

Advance Questions for Michael Bruce Donley
Nominee for the Position of Secretary of the U. S. Air Force

Defense Reforms

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the services and the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and education and in the execution of military operations.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

I strongly supported these reforms from my early days on the Senate Armed Services Committee staff through my service at the National Security Council where I fought for their enactment in what eventually became the Goldwater-Nichols Act. If confirmed, I will be mindful of the need to periodically review organizational and management frameworks to ensure their continued validity and consistency with the provisions of Goldwater-Nichols. I will work closely with the Secretary of Defense and the Congress to continually review Goldwater-Nichols and implement any changes that may be needed.

If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

I have no suggested modifications at this time.

Do you believe that the role of the service chiefs under the Goldwater-Nichols legislation is appropriate and the policies and processes in existence allow that role to be fulfilled?

I do believe that the roles of the service chiefs under Goldwater-Nichols are appropriate and the policies and processes in existence allow that role to be fulfilled.

Do you see a need for any change in those roles, with regard to the resource allocation process or otherwise?

I do not see a need to modify the roles of the service chiefs under Goldwater-Nichols, particularly as that regards the resource allocation process.

Relationships

Section 8013 of title 10, United States Code, discusses the responsibilities and authority of the Secretary of the Air Force. Other sections of law and traditional practice, also establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Secretary of the Air Force to the following officials:

A. The Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of Defense is responsible for all matters within the Department of Defense. The Secretary of the Air Force is subject to the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed I look forward to working closely with the Secretary of Defense.

B. The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense assists the Secretary of Defense in carrying out his duties and responsibilities and performs those duties assigned by the Secretary of Defense or by law. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Deputy Secretary of Defense on all matters.

C. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD, AT&L) is DoD's most senior acquisition official. If confirmed, I look forward to working with this official on all matters related to acquisition, technology and logistics programs impacting the Department of the Air Force.

D. Chief of Staff of the Air Force

The Chief of Staff of the Air Force is subject to the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of the Air Force, presides over the Air Staff, and is a principal advisor to the Secretary. In addition, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff he is a military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. There is no more important relationship within the Air Force than that between the Secretary and the Chief of Staff. If confirmed, I would foster a close working relationship with the Chief of Staff to ensure that policies and resources are appropriate to meet the needs of the Air Force and respect his additional responsibilities as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

E. The Under Secretary of the Air Force

The Under Secretary of the Air is authorized, subject to the Secretary of the Air Force's direction and control, to act for and with the authority of the Secretary of the Air Force on all matters for which the Secretary is responsible; that is to conduct the affairs of the Department of the Air Force. In addition, the Under Secretary of the Air Force has duties and responsibilities, when delegated by the Secretary of the Air Force, as the Department of Defense Executive Agent for Space.

F. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Chairman through the Chief of Staff of the Air Force on all joint matters affecting the Air Force.

G. The Combatant Commanders

I will work with the Chief of Staff to ensure that the Air Force is properly organized, trained and equipped to provide the capabilities the combatant commanders need to execute their missions. This goal can be achieved through forthright dialogue which I will encourage.

H. The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition

The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition acts as the Senior Acquisition Executive for the Air Force. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Assistant Secretary on acquisition matters. I will also ensure that military views are well represented in the Air Force acquisition process and that the Chief of Staff is fully informed on acquisition matters.

I. The General Counsel of the Air Force

The General Counsel is the chief legal officer and chief ethics official of the Department of the Air Force and serves as the senior legal advisor to Air Force leaders. She is responsible, on behalf of the Secretary of the Air Force, for the effective and efficient provision of legal services in the Air Force. If confirmed, I would look forward to developing a good working relationship with the General Counsel.

J. The Judge Advocate General of the Air Force

The Judge Advocate General (TJAG), per 10 USC §8037, is the legal advisor of the Secretary of the Air Force and of all officers and agencies of the Department of the Air Force. He is also responsible for directing judge advocates in the performance of their duties. If confirmed I will

endeavor to maintain the close working relationship the Secretary of the Air Force has historically enjoyed with the Judge Advocate General.

K. The Superintendent of the U. S. Air Force Academy

The United States Air Force Academy is an invaluable institution that continues to attract the brightest young women and men from across the United States. The Academy functions as a separate Field Operating Agency reporting through the Chief of Staff to the Secretary of the Air Force. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Superintendent to address issues faced by the Academy and to promote the Academy's sustained commitment to excellence and fulfillment of its mission to train and educate future Air Force leaders.

L. The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office

Under current organizational relationships, the Undersecretary of the Air Force is no longer dual-hatted as the Director, NRO. However, a strong collaborative relationship between the Air Force and the NRO remains essential to facilitate continuing Air Force technical and personnel support for the NRO's mission. If confirmed, I will work to foster a close working relationship with the Director, NRO.

M. The Director of National Intelligence

It is also vital that a strong collaborative working relationship exist between the Air Force and the Director of National Intelligence. If confirmed, I will work with the Director of National Intelligence to foster that relationship, particularly in coordination of national security space matters.

Duties

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Secretary of the Air Force?

Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. Section 8013 and subject to the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force is responsible for and has the authority necessary to conduct all affairs of the Department of the Air Force. These functions include organizing, supplying, equipping, training, maintaining and administering the Air Force. The Secretary of the Air Force is also performing the duties of the DoD Executive Agent for Space in the absence of an Under Secretary to whom these duties had previously been delegated.

Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect that the Secretary of Defense would prescribe for you?

If confirmed as the Secretary of the Air Force, I would expect the Secretary of Defense to assign me duties consistent with the responsibilities outlined above.

Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Secretary of the Air Force?

Title 10 provides for two staffs in the same headquarters, a predominantly military Air Staff and a predominantly civilian Secretariat. My intention is that these two staffs will function effectively together as a single headquarters team supporting the needs of both the Chief of Staff and the Secretary, while protecting the Chief of Staff's independent advisory role as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I will foster close working relationships between the civilian and military staffs and work with them on matters within their areas of responsibility in order to more effectively lead and manage the Department of the Air Force.

Qualifications

What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?

If confirmed, I will bring 30 years of experience in the national security community. I have served on the professional staff of this committee, on the staff of the National Security Council, and held various leadership positions within the Department of Defense and the defense industry. Most recently, I served as Director of Administration and Management in the Office of the Secretary of Defense with broad responsibilities in the Pentagon and the National Capital Region. In 1993, I served as Acting Secretary of the Air Force for seven months, after serving four years as the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller).

Major Challenges and Problems

In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the Secretary of the Air Force?

The joint nomination of both a new Secretary and new Chief of Staff under the current circumstances is unprecedented. The immediate challenges are to restore confidence in the Air Force among those to whom we are responsible, build personal and institutional relationships with Congress and the national security community, and undertake actions to address the issues – such as re-establishing focus on the nuclear enterprise -- that brought us to this point.

Other key challenges include: Maintaining focus on support to current operations while also planning to meet potential future threats; maintaining aging fleets of aircraft while conducting recapitalization; migrating supplemental funding to the Air Force's base budget; rising operational costs, especially in personnel support, medical care, and fuel; meeting new mission requirements in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, space, and cyber domains; and preparing for transition to a new administration.

Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

Working with the Chief of Staff and the Air Force leadership team, and OSD and the Joint Staff, I plan to address these issues within DoD's existing planning, programming, and budgeting cycles.

What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the Secretary of the Air Force?

The immediate challenge is to build trust and confidence in the Air Force leadership team.

If confirmed, what management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems?

I am a strong believer in the Air Force core values of Integrity First, Service Before Self, and Excellence in All We Do. If confirmed, I will work with the Air Force leadership team to define specific plans to meet these challenges that build on these core values and enable the Air Force to support Joint, Interagency, and Coalition operations when and where needed.

Priorities

If confirmed, what broad priorities will you establish?

As Acting Secretary since June 21st, following ADM Donald's report to the Secretary of Defense, I have directed preparation of a strategic roadmap within 90 days for rebuilding the Air Force nuclear enterprise and also set in motion a review of related accountability matters. In addition, I have directed a review of acquisition lessons learned from the GAO's sustainment of Boeing's protest on the KC-X program.

Going forward, my broad priorities will be consistent with those set by the Secretary of Defense for DoD as a whole--Prevail in Global War on Terror;

Strengthen Joint Warfighting Capabilities; Focus on People; and Transform Enterprise Management.

Readiness Levels

What is your assessment of the current readiness of the Air Force to execute its assigned missions?

I have not yet had time to make a fully informed assessment of current readiness.

What do you view as the major readiness challenges that will have to be addressed by the Air Force over the next five years, and, if confirmed, how will you approach these issues?

My initial impression is that we have a high operational tempo (OPSTEMPO), aging aircraft, personnel shortages, and several stressed career fields. I plan to review these matters during ongoing Air Force and DoD discussions on the FY10 program and budget.

Personnel and Health Benefit Costs

The cost of the Defense Health Program, like the cost of medical care nationwide, is escalating rapidly. Similarly, the cost of personnel as a key component of the Services' budgets has risen significantly in recent years.

If confirmed, how would you approach the issue of rising health care and personnel costs?

One of our top priorities is to take care of our Airmen and their families. As a retention force, quality of health care is of critical concern to our Airmen and any degradation of benefits or service risks hurting our recruiting and retention.

If confirmed, I will continue efforts from the past 10 years to streamline our organic medical infrastructure and take advantage of advancements in the field of medicine. I also understand that the Air Force is continuing to work with DoD and the other military services to streamline medical infrastructure; leveraging civilian trauma centers and other Service/Veterans Administration medical facilities to reduce the number of facilities/personnel required to reduce costs. We will continue to optimize the use of our assets and those of our partners to ensure the greatest return on our investments.

With regard to personnel costs, increasing pay and benefits, along with other efforts to recruit and retain our high quality Airmen, have resulted in increasing personnel costs. I believe that these benefits are appropriate, particularly in light of our high operational tempo. If confirmed I would expect to continue to budget for all authorized personnel pay and health care benefits in our President's Budget

submission. If necessary, these non-discretionary accounts will be paid first before deciding on programmatic funding levels.

Support for Wounded Airmen

Wounded airmen from Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom deserve the highest priority from the Air Force for support services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, successful transition from active duty if required, and continuing support beyond retirement or discharge.

What policies and practices does the Air Force have in place to deal with severely wounded and injured airmen?

The Air Force runs two main programs that work together for our Wounded Airmen and their families: the Survivor Assistance Program and the Wounded Warrior Program. The Survivor Assistance Program tracks the wounded Airman from the time of injury and arranges for a sister unit to assign a Family Liaison Officer (or FLO) at each en-route stop and treatment location. The FLO serves as the personal representative of the member's commander, a bond between the Air Force and the family members, and a link to the array of Air Force assistance and support services. FLOs play an important role in taking care of the needs of the wounded Airman: keeping their families informed, arranging to reunite family members with the wounded at the earliest opportunity, and providing whatever assistance the wounded or families need for lodging, transportation, or administrative chores.

Our first priority is to retain those seriously wounded Airmen who want to remain a part of the active duty force. We may do this by offering a limited duty assignment to the Airman, or through retraining opportunities into a career field for which the Airman is otherwise qualified. Our combat wounded Airmen have a wealth of experience to offer and I strongly support the retention of these heroes in our Air Force.

Wounded Airmen may elect to accept a medical retirement, or due to the severity of their injuries, may not be able to remain on active duty. In these cases, our Wounded Warrior program will step in to offer a host of services, including employment assistance, financial counseling, and to serve as an advocate with numerous federal, state, and private organizations. We owe our Airmen who have made tremendous sacrifices for our country every ounce of support we can provide to ensure they have an opportunity to lead a fulfilling life despite their severe injuries.

How does the Air Force provide follow-on assistance to wounded personnel who have separated from active service? How effective are those programs?

The Air Force Wounded Warrior program provides follow-up for a minimum of 5 years to those Airmen who have separated as a result of their wounds. This support includes regular contact with the wounded member, a variety of services including resume writing, job placement assistance, serving as a liaison with the Veterans Administration, and a host of other services based on the needs of the Airman and family. The personalized service provided seems very effective, and if confirmed, I will keep my fingers on the pulse of the program by giving it a fresh look on a regular basis and personally visiting Air Force Wounded Warriors.

If confirmed, are there additional strategies and resources that you would pursue to increase the Air Force's support for wounded personnel, and to support their progress in returning to duty or to civilian life?

The joint DoD-DVA Senior Oversight Committee has laid the groundwork for added improvements to the wounded warrior program for all of the Services. If confirmed, I'd like to see these improvements implemented expeditiously and plan for the Air Force to be both a leader and a partner with our sister services in making this happen. Support of the families of our wounded is a fundamental responsibility where we as a country cannot fail. For example, families who provide non-medical attendant care for a loved one, in many cases, do so at the expense of their job and that lost income is crucial to the financial well-being of the family. This is the type of situation where we must do better and is one of the many areas being addressed by the SOC. If confirmed, I will look forward to working with our sister services to continue improving programs and policies that serve our wounded Airmen and their families.

Surge Capability for Behavioral Health Services

The Army Mental Health Advisory Team's reports, which look at the mental well-being and morale of Army soldiers deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan each year, have stated that soldiers on their third or fourth deployments were at high risk for mental health problems. In addition, reports have stated that deployment length was related to higher rates of mental health problems. In light of the fact that many Army units have endured multiple deployments, it is anticipated that there will be a sharp increase in the need for behavioral health services to help returning service members and their families cope with reintegration into a non-combat environment.

If confirmed, will you assess the sufficiency of Air Force behavioral health assets to support the Army on a temporary basis during these surge periods when Army combat teams return from their deployments and provide such support to the extent that Air Force assets are sufficient to do so?

If confirmed, I would want the Air Force to extend our support of the Army by assessing the mental health needs of deployed and returning personnel and assist

in determining how best to utilize all available resources to support those needs, to the maximum extent that our assets would allow. Roughly 40 percent of deployed Air Force mental health personnel currently support joint missions.

Post-Deployment Health Concerns

The health-related problems experienced after Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm led to the Department, at Congressional direction, undertaking extensive efforts to establish a comprehensive health database on deployed forces based on pre- and post-deployment health surveys.

If confirmed, what actions would you expect to take to ensure that the Air Force uses available data on the health of returning airmen to ensure that appropriate treatment is available and that all signs of deployment-related illnesses or potential illnesses (including post-traumatic stress disorder and traumatic brain injury) are identified and documented in health records?

The health and well-being of our Airmen are the cornerstone of our mission readiness. We aggressively assess, track and manage physical and mental readiness upon accession; during yearly health assessments; prior to deployments; immediately following deployments; and again 90-180 days post-deployment. Each assessment provides an opportunity for Airmen to discuss any and all health concerns with their healthcare provider. Traumatic brain injury, post-traumatic stress disorder and other combat related health concerns are assessed during these health assessments. If confirmed, I would expect to continue these practices.

Medical Personnel Shortages

The military medical and dental corps of all three services are facing unprecedented challenges in the recruitment and retention of medical and dental personnel needed to support DOD's medical mission.

What steps would you take, if confirmed, to address recruitment and retention challenges in the Air Force Medical Services including the Air Force Reserve?

In response to the challenging recruiting & retention environment for health professionals, the AF stood up the Recruiting & Retention Investment Strategy Council (RRISC). The RRISC is chartered to review, integrate and approve policies and strategies that drive recruiting and retention programs and funding requirements and to approve the prioritization of programming inputs to the AF Corporate Structure for those programs. The initial focus has been on critically manned health professionals, specifically defining the optimal investment strategy for the Dental Corps and select AFSCs of the Medical Corps. If confirmed, I

would expect to continue this approach and to seek others that will assist in recruiting and retention of medical professionals.

Are you confident that the Department has sufficient tools to achieve goals for recruitment and retention of highly skilled health care personnel? If not, what additional tools should be considered?

I do not have a fully formed opinion on this question, but will consider those tools best suited to this challenge, such as accessions bonuses for fully qualified healthcare providers and an increase in medical and dental scholarships.

Battlefield Airmen

Operations in Iraq have required Air Force personnel to provide direct support to ground forces, including participation in convoy duty. The training provided to deployed airmen who may be required to defend a convoy and installations against insurgents must be sufficient to prepare them for combat.

What non-traditional roles and missions can the Air Force assume to assist the ground forces?

Currently 93% of Airmen who perform In-Lieu-Of (ILO) duties do so within their core-competency in 34 distinct skill sets. These include civil affairs, public affairs/legal/chaplain, Intel/counter-intel, medical, communications, logistics, civil engineers, and security forces. Some Airmen (7% of ILO) form Ad Hoc teams and provide individual skills that no service is organized, trained or equipped to perform. By continually assessing and modifying ILO training to meet the ever-changing threat, we ensure Airmen have the most current skill sets necessary to perform their assigned mission. If confirmed, I will expect the Air Force to aggressively assess ways that we can continue to support the ground forces.

What training is being provided to airmen who are assigned to, or who volunteer to perform, convoy duty or other duties requiring proficiency in small arms or crew served weapons?

Airmen that perform convoy duty attend Basic Combat Convoy Course (BC3) training at Camp Bullis, TX. Other ILO Airmen attend training at various Army Power Projection Platforms tailored to their specific mission. Additionally, Second Air Force established a Training and Equipment Review Board (TERB) to

monitor and modify training to meet the gaining commander's needs and ensure ILO Airmen can operate and survive in their deployed environment.

What is your assessment of the sufficiency of the training currently being given to Aerospace Expeditionary Force airmen deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan?

I have not yet had the opportunity to address this issue but, if confirmed, would expect to do so in advance of AEF rotations scheduled for later this year.

Air Force End Strength

The Secretary of Defense recently announced he would halt the reduction in Air Force active-duty end strength, and keep the active Air Force at 330,000. For fiscal year 2008, Congress authorized an active-duty Air Force end strength of 329,563 and for fiscal year 2009, the Department requested, and budgeted for, an active-duty end strength of 316,600.

How does the Air Force plan to fund the extra end strength?

In the near term, the Air Force is halting the previously planned drawdown. By stopping the drawdown in FY08, force shaping initiatives, such as Voluntary Separation Pay, will not be needed in FY09 as originally budgeted. The Air Force will apply those funds to cover costs associated with FY09 manpower increases. The long term manpower increases supporting on-going, new and emerging missions are being addressed in the FY10 POM.

Does the Air Force plan to formally request Congress to authorize an active-duty Air Force end strength of 330,000 for fiscal year 2009, or does it plan to rely on its authority to suspend end strength limitations in time of war or national emergency?

I understand the Air Force included in its FY 09 Unfunded Priority List to Congress a request for funding end strength at 330K in FY 09. If funded, then the Air Force expects to receive authorization. If not funded, then the Air Force will consider exercising its authority to suspend end strength limitations in time of war.

Does the Air Force plan to identify and formally request reprogramming authority to pay for the end strength of 330,000?

The Air Force is committed to resource the manpower within FY09 funding. While a reprogramming cannot be ruled out completely, right now we do not believe it will be necessary.

Are there any increases to the Air Force Reserve or Air Guard planned in addition to the increases in the active component?

Yes, there is a commensurate increase to Air Force Reserve end-strength planned. Both Reserve and Regular staffs are working to ensure we are adding back the correct mix of part-time and full-time reservists

There are currently no plans to increase Air National Guard (ANG) end strength. As part of their planned reductions under PBD 720, the ANG elected to accept budget offsets versus manpower reductions. While this offered a temporary solution to funding their portion of PBD 720, the budgetary offsets will have direct impact to their overall declining readiness. We intend to seek solutions through either reimbursement or through the use of associate constructs to maximize the capability of all components.

Your predecessor said earlier this year that the reductions in end strength, even to 316,600, were not enough to allow the Air Force to realize its recapitalization goals.

How does keeping Air Force active end strength at 330,000 impact recapitalization?

The Air Force initiated a manpower drawdown from 360,000 to 316,000 in an effort to free up funding to self finance the recapitalization effort.

Looking at ongoing missions and the expected growth in new mission areas, the Air Force realized it needed to stop the drawdown at 330K.

The drawdown halt will keep us at 330K, but the content of people/skill sets within the 330K will need to be shaped in order to meet evolving mission requirements. We are looking to utilize Defense Department's revised fiscal guidance for the FYDP beginning in FY10, to help sustain 330K and minimize the impact our recapitalization efforts.

Transformation of the National Guard and Reserves

Legislative proposals introduced in 2008, and recommendations by the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves submitted on March 1, 2007, and January 31, 2008, are currently under consideration.

How do you assess the proposed changes in the roles and mission of the National Guard and the National Guard Bureau?

I supported the broad intent of this legislation to better connect the National Guard Bureau with DoD and joint leadership, while maintaining necessary connectivity with the Army and Air Force.

Do you think the Air Force processes for planning, programming, and budgeting sufficiently address the requirements of the National Guard? What is the appropriate role for the Chief of the National Guard Bureau in this regard?

Yes. The Director of the Air National Guard has been, and will remain, a valued, active participant in Air Force Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) processes. The Air National Guard is a full participant in the Total Force approach to our missions, and its requirements accommodate our planning, programming and budgeting.

The Chief National Guard Bureau participates in Joint Staff capability-based planning and assessments, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System and DoD PPBE process deliberations and actions pertaining to National Guard capabilities, including but not limited to homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities.

If confirmed, how would you ensure that the resourcing needs of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve are fully considered and resourced through the Air Force Budget?

If confirmed, I will ensure that the Chief of the Air Force Reserve and the Director of the Air National Guard maintain their highly influential roles within the corporate structure of the Air Force, and that the Chief, National Guard Bureau remains well-connected to Air Force resourcing decisions. Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard advisors are fully integrated throughout the entire structure of the Air Force and actively participate in resourcing discussions. I would expect this to continue.

What is your view of the appropriate role of the National Guard Bureau in relation to the military departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

If confirmed as the Secretary of the Air Force, I will look forward to working with the Chief, National Guard Bureau in executing the new National Guard Bureau Charter. The Air Force will maintain connectivity to joint matters involving the National Guard Bureau through established Joint Staff processes.

Reserve Deployment and Mobilization

In recent years, reserve force management policies and systems have been characterized as “inefficient and rigid” and insufficiently integrated with active-

duty units and personnel, and readiness levels have been adversely affected by equipment stay-behind, cross-leveling, and reset policies.

What are your views on the optimal role for the Air Force Reserve and Air Guard in meeting combat missions?

I believe the Air Force is the model for melding Guard, Reserve and civilians with its active duty elements through a Total Force philosophy in essentially all Air Force mission areas. To meet the needs of the nation, we continue to develop concepts, force management policies and practices, capitalizing on legal authorities to access sufficient Air Reserve Component forces. The Air Force seamlessly provides the Joint warfighter right, ready, and trained Active, Reserve or Guard forces *today*, with little to no additional training required to support this nation in times of war or national emergency and at such other times as national security requires. The Air Force is actively updating our Air Expeditionary total force generation construct in line with the Secretary of Defense's current force utilization policies.

What is your opinion about the sufficiency of current Reserve force management policies?

I have not yet had the opportunity to form an opinion on this matter.

Do you support assigning any support missions exclusively to the Reserve?

In general, I do not support assigning support missions exclusively to the reserve forces. We need to retain flexibility to provide the right mix of Active, Guard and Reserve forces, at the right time, to meet the wide ranging, and changing needs of the Combatant Commanders. The few Air Force missions that currently are solely Reserve missions, such as WC-130 weather mission at Keesler AFB (the "Hurricane Hunters") and the Modular Airborne Fire Fighting System (MAFFS) C-130s, have a very small footprint and are not required all the time, which has made them excellent missions for the Air Force Reserve.

Sexual Assault Prevention and Response

The Department of the Air Force has implemented changes in policy and procedures aimed at preventing and responding appropriately to incidents of sexual assault.

What is your view of the responsibility of senior military and civilian leaders in the Secretariat and the Air Force staff in overseeing the implementation of policies relating to sexual assault?

Senior Air Force leaders, including the Chief and me, form the leadership team that must set the tone for the rest of the institution: sexual assault is criminal behavior that cannot and will not be tolerated. I am aware of Commander focused programs in place to address prevention/education efforts, a robust victim response program (Sexual Assault Response Coordinators (SARCs) & victim advocates). There is a strong emphasis on accountability at all levels.

Responsibility lies with me and all of our senior leaders to ensure that we have sound policies and that they are resourced and implemented effectively. If confirmed, I will continue to work with Congress and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to ensure that we monitor implementation and respond effectively.

Family Support

In your view, does the Air Force have adequate programs in place to ensure support for active and reserve component families, particularly those who live great distances from military installations?

The Air Force has world-class programs, but I understand resources continue to be a challenge. For example, we have expanded our efforts to provide child care options close to home for dispersed members located far from military installations: people like Air Guard, Air Reserve, recruiters, Reserve Officer Training Corps instructors, Military Entrance Processing Station personnel and others on independent duty assignments.

If confirmed, what additional steps would you take to enhance family support to airmen?

Family support and child care are important components of quality of life. They are top priorities for our Airman and their families, and ultimately support personnel retention and a motivated, experienced workforce. If confirmed, I would continue to support these programs, particularly those which support the total force and families of deployed personnel.

Morale, Welfare, and Recreation

Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs are critical to enhancement of military life for members and their families, especially in light of frequent and lengthy deployments. These programs must be relevant and attractive to all eligible users, including active-duty and reserve personnel and retirees.

What challenges do you foresee in sustaining Air Force MWR programs and, if confirmed, what improvements would you seek to achieve?

I understand that competing requirements to modernize our weapon systems have forced commanders at all levels to make some hard decisions on funding for MWR and other Quality of Life programs, with cutbacks in fitness, food service, child care, libraries, and other areas. However, I have not had the opportunity to review this issue. If confirmed, I will revisit the status of these programs to ensure we strike the right balance in resource allocation between support for equipment and support to people.

General Officer Management Issues

Incidents of misconduct or substandard performance and findings of inspectors general and other command-directed investigations are documented in various ways in each of the services. Procedures for including and forwarding adverse and alleged adverse information in connection with the promotion selection process are set forth in title 10, United States Code and in DOD Instruction 1320.4.

How is the Air Force ensuring compliance with requirements of law and regulation regarding the review of adverse information?

The Air Force is required by law and DOD policy to present all adverse information of a credible nature to general officer promotion and federal recognition boards. Upon receipt of the names of officers meeting a general officer promotion or federal recognition board, SAF/IG initiates a review of Air Force, DOD, and other government investigative files for potential adverse information. If substantiated adverse information is uncovered that does not already exist in the officer's selection record, a summary of the adverse information, plus any written comments from the officer, are placed in a senior officer unfavorable information file and attached to the officer's selection record. If the officer is selected for promotion or federal recognition, this file stays with the officer's nomination package through its coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the White House, and the Senate. If unfavorable information is discovered about an officer after selection for promotion or federal recognition, that information will be presented to a promotion review board. The promotion review board will consider the adverse information and make a recommendation to the Secretary of the Air Force whether to continue to support the officer for appointment to the next higher grade. If the Secretary continues to support the officer, the information will be added to the nomination package.

What standards and procedures are in place in the Air Force to ensure that allegations of adverse information relating to a nominee for promotion are

brought to the attention of the Department and the Committee in a timely manner?

The Air Force has rigid procedures in place to ensure any adverse or potential adverse information is presented with the nomination packages. Prior to the promotion selection board the Air Force conducts an initial screening for adverse information as outlined in the response to the question immediately above. The Air Force performs additional such checks following the selection board, and every 60 days throughout the nomination process.

For 1- and 2-stars, if there is substantiated adverse information, the selection board will review the information as part of the process and that information will be included in the nomination package. If allegations or adverse information arise after the board is complete the Air Force typically will separate the individual's name from the list until the investigation is complete and if necessary, until command action is complete, and then convene a promotion review board to determine if the individual should continue to be a nominee for promotion to the next higher grade. The Air Force always includes substantiated adverse information with its nomination packages through OSD to the Senate.

For 3- and 4-star nominations, substantiated adverse information is included in the nomination packages and the Air Force performs adverse information checks every 60 days throughout the nomination process from OSD to the Senate.

Management and Development of the Senior Executive Service (SES)

The transformation of the Armed Forces has brought with it an increasing realization of the importance of efficient and forward thinking management of senior executives.

What is your vision for the management and development of the Air Force's senior executive workforce, especially in the critically important areas of acquisition, financial management, and the scientific and technical fields?

The Air Force has implemented a corporate approach to overall management of the senior executive corps, which facilitates recruitment, development, compensation, and succession planning for about 280 senior civilian leaders. I subscribe to this approach.

Senior leaders are matched to developmental opportunities based on gaps in training related to their current responsibilities or their ability to meet future corporate requirements identified in succession plans. The methodology focuses limited resources on those individuals who demonstrate potential to assume higher levels of responsibility.

Do you believe that the Air Force has the number of senior executives it needs, with the proper skills to manage the Department in the future?

While I believe our current executive workforce is highly competent and effective, today's emerging missions may drive the need for additional executive resources.

The Air Force has several emerging missions requiring previously unforeseen civilian leadership assignments across numerous functional areas. Additional SES allocations will be necessary to provide support to the Combatant Commands and Joint Staff or to back-fill positions previously filled by General Officers when the uniformed officer is needed in a uniquely military assignment.

Over the last three fiscal years, the Air Force has requested significantly higher numbers of additional allocations, while also ensuring that existing allocations were consistently filled.

National Security Personnel System

What are your views on the strengths and weaknesses of the implementation of the National Security Personnel System (NSPS) within the Department thus far?

I understand that the Air Force has successfully completed implementation of NSPS for nearly all eligible, no bargaining unit, Title 5 employees (approx 39,000 employees or 32% of total AF civilian workforce). By law, the AF Research Laboratory cannot convert to NSPS before October 1, 2011. Title 5 employees of the Air National Guard are planned to convert with the rest of the National Guard. We will not convert Bargaining unit General Schedule (GS) employees until DoD gives us the green-light. The Air Force's network of NSPS champions at major command and base levels, robust training program for employees and supervisors, and practice conversions, have ensured a smooth transition.

From my recent experience outside the Air Force, the strengths of NSPS are in its pay for performance features and the increased communication between managers and employees. Weaknesses relate mostly to the extra efforts required to learn a new personnel system, including introduction of new electronic tools and implementation of a new annual cycle.

What do you believe will be the benefits of NSPS when implemented, and what steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure both a smooth transition and effective employee support?

The key benefit of NSPS is increased communication between employees and their supervisors on goals, objectives, and expectations. If confirmed, I will continue to emphasize the importance of communication, accountability, and the link between performance and pay and mission accomplishment.

Senior Military and Civilian Accountability

While representative of a small number of individuals, revelations of abuses of rank and authority by senior military and civilian leaders and failures to perform to accepted standards are frequently reported. Victims of such abuses often report that they felt that no one would pay attention to or believe their complaints. Accusations of unduly lenient treatment of senior officers and senior officials against whom accusations have been substantiated are also frequently heard.

What are your views regarding the appropriate standard of accountability for senior civilian and military leaders of the Department?

Accountability is an essential element of a well-disciplined force. Leadership requires accountability and our senior leaders must be ready and willing to accept responsibility for things that happen on their watches. An organization that fails to hold its senior leaders accountable for failures to perform to accepted standards or for misusing their authority sends the wrong message to our Air Force personnel and to the public. It is important that all Air Force personnel feel comfortable in exercising their obligation to bring issues forward—this is a basic element of an ethical culture.

If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that senior leaders of the Air Force are held accountable for their actions and performance?

If confirmed as the Secretary of the Air Force, I will take all appropriate steps to ensure timely accountability of individuals at all levels within the Air Force for their actions and their performance, including senior leaders as warranted. I will make the fullest use of the various tools available to me both to ascertain the facts and to deal effectively with problems that are identified. All accountability actions will be executed in strict adherence to fairness and due process as provided by law and regulation.

Acquisition Issues

Major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) in the Air Force and the other military services continue to be subject to funding and requirements instability.

Do you believe that instability in funding and requirements drives up program costs and leads to delays in the fielding of major weapon systems?

Yes. Funding instability can drive up costs but cost growth is also a consequence of changing requirements, relying on immature technologies when committing to new programs or underestimating the amount of systems engineering work that will be required (the integration/test/trouble-shoot/fix/retest loop). The Department has learned how important it is to carefully vet weapon system requirements and eliminate "requirements creep" to minimize cost growth.

What steps, if any, do you believe the Air Force should take to address funding and requirements instability?

I believe that programs perform better both for cost and schedule when programmatic risk is reduced through overarching systems engineering, the use of mature technologies proven in a realistic operational environment, and programs are funded to high-confidence cost estimates. It is also critical to establish and hold constant the performance requirements once they are validated and approved. I understand the Air Force has also implemented senior level configuration steering boards, as directed by USD(AT&L), to balance emerging requirements with funding during program execution.

The Government Accountability Office has reported that the use of insufficiently mature technologies has resulted in significant cost and schedule growth in the MDAPs of the Air Force and the other military departments. Section 2366a of title 10, U.S. Code, requires the Milestone Decision Authority for an MDAP to certify that critical technologies have reached an appropriate level of maturity before Milestone B approval.

Do you believe that the use of insufficiently mature technologies drives up program costs and leads to delays in the fielding of major weapon systems?

Yes, working to mature technology at the same time it is being integrated with other technologies in a development effort is a significant contributor to increased program cost and schedule delays.

What steps will you take, if confirmed, to make sure that the Air Force complies with the requirements of section 2366a?

If confirmed, I will ensure that all Air Force MDAPs for which I am the Milestone Decision Authority are in compliance with the law before giving Milestone B approval. For those MDAP programs where I am not the Milestone Decision Authority, I will ensure they are in compliance with the law before they go forward to their Milestone Decision Authority for a Milestone B approval. I

will also ensure the Air Force has incorporated this requirement into our acquisition policy.

The Government Accountability Office has reported that the use of unrealistically optimistic cost and schedule estimates by the Air Force and the other military departments is a major contributor to cost growth and program failure.

Do you believe that the use of unrealistically optimistic cost and schedule estimates leads to program disruptions that drive up program costs and delay the fielding of major weapon systems?

Yes, using unrealistically optimistic cost and schedule estimates can lead to cost, schedule and performance baselines that are unexecutable and potentially lead to Nunn-McCurdy breaches.

What steps do you believe the Air Force should take to ensure that cost and schedule estimates are fair and independent and provide a sound basis for Air Force programs?

The Air Force has taken several steps to ensure better cost and schedule estimates, from higher confidence levels for cost estimates to in-depth Air Force Review Boards to review program schedules and acquisition strategies. If I am confirmed, we will continue to review these processes and make adjustments to ensure sound estimates and to fund programs at the appropriate confidence level.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics has issued a memorandum directing the military departments to institute new “Configuration Steering Boards” to review and approve new requirements that could add significantly to the costs of major systems.

Do you support this requirement?

Yes, I support this requirement.

What steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that the Air Force complies with this new requirement?

The Air Force has already instituted Configuration Steering Boards in compliance with the policy and, if confirmed, I will ensure that these boards continue so that all programs are reviewed on a regular basis.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics has also issued a memorandum directing that the largest DOD acquisition programs undergo competitive prototyping to ensure technological maturity, reduce technical

risk, validate designs, cost estimates, evaluate manufacturing processes, and refine requirements.

Do you support this requirement?

USD(AT&L) has implemented a competitive prototyping philosophy which I support for all appropriate acquisitions; but in some instances, such as large, complex satellite acquisitions, the cost to carry two vendors may be prohibitive. While we cannot typically afford to prototype a complete space system with all competitors, we do prove the critical technologies in their relevant performance environment before we enter full scale development.

What steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that the Air Force complies with this new requirement?

The level of prototyping varies with each program. For commercially derived items, the basic article is already in use and the prototyping should focus on the risk areas associated with military adaptation. For new development items, risk areas should certainly be prototyped, but the entire system may have to be prototyped before selecting the winning vendor. If confirmed, I will work with OSD through the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) to clearly set prototyping guidance as we tailor acquisition strategies for each program.

Numerous acquisition reviews over the last decade have identified shortcomings and gaps in the acquisition workforce of the Department of Defense. Section 852 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 establishes an Acquisition Workforce Development Fund to provide the resources needed to begin rebuilding the Department's corps of acquisition professionals.

Do you believe that a properly sized workforce of appropriately trained acquisition professionals is essential if the Air Force is going to get good value for the expenditure of public resources?

Yes, it is absolutely essential that we have a properly sized and trained acquisition work force. If confirmed, I will expect the Department to use this recent legislation to enhance our ability to attract, recruit, develop and retain qualified personnel.

What steps do you expect to take, if confirmed, to ensure that the Air Force makes appropriate use of the funds made available pursuant to section 852?

I understand the Air Force is working closely with USD (AT&L) on numerous initiatives enabled by Section 852, "Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund," which provides funding for recruiting, training, and retention. I also understand there is pending legislation in both Senate and House authorization

bills to provide expedited hiring authority for the Defense Acquisition Workforce, which would improve our ability to hire and retain the right people.

Five years ago, Air Force leadership failed to follow acquisition statutes and regulations and ensure good stewardship of taxpayer funds in the proposed tanker lease. Last month, the Department of Defense Inspector General released a report indicating that senior Air Force leaders had improperly influenced the award of a contract to a company managed by individuals with close personal ties to the Air Force leadership. Last week, the Government Accountability Office recommended that a new contract to replace the Air Force's tanker fleet be set aside because of serious errors in the evaluation process.

Do you believe that there are serious problems in the Air Force acquisition system?

The three examples provided each involve different circumstances. In the first two cases where criminal or improper behavior – or even the appearance of such behavior, was involved the individuals have been sanctioned and held accountable. We need to constantly reiterate the importance of adherence to the core values of the Air Force and individual accountability. This applies not only to the acquisition process but to all other areas of Air Force operations.

In its recent decision on KC-X, the GAO validated the Air Force's decisions in roughly 100 areas but, importantly, found problems in eight areas that caused them to sustain Boeing's protest. While I do not believe the Air Force acquisition is fatally flawed, GAO's findings are troubling. They indicate the need for changes that will ensure we are better prepared in the future to more fully document the details of source selections such that Air Force decisions will successfully withstand protests and thereby restore confidence in the acquisition process.

What steps do you believe the Air Force should take to address such problems and restore the confidence of Congress and the public in Air Force acquisition?

I have directed the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) to identify the lessons learned from the recent GAO decision on KC-X, and previous decisions in which protests were sustained, and outline a near-term plan for improvement that will strengthen the major program and source selection decisions pending for later this year. I also plan two 90-day reviews of the Air Force acquisition process, one internal and one external, to recommend opportunities for longer-term improvement.

Contract Management

By some estimates, the Department of Defense now spends more money every year for the acquisition of services than it does for the acquisition of products, including major weapon systems. Yet, the Department places far less emphasis on staffing, training, and managing the acquisition of services than it does on the acquisition of products.

What steps, if any, do you believe the Air Force should take to improve the staffing, training, and management of its acquisition of services?

I understand the Air Force has established a credentialing system for individuals who award and manage services contracts so that their authority to manage larger programs is based on their track record of success with smaller programs. In addition, the Air Force is working with the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) to enhance training courses and opportunities for non-traditional acquisition parties often involved in the acquisition of services.

Do you agree that the Air Force should develop processes and systems to provide managers with access to information needed to conduct comprehensive spending analyses of services contracts on an ongoing basis?

The Air Force currently uses the Federal Procurement Data System - Next Generation (FPDS-NG) to pull data for spending analysis. I am advised that, while not perfect, we can get sufficient insight into our spending rates to do some strategic decision making and that the Air Force is improving its abilities to do so.

The last decade has seen a proliferation of new types of government-wide contracts and multi-agency contracts. The Department of Defense is by far the largest ordering agency under these contracts, accounting for 85 percent of the dollars awarded under one of the largest programs. The DOD Inspector General and others have identified a long series of problems with interagency contracts, including lack of acquisition planning, inadequate competition, excessive use of time and materials contracts, improper use of expired funds, inappropriate expenditures, and failure to monitor contractor performance.

What steps, if any, do you believe the Air Force should take to ensure that its use of interagency contracts complies with applicable DOD requirements and is in the best interests of the Department?

In August 2007, The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management) and the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) issued a guide entitled "Air Force Purchases Using Military Interdepartmental Purchase Requests (MIPRs)." The guide applies to all purchases to non-DoD agencies using interagency contracts and agreements. I am advised that this guide implements DoD policies directed in response to audit findings and is closely aligned with the Office of Federal Procurement Policy guide on interagency acquisitions published in June 2008.

Air Force Acquisition System Flaws

Over the last four years, the GAO protests have resulted in the reversal of a number of significant Air Force contract award decisions, including award decisions on the KC-X tanker replacement contract; the Combat Search and Rescue Helicopter Replacement Program (CSAR-X) contract; the C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) contract; the Small-Diameter Bomb contract; the Thunderbird video contract; and a contract for F-15 training simulators.

In your remarks at the July 9, 2008, DOD press briefing with Secretary's Gates and Young on the Department's path forward on the KC-X contract you concluded "that the underlying Air Force acquisition system is not somehow fatally flawed."

Do you believe that there are significant problems in the Air Force acquisition system today?

In its recent decision on KC-X, the GAO validated the Air Force's decisions in roughly 100 areas but, importantly, found problems in eight areas that caused them to sustain Boeing's protest. While I do not believe the Air Force acquisition is fatally flawed, GAO's findings are troubling. They indicate the need for changes that will ensure we are better prepared in the future to more fully document the details of source selections such that Air Force decisions will successfully withstand protests and thereby restore confidence in the acquisition process.

If so, what are those problems and how would you propose to address them?

I have directed the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) to identify the lessons learned from the recent GAO decision on KC-X, and previous decisions in which protests were sustained, and outline a near-term plan for improvement that will strengthen the major program and source selection decisions pending for later this year. I also plan two 90-day reviews of the Air Force acquisition process, one internal and one external, to recommend opportunities for longer-term improvement.

If not, why do you believe that the Air Force has been the subject of so many adverse bid protest decisions?

Although I believe that the AF acquisition system is not fatally flawed, I agree there are opportunities for improvement. Major weapon systems contracts require complex, in-depth evaluations across many functional areas. The Air Force is continuing to examine processes and factors to ensure fair evaluations of these highly complex proposals that protect the interests of both the warfighter and the taxpayer. Because of the consolidation of the defense industrial base, especially

in the aerospace sector, major contracts can be make-or-break events for the remaining companies, which I believe is a factor in explaining an increase in the number of protests.

Actions of Air Force Officials

Over the last several years, senior Air Force officials are alleged to have advocated the funding of a number of programs that were not included in the President's budget and for which there was no currently validated joint requirement. These programs include the procurement of additional C-17s, the continuation of the C-130J multi-year contract, and the multiyear procurement of additional F-22 aircraft . Senior Air Force officials are also alleged to have advocated a legislative proposal that would overturn a decision of the base realignment and closure commission relative to Joint Basing.

What is your view of the propriety of efforts by senior Air Force officials to advocate the funding of programs that are not included in the President's budget and for which there is no currently validated joint requirement?

There are established processes for informing Congress of the Air Force's funding needs and priorities. I believe it is inappropriate for Air Force officials to step outside of those procedures to advocate for funding of items that are not included in the President's budget and especially in cases where there is no validated joint requirement.

If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to curb such efforts?

As Acting Secretary I have made my views on this subject known to the staff and have had private conversations with individuals where necessary. If confirmed as Secretary of the Air Force, I intend to use established procedures for advocating program funding and priorities. In addition, I will reinforce with Air Force Legislative Liaison and Appropriations Liaison personnel those procedures for responding to Congressional requests for information, and providing professional military advice, in a manner consistent with DoD decisions reflected in the President's Budget.

Defense Budgeting

On January 27, 2008, the Washington Post reported on internal Air Force briefing slides which included statements that: "the Air Force is targeting the other services"; the "Budget Battle" is a "Zero Sum Gain" and a "Non-Permissive Environment"; and "some services are going to win and some are going to lose".

What is your view of these briefing slides and the views that they appear to be intended to communicate?

Competition for resources is as old as Washington itself. While I am not familiar with the details of these slides or the context in which they were presented, they seem a bit 'over the top' and not helpful.

Pilot Program on Commercial Fee-For-Service Air Refueling

Section 1081 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 requires the Air Force to establish a pilot program to assess the feasibility and advisability of using commercial fee-for-service air refueling tankers for Air Force operations.

What is the status of implementation of the pilot program, and, if confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that the program meets the elements set forth in section 1081?

I understand that there was no FY08 appropriation to accompany the FY08 National Defense Authorization Act direction, so the Air Force is working on reprogramming funds for the program in FY08-09. The Air Force has already released a Request for Information and had dialogue with industry for concept refinement. A Request for Proposal is planned to be released in 1st Quarter FY09, after which the Air Force anticipates receiving proposals from interested/qualified offerors. The program requires industry commitment and investment to develop and certify a commercial boom-equipped aircraft. The Air Force must determine the feasibility of executing a program based on industry responses. If executed, we anticipate industry will require 18-24 months to accomplish boom design, modification, and integration. A minimum of an additional 6 months will be required for boom system operation, aircrew certification, and receiver qualification. Once complete, we can conduct the pilot program in FY12-16.

If confirmed, I will monitor progress on this plan to ensure we meet the pilot program objective.

Transformation

If confirmed as the Secretary of the Air Force, you would play an important role in the ongoing process of transforming the Air Force to meet new and emerging threats.

If confirmed, what would your goals be for Air Force transformation?

While I have begun to assess major Air Force challenges and priorities, I have not yet had the opportunity to assess past progress on, or future goals for, Air Force transformation.

In your opinion, does the Air Force POM have adequate resources identified to implement your transformation goals?

N/A

Unmanned Air Vehicles

In the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Congress set a goal that within ten years, one-third of U.S. military operational deep strike aircraft would be unmanned.

Do you support the ten-year goal established by Congress?

The rapid increase in research, development, and fielding of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) in multiple roles is without question among the most dramatic changes since I last served with the Air Force in 1993. Though I am not yet clear on where the Air Force currently stands in relation to the stated Congressional goal, the application of UASs in support of the GWOT and other current missions has clearly been a success; and continuing the development and fielding of unmanned aerial systems is a trend I fully support.

Do you believe the current level of investment in the various Unmanned Aerial Vehicle programs is sufficient to the program objectives and schedules of these programs and to comply with the ten year goal?

I am advised that the ten year goal set in 2001 is not yet achievable. However, the current POM is aggressively pursuing UASs in greater numbers than any previous POM submission with vehicles having greater capabilities in range, altitude and payload than their predecessors.

Thanks to Congress' supplemental funding, nearly 30 per cent of our strike capable platforms procured during FY08 were UASs, including MQ-1s and MQ-9s. The FY09 PB procurement reflects that over 50 per cent of the strike capable platforms requested were UASs. We anticipate the same percentage of manned versus unmanned procurement in FY10 for strike capable platforms.

If not, what recommendations would you make to comply with the statute?

I have not yet had time to review the status of currently planned investments in relation to the statutory goal.

Joint Basing

The 2005 base realignment and closure commission directed, at the request of the Department of Defense, the establishment of twelve joint bases. Nine of these recommendations involve the Air Force.

Does the Air Force support or oppose this joint basing effort?

The Air Force fully supports joint basing and is committed to making it a success.

Does the Air Force support joint basing in cases where the Air Force will not be the lead service for the joint base?

Yes. To accomplish this, we advocated for and in conjunction with the other Services and OSD, established installation support common output level standards. Our Airmen, Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, DoD Civilians and their families will benefit from efficient, consistent installation support services. Such standards will ensure the Air Force and our sister Services continue to provide all personnel with the level of installation support services they deserve.

If I am confirmed, we will work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and our sister Services to ensure all Joint Basing initiatives contribute to the DOD's ability to perform its mission.

What concerns, if any, does the Air Force have about establishing joint bases?

The Air Force remains committed to ensuring that all bases, Joint or otherwise, maintain their capability to perform their missions and provide the highest standards for all warfighters and their families. We want Joint Bases to be so efficient and effective that an assignment to a joint base would be a highlight for every Service member.

What effort is the Air Force making inside the Department of Defense, at both the senior and working group levels, to find solutions for these concerns?

The Air Force has a long and successful history of working toward common goals in a joint environment — joint basing will be no different. To guarantee success, each Joint Base should be required to provide a suitable setting to all of its assigned personnel, their families, and other customers within the local communities our bases support. To accomplish this, we have successfully advocated for the establishment of 265 common Joint Base quality of life standards that are the “highest standards” for all Services.

In your opinion, can the joint basing decision be carried out in a manner that will result in significant cost savings and will not adversely impact the Air Force?

I believe joint basing will likely result in greater efficiencies in installation management and can be carried out in a manner that will not adversely impact the Air Force.

Encroachment on Military Installations

Various Air Force Bases have encroachment issues, some of which are significant. These include population growth near military installations, environmental constraints on military training ranges, airspace restrictions to accommodate civilian airlines, and conflicts with civilian users over the use of radio frequency spectrum.

In your opinion, how serious are these problems for the Department of the Air Force?

I have not yet had the opportunity to address this issue, but recognize that encroachment can be a critical matter for the safety and effectiveness of flight operations, and that it also impacts community relations.

If confirmed, what policies or steps would you take to curtail the various encroachment issues?

If confirmed, what role do you expect to play in addressing these challenges?

If confirmed, I will support the policy initiative already underway to institutionalize operational sustainability across the Air Force. This naturally involves focused implementation and follow-up to adapt the initial policy and guidance to changing regional circumstances and new challenges.

Energy Conservation and Use of Alternate Fuels

In the past year, the Department of the Air Force has assumed a leadership role within the federal government for the advocacy, research, and testing of alternate fuels for use in military aircraft. In addition, the Air Force has encouraged proposals for the use of federal property to construct refineries and power plants to include nuclear power.

In your view, which energy alternatives offer the greatest potential for benefit to Air Force programs and operations?

I am still reviewing the Air Force energy program. In general, I support the program's three-part strategy of reducing energy demand and consumption, increasing supplies from alternative sources, and shaping the Air Force culture to increase energy awareness in all we do. I also support the focused effort to certify Air Force aircraft on a synthetic aviation fuel blend by 2011.

Do you support the goals adopted by the Air Force related to the increased use of alternate fuels?

I have not yet had an opportunity to assess the specific goals outlined in the Air Force energy program.

In your opinion, what constraints does the Air Force face in carrying out initiatives to reduce reliance on fossil fuels?

My initial assessment is that it would be difficult for the Air Force alone to economically convert to a synthetic fuel blend for aircraft without broader market forces for commercial aviation fuel in place to make this viable. In addition, the potential hosting of nuclear power sites on Air Force installations has broad policy implications extending well beyond the immediate responsibilities of the Air Force. In my opinion, moving beyond the level of technical and economic feasibility studies in both of these areas will require more comprehensive consultation and coordination within DoD, across the Executive Branch, and with Congress and industry.

Investment in Facilities

Air Force leaders have stated in testimony, "MILCON is an essential enabler of Air Force missions; however, due to fiscal constraints, we must reduce funding and accept greater risk in facilities and infrastructure in order to continue our efforts to recapitalize and modernize our aging aircraft and equipment."

In your opinion, at what point is the reduction of funding for facilities and infrastructure too much of a risk for the Air Force?

I understand that the Air Force has managed or mitigated risk by balancing limited resources among Facility Sustainment, Restoration & Modernization, and MILCON accounts. Taking manageable risk in infrastructure seems prudent given the Air Force's previous investment in infrastructure combined with its current investment in maintaining our facilities by increasing Facility Sustainment to 90% of the DoD requirements and increasing Restoration & Modernization (R&M) by \$160M compared to FY08. While these actions help to manage risk in the short run, higher levels of investment will likely be required to support new missions and capabilities as they enter the total force.

If confirmed, would you support goals established by the Department of Defense for certain levels of funding dedicated to the recapitalization and sustainment of facilities?

Yes. The Air Force supports the existing Department of Defense goal for Facility Sustainment by funding our program to at least 90% of the modeled requirement. If I am confirmed, I will support Facility Recapitalization efforts because installations provide a critical capability to the Air Force -- we fight from our bases, they are our Installation Weapon Systems.

What is your position on the use of public-private ventures to address critical deficiencies in family housing and utility infrastructure?

Congress provided the Services public-private venture authorities designed to attract private sector financing, expertise and innovation to improve the quality of life for our Airmen and their families; enable our utility infrastructure to meet current standards; and improve mission capability by leveraging existing real estate assets faster and more efficiently than traditional Military Construction and Operations and Maintenance processes would allow. Consistent with the conditions outlined by Congress, I would continue to take advantage of these powerful authorities because they enable us to obtain private capital to leverage government dollars, making efficient use of limited resources to build, renovate and operate our military housing and infrastructure.

Long Range Bombers

The B-1s, B-2s, and B-52s will begin to be retired in the 2030 time frame.

When do you believe that the United States needs to develop a new manned bomber?

The current bomber fleet (B-1, B-2 & B-52) is already being modernized through various sustainment, electronic warfare and communications initiatives in order to close emerging capability gaps and remain relevant through 2030.

Current air-launched weapons also face similar performance issues and the AF is committed to increasing the lethality of its Long Range Strike force through advanced weapons. While I understand the Air Force does not have a formal position on future status for the current inventory, it is developing a new generation of scalable weapons with improved accuracy, standoff, penetration, and stealth. Available in the near to mid-term, these weapons would help to mitigate the risks now evolving.

Based on the current projections, a Next Generation Bomber would achieve initial operational capability in 2018. This date is directed by the 2006 QDR based on the realization that the current bomber fleet has projected capability gaps in the anti-access environment for the 2015-2020 timeframe.

At a recent hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics indicated that the next generation long range bomber is already over budget and behind schedule.

Do you agree with this statement?

I have not yet had the opportunity to review this program in detail.

NRO and the Air Force

The responsibilities of the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) were once included in the responsibilities of the Under Secretary of the Air Force. Dual-hatting the Under Secretary ensured that there was close cooperation between the NRO and the Air Force.

What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that DOD space programs and NRO programs are managed in a coordinated fashion?

I understand that in June 2006 the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and the Director of the NRO implemented a Statement of Intent documenting the specific responsibilities and actions the AF and NRO will take to ensure our historical relationship remains strong, while continuing to effectively achieve mission success and meet user needs.

If confirmed, I will work with the Director of the NRO to ensure we coordinate efforts in areas of joint interest, such as development and acquisition, space command, control and operations, space launch, defensive space operations, and professional development of our personnel.

Operationally Responsive Space

The Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) Office stood up just about a year ago. One of the primary goals of the office is to provide military commanders with an ability to utilize small satellites to rapidly augment or reconstitute capabilities for such things as communications and surveillance.

If confirmed, would you support Operationally Responsive Space?

Yes, ORS was established to develop concepts for surge, augmentation and reconstitution. It is a vital element of our space protection strategy in the contested space environment and I understand is strongly supported by the commander of the United States Strategic Command.

Do you believe there are other opportunities for ORS including support to research and development?

It is my understanding that ORS is already providing the launches for Tactical Satellites (TacSats) being developed by the Scientific and Technology (S&T) community. ORS is also leveraging past research and development investments, as well as advancing specific technologies to support the development of enabling technologies for responsive satellite building, launch, on-orbit operations, and direct links to the warfighter. These activities will ultimately mature ORS into a national strategic capability able to rapidly develop and deploy smaller, single-purpose, shorter-lived platforms tailored to a specific warfighter need or to augment or reconstitute our core space capabilities.

Space Acquisition

Virtually all current space acquisition programs are suffering from cost overruns and schedule slips.

If confirmed, how would you propose to ensure that the space acquisition process is successfully revamped to deliver future systems within promised costs and schedules?

Ensuring future space systems are delivered within promised cost and schedule requires an intense focus on affordable and executable acquisition strategies, realistic cost estimates, stable requirements and funding, and sound systems engineering practices. Implementing policies which ensure continuity of program leadership, coupled with thorough upfront program planning, should create a balance between cost, schedule and performance that can be sustained throughout a program's life cycle.

Milestone decision authority for space programs currently resides with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. If confirmed will you seek to return this authority to the Air Force or are you comfortable with this authority residing with the Under Secretary?

I believe the Air Force should be taking steps internally to raise confidence in its ability to manage space programs and carry out its responsibilities as DoD Executive Agent for Space such that Milestone Decision Authority for space Major Defense Acquisition Programs would be returned to the Air Force at the earliest opportunity.

Executive Agent for Space

The Secretary of the Air Force has previously been designated as the Department of Defense Executive Agent for Space.

If confirmed will you retain this designation?

If confirmed, I intend to exercise all responsibilities and authorities assigned to this office, including those associated with the DoD Executive Agent for Space consistent with Department of Defense Directive 5101.2. This includes planning, programming and acquisition of space systems within DoD in concert with the Heads of DoD Components, and the USD(Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), USD(Policy) and USD(Intelligence).

Air Force Science and Technology

What metrics will you use to assess the effectiveness of the Air Force science and technology programs?

One of the best metrics to assess S&T effectiveness is to measure technology transition into developmental programs and, ultimately, into operational use. There is solid evidence that past investments in S&T have resulted in a significant number of technologies being incorporated into fielded systems, thereby, securing the Air Force's position as the premier air force in the world. To maintain this legacy of success into the future will depend on ensuring programs are in place to transition mature laboratory technologies into developing and fielded systems.

What metrics will you use to assess the effectiveness of the Air Force's basic research programs?

The very nature of basic research makes it difficult to determine effective measures of merit. However, indicators such as the number of referred journal publications, certificates of research merit, and other awards and publications can provide a general sense of how well the basic research program is laying the foundation for future military capabilities.

Do you believe the current balance between short- and long-term research is appropriate to meet current and future Air Force needs?

I have not yet had time to review details of the R&D program.

What metrics will you use to assess the adequacy of investment levels in Air Force science and technology programs?

The Air Force uses a number of different inputs to determine the adequacy of the total Science and Technology (S&T) investment beginning with overall National strategy followed by Guidance for the Development of the Force, the Air Force Strategic Plan, Advanced Air Force Planning Guidance, and guidance from the

Air Force S&T Executive. This entire determination process revolves around identifying capability gaps to determine what breakthrough technologies might be required in the future.

What role do investments in science and technology play in reducing costs and technical risk of acquisition programs?

The Science and Technology (S&T) Program is a key element in making demonstrated mature technologies available for transition into development programs. The Manufacturing Technology program is also a key to reducing costs and risks to acquisition programs. The S&T Program provides a strong foundation for reducing technical risk and costs.

Test and Evaluation

What are your views on the effectiveness of the Air Force's test and evaluation activities?

It is my understanding that Air Force test and evaluation activities are sufficient to support testing requirements and that the test and evaluation budget has been certified as adequate each year by OSD's Test Resource Management Center.

What are the major weaknesses and deficiencies with the Air Force test and evaluation enterprise in meeting current and emerging Air Force testing requirements?

The development of weapon systems with increased technical complexity and capabilities is challenging Air Force test and evaluation organizations to be technically innovative and resourceful. I understand that the T&E budget has been certified as adequate each year by OSD's Test Resource Management Center.

The Air Force has recently contemplated a number of steps to reorganize both development and operational test activities. Some of these proposals included significant government and contractor workforce reductions and potential closures of test assets.

If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that any reorganizations or closure of test assets or reductions in test workforce result in actual cost reductions and do not entail undue risk to Air Force or other DOD current or future acquisition programs?

If confirmed, I would expect the Air Force test and evaluation community, like other functional areas, to continually pursue efficiencies that add value to acquisition and promote needed test capabilities. Any proposals for significant

reorganizations or realignments would require thorough analysis and consultation with stakeholders and Congress.

I have recently reviewed a report prepared in response to Congressional guidance, assessing the potential realignment of functions between Edwards AFB and Eglin AFB. The report discusses the benefits of having test capabilities at both locations and concludes that previously planned realignments would not result in significant savings or benefits and therefore should not go forward.

What is your view of the role of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation and the Director of the Test Resource Management Center in ensuring that such reductions do not undermine the ability of the Air Force to carry out needed test programs?

The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation and the Director of the Test Resource Management Center are responsible to ensure our nation's test and evaluation infrastructure, processes, and workforce are adequate, responsive, and available to support the development of the technologically advanced weapon systems that our warfighters need.

The Air Force has some unique requirements with regard to prompt global reach and affordable, responsive space lift missions.

In your view, are changes in current test range structure, operations, and mission assurance parameters required to accommodate Air Force experimentation and small launch needs?

I have not yet had time to review this area.

Air Force Research Laboratories

What are the major challenges facing the Air Force Research Laboratory?

I recognize the value of Air Force labs and the technical expertise of that workforce as critical resources for the Air Force. However, I have not yet had time to review the current status of AFRL.

How do you plan to address these challenges?

NA

Are you supportive of efforts of the Air Force Research Laboratory to expand and enhance their unique laboratory personnel demonstration program to ensure that they can attract and retain the finest technical workforce?

I recognize and support the need to attract and retain the finest technical workforce, but have not had time to review this area.

Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)

The airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets developed and operated by the Air Force form an indispensable part of the Nation's overall intelligence architecture. These assets are often referred to as high demand, low density systems because of the extensive number of requirements and high operational tempo on their systems and crews.

In your view, does the Air Force have sufficient airborne ISR assets to meet current and projected requirements?

The Air Force is striving to meet current ISR demand by rapidly increasing actual numbers of ISR platforms, integrating non-traditional ISR means, and establishing mechanisms to improve analysis, processing, targeting, and systems to expand ISR dissemination. For example, I understand the Air Force is currently increasing combat air patrols (CAPs) of our unmanned airborne systems (UAS). Our JROC-approved UAS requirement is 21 CAPs, and we are already flying 26 today to meet the additional needs of the Combatant Commanders. We are also working to increase the number of CAPs to 31 by December 2008. Continued production will increase the density of these assets but demand will continue to be high. We will find ways to satisfy this demand both in capability terms and, importantly, execute the function in a manner that meets supported commander expectations.

What changes would you recommend, if confirmed, to current plans for the development and acquisition of airborne ISR platforms? Will these changes remove ISR platforms from the "high demand, low density" category?

I have no changes to recommend at this time. My initial impressions are that more widespread arming of UAVs recently considered as ISR platforms, along with the availability of sensors and targeting pods on new fighter/attack aircraft, are two trends further blurring functional lines between intelligence and operations. Both of these trends are positive and present opportunities; and as they are fully integrated, should increase operational capability and flexibility for the warfighter. At the same time, these trends will force questions about how air vehicles should be classified and where they should be assigned.

If confirmed, will you review the necessity for requiring rated pilots for the operation of ISR assets?

Yes.

AFRICOM

In the Committee-passed version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, the committee expressed concern that the Commander of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) lacks the necessary air support to execute effectively his mission in a continent comprised of 53 countries, spanning a geographic area larger than the United States, China, and Western Europe combined. The Commander of AFRICOM recently indicated before the Air Force Defense Strategy Seminar this shortage of aircraft remains.

If confirmed, what would you do to support AFRICOM, given the demand on existing assets within other geographic combatant command AORs?

My understanding is Gen Ward is satisfied with our proposed Air Force component support, but has expressed concern over airlift requirements for his command.

For component support, we are establishing and assigning a Numbered Air Force--17th Air Force--consisting of a two-star general, his staff, and a tailored air and space operations center to provide command and control capabilities. We are committed to declaring initial operational capability this fall.

The near term plan for airlift support to AFRICOM is not yet certain. In the absence of validated requirements, the Air Force submitted a \$30M O&M request in FY09. I understand there is a \$20M mark against that request and this will likely be a conference issue. If the request is not fully funded by the Congress, there will be some risk associated with the shortfall. General Ward is in a better position to describe the risk.

Our long-term plan for airlift is becoming clearer. TRANSCOM recently completed an airlift analysis for AFRICOM and recommended 2 key actions. First, TRANSCOM recommended we acquire or assign a C-37 and a C-40 to AFRICOM. Second, they recommended we allocate O&M funds for common user airlift requirements. I understand the Air Force plans to support those recommendations in its POM 10 submission and the Forces For Unified Commands Memorandum.

Nuclear Matters

Over the course of the last year substantial systemic problems have surfaced with the ability of the Air Force to manage all aspects of the nuclear weapons programs. These problems have generated several reports highlighting very serious

shortfalls and setting forth over one hundred recommendations to address the problems.

If confirmed, what would you do to identify the various problems and restore credibility to the ability of the Air Force to manage nuclear weapons and systems?

I believe most of the problems concerning the Air Force's stewardship of its nuclear enterprise have been identified and documented in both external and internal reports over the past few years. As outlined below, restoring Air Force credibility in our stewardship of the nuclear mission has been a high priority since my first day as Acting Secretary. I have reviewed the situation with four MAJCOM commanders who have nuclear-related missions, visited four bases, and spoken to Airmen regarding the need to recommit ourselves to high standards of excellence. In our approach to the nuclear mission, we should not be 'managing risk', but eliminating risk.

If confirmed, what would you do to review all of the recommendations that have been made by the various review teams to put these recommendations in place and then ensure that these recommendations do, in fact, fix and resolve the many problems?

Upon arrival as Acting Secretary, I set in motion a Nuclear Task Force to coordinate and synchronize the corrective actions underway across various MAJCOMs and prepare a strategic roadmap for improvement that fully recommits the Air Force to this critical mission. This roadmap will be comprehensive, covering all dimensions of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and inspection regimes. The roadmap will be prepared in coordination with other DoD components, including USSTRATCOM, and the Department of Energy; and will incorporate appropriate recommendations from the panel established under former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger. I expect to see a final version of this roadmap by the end of September.

Do you disagree with any of the recommendations, and if so, which ones and why?

While I am not personally tracking every recommendation from all the relevant reports, the Nuclear Task Force support staff is performing this function and MAJCOM commanders are leading implementation plans within their respective commands.

I understand that one of the recommendations from the Air Combat Command Commander Directed Investigation was not implemented because it would have

been in violation of current DoD security requirements and may have resulted in increased vulnerability to our nuclear security response posture.

I am advised that all other recommendations have either been implemented or are in the works at this time. The Air Force has much more work that needs to be done.

If confirmed, what specific actions will you take to assess, sustain and improve the professional development and experience base of Air Force personnel supporting nuclear systems and operations?

I expect to receive recommendations in this area from the Nuclear Task Force that will be included in our roadmap for the nuclear enterprise.

What specific resources do you believe are most urgently needed to restore the Air Force's stewardship of its nuclear mission?

We are currently evaluating the established unfunded requirements as well as the resourcing requirements resulting from the findings and recommendations of the Donald Report and the internal Air Force Inventory and Assessment Report. This work is in progress.

Meeting funding requirements, however, is just one aspect of rebuilding the Air Force nuclear enterprise. Daily mission success in this most vital mission area demands unwavering focus that results in rigid adherence to standards. Ensuring our great airmen have resources, policies, procedures, engaged leadership and strict accountability at all levels will restore credibility and confidence in Air Force stewardship of its nuclear mission. We are actively working all of these related areas to ensure success.

Nuclear Task Force

In a memorandum you sent as Acting Secretary on June 26, 2008, to the Air Force Chief of Staff and all major commands, you discussed rebuilding of the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise. You directed the establishment of a Nuclear Task Force to perform key functions including an organizational review to assess and recommend options for alternative assignments of responsibility and/or command arrangements. You have required the Task Force to submit a draft roadmap, including recommendations for organizational adjustments, in 60 days.

What are your expectations of the effect this Task Force will have on the Air Force's nuclear-related policies and procedures, logistics, sustainment, organization, and personnel force shaping?

The task force is a means to integrate related on-going efforts and ensure we have a comprehensive way ahead to rebuild the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise. This will necessarily include nuclear-related policies and procedures, logistics, sustainment, organization, and personnel force shaping.

When do you intend to provide this Committee with the results of this review?

I will provide the defense Committees with the results upon completion of this activity, which I expect to be early this fall.

Air Force Reorganizations

In recent years the Air Force has reorganized to create warfighting headquarters and to place maintenance squadrons under air combat wings. Both initiatives have been criticized as creating unnecessary bureaucracy and attempting to create more general officer or command billets than is necessary.

What is the status of the implementation of these initiatives?

I have not yet had the opportunity to review the status of the warfighting headquarters (WFHQ) implementation, which I understand is well underway.

Likewise, I have not had the opportunity to review the Global Wing maintenance initiative. Because this initiative was scheduled to be implemented beginning 1 July, as the recently arrived Acting Secretary, I put this initiative on hold for further review by the incoming leadership team.

What is your personal view of the merits and justification for these organizational changes?

NA

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Secretary of the Air Force?

Yes.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes.

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic communications, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes.