTRATCOM and the other Regional and Functional Combatant Commanders. Additionally, we must continue to foster collaborative data sharing with our allies and their systems to enhance global coverage.*

**What programs and policies, in your view, should be changed or added to ensure adequate space situational awareness?**

*I think as a government, we should examine the potential utility of a code of conduct or "rules of the road" for the space domain, thus providing a common understanding of acceptable or unacceptable behavior within a medium shared by all nations.*

**In 2002, the Executive Agent for Space was established and the responsibility for space programs was consolidated under the Executive Agent, the Undersecretary of the Air Force. This consolidation was later undone, and today the responsibility for space program management is spread among three positions.**

**What are your views on how military and national security space should and could be integrated?**

*In the area of operational planning and execution, I believe it is an imperative that military and national security space be integrated. USSTRATCOM created the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) to ensure a more focused global command and control of Department of Defense (DoD) space operations. Their and the NRO's efforts to better integrate the JSpOC and NRO operations center and to share data are key to the successful conduct of space operations in any future conflict.*

**In your view, what role should the National Security Space Office play in integrating military and national security space?**

*My view is that the NSSO should assess existing National Security Space acquisition strategies, plans and programs in order to advise National Security Space decision-makers on matters affecting the acquisition of National Security Space capabilities.*

**In your view, should the role of the National Security Space Office be modified or expanded in any way?**

*Given the changes in various authorities in the department over the past year, I believe NSSO roles and functions should be re-examined by the Executive Agent for Space.*

### **Cruise Missile Defense**

**In your view, how serious is the vulnerability of our nation and deployed military forces to the cruise missile threat?**

*Cruise missiles represent a credible threat to the Homeland, deployed forces and allies. The preponderance of the cruise missiles under development can carry nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads and sub-munitions. Thus, prudent defense planning, active defense design, and command and control are required to mitigate the threat.*

**What role do you believe U. S. Strategic Command should play in the cruise missile defense of our nation?**

*The USSTRATCOM role in the cruise missile defense of our nation should align with our current mission to integrate global missile defense. By leveraging the Command's unique ballistic missile defense advocacy and requirements role, similar*



*cruise missile defense capability requirements could be smoothly integrated into existing processes.*

## **Nuclear Deterrence**

**Do you believe that there is a minimum number of strategic nuclear weapons needed to sustain a viable deterrent posture?**

*In today's world and for the foreseeable future, yes. The size and composition of our nuclear forces should be determined by taking into account a broad range of political-military considerations, of which deterrence is but one factor. I fully support the President's commitment to reduce the nuclear stockpile to the lowest level possible consistent with our national security needs.*

**In your view, is there a relationship between U.S. nuclear deterrence policy and nonproliferation policy? If so, please describe the relationship.**

*Yes, I believe there is a relationship. A credible U.S. nuclear deterrent, in concert with treaty and alliance structures, assures allies that the U.S. will deter, prevent, or limit damage to them from adversary attacks. This removes incentives for many of them to develop and deploy their own nuclear forces thereby encouraging nonproliferation.*

**There has been much discussion in the press and elsewhere about the need for a new discussion on nuclear weapons policy. Former Senator Sam Nunn, and former Secretaries of State George Shultz and Henry Kissinger, and former Secretary of Defense William Perry, in a joint editorial in January, 2007, called for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. If confirmed as Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, you would be involved in such discussions and in shaping the next U.S. Nuclear Posture Review.**

**In your view, what are the key questions on which future analyses of U.S. nuclear policy should focus?**

*U.S. nuclear weapons policy is the purview of the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will provide a Combatant Commander's insights regarding the nuclear capability requirements necessary to perform the missions assigned to U.S. nuclear forces under my command by the Secretary of Defense. Some of the key questions I would think should be examined for any future analyses include: Are nuclear weapons still key to the National Security interests of the U.S. and USSTRATCOM's specific strategic deterrence mission? If not, what alternative capabilities exist or should be fielded to meet those needs? If so, what levels of force do we need to sustain and how should we proceed to properly organize, train and equip them for the future?*

## **Reliable Replacement Warhead**

**The proposal for a Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) included in the fiscal year 2008 budget request seeks authority for an early phase in the nuclear weapons development process. Three of the relevant congressional committees have recommended that the RRW proceed with phase 2A development only, the fourth committee recommended no funding for the RRW. Work in phase 2A would, if eventually approved and funded, begin to provide some understanding as to whether RRW could meet the goals established.**

**One of the goals is that it would be deployed without nuclear weapons testing. Do you support this goal?**

*Yes.*

**One of the goals is that it would enable additional reductions to the overall stockpile. Do you support this goal?**

*Yes.*

**One of the goals is that it would increase the safety and security of the weapons themselves. Do you support this goal?**

*Yes.*

## **Hard and Deeply Buried Targets**

**In your view, how adequate are current efforts to address hard and deeply buried targets?**

*In my current position, I am not well enough informed as to the adequacy of current efforts. If confirmed, I will examine our current efforts. That said, it is clear that potential adversaries protect their most highly valued assets in hardened and deeply buried facilities. Deterrence requires that we possess a full spectrum of capabilities to hold these highly valued assets at risk, whether kinetically or non-kinetically. I support ongoing efforts to deliver the robust suite of intelligence, planning and strike capabilities necessary to enable full dimensional defeat of these facilities and the high value assets they protect.*

**If confirmed, would you support or recommend steps to improve the management or coordination of development efforts to hold at risk hard and deeply buried targets?**

*If confirmed, I would fully support an integrated examination of the suite of capabilities necessary to enable full dimensional defeat of these facilities and the high value assets they protect. I believe an integrated approach would better direct*

*development efforts across the broad spectrum of potential military solutions – kinetic and non-kinetic.*

**Do you support development of new or modified nuclear weapons to hold at risk hard or deeply buried targets?**

*The Department of Defense must first define the capability required to hold such targets at risk and then evaluate all potential material and non-material solutions to engage them. I do not believe nuclear weapons should be eliminated from consideration as a possible solution.*

### **Arms Control**

**In the last several years, the United States ratified the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty with Russia and withdrew from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.**

**What is your view of the significance of strategic arms control agreements in the current environment?**

*I believe agreements must be verifiable to the satisfaction of the signatories or they are of little value. Also, we need to keep in mind that as weapons technologies proliferate around the world, predicting which nations will come to possess advanced weaponry is becoming increasingly difficult. In light of this, I think we should ensure that future treaties are constructed to allow us to protect our national interests in an evolving international environment.*

**If confirmed, what arms control initiatives, or other forms of cooperative initiatives related to armaments, if any, would you recommend?**

*Arms control initiatives are in the purview of the policy makers in the Department of State, DoD and National Security Council. In order to provide my best military advice to those bodies, I would first review our current arms control programs to better understand where we are today and what we might do better with new initiatives.*

**In your view, should the U.S. continue to abide by a moratorium on nuclear weapons testing?**

*Given my current understanding of the health and readiness of our forces, I would say yes for now. If confirmed, this is an area that I will delve further into to better understand plans for sustaining the health and readiness of our systems and work closely with the Department of Energy, the National Nuclear Security Administration and our National Laboratories.*

**In your view, what elements of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) would be beneficial to retain if the treaty is allowed to expire in 2009?**

*It is my understanding that official U.S. negotiating representatives are now discussing with their Russian counterparts an agreement that would continue selected transparency and confidence building measures that would continue to benefit both nations, and that these elements would build on the openness both nations have demonstrated in our mutual willingness to convince each other of our sincerity to limit our strategic nuclear systems.*

### **Global Strike**

**Are you satisfied with service efforts to provide appropriate weapon systems and platforms to support the U. S. Strategic Command global strike mission, including conventional, prompt global strike?**

*Speaking from an Air Force perspective, I feel we are headed down a path to develop the technologies that would enable our participation in this mission. If confirmed, I will look across all Services efforts and work closely with them to fill this capability need.*

**What strike weapon systems and platforms do you believe are most important in this regard?**

*The Air Force-led Prompt Global Strike Analysis of Alternatives will be complete in the spring of 2008. This analysis is exploring military concepts proposed by the Services and industry to identify the concepts best suited to close the prompt global strike capability gap. I look forward to seeing the results of this analysis.*

### **Stockpile Stewardship Program**

**What is your view of how well the Stockpile Stewardship Program is proceeding towards its goal of being able to continuously assess and annually certify the U. S. enduring nuclear weapons stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable, without the need for underground nuclear testing?**

*I do not have a view at this time. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the National Nuclear Security Administration to better understand details of their Stockpile Stewardship Program.*

**In your opinion, what are the biggest challenges for the Stockpile Stewardship Program?**

*I have not formed an opinion on the challenges of the Stockpile Stewardship Program. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the National Nuclear Security Administration to understand their specific challenges.*

**Military-to-Military Cooperation Programs**

**The U.S. Strategic Command has a long history of conducting military-to-military exchanges and discussions with its counterparts in Russia.**

**If confirmed, would you continue or expand this dialogue?**

*I would work to expand this dialogue.*

**Would you expand your military-to-military programs to include other countries, such as China?**

*Yes. That would be my advice to the Secretary of Defense.*

**Strategic Forces and Missions**

**During the Cold War, the primary mission for strategic forces was to deter the Soviet Union from using its nuclear weapons and, more broadly, to contribute to U.S. efforts to contain the Soviet Union. Strategic forces were therefore synonymous with nuclear forces. This isn't the case today, as the wide-ranging missions assigned to U.S. Strategic Command make clear.**

**What, in your view, is the primary mission for U.S. Strategic Forces today and in the future?**

*As your question implies, our strategic forces are no longer synonymous with our nuclear forces alone. Consistent with the missions assigned to USSTRATCOM, I see our strategic forces as including our Global Strike forces (nuclear and conventional), space forces, cyber and information operations forces, global Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance forces, and ballistic defense forces.*

*These forces serve to deter, dissuade and if necessary defeat adversary attacks on the U.S. or its allies.*

**Should we think differently about the use of strategic forces today?**

*Yes, because the scope of those forces and their contributions to our security have expanded significantly since the Cold War.*

**Given the mission for strategic forces, as you define it, what capabilities are still needed to carry out that mission?**

*We require survivable, responsive Global Strike forces that are second to none, space forces that ensure we have assured access to space and the space capabilities that enable all U.S. military forces to fight and win when and where necessary, cyber and information operations forces that can protect our nation's access to cyberspace and can deny potential adversaries the ability to asymmetrically undermine our military capabilities; global Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance forces that can provide our military forces information about any adversary necessary to deter or defeat them at acceptable cost; and integrated ballistic missile defense forces that help dissuade potential adversaries from acquiring ballistic missiles, deter adversaries from launching ballistic missile attacks on the U.S. or its allies, and limit the damage adversary ballistic missile attacks can inflict.*

### **Nuclear Weapons Security and Handling**

**If confirmed, will you commit to working with the Nuclear Weapons Council to undertake a review of nuclear security and handling practices and procedures?**

*Yes.*

### **Congressional Oversight**

**In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.**

**Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?**

*Yes.*

**Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power?**

*Yes.*

**Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as Commander, U. S. Strategic Command?**

*Yes.*

**Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?**

*Yes.*

**Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?**

*Yes.*