“The thrust of testimony from DoD witnesses is inconsistent with the published results of the Bottom-Up Review, as well as with the Air Force’s 1992 ‘Bomber Roadmap’ and recent detailed analyses carried out by major defense contractors, such as Boeing and Rockwell, by ‘think tanks,’ such as the Rand Corporation, and by respected independent analysts.
“DoD has not revealed its own detailed analyses supporting its decisions to sharply reduce the bomber force structure. Nor has it attempted to refute any of the studies noted above, all of which call for substantially larger bomber forces. . . . Results of several of the independent studies show that a heavy bomber force reduced to the size and composition that DoD proposes to fund would be inadequate to prevent major losses in the opening phases of a two-MRC scenario and would run high risk of failure even in single-MRC scenarios.”
Senate Armed Services Committee, June 10, 1994, final report on the Defense Department authorization for Fiscal 1995.
“I certainly would never consider trading off the F-22 for more B-2s.”
Sheila E. Widnall, Air Force Secretary, as quoted in a June 27, 1994, Aerospace Daily interview during which she said unplanned buys of B-2 bombers would force major force-structure changes elsewhere.
The Fear That Wouldn’t Die
“The Administration has decimated the missile defense budget. . . . When it comes to killing [US] missile defenses, an Administration given to drift and vacillation has found an uncharacteristic sense of purpose. The extraordinary thing about the opposition to an American strategic defense is its resilience. The now-obsolete . . . concern that development of an American missile defense would deepen a US-Soviet arms race has managed to survive the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union with no loss of fervor.”
Richard N. Perle, in a June 17, 1994, statement. Perle was an assistant secretary of Defense during the Reagan Administration.
And That Was in 1990
“The KGB has received information from reliable sources saying that [North Korea] has been actively continuing its research and design work aimed at creating nuclear weapons. According to available data, the development of the first nuclear explosive device had been completed at the nuclear research center in the town of Yongbyon.”
Vladimir Kryuchkov, former KGB chief, in Document 363-K, a top-secret February 22, 1990, intelligence memo to senior Kremlin leaders, as reported in Izvestia, June 24, 1994.
“Isn’t it absurd . . . that the world’s best military alliance has to be subjected to the judgment of a civilian bureaucrat from Japan who happens to be a civil servant of the UN? . . . This is a wholly absurd arrangement, and it turns people off. It turns me off.”
Rep. Tom Lantos (D-Calif.), chairman of the House International Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights Subcommittee, on May 17, 1994, commenting on the authority of Yasushi Akashi, a UN functionary in Bosnia-Hercegovina, to direct NATO forces.
Why C-17’s the One
“All parties agree that there is an urgent military requirement for a military airlifter that delivers outsize cargo with significant throughput to austere fields. . . . That view has been confirmed by every militarily competent review of this problem. . . . The reason the C-17 requirement has been confirmed is that a combination of commercial wide-body jets and C-130s cannot do the job. Why? Because of . . . the need to deliver outsize cargo and the need to have high throughput on austere fields.”
John M. Deutch, deputy secretary of Defense, in May 17, 1994, testimony to the House Armed Services Committee.
Life at Sea, 1994
“Please don’t worry [about] what you might inadvertently grasp. I’d rather be groped than end up in sick bay.”
Lt. Cmdr. Jan Hamby, an officer on the carrier USS Eisenhower, as quoted in the June 27, 1994, Washington Post. The commander addressed a male lieutenant who, worried that he might commit a sexual offense, had stopped himself from catching her as she tripped on one of the ship’s ladders.
Yes, It Does
“It seems strange to me that I’m welcoming you here to this building today.”
Gen. Pavel S. Grachev, Russian Minister of Defense, in a May 25, 1994, greeting to Defense Secretary William J. Perry upon the latter’s arrival at NATO headquarters in Brussels. Grachev was representing Russia at a NATO conference.
Voodoo Foreign Policy
“I had some reservations about whether I was willing to say this on television, but I guess I’ll say it. My recommendation for what to do about Korea is to invade Haiti. We’ll win in Haiti. The Koreans might think that we’re tough, and Bill Clinton needs to look tough.”
Nina Totenberg, television reporter and pundit, in a June 12, 1994, broadcast of “Inside Washington,” a weekly television show originating in Washington, D.C.