“United States Objectives and,
Programs for National Security”
Paul H. Nitze
Report to the President,
Washington, D.C., April 7, 1950
FULL TEXT VERSION
This once-classified paper was a major milestone—perhaps the major milestone—in postwar US defense planning. Better known as “NSC-68,” it provided the intellectual basis for what became a vast military buildup to counter communist aggression.
President Truman had been shocked by the Berlin blockade and Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. In late 1949, he faced two more stunners—Soviet explosion of an atomic weapon and Mao Zedong’s communist conquest of China.
NSC-68’s purpose, said Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson, was to “bludgeon the mass mind” of government to respond. The author, Paul H. Nitze, was a Cold War legend (obituary, p. 17). He painted a grim picture of the threat and was vindicated on June 25, 1950, when communist forces attacked South Korea.
The Soviet Union is developing the military capacity to support its design for world domination. The Soviet Union actually possesses armed forces far in excess of those necessary to defend its national territory. These armed forces are probably not yet considered by the Soviet Union to be sufficient to initiate a war which would involve the United States. This excessive strength, coupled now with an atomic capability, provides the Soviet Union with great coercive power for use in time of peace in furtherance of its objectives and serves as a deterrent to the victims of its aggression from taking any action in opposition to its tactics which would risk war.
Should a major war occur in 1950, the Soviet Union and its satellites are considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be in a sufficiently advanced state of preparation immediately to undertake and carry out the following campaigns.
a. To overrun Western Europe, with the possible exception of the Iberian and Scandinavian Peninsulas; to drive toward the oil-bearing areas of the Near and Middle East; and to consolidate communist gains in the Far East;
b. To launch air attacks against the British Isles and air and sea attacks against the lines of communications of the Western powers in the Atlantic and the Pacific;
c. To attack selected targets with atomic weapons, now including the likelihood of such attacks against targets in Alaska, Canada, and the United States. Alternatively, this capability, coupled with other actions open to the Soviet Union, might deny the United Kingdom as an effective base of operations for allied forces. It also should be possible for the Soviet Union to prevent any allied “Normandy” type amphibious operations intended to force a re-entry into the continent of Europe.
After the Soviet Union completed its initial campaigns and consolidated its positions in the Western European area, it could simultaneously conduct:
a. Full-scale air and limited sea operations against the British Isles;
b. Invasions of the Iberian and Scandinavian Peninsulas;
c. Further operations in the Near and Middle East, continued air operations against the North American continent, and air and sea operations against Atlantic and Pacific lines of communication; and
d. Diversionary attacks in other areas. …
The Soviet Union now has aircraft able to deliver the atomic bomb. Our intelligence estimates assign to the Soviet Union an atomic bomber capability already in excess of that needed to deliver available bombs. We have at present no evaluated estimate regarding the Soviet accuracy of delivery on target. It is believed that the Soviets cannot deliver their bombs on target with a degree of accuracy comparable to ours, but a planning estimate might well place it at 40 to 60 percent of bombs sortied. For planning purposes, therefore, the date the Soviets possess an atomic stockpile of 200 bombs would be a critical date for the United States, for the delivery of 100 atomic bombs on targets in the United States would seriously damage this country.
At the time the Soviet Union has a substantial atomic stockpile, and if it is assumed that it will strike a strong surprise blow, and if it is assumed further that its atomic attacks will be met with no more effective defense opposition than the United States and its allies have programmed, results of those attacks could include:
a. Laying waste the British Isles and thus depriving the Western powers of their use as a base;
b. Destruction of the vital centers and of the communications of Western Europe, thus precluding effective defense by the Western powers; and
c. Delivering devastating attacks on certain vital centers of the United States and Canada.
The possession by the Soviet Union of a thermonuclear capability in addition to this substantial atomic stockpile would result in tremendously increased damage.