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SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
ON THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

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Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and Members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity. Since assuming the leadership of U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) in October 2007, I have appreciated many thoughtful exchanges with you and your staffs on our nation's security – in Washington, at our headquarters at Offutt Air Force Base, and at locations around the globe. USSTRATCOM remains a vital element of our national security structure. The Command appreciates your thoughtful interest and tremendous support for our team and in addressing America's security challenges.

Since my last testimony before you, the men and women of USSTRATCOM have made great progress advancing the Command's vision. Building on a unique mission set's natural synergies, we execute strategic deterrence, space, and cyberspace operations every day to achieve national and Command objectives. USSTRATCOM's unique global perspective, responsibilities, and relationships enable effective execution across all of our assigned missions, closing the seams between other combatant commanders and providing a clear and consolidated warfighter position on future requirements.

This year, 2009, will be especially noteworthy. America inaugurated its 44th President, the first in 40 years to assume office in a time of war. This Administration will undertake the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) in an era of largely irregular and persistent conflict. The recommendations made in these studies will shape America's deterrence and global warfighting capabilities far into the future. Today, I will provide an update on USSTRATCOM's progress, plans, and capability requirements, and seek your assistance in securing America's future together.

U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND

Several milestones define the Command's 2008 progress. Last February, a USSTRATCOM-led Joint Interagency Task Force, formed in partnership with the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and many other federal entities, eliminated the threat to human life posed by an uncontrollable satellite's

frozen hydrazine fuel. This team adapted quickly and with great professionalism to the emerging challenge, providing lessons learned that enhance mission partner relationships and information sharing. In the fall, the Secretary of Defense approved a new global deterrence plan, a significant step toward integrating deterrence activities across government agencies and with Allied partners. By enforcing common standards and discipline throughout the year, our work in the cyberspace domain continued to better secure military networks.

The USSTRATCOM team also strengthened the Command's exercise program to meet the demand for operational proficiency across our lines of operation. The new, comprehensive field training program engages all Command elements well beyond previous command-post-only style exercises. This approach allows us to test and assess our combat readiness, re-emphasize every function's unique importance to the overall mission, and demonstrate effectiveness to ourselves and the world.

As a steward of America's nuclear enterprise, USSTRATCOM remains committed to the highest standards of excellence, and, after a fresh look, our team made several internal adjustments in 2008. We created and filled a new General Officer position within the Directorate of Global Operations, providing a senior-level, full-time nuclear mission focus. We also established the Nuclear Enterprise Council (chaired by USSTRATCOM's Deputy Commander) and the Nuclear Enterprise Board (comprised of staff and components) which provide active nuclear policy, requirements, operations, and surety oversight within the command. Finally, we expanded the capacity of the Command's Inspector General Office, allowing for 100% oversight of every nuclear inspection with direct feedback to the USSTRATCOM Commander.

STRATEGIC CONTEXT

The hallmarks of today's complex global security environment include pressures from population changes, competition for increasingly scarce natural resources, economic struggles, and bids for regional and global power. The United States faces stark economic challenges at home, just as we witness similar struggles abroad. The past decade's complicated security landscape blurred the way we define regular, irregular, strategic, conventional, and unconventional operations and the capabilities required to address them. Perhaps more than any other force, technology underlies today's challenges and opportunities, enabling activities once thought impossible but now deemed commonplace. We bank online, obtain driving directions from cell phones, communicate around the world from our living rooms, fly Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) in Iraq from the U.S., and expect information to be delivered in an instant. In some ways, a few well placed computer keystrokes today can potentially match the impact of earlier generations' armed forces - for good or ill.

Strengths gained from America's space-based and cyberspace-enabled capabilities are truly amazing. We must remember, however, that asymmetric advantages carry asymmetric challenges - a particularly poignant consideration in this era of irregular and persistent conflict. Though we cannot rule out the need for capabilities to dominate a classic, force-on-force conflict (indeed, those capabilities are an integral part of our deterrent), in the near term it is unlikely that any state would choose such a course with the United States. Adversaries are increasingly more likely to seek indirect and irregular means to challenge our freedom of action and disrupt our way of life. Countering these threats requires an innovative, global approach, one for which USSTRATCOM is uniquely positioned.

STRATEGIC DETERRENCE

The Department of Defense's (DoD) 2009 Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review identifies deterrence as one of six core mission areas and defines deterrence operations as "integrated, systematic efforts to exercise decisive influence over adversaries' decision-making calculus in peacetime, crisis, and war." Deterrence today is not just Cold War deterrence, and we cannot address all of today's threats with only yesterday's tools. Effective, modern deterrence requires a complex global understanding and the elegant execution of coordinated, whole-of-government options to meet today's broad security challenges. In that role, USSTRATCOM supports DoD efforts to foster interagency relationships and synchronize government-wide deterrence activities. In fact, the Unified Command Plan assigns USSTRATCOM's first responsibility as detecting, deterring, and preventing attacks on the United States, its territories, possessions and bases, and employing appropriate force to defend the nation should deterrence fail. Deterrence depends on both the credible capability to impose costs or deny benefits and the expressed will to do so. America's civilian leadership represents the "will" of the people. USSTRATCOM's job is to ensure that our national leadership has credible capabilities available, and that adversaries and allies alike grasp their nature and our constant readiness to employ them.

The deterrence problem grows more intricate each year, but our bedrock capability remains a reliable, safe, and secure nuclear deterrent. The same land-based, airborne, and seaborne delivery platforms; nuclear command and control platforms; communications and warning satellite constellations; ground-based radars; laboratories and industrial base; intelligence capabilities; and warhead stockpile that have always underpinned the U.S. strategic deterrent enterprise remain just as vital today as in the past. Nuclear weapons endure, for now and the foreseeable future, as essential national security tools, deterring both nuclear aggression among nuclear

powers and large scale conventional conflict. As long as other states maintain nuclear arsenals, we must maintain a reliable, safe, and secure nuclear deterrent. Nuclear weapons' political significance makes their status as much about political objectives as military requirements, but if our capabilities are not seen as credible, our leadership's options become severely limited.

Within the nuclear enterprise, the U.S. stockpile – which today is indeed reliable, safe, and secure – requires the most urgent attention. Without action, our current weapons are not indefinitely sustainable. The weapons continue to age and decay in ways we may not sufficiently understand, and even though the Stockpile Stewardship Program's scientific advances have allowed us to retain an acceptable level of confidence, we risk a disruption in confidence from unanticipated technical changes in nuclear and non-nuclear components. We mitigate that risk today, along with risk from an inability to respond to strategic surprise, only by maintaining more weapons than we would otherwise need. This is clearly an unacceptable long-term approach. Similarly, today we do not need new or additional weapons, nor upgraded military capabilities, nor an effort to resume nuclear testing, but we do clearly need to fix our decaying stockpile. In other words, we need a concerted effort to assuage growing uncertainty and ensure a more reliable, safer, more secure, and sustainable long-term nuclear deterrent.

Nuclear weapon proliferation represents a serious global challenge, and USSTRATCOM supports efforts to combat the spread, transfer, or use of nuclear weapons wherever possible. In my opinion, a stockpile modernization strategy and nonproliferation efforts should be considered complementary, not mutually exclusive, means to the same safer world. Modernization could provide a unique opportunity to introduce enhanced safety and security features that would render our weapons undesirable terrorist targets. It can be argued that the effort also strengthens the confidence numerous allies derive from

our extended nuclear deterrent umbrella, allowing them to forgo indigenous nuclear programs. Should these allies (many of whom have the resources and technical ability to develop their own nuclear weapons) come to believe the United States is unwilling or unable to protect their interests through the full use of our assets, I believe global nuclear proliferation could increase, a clearly unacceptable prospect for U.S. or global security interests.

Unfortunately, some other states perceive nuclear weapons as a significant bargaining tool and deterrent to conventional intervention in their regional conflicts, and non-state actors pursue them as weapons of ultimate terror. We must use all of the tools at our disposal to ensure that nuclear capabilities do not spread. Maintaining a robust nuclear deterrent capability should be seen as an important nonproliferation tool for both deterring potential adversaries and reassuring allies.

I ask for your support to act and ensure a credible nuclear enterprise for as long as our nation requires it. We need reliable warning, command, control, and communication systems to enable and direct our forces; Service programs that sustain the long-term viability of our land-based, airborne, and sea-based delivery platforms; and the meaningful nuclear weapons work in our laboratories to attract and retain the human capital necessary to support the nuclear stockpile of the future. Additionally, the valuable Stockpile Stewardship Program deserves robust support. We should also consider using sustainable designs, employing less-exotic and better understood materials, restoring a responsive infrastructure, and introducing increased weapon reliability and key safety and security measures as ways to further increase our confidence in our arsenal over time.

Other USSTRATCOM capabilities also contribute to modern strategic deterrence. U.S. missile defense capabilities provide a critical deterrent against certain existing and potential threats, increase the cost of

adversaries' already expensive technologies, and reduce the value of their investments. To provide the President a better range of non-nuclear options against rapidly emerging threats, we also require a deployed, conventional prompt global strike capability to hold at risk targets in denied territory that can only be rapidly struck today with nuclear weapon platforms. Sustaining a viable missile defense and filling our prompt global strike capability gap remain essential to broader deterrence. We appreciate Congress' Fiscal Year 2008 and 2009 support and look forward to 2009 as an important development year, as we increase the available range of national leadership deterrence options.

Finally, our new strategic deterrence plan, approved by the Secretary of Defense last year, incorporates an interagency approach and acknowledges the need for a new understanding of the global context in which we live. Accordingly, the Command's Director of Intelligence moved to recapitalize our organic intelligence capability and established the Strategic Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIIOC). These actions, recommended by the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and applauded by the Secretary of Defense's Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management, will ensure appropriate intelligence support across our missions. Seeking new ways to understand our world, address national security challenges, and support combatant commanders' efforts to build global partnerships strengthens global security for America.

SPACE

Space assets, whether space or terrestrially based, provide the U.S. with vital communications, command and control, positioning, navigation, timing, surveillance & reconnaissance, environmental observation, warning, and launch capabilities. The greatest challenge facing our space assets today are all-too-often reactive planning, programming, and procurement processes best described collectively as "gap management." It is time for

this approach to end. Our historical experiences in space operations tell us that we will likely have a critical space capability launch or on-orbit failure in the future. We must posture ourselves to stay more than a single failure away from an unacceptable degradation in these national security capabilities.

Missile warning and satellite communications represent two such capabilities. Reliable and enduring strategic missile warning for U.S. leadership and forces is essential to defending our interests worldwide. Although Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites have provided assured, uninterrupted missile warning since 1970, this aging constellation is performing well past its intended lifetime. The DSP constellation's age and ongoing delays in follow-on programs place our missile warning capability at an unacceptable risk.

Similarly, to assure robust global satellite communications for our national leadership, nuclear forces, and combatant commanders, we will continue to need uninterrupted, survivable, and protected communications capabilities and more flexible, wideband assets to address bandwidth growth. I strongly urge continued support to protect against future failures or schedule slips and to provide effective satellite communications capabilities throughout the next decade.

We have begun to make progress in Space Situational Awareness (SSA), although February's unfortunate collision between an active communications satellite and an inactive Russian satellite highlights remaining SSA challenges. The U.S. space surveillance architecture detects and tracks thousands of objects, but critical gaps remain in an ability to fully characterize all on orbit objects, analyze and predict conjunctions, and protect not just military satellites but also the commercial satellites on which military operations rely. Working across the National Security Space Enterprise and with the Congress, we funded critical legacy SSA elements to

increase overall SSA capability. We must sustain the momentum gained through these investments and strive to close SSA gaps, bringing us ever closer to combining an operational picture of space with command and control systems and moving us from 'watching and reacting' to 'knowing and predicting' in the space domain.

An improved awareness of the entire operational space environment, including the ability to discriminate across natural and man-made threats, will establish the foundation for protecting the vital space capabilities of the United States and its friend and allies. Space Situational Awareness is also critical to ensuring our Nation's freedom of action in what is clearly a contested environment. With increasing concern about sustaining our constellations and the threats they face, space protection is increasingly important. The Air Force and NRO's development of a Space Protection Program last year represents an important step forward in this arena.

The U.S. must also continue to lead the community of space-faring nations in promoting spaceflight safety and encouraging responsible behavior. International space cooperation is essential to maintaining space as a free and accessible domain. I appreciated the opportunity to meet with many space-faring partners in 2008, including attending the Strategic Space and Defense Symposium in Omaha with delegations from the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. I also met with military space leaders from the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, and participated in a military space operations and security conference last spring in Paris, France. These engagements laid the groundwork for greater cooperation with our friends and Allies around the globe and with other leading spacefaring nations. Enhanced data sharing with our Allies is important to the future of Space Situational Awareness, as we build a common understanding of the space environment. Pursuing opportunities for mutual benefit through peaceful exploration, data sharing, and other endeavors strengthens alliances and national security with partners

who possess or are developing space technology and demonstrate the intent, will, and capacity for responsible space operations.

Finally, I remain concerned that our own civil and commercial space enterprise, which is essential to the military space industrial base, may be unnecessarily constrained by export control legislation and regulation. Clearly, legitimate national security concerns must continue to underlie the need to restrict the export of certain space-related technologies, equipment, and services. However, appropriate flexibility to permit relevant technology transfers to allies, or decontrol of some technologies in a timely fashion when commercial availability renders their control no longer necessary should be considered to help ensure our space industrial base for the future.

CYBERSPACE

Within DoD, USSTRATCOM is the global warfighter for cyberspace, charged with operating and defending the Global Information Grid (GIG), planning, and acting – when directed – to maintain our freedom of action in this domain. Cyberspace is a key front in today's irregular conflicts and is itself a warfighting domain upon which all others depend. In fact, irregular warfare manifests itself in cyberspace in ways not seen elsewhere, driven by actors ranging from the unsophisticated to the trained military hackers who can target industry, academia, government, and the air, land, maritime, and space domains. Consistent with the National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations, we have made progress toward defining requirements and advocating for Service cyberspace workforces. Still, addressing the cyber threat is no small challenge and demands a new mindset as we refine the culture in which we understand our responsibilities and grow our cyber expertise; shape the conduct we follow to organize and orient against threats; and improve the technical and manpower capabilities our Services and interagency partners bring to the cyberspace fight.

Cyberspace is a national challenge, further complicated, in many cases, by the physical location of the servers and constructs (organizational & administrative) developed for physical domains. All networks, regardless of their location, are at risk. Whether a network domain ends in .com, .edu, .org, .gov, or .mil makes no difference, as cyberspace intrusions can rapidly cross between military and civilian networks. Cyber threats demand new approaches to managing information, securing information systems, and ensuring our ability to operate through an attack. As we seek to mitigate the immense but unseen costs of cyber espionage, DoD personnel must always understand that every networked computer is on the front line. Everyone who logs on is a cyber defender first. There are no 'protected zones' or 'rear areas'; all are equally vulnerable. Future growth in intelligence, planning, and operations requirements emphasizes an increasing need to act and react at machine, not human, speeds.

USSTRATCOM's Joint Functional Component Command for Network Warfare (JFCC NW) and Joint Task Force for Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO) have added unprecedented rigor to meeting challenges within and beyond the cyber domain. For example, this team recently marshaled resources to mitigate capacity degradation stemming from breaks in undersea cables, restoring service with no significant operational impact. They have also implemented a more responsive command and control structure reliant on centralized orders and decentralized execution. This structure enables DoD-wide leadership to address computer security incidents and network compromises – enhancing timely threat identification and mitigation through unity of effort. Steps to secure the GIG also include enhanced internet access protections and improved instrumentation that give us greater visibility into and control of our diverse network configurations. Tightening the relationship between JFCC NW and JTF-GNO this past year has led to a better, more responsive capability to defend our military networks.

Within DoD, we continue to evaluate organizations, processes, and personnel to ensure agility in adapting to new challenges. USSTRATCOM is also working with the Services and leading a cyber Manning Integrated Process Team to determine cyber workforce composition and sourcing across DoD. The provisioning of adequate cyber forces to execute our assigned missions remains our greatest need in this mission area. Finally, we are also assessing joint doctrine to ensure that it addresses cyberspace operations and collaborative planning among the DoD, interagency, and allied partners.

GLOBAL SYNERGY

Beyond the three areas where we maintain day-to-day operational responsibilities, USSTRATCOM is also charged with synchronizing DoD planning and advocacy to support several joint mission areas. Taken most simply, we identify challenges and support solutions to issues that cross geographic combatant command borders and advocate for the right balance of effort toward achievement of theater and national objectives.

INTEGRATED MISSILE DEFENSE

The threat of WMD, coupled with ballistic missile proliferation, is a very real danger to the U.S., our deployed forces, and our Allies. We must continue the careful development of a missile defense capability that preserves our freedom of action at home and abroad. Regional and global ballistic missile threats will require sustained, focused attention and dedicated resources to ensure a balanced defensive capability portfolio.

This past year, the Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) efforts enhanced missile defense capabilities by increasing the redundancy and depth of the ballistic missile defense system. Additionally, successful tests in 2008 improved our confidence in the performance of existing capabilities. Close coordination between combatant commands and MDA enabled warfighters to train with and operate the ballistic missile defense system while continuing to support a robust test and evaluation program.

Through USSTRATCOM's maturing advocacy role and the Warfighter Involvement Process, warfighting combatant commanders, in particular U.S. Northern Command, influence MDA development decisions. MDA's program activities are also reviewed by the Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB), which meets quarterly and includes USSTRATCOM. I believe the MDEB provides effective oversight.

This year, USSTRATCOM's Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC IMD) developed a Global Integrated Missile Defense Concept of Operations in concert with the geographic combatant commanders. In the coming year, this effort should implement a collaborative planning framework to address present day threats with pre-planned rules of engagement and execution doctrine. JFCC IMD is also exploring mechanisms to increase interoperability with our allies' capabilities to enable better operational cooperation. Agile concepts of operation, integrated sensor suites, warning systems, and common battle management systems will help us to better address future threats.

COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

A key 2008 National Defense Strategy objective is to prevent adversaries from acquiring or using weapons of mass destruction. Our nation must prepare – across the collaborative whole of Federal, State, and Local governments – to deter, dissuade, detect, tag, track, intercept, and destroy WMD materials. Should the worst occur, we must also be ready to respond.

In the last year, several USSTRATCOM initiatives enhanced our nation's ability to combat weapons of mass destruction. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council validated our Joint Capabilities Document, prioritizing current combatant commander needs and providing a foundation for future capability development. We also facilitated the first Global Combating WMD Synchronization Conference, bringing stakeholders from across the government into a common forum to promote a unified approach and to clarify roles across

the combating WMD community of interest. We initiated a Capabilities Based Assessment to define requirements for DoD to support National Technical Nuclear Forensics, which should be complete in early 2009 and inform future advocacy efforts. The Joint Elimination Coordination Element, intended to form the core of a Joint Task Force for elimination, progressed toward full manning and supported multiple combatant command exercises, providing valuable planning capability. Finally, the SCC-WMD-managed Interagency Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Database of Responsibilities, Authorities, and Capabilities emerged this year as a key information reference resource, aiding planning, advocacy, and training exercises and assisting in providing transparency and synchronization across the federal government for assessment, planning, and response activities.

Congressional support for standoff detection of shielded nuclear materials sparked additional interest and investment in this high priority area, allowing the Defense Threat Reduction Agency to accelerate promising active interrogation technologies, as evidenced in a field demonstration last September. Intelligence linkages between USSTRATCOM and U.S. Special Operations Command – including a newly created cell for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment – should enhance predictive analytic capabilities, allowing us to act rather than react to threats. Finally, in support of the National Response Framework, our efforts this year with U.S. Northern Command, U.S. European Command, and other Allies will focus on mitigating the effects of an actual attack. The results of an evaluation across geographic combatant commanders' consequence management capabilities only amplified the need for additional experts and trained personnel to operate in contaminated areas.

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE (ISR)

USSTRATCOM, through our Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JFCC ISR), collaborated with

geographic and functional combatant commanders this past year and participated in planning, allocation, and assessment efforts to optimize global ISR utilization. An enterprise-wide management approach in 2008 enabled adequate support for surge operations in U.S. Central Command while mitigating risk to ISR support for other commands. Within the Secretary of Defense's ISR Task Force, USSTRATCOM also spearheaded efforts to highlight the vital link between collection systems and processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) capabilities, making progress to ensure that ISR collection and PED requirements are paired appropriately.

Operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and across all combatant commands continue to intensify global ISR demand. Modern technological advancements enable large volumes of intelligence data to flow to warfighters, analysts, and decision makers around the globe. While available ISR capabilities continue to increase, demand has risen even faster. Unmanned Aircraft Systems in particular have experienced explosive growth, but demand continues to outstrip existing capacity. Many intelligence requirements lie beyond the reach of our manned and unmanned terrestrial platforms and can only be met by space-based capabilities. We must continue to address these warfighter requirements and mitigate dangers to our forces as we begin the development of the next generation of space-based ISR. We will need an efficient, responsive ISR enterprise long into the future to employ available resources while modernizing key assets, synchronizing operations, integrating U.S. and Allied ISR capabilities, and meeting the challenges posed in the space and cyberspace domains.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Controlling the use of the electromagnetic spectrum and ensuring its availability to our forces and our Allies remains fundamentally important to all of our missions, other combatant commanders, and larger national security efforts. In the 21st century, an increasingly congested and contested

electromagnetic environment promises new challenges to maneuverability and operations through this increasingly limited resource. During the past year, we successfully completed a DoD-wide effort to identify and address joint electronic warfare capabilities and gaps. The Joint Information Operations Warfare Command's (JIOWC) Electronic Warfare Center is now conducting a Joint Staff directed study to identify and recommend viable solutions to identified gaps, ensuring our joint forces access to and freedom within the electromagnetic environment for the full spectrum of military operations. We have also made significant strides in ensuring well-coordinated and synchronized trans-regional information operations across the combatant commands, in an effort to better link actions toward achieving theater and national objectives.

CONCLUSION

America today faces unique national security challenges and equally unique leadership opportunities. In the face of an increasingly complex strategic environment, we must act to address the long-term safety, security, and reliability of our nuclear enterprise; the robust health of critical space-based capabilities; and the culture, conduct, technical capabilities, and manpower necessary to defend against 21st Century cyberspace threats. USSTRATCOM, as a warfighting combatant command with a global perspective, is uniquely positioned to execute and integrate these vital, global missions and to support national security activities around the world. In this uncertain world, your support is critical to enable USSTRATCOM's successful execution of its assigned missions. The men and women of U.S. Strategic Command are fully engaged and with your help will continue to provide global security for America.